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ABSTRACT 
Accidents involving vessels carrying oil or other hazardous and noxious 
substances have been in many cases the cause of spillage with devastating 
consequences onthe local economic and the environment. This was highlighted by 
the Torrey Canyon incident, in March 1967, which proved that there is inadequate 
legal means, at international level, to cope with the problems in the recovery of the 
considerable expenditure involved in taking preventive measures, cleaning up and 
damage to the third parties and the environment. This thesis is an attempt to 
explore, analyse and develop a legal framework aimed at compensating and 
insuring against pollution liability at sea. The international response in providing 
liability and compensation and the role of insurance in solving these problems has 
been carefully considered throughout this thesis. 
This thesis is divided in 5 parts beginning with an introduction and ending 
with a conclusion and bibliography. Part one, which comprises six chapters, seeks 
to overview the range of legal cases whereby liability for compensation and 
insurance of pollution damage may be established. The role of Tort or Delict, 
principally Negligence, Trespass and Nuisance, in establishing liability forms 
section one of this part. Chapter two outlines the role of two voluntary agreements, 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, in settling the question of the liability and financial cover 
of the costs of oil spillage by tankers. A descriptive and analytical approach, 
regarding the compensation and insurance, is linked to the discussion of 
mandatory conventional liability for oil and other noxious substances. This is 
considered in chapter three, chapter four and chapter five, under the MARPOL 
73178, CLC, FC and HNS in full. Chapter six considers the place of liability cover 
in the marine insurance market and seeks to find a place for pollution liability 
cover. 
Basic insurance schemes and statements of liability cover in the 
international insurance market are considered in part two of the thesis. Chapter 
one of this part examines the place of pollution liability cover in general ships 
policies. This part is followed, in chapter two, by a discussion of pollution liability 
cover under the Comprehensive General, Public, Liability policy, in order to 
determine whether such a policy covers or excludes pollution liability at sea. The 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs have effectively responded to the liability arising 
out of oil pollution and other hazardous substances. Therefore, it rightly deserves 
to occupy more pages of this part in chapter three. 
The identification of a suitable party against whom legal action for pollution 
damage can be brought is an important matter which needs to be discussed in 
detail in the light of the different potential individuals, polluter, state or community, 
ship owner, charterer, shippers, users. This is dealt within Part three, which 
includes three chapters, under the headings of philosophies inherent in pollution 
liability pays. 
, 
Ship owners liability has, for a long time in maritime history, been subject 
to the right of limitation, due to the huge potential amount involved in maritime 
accidents. Thus, sufficient recovery of pollution damage depends on the careful 
consideration of a ship owner's right to limit and his ability to pay and insure 
against it. This is why Part four looks at the extent of liability and quantum of 
cover in its two chapters. 
Full cover for pollution liability by insurance will only be efficacious if it aims 
to deter dangerous or negligent conduct and to encourage preventive action by 
industry involved in pollution activity. Part five, in Three chapters, considers the 
effectiveness of insurance so as to not only protect the polluter, but also provide a 
reasonable vehicle for protection of the environment. To achieve this goal, it 
vi 
concludes that a balance should be made between the protection of the insured 
and the environment. 
vii 
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Introduction 
An accident involving an oil tanker may result in millions of gallons of oil 
spilling into the water and catastrophic damage to the environment, coastal 
property, the fishing industry, tourism and other commercial interests. This may 
also happen when a vessel is carrying other chemical pollutants. There is little 
doubt that those who have suffered the damage and loss should be 
compensated, but the problems arise when deciding on how liability arises, who 
is liable and to whom and what losses the law should compensate. These 
issues are complicated by the fact that the rules relating to compensation may 
vary according to the nationality of the offending ship despite the fact that 
justice and equity demand that pollution victims should be compensated for 
their losses no matter where these losses arise. 
The Torrey Canyon incident in March 1967 highlighted the fact that 
inadequate provisions existed at international level to enable Governments and 
others affected by marine pollution damage to recover the considerable 
expenditure involved in taking preventive and cleaning up measure quite apart 
from the question of damage to third parties. Before this incident, if oil from 
ships polluted the shore of one or more states, the question of whether an 
individual or Governmental authority could sue for damage and loss resulting 
from pollution was lega"y governed by the internal law of each state. This 
presented severe problems in many states. In Common law countries, liability is 
based on negligence and the plaintiff has to prove fault. Further, jurisdiction 
against a foreign defendant could only be established if the wrong was held to 
have occurred in the territory sea or internal waters of the state, rather than on 
the high seas. There was also no legal obligation to insure against pollution 
liabilities. 
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The Torrey Canyon disaster forced the international community to 
reconsider the problem of marine pollution, and in particular oil pollution, 
caused by ships. Several international agreements and conventions were 
formed. First, in January 1969, the major tanker owners of the world agreed to 
a voluntary scheme on liability, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement 
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution(hereinafter TOVALOP). Secondly in 
November that year, a formal International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, hereinafter CLC, was opened for signature at Brussels. 
Thirdly, in January 1971, TOVALOP was supplemented by a Contract 
Regarding an Interim Supplement of Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution 
(hereinafter CRISTAL). Fourthly In 1971, the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, (hereinafter FC), was promulgated as supplemental to the 1969 CLC. 
These four documents, which have been revised several times, can be seen as 
successive steps on two parallel paths, the voluntary path and path of public 
international law, to settle the question of liability and financial cover to the 
costs of oil spillage. However the terms and application of the four elements are 
not exactly similar. 
World-wide concern with the risks which necessarily arise with the 
increased frequency in the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by 
sea has led to the formulation and adoption of international technical standards 
to promote maritime safety and enforcement of measures. These goals have 
been well set out in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships 1973 and its Protocol of 1978, (referred to MARPOL 73178), as a 
response to the threat of contamination of the marine environment. Although 
MARPOL is not an international convention on civil liability for oil pollution 
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In addition, growing environmental awareness of the public at large, 
especially in the industrialised countries of the world, has given rise to the 
consideration of issues of liability and compensation in respect of damage 
caused by hazardous and noxious substances other than oil, when carried by 
sea. The International Maritime Organisation, IMO, has responded to the public 
concern by proposing a Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in 
connection with the Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous Substances by Sea-
(Draft HNS Convention). The analysis of the background of the Draft HNS 
Convention will have a great effect on the development of this instrument. 
The first condition for the recovery of pollution damage is to establish 
appropriate liability against those who have been involved in activities at sea 
which cause pollution. Liability for damage can be established in a number of 
ways. Firstly, liability can be based on fault, (i.e. a party may be liable only 
when the claimant can prove that the accident resulted from negligence); 
secondly, it can be founded on fault with a reverse burden of proof on the party 
from whom compensation is being claimed; thirdly, it may be founded on strict 
liability, with some exceptions, under which responsibility is imposed upon the 
party causing the damage whether or not he was at fault; and finally, liability 
can be absolute so that the party causing damage is liable regardless of the 
circumstances. In this part of the thesis, the kinds and extent of damage and 
loss for which the liability can be claimed will be discussed. 
The potential amount of money involved in a claim for pollution damage, in 
terms of clean up costs and other damages, has risen in the light of the 
increase in the size of tankers and the amount in volume and the type of 
substances carried. Possible losses from a supertanker break- up may run into 
the hundreds of millions of pounds. Most shipping corporations are likely to be 
financially unable to meet the high costs of cleaning up and compensating 
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the hundreds of millions of pounds. Most shipping corporations are likely to be 
financially unable to meet the high costs of cleaning up and compensating 
injured parties. In consequence, there is a growing trend at international level 
towards requiring shipping industries to carry a financial certificate which 
guarantees such payment. There are different possible ways in which a 
compensation system can financially operate. Among them a system which is 
based on insurance is the most common method. 
While there is little incentive in the insurance market to cover pollution liability 
at sea, most world ocean going vessels are insured against liability, incurred in 
their operation, with a group of ship owners which provides protection and 
indemnity. These are known a P&I Clubs. The members of such clubs mutually 
insure each other against pollution liabilities. The amount of cover may differ 
from case to case with regard to the nature of the liability. However it is 
important to bear in mind that there are uninsurable areas of risk where the 
parties cannot avail themselves of insurance protection. It should also be 
realised that the sums insured are subject to certain limitations applied by the 
underwriters. 
Before a claim for pollution damage can be made the appropriate party 
against whom legal action can be brought must be identified. A ship may be 
owned by a corporation, but it may have been chartered at the time of the 
incident. Discharge of pollutants into the water of one state may harm the 
coastal interest of a nearby state. It may also damage the property and 
interests of private individuals and impose a financial burden on the citizens at 
large for the expenses incurred by government in taking measures to prevent 
or remedy pollution damage and as a result of damage which results from such 
corrective measures. The second coastal state may seek to obtain 
compensation for all these damages from the state in whose jurisdiction the 
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with an interest in the cargo must share the burden of the damages. All these 
arguments may lead to the conclusion that the community which benefits from 
carriage of such substances must take on its shoulder all such damages and 
costs. 
Even when contact is made with a financially sound owner, full recovery of 
damages will depend on the whether the ship owner can limit his liability or not. 
The practical effect of limitation is that any damage caused by the operation in 
excess of the fixed limit has to be borne by the victim. It is therefore necessary 
to consider carefully the use of the right to limit liability. Given the limited 
knowledge of the possible consequences of major pollution, the fixing of a 
definite maximum limit of liability seems to be a difficult task. 
Full liability insurance and compensation for all pollution damage is 
worthwhile only if it aims to deter unnecessarily dangerous or negligent conduct 
and encourages a socially optimum level of precautions in the industry at the 
same time. So long as the cost of negligent or intentional discharge or the 
inherent risk of shipping oil and other noxious substances by sea can be shifted 
to third parties such as the insurance industry or a special fund, oil or noxious 
substances production or shipping industries may have insufficient incentive to 
improve technology and personal performance to minimise pollution. There is 
therefore a double edge to full insurance cover and a balance to be struck 
between compensation and deterrence. 
Tremendous efforts, not necessarily based on systematic analysis, have, 
in recent years, been made so far to solve legal problems concerning 
compensation and insurance in respect of pollution damage at sea. Although 
fairly successful results have been obtained there are still legal problems which 
necessitate further consideration and careful development of existing regimes, 
at national and international levels. These problems have been highlighted the 
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necessitate further consideration and careful development of existing regimes, 
at national and international levels. These problems have been highlighted the 
Exxon Valdez and Braer incidents and are brought into sharper focus each time 
there is an accident with catastrophic damage. In relation to the overall theme 
of compensation and insurance this thesis has the following objectives: 
1. To consider the problems which are involved in different compensation and 
insurance regimes dealing with civil liability for pollution damage at sea; 
2. To evaluate and develop the law relating to them, in order to a make a 
contribution to the remedy of the problems; 
3. To suggest, where appropriate, the best direction in which further 
development should take place. 
PART 1. OVERVIEW OF LIABILITY 
Different legal mechanisms have provided liability for pollution 
damage. Liability could arise under common law which is applied to the 
issue of civil liability for pollution damage where the civil liability 
convention has not been adopted or does not apply and no special 
statute has been introduced. Even where the liability convention applies 
to claims, some of its principles, e.g. causation, remoteness, still need to 
be considered under the common law. International law has also tried to 
provide liability, through national law, in connection with duties to enforce 
pollution standards laid down in specific conventions. Voluntary private 
legal schemes have addressed the question of pollution liability in order 
to provide a prompt and sufficient compensation regime. International 
convention has established civil liability for those who are involved in 
pollution incidents as well. It is, in this part of the thesis, also worth 
discussing the place of liability for pollution resulting from substances 
other than oil and the role of the insurance market in establishment of 
the principle of liability for pollution hazards. The importance of all these 
considerations will be realised when attempts are made to provide 
proper insurance mechanism for the cover of pollution liability at sea. 
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Chapter 1. The role of common law in establishing liability 
for pollution damage. 
1.1. Introduction 
There are some precedents which clarify the liability for damage 
and cleaning up resulting from pollution. These precedents do not arise 
from maritime law but from common law and deal not only with oil 
spillage but also with other problems. The rules of tortious liability, as a 
legal means to achieve justice between individuals where one has 
harmed another, were applied to deal with hazards involved in this field. 
Tort law was aimed at furthering the mixed private and public goals 
of compensation, deterrence, and retribution. 1 Before insurance became 
widely available in relation to pollution, tort compensation was a way to 
reimburse an innocent victim for his injuries by imposing liability for such 
injuries. 
1.2. Principle of negligence and pollution liability 
1.2.1. Action is based on negligence 
In the common law the conventional element of tort (delict) liability 
was based on negligence,2 so that the action for negligence constitutes 
the majority of common law claims. In each negligence case the court 
must first decide whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiff or not. Such a duty has been defined as the conduct of a person 
1 See Cane, P., Atiyah'sAccident, Compensation, and the Law, 4th ed., Wiedenfled and Nicolson, 
London, Chapter 24, 1987, pp. 489-524. 
2 Negligence as an independent tort has been arOlmd much longer than that of Donoghue ( or 
McAlister) v. Stevenson [1932] AC. 562, in which it was held that, by Scots law and English law 
alike, the manufacturer of an article of food, medicine or the like, sold by him to a distributor, in a 
circumstances which prevent a distributor or the ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering 
by inspection of any defect, is under a legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take 
reasonable care that the article is free from defect likely to cause injury to health. 
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who fails to avert the risk of harm as a reasonable man would have 
done. 3 The reasonableness of care depends on the circumstances of 
each particular case. The recent attitude of the courts is to be cautious 
as to extending the situations in which a duty of care applies. 4 
By itself, a breach of duty resulting in harm does not necessarily 
have any legal effect.s The plaintiff must also establish that the 
defendant has been in breach of a specific binding legal duty to take 
care. 6 This duty is based on the neighbour principle, with some 
qualification, as the source of modern negligence. This principle was 
outlined in the judgement of Lord Atkin in_Donoghue v. Stevenson,? in 
which he said: 
"the rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must 
not injure your neighbour; ... you must take reasonable care to avoid acts 
or am iss ions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure 
your neighbour." 
The question which may arise here is whether this concept can be 
applied in determining the duty of care in all activities, e.g. pollution 
accidents, or not? There is no reason to prevent the applicability of the 
principle in all cases where there is no justification or valid explanation 
for its exclusion.8 
3 White, Carelessness, Indifference, and Recklessness, [1961] 24 M.L.R. pp.592-3. 
4 In Scotland see, e.g. Landcatch Ltd. v. Gilbert Gilkes, 1990, S.L.T. 688., in which no duty of 
care was found to exist in respect of loss of profit following the death of young salmon brought 
about by a failure in a system to pump salt water through their tank. In England, e.g. see, Mmphy. 
v. Brentwood District Council, [1991] 1 AC. 398, in which the Court of Appeal extended duty of 
care only to latent defect. 
s Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners [1964] AC. 465. 
6 Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings [1977] AC. 890. 
7 [1932] A.C. 562 at p. 580 
8 See Lord Reid in Home Office. v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC. 1004. at p. 1027. 
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The application of the principle was limited by the decision of Lord 
Wilberforce, in Anns and Others. v. Merton London borough 
Council/ who said: 
"the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty 
of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the 
facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty 
of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be 
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the 
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a 
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the 
reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may 
be likely to cause damage to the latter- in which case a prima facia duty 
of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it 
is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which 
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class 
of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may 
give rise". 
The proxim ity or neighbourhood test lost its "definitive character" 
when the House of Lords, in Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon 
Shipping Co. Ltd.,10 upheld a long established principle whereby a 
person could only claim in respect of loss caused to him by reason of 
loss or damage to property if he had either the legal ownership or 
possessory title to the property concerned at time when the loss or 
damage first occurred. In the other words, the duty of care extends to 
those plaintiffs who have legal or possessory interest at the time of the 
incident. 11 
The standard of care for the navigation of a ship varies according to 
the rules, international and local, or principles of seamanlike prudence 
which accord with common sense and which is reflected in many 
9 [1978] A.C. 728 atpp. 751-752. 
10 [1986] A.C. 785. 
11 See also Transcontainer Express Ltd. v. Custodian Security Ltd [1988] I Lloyd's Rep. 128., in 
which it was held that Custodian, defendant, has a duty of care to Transcontainer, plaintiff, on the 
ground that such duty extended only to those with a possessory interest at the time of Custodian 
default and Transcontainer had not such interest, thus its claim failed. 
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regulations. 12 The existence of the rules will afford the best reason for 
holding the ship violating it to be guilty of a breach of duty and 
consequently to blame for the incident. Thus the ship owner will be liable 
for damage caused by the discharge of a substances from a ship, 
following an accident, if he, or those for whose action he is liable, have 
not taken into consideration all rules and prudent measures which are 
necessary for management, navigation of the ship and transportation of 
the particular shipment. 
Furthermore, if no harm stems from an individual's breach of a duty, 
there can be no basis for liability. It is also necessary for there to be a 
reasonably proximate causal link, known as the proximate cause, 
between the breach of the duty and the harm. In addition, causal chains 
cannot include, as the proximate cause of the harm, an act or omission 
which is too remote from the injury.13 Thus if, as a result of the negligent 
navigation or management of a ship, pollution occurs causing damage to 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be able to obtain compensation from the 
owner of the vessel if the negligent act resulting in pollution was the 
proximate cause of the loss or damage. 
The application of the tort of negligence in pollution litigation may be 
limited. This is mainly because negligence requires proof of the 
defendant's fault.14 This imposes great burdens on the claimant who 
12 The Roseline [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 410. 
13 Lord Atkin, Donoughue. v. Stevenson [1932] A.c. 562 at p. 580. He said, "acts or omissions 
which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to 
every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range 
of complainants and the extent of their remedy". 
14 An example of difficulties inherent in proving negligence can be see in Pearson v. North 
Western Gas Board [1968] 2 All E. R. 669. 
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must prove the existence of a legal or proximate cause of his damage 
and establish failure aboard the vessel to take care. Within the sphere 
of marine pollution liability, defeating a defence of compliance with good 
professional practice will be very difficult, because of lack of 
technological know-how and other necessary information about the 
accident. Proof may also create enormous difficulty for an owner whose 
actual damage is pure economic loss. There is also some weakness in 
the tort of negligence, which may cast doubt over its useful application in 
establishing pollution liability at sea. There is a deep seated idea that 
one of the main objectives of the law of tort, as a system of establishing 
liability, is deterrence, the prevention of the harmful conduct, by 
imposing compensation on those who are liable for the creation of 
damage. It is, however, doubtful whether there is any deterrent force in 
the tort of negligence. A generalised instruction to people to take care is 
of little practical use in controlling their behaviour in a given situation. 15 
The force of this criticism probably varies from one type of accident to 
another. It is particularly strong in the case of pollution accident at sea, 
where activity is such that the lack of sufficient attention could lead to 
catastrophic results. 
Negligence as a basis of liability has also been criticised for the 
expensive cost of administration,16 and problems of long delay from the 
date of claim to the date of its disposal. 17 Unpredictability of the result of 
15 Per Lord Radcliffe, Brown v. National Coal Board [1962] AC. 574 at pp. 594-599. 
16 Royal Commission on Civil Liability for Personal Injury, Person Report, 1978, vol. 2, Table 
116~ The Civil Justice Review (1988) Cmnd. 394. estimated that in actions for proceeding to trial 
in the High Court costs amounted to 50 and 70 percent of damage. This amount probably rise in 
cases pollution litigation in which there is enormous difficulty in proving of negligence. 
17 Id. The Civil Justice Review. 
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the cases may put plaintiffs under pressure to settle their claims for 
amounts less than they would if their claims went successfully to trial. 18 
All these criticisms may be a good justification for extension of strict 
liability, i.e. liability imposed without proof of fault, in particular pollution 
cases which involve huge problem of proof of negligence. 
1.2.2. Negligence as a basis for insurance cover. 
The general principle in insurance law is that risks insured against 
include, unless there is express provision in the policy to exclude, those 
caused by negligence,19 whether the negligence is of the assured 
himself or third parties for whom assured are responsible for their 
action.2D Section 55(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides, "The 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of 
the assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provided, he is liable for 
any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, even though the 
loss would not have happened but for the misconduct or negligence of 
the master or crew." 
What is clear from this Section is that the Act has made a distinction 
between the wilful misconduct on the part of the assured or his agents 
and loss which is the result of negligence and covered by insurance. It 
says that if the loss is proximately caused by an insured peril, negligence 
as a contributory cause is to be ignored. For example, a vessel may 
18 Royal Commission on Civil Liability for Personal Injury, Person Report, 1978, vo1. 2, Table 
104. 
19 Austin v. Drew (1815) 4 Camp. 360 at p. 362. 
2D Lord M'Laren, Clidero and Anotherv. Scotish Accident Insurance, 1892,29 S.C. L. R. 303 at p. 
308. 
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strand due to negligent navigation but the loss would be treated as 
stranding damage not as a negligence. This is supported by the finding 
in the case of, Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Hamilton Fraser and CO.,21 in which it was held that the proximate 
cause of the loss was the negligence by the member of the crew and 
that negligence is not a peril at sea. Since negligence is not a peril of the 
sea, it had to be specifically stated as a peril in the policy, for loss 
proximately caused by negligence to be covered. Thus, if an oil tanker is 
insured against damage or loss resulting from peril insured, the insurer 
would be liable, regardless of negligence, provided that the pollution 
damage was caused proximately by insured peril. 
There is, with regard to what has been said, an overlap between the 
tort of negligence and insurance law. First, the victim of accidental injury 
or damage is entitled to be redressed through the negligence if, and only 
if, his loss has occurred as a result of the negligence of the defendant or 
those for whose negligence the defendant must answer; in contrast, 
insurance cover is available without regard to the fault of negligence of 
the assured or his agents or servants, provided the loss was caused 
proximately by a peril insured against and was not caused by the wilful 
misconduct. Secondly, the indemnity, under tort law, due from the 
defendant whose liability is established is full, is equivalent as to the 
plaintiffs' loss; whereas, in a contract of marine insurance the liability of 
the insurer is to the extent thereby agreed 22 not a full indemnity.23 This 
21 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 484. This was the famous Inchmaree case which led to introduction of the 
Inchamree clause in the standard hull policy, which extended hull policy to cover loss proximately 
caused by negligence. 
22 S. 1. MIA 1906. 
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can be well justified when it is realised that there is lim ited insurance 
cover for oil pollution liability under P & I Clubs. 
It may be said that there are cases in which the negligence of the 
assured may have a determining role in insurer's liability. A condition or 
implied warranty, e.g. seaworthiness of the ship during the particular 
voyage, in the policy may require the insured to take reasonable care to 
avoid loss. It seems such a clause would negate a large part of the cover 
intended to be effected by insurance, since one of the major purposes of 
a liability policy is to insure the insured against negligence, and 
negligence is failure to take reasonable care when a duty of care is 
owed. To give more effect to such a policy, the courts have narrowly 
construed the condition so that only negligence on the part of the 
insured will amount to a breach of the condition and have not extended 
the condition of the duty of care to the assured's agent or servants. Thus 
where the assured chose trustworthy skilled foreman, his foreman's 
negligence was held to be no defence to the insurer.24 
The assured's reasonable care was limited with having regard to the 
commercial purposes of a contract of insurance which includes 
indemnity against insured's own negligence.25 To achieve this purpose, 
the condition of the duty of care has been construed in a way to ensure 
that where the insured recognises a danger he should not deliberately 
take the measures which he himself knows are inadequate to avert it. In 
other words, to satisfy the condition it is not enough to say that the 
23 See, Ivamy, ER Hardy, Chalmers' Marine Insurance Act 1906, 9th ed., pp. 2, no. 
24 Woolf all and Rimmer Ltd. v. Moyle and Another [1942] 1 K.B. 66. 
25 Fraserv. B.N. Furman (Production) Ltd, Miller Smith & Partners (A finn) Third Party [1967] 1 
W.L.R 898. 
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insured's omission or act II to take any particular precautions to avoid 
accidents should be negligent; it must be at least reckless, that is to say, 
made with actual recognition by the insured himself that a danger exists, 
and not caring whether or not it is averted. 1126 
1.2.3. Foreseeability of plaintiff as a condition for liability 
One of the most important elements in the attribution of legal liability 
to the tortfeasor, in case of fault, is the causal relationship between the 
1 
defendant s conduct or breach of duty and the plaintiffs. Bankes L.J. in 
Re Polemis, 27 said, "what a defendant ought to have anticipated as a 
reasonable man is material when the question is whether or not he was 
guilty of negligence." However, while ordinary people may consider that 
no limit can be set on the consequences of an act, the law seeks to 
impose limits on consequences. In Re Polemis it was decided that the 
defendant was responsible for all consequences of his negligent act 
which were the direct result of the act, whether reasonably foreseeable 
or not. Thus, the consequences to which liability may be attached, i.e. for 
which the actor may be held accountable or responsible, are those which 
are in direct result of the breach of the duty of care, in the light of 
knowledge and experience to be attributed to the reasonable man in the 
circumstances.28 
26 Id. Per Diplock L.J. at p. 906. 
27 In re An Arbitration between Polemis and Another. v. Furness, Withy and Company Ltd [1921] 
3 KB. 560 at p. 571. 
28 It means keeping all the standard which is related to duty which is to be performed without . 
regard to people, subjects doing it. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, supra. No.9. 
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It does not seem consonant with the idea of justice or morality that 
for an act of negligence, the actor should be liable for all consequences 
however unforeseeable and however grave, so long as they can be said 
to be direct. It is a principle of civil liability that a man must be considered 
to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand 
more of him is too harsh a rule; to demand less is to ignore the principle 
that civilised order requires the observance of a minimum standard of 
behaviour. 29 For this reason, if it is asked why a man should be 
responsible for the natural or necessary or probable consequences of 
his act, the answer is not because they are natural, or necessary or 
probable, but because they have the quality which is judged to be 
reasonably foreseen. 
The direct test lost its credibility when the question was considered 
in the First Wagon Mound (No. 1),30 in which the House of Lords, 
without distinction between the criterion for determining liability and 
compensation,31 decided that the essential factor in determining liability 
for the consequences of a tortious act of negligence is whether the 
damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen. 
Liability does not depend solely on the damage being "direct" or "natural" 
consequences of the precedent act, because the direct consequence 
test leads to nowhere but never-ending and insoluble problems of 
causation.32 It was concluded that the foreseeable damage from spilling 
29 Viscount Simonds, Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd., the 
Wagon Mound (No.1) [1961] AC. 388 
30 Id. 
31 It was decided that there can be no liability until the damage has been occurred. See id, pp. 424-
425. 
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a quantity of oil into waters of harbour was pollution and, therefore, 
appellants who could not reasonably be expected to have known that the 
oil would catch fire, were not liable for the damage.33 
The distinction between the test of foreseeability in relation to duty 
of care and remoteness of damage may be well justified, when it is 
realised that both have different aims. In relation to the duty of care the 
foreseeable test is used to determine whether the defendant was 
careless towards the plaintiff or not. In a fault based system the natural 
tendency is not to condemn a defendant unless he acted negligently, 
and thus the function of the duty concept is to protect the defendant by 
posting a necessary relationship, through the foreseeability test, 
between the parties so as to avoid liability to persons beyond the range 
of those whom a reasonable man believes are entitled to protection from 
the careless acts of the defendant. On the other hand, in relation to 
remoteness of damage the foreseeability test is applied to determine the 
extent of liability to a person with whom the necessary link has already 
been established, and hence the tendency is to say that once the 
defendant has been shown to have acted carelessly towards the plaintiff, 
the law should not be too sever on excluding loss which in fact been 
caused by that carelessness. Accordingly, it is suggested that the 
concept of duty of care and remoteness should be kept distinct, in 
application of the foreseeability test, in order to prevent confusion and 
wrong results. 
It is also subject to criticism to apply the same test of foreseeability 
for both duty of care and remoteness, since the two concepts fulfil 
32 Id. pp. 423-426. 
33 Id.389. 
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different roles in insurance. For example, one function of duty is to 
determine which of two parties, involved in case, should insure against 
the potential loss, and the question becomes who is in the better position 
to bear the costs of insurance, whereas, in remoteness the question is 
how much insurance cover a potential defendant should obtain. Hence, 
extension of the foreseeability test in duty to remoteness may include 
some unlikely loss in an insurance policy. It would be, however, wrong to 
include losses in the policy if no duty has been established in relation to 
that category of loss. 
The foreseeability test, was also considered in the Southport 
Corporation case, without distinction between liability and 
recoverability, in which it was argued34 that: "if it was careless on the part 
of the Inverpool to enter the estuary of the Ribble, it was not a 
foreseeable consequence of that carelessness that she might strand and 
have to discharge oil which would be carried by the wind and tide to the 
Southport foreshore." This was rejected by Lord Denning who said: "the 
master of every coastal tanker must be aware that if he is in an estuary 
and he gets himself in to a position where he has to jettison oil, it is very 
likely to reach some part of coast". For recognising likely hazards, it is 
not necessary that the chance that the damage will result should be 
greater than the chances that no damage will occur. But a real damage 
should be reasonably foreseeable. 35 
34 By Privy COlmcil, R.I. Nelson Q.C., see Esso Petroleum. v. Southport Corporation [1956] AC. 
218 at p. 224. 
35 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship. Co. Pty. Ltd and Another, The Wagon 
Mound (No.2) [1967] 1 AC. 617. 
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Scots Law has drawn a distinction between liability and damage in a 
application of the foreseeability test. The question was raised in 
McKillen v. Barclay Curle & Company Limited.,36 in which it was held 
that the doctrine of reasonable foreseeability had no relevance to the 
measure of damage once liability had been established since the party 
guilty of negligence must take his victim as he finds him.37 The distinction 
test was recently re-exam ined in Gilchrist v. D.B.Marshall (NewbridgeJ 
Ltd.,38 in which it was held that, once any physical injury was 
foreseeable, the particular injury suffered by an injured pursuer was 
foreseeable in law. Thus, in Scotland, once a man is negligent in a 
pollution accident and injures others by his negligence, he is liable for 
the damages to the injured man which naturally and directly arise from 
negligence, whether the reasonable man would have foreseen the 
damage or not. It does not matter whether pollution victims are close to 
the place of the accident or far from it. 
It cannot be disputed that foreseeability has a particular relevance 
to cases arising from pollution, since pollution damage is too wide to 
categorise. Therefore, it must be asked: is it foreseeable, e.g. that an 
error in navigation, committed by the captain of a tanker on the high sea, 
will cause damage to the holiday industry in one or several countries 
some distance away ? VVhat remains of the rights of redress of those 
who suffer in this way? 
36 1967 S.L.T. 4l. 
37 The principle of Scots Law was laid down as long as 1864. See Lord Kinloch in Allan v. 
Barelay (1864) 2 M. 873, atp. 874; see also Bourhill v. Young's Executor, 1943, S.L.T. 105. 
38 1991, Greens Weekly Digest, 1-48. 
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There is no doubt that a duty of care is owed to those pollution 
victims who are close to the physical impact of the negligent act. Thus, 
there is no duty of care problem in oil pollution cases which involve 
physical damage to property, such as the foreshore, harbour 
installations, vessel, fishing gear. The law, however, is not clear as to the 
extension of duty of care to those outside the area of likely physical 
impact. The House of Lords in Bourhill v. Young's Executor,39 decided 
that a bystander in no physical danger from a street accident is not 
entitled to recover for nervous shock. This decision has been 
substantially changed in McLoughlin v. O'Brian and Others,4O in which 
the mother of a family who suffered nervous shock as a result of 
witnessing the injuries to other member of her family caused by a road 
accident in which she was not involved, did recover damages. This 
decision indicates the extension of the duty of care to those who suffer 
pure econom ic loss, as a result of pollution incident, needs further 
consideration. 
1.2.4. Restrictions for recovery of pure economic loss 
Whilst consequential economic loss, arising from pollution damage 
to the property! is recoverable, it would be extremely difficult to recover 
anything for pure economic loss which resulted from negligence, even 
where the injury was clearly foreseeable and no causation problems 
39 1943, S.L.T. 105. 
40 [1983] AC. 410. 
41 Such a claim is not recoverable if damage happens to property which does not belong to 
claimant, see the Margarine Union v. Cambay Prince Steamship Co. Ltd, [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
315. 
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were present,42 and apparently most other heads of tortious liability 
(except in certain well established circumstances43 ). This may well be 
justified because the imposition of a duty of care to avoid pure economic 
loss may lead to creation of recoverability, "in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."44 
Liability for pure economic loss45 is not as clearly established as that 
for economic loss which follows from physical damage.46 Pure economic 
loss may be rejected as being too remote, since it is not the kind of harm 
which is foreseeable. The point was clearly illustrated by Spartan Steel 
& Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & CO.(Contractors} Ltd. ,47 in which the 
defendant negligently cut off the plaintiff's power supply and damaged 
metal being processed. The plaintiff recovered the depreciation in value 
of the metal, but was denied the loss of profIt which he would have had 
from further operation during the power cut. He was denied recovery 
because the loss of profit was not a consequence of any damage to their 
property, but simply interruption of the electricity supply. However, there 
are cases in which foreseeable. economic loss is recoverable without 
42 Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 Q.B. 569. 
43 Clerk & Lindsel on Torts, 16 ed., pp. 10-16. See also Mmphy v. Brentwood District Council. 
[1991] 1 A.C. 388. 
44 This is known as "floodgate argument", see Cardozo C.l in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 
255 N.Y. 170 at 179. (1931). 
45 For instance, loss of amenities (such as beaches, harbour which must be closed for cleaning, loss 
of profit by hoteliers, publican and in tourist industry) cost of preventive measures, the fisherman's 
lost profit. 
46 Such as: the fouling of nets and fishing gear generally, the contamination of pleasure yacht, 
lights, buoys, harbours, beaches, and coastline. Also included, in this head of damage, in the case 
of personal injury, e.g. an individual may get skin disease from contact with polluted water. 
47 [1973] Q.B. 27. 
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physical damage.48 In both cases there is no clear reason for 
acceptance or denial of pure economic loss. 
Thus, broadly speaking, there is no specific rule for denial of 
recovery of pure econom ic loss, without physical damage, in an action in 
negligence. It may, therefore, be said that although there is no sufficient 
proximity between pollution at sea and hotel keepers, loss of profits 
resulting from pollution of beach, and recovery of such a loss may not be 
denied since it may easily be shown to be a foreseeable consequence of 
negligent spill. 
Foreseeability as a condition for recovery of pure economic loss 
does not seem to be sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to recover loss. While 
the consequences of physical damage are normally limited, the effects of 
pure economic loss may be almost limitless. This may create fear of 
giving rise to indiscriminate liability, so insurance may be unobtainable at 
a reasonable rate. 
The costs of prevention or mitigation can be identified as one of the 
most important kinds of economic loss which may arise out of an oil 
spil1.49 Are these costs recoverable as damages? One argument might 
be that since pollution has never reached the shore, no actionable 
damage has been suffered.50 There is little difficulty in rejecting the 
48 See e.g. Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 AC. 520. 
49 Suppose that a ship has gone aground 30 miles from coast, oil is spilling from her tanks and 
carried by wind, tide and water currents towards the shore. The local authority succeeds in cleaning 
up all the shore before it reaches the shore. 
50 In Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd [1983] 1 AC. 520, a majority of the House of Lords 
extended the duty of care beyond the recognised situation of a duty to prevent harm being done by 
faulty work, to a duty to avoid such fault being presented. The result was that, they held that the 
loss incurred in preventing or mitigating to the health or safety of any person or damage to any of 
other property of the owner is not recoverable. 
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argument where circumstances show that the measures taken were 
reasonable to mitigate physical pollution dam age. 51 For example, where 
the defendant's negligence has caused the damage, the defendant 
cannot escape liability if the plaintiff tries to save himself by choosing a 
course of conduct to mitigate or prevent further damage or loss, 
provided that the method used was reasonable.52 
Like the tort system, insurance also provides compensation for 
economic loss, i.e. lost profit arising from the damage or destruction of 
profit-earning property. However, there a fundamental difference, 
between the tort system and insurance, in approach, with regard to 
consequential loss or pure economic loss which does not follow from 
physical damage to property. This kind of loss is regularly covered by 
special types of insurance policy which are available to cover a wide 
variety of risks which are probably not normally protected by the torts 
system. But there are limits to the cover which is usually available to 
provide for loss of profits. For example, insurers are not prepared to 
provide cover for lost profit suffered by hotel proprietor or those who 
supply to such a hotel which has been closed for polluted beaches as a 
result of oil spilling from a grounded tanker at sea in miles far away from 
the beaches. 53 
51 In order to decide what is reasonable, balance must be made between action taken with threat 
posed. See, Sayers. v. Harlow Urban District Council, [1958] 2 All E.R 342 
52 Hyert. v. Great Western Railway Co. [1947] 2 All E.R 264. This was confirmed in U.K. law in 
Section 15 (1) of the Merchant Shipping (Oil) Pollution Act 1971 
53 Cloughton, ed., Riley on Business Interuption and Consequential Loss Insurance and Claims, 6 
ed., 1985, para. 337. 
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1.2.5. Test of remoteness in pollution damage 
Before reaching the question of remoteness of damage it must be 
decided that the breach of duty was, as a matter of law, a cause of 
damage. In all the cases the causal connection between breach of duty 
and harm must be established. It is not sufficient to show that both 
occurred. 54 Suppose, where the ship has gone aground as a result of the 
negligent act and started spilling which caused damage to a property; 
there is a legal liability if the accident, spillage and damage is regarded 
as single and continuing event, i.e. existence of causal relationship. 
There is no such link if reasonable effort is used to stop any spilled oil 
reaching at a place where it causes damage. 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906, in section 55(2) provides that the 
insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured 
against. Thus it is not sufficient, in order to have an insurance cover for 
loss suffered by insured, only to show that the loss falls within the cover 
provided in the policy; the insured must also show that the loss was 
proximately caused by an insured peril. It is, therefore, essential to 
determine the proximate cause of a loss to ascertain whether damage is 
to be recoverable under the policy. 
More than one cause may, in most cases, contribute to the actual 
cause of pollution liability. For example, oil pollution may be as the result 
of oil spill or the failure to keep oil on board when a ship was aground or 
failure of some persons or authorities to conduct effective clean up 
operations. The question which arises here is, which of these factors is 
the effective cause of loss? Looking at the whole circumstances of a 
54 Roger, W.V.H, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 12 00., 1984. London, Sweet and Maxwell, pp. 
10-126. 
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group of acts or event from a common sense stand-point, which can 
fairly be said to have chiefly and mainly caused the harm? 
Although what is the proximate cause in any situation is a question 
of fact, there are different tests which help in defining the factual 
causation. The most generally accepted of them is the so called "but-for 
test", whereby if the damage would not have happened but for a 
particular fault, then that fault is the cause of the damage. In another 
words, if it would have happened just the same, fault or no fault, the fault 
is not the cause of damage.55 The applicability of the "but-for" test in 
every case relating to breach of duty is in doubt. The House of Lords in 
McGhee. v. National Coal Board. ,56 considered that the plaintiff may be 
successful if he shows that the breach of duty, cause of action, 
materially increases the risk of injury. The application of the test may 
even become different where there are two breaches of duty and either 
one of which alone would have been sufficient to cause the plaintiff's 
damage. 
Interruption or breach of the chain of the causation by some 
intervening cause,57 proximate cause in the sense of dominant or 
effective or real cause not necessarily the nearest cause in time of the 
actual 10ss,58 the last opportunity in avoiding the result, foreseeability of 
intervening actS9 have been proposed as examples of other tests of 
causation and remoteness of damage.60 
55 Barnett. v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] I Q.B. 428. 
56 [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1. 
57 TIlls is known as, Novus Actus lnterveniens, see The Oropesa [1943] 1 ALL E.R. 211. 
58 McWilliams. v. Sir William Arrol & Co. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 295. 
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Legal liability may arise independently of causation such as in the 
case of imputed negligence, e.g. vicarious liability. Professor Prosser 
has written: 
"A is negligent, B is not. Imputed negligence means that, by reason of 
some relation existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be 
charged against B although B has played no part in it, has done nothing 
whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly 
can prevent it". 61 
That is to say, certain classes of individuals are held responsible for 
conduct of others. For instance, employers are liable for the torts 
committed by an employee in the course of his employment. 
An individual may be also held responsible for the consequences 
of his act or omission when his conduct is not, properly speaking, the 
proximate cause. He may be held legally liable to compensate for 
injuries arising out of the consequences of the opportunities that his act 
or omission has created. 62 For example, the failure of a master to take 
account of navigational warnings. 
Even if the causation is established between the act and harm, no 
person is answerable indefinitely for every consequence that follows 
from his wrongful conduct. Damage may be rejected as being too 
remote from the initial wrong. The question of what extent of pollution 
damage may be compensated at common law depends on the 
application of the rule of remoteness of damage. The problem may be 
illustrated as follows: suppose the spill causes widespread pollution to 
five miles of holiday resort beaches in a small country heavily depend 
59 In re An Arbitration between Polemis ans Anither v. and Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. [1921] 3 
K.B. 560. 
60 Clerk & Lindsel on Torts, 14 ed., 1975, pp. 307-357. 
61 Prosser, The Law of Torts, 4 ed. 1971, atp. 485 
62 Home office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] 2 All E.R. 294. 
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on foreign tourism, at a period when foreign tourists are going on 
holiday. As a result very few tourist come that year. The sea front hotels 
lose business. So do those in the inland town fifteen miles away. So do 
the wholesalers supplying food to these hotels, local fisherman and the 
national air line. Which of these suffered and which is too remote? 
Direct consequences of careless conduct has been considered as 
a test for remoteness of damage. Therefore, if the breach of duty 
constitutes negligence, all damages directly resulting from the negligent 
act would be recoverable. This concept was raised, in Re Polemis,63 by 
Scrutton LJ who said that "once the act is negligent, the fact that its 
exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial". Thus, if it be 
determined that the act is negligent, then the question whether particular 
damage is recoverable depends only on the answer to the question 
whether it is a direct consequence of the act or not. It was viewed that 
the damage is indirect if it is "due to the operation of independent causes 
having no connection with the negligent act, except that they could not 
avoid its results.'164 
In the extreme case all pollution damage may be regarded as being 
indirectly caused. In pollution cases it should be pointed out that the 
relationship between the cause and damage itself is rarely a direct one, 
but takes place through the factors of environment, e.g. pollution at sea 
which is brought to the coast by wind or waves. 
63 In Re An AIbitration between Polemis and Another v. Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. [1921] 3 K.B. 
560 at p. 577. 
64 Scrutton L.J, Id. at p. 577. 
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1.2.6. The burden of proof: the maxim of res ipsa loquitur 
As a general rule, the burden of proof of negligence rests on the 
plaintiff.65 This rule is subject to an important qualification introduced by 
what is called the "res ipsa loquitur principle".66 It requires that the mere 
fact of the circumstances of accident, where it seems unlikely that the 
event could have occurred without negligence on the part of defendant 
or other persons for whom he was responsible, raises the inference of 
negligence so as to establish, in the absence of plausible explanation by 
the defendant, prima facie evidence against the defendant.67 For 
example, where a ship is involved in a collision and oil is discharged, it 
can be said, that the ship would not be involved in the collision if it was 
well navigated, well maintained and well run. In the absence of an 
explanation, such as the stress of very heavy weather, the prima facie 
case would seem to be made. 68 It is supposed that the application of this 
maxim brings a negligence case into the sphere of strict liability. 
The onus of disproving negligence lies on the defendant. He will be 
exonerated if he furnishes a reasonable explanation, which is consistent 
with due care on his part, that the event could have occurred without 
negligence.69 If he cannot do this, he will still escape liability if he proves 
there was no lack of care on his part or on the part of people for whom 
he is responsible.70 Lord Denning said that the defendant can only get 
65 Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] I All E.R 577. 
66 Scott v. London St Katherine's Dock Co. (1865) 2 H & C. 596. 
67 Winfield and Iolwics on Tort, supra. No. 54, p. 108. 
68 Id. at p.I12. 
69 Barkwayv. South Wales Transport Co. [1950] I AllER 392. 
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rid of proof of negligence against the plaintiff by showing inevitable 
accident.71 Therefore, the principle of res ipsa loquitur is, in this sense, 
similar to the strict liability under which liability is not avoidable by the 
defendant except in some particular circumstances, e.g. in inevitable or 
irresistible cases. 
1.3. The possibility of extension of the Trespass Principle to 
pollution damage. 
In a legal sense, trespass means any forcible injury whether to 
person, chattel, or land. The term forcible has been defined as any 
physical interference with the person or property. The requirement of 
forcible interference means that merely causing economic loss, as may 
happen by deceit, is not regarded as trespass. Trespass to land is 
constituted by unjustifiable direct interference, however slight, with 
possession of land, i.e. immediate and exclusive right to possess.72 
Thus, trespass may be an efficient means for recovery of compensation 
for owners suffering damage in beach fronts, oysterbids, fish farms if 
actual physical entry or invasion of pollution is proved. Thus, recovery 
may not be obtained if the owner cannot show actual invasion of their 
property. 
To constitute trespass, injury must be direct and not merely 
consequential to a discharge elsewhere.73 Direct means the acts which 
follow immediately upon the act of the defendant, so as to constitute part 
70 Sinclair Eugene Swan. v. Salisbury Construction Co. Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R 204. 
71 Esso Petroleum. v. Southport Corporation [1954] 2 Q.B. 182 at p. 200. 
72 Winfield and Jolwies, 12 ed., pp. 359-363. 
73 Devlin. 1. Esso Petroleum Ltd v. Southport Corporation, [1956] A.C. 218, at p. 224. 
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of it.74 In the other words, consequential injury is not, by some obvious 
intervening cause, regarded as part of defendant's act. It may be argued 
that there is a good cause of action in trespass if oil deliberately pumped 
out at sea reaches the shore by the action of tide and wind, i.e. 
consequential cause. Morris J believed, "There may be trespass if 
something is placed upon land; but equally I think that there may be 
trespass if something is thrown upon land or if the force of the wind or 
moving water is employed to cause a thing to go on to land."75 However, 
in the House of Lords, the direct test was preferred, partly on the ground 
that it would be difficult, if the consequential test applies, to say where 
any such pollution would end up, thus removing any element of intention 
in trespass.76 
Trespass will not normally lie in pollution cases because the 
establishment of the sufficient direct requirement is, in most cases, 
impossible. This is true even where it is deliberately discharged on the 
sea; the injury will be insuffiCiently direct, on the basis that rarely will 
there be sufficient certainty that spillage or discharge of the pollutant at 
the sea will lead to contamination of shore.77 However, a situation where 
the injury might be sufficiently direct is where the discharge takes place 
in harbour or at terminal and the harbour or terminal is affected. It is 
quite clear if pollutant spills on to the water and then catches fire, 
resulting damage would be consequential. 
74 Id. Devlin J at p. 225. 
75 Southport corp. [1954] 2 Q.B. 182 at p. 204. 
76 Southport Corp. [1956] AC. 218 at pp. 242 and 244. 
77 D. W. Abecassis (edt.), Oil Pollution From Ships, 2 ed., 1985, p. 359. 
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In addition, in modern law, trespass to goods is confined to 
intentional interference and the negligent interference is remedied only 
by tort of negligence. Lord Denning in Letang. v. Cooper,18 said, u\Nhen 
the injury is not inflicted intentionally, but negligently, I would say that the 
only cause of action is negligence and not trespass." Thus when the 
injury is caused by the defendant's intended act the cause of action is 
trespass; when unintended, negligence. It may be concluded that 
trespass may not be regarded as good cause for accidental pollution 
cases. In the circumstances, therefore, an action for trespass in the case 
of accidental pollution of the sea causing damage on land is unlikely to 
succeed without proof of negligence. Thus, trespass, as an intentional 
tort, is not subject to the insurance cover which is usually provided to 
cover damages which are caused negligently. 
1.3.1. Necessity as a defence 
It may well be justified that a defendant is not involved in liability 
when he shows he was acting under necessity to prevent a greater evil, 
provided that the discharge was reasonable. For example, it can be 
justified by showing that it was necessary to discharge at sea in order to 
save life or property. 
Devlin J./9 was not prepared to hold without further consideration 
that a man was entitled to damage the property of another without 
compensating him merely because the infliction of such damage was 
necessary in order to save his own property, whereas, the necessity for 
78 [1965] 1 Q.B. 232. 
79 Esso Petroleum. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.c. 218 at p. 227. 
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saving life has always been considered a proper ground for inflicting 
such damage upon another's property. 
The defence would not apply if the dangerous situation of the vessel 
was caused by her own negligence.80 The defence of necessity has also 
no practical significance in the pollution damage, because it is unlikely to 
apply where cargo is emptied at sea to save a ship. However, in all 
cases, it must be decided whether a greater loss will be caused if a 
pollutant is discharged. 
1.3.2. Is Traffic Rule a good defence in navigable water? 
It is an established law that people whose property adjoin a highway 
cannot complain for damage caused by people using the highway unless 
it is caused negligently or wilful intention on the defendant's part. 81 There 
is no case to show that this principle has been applied to damage in 
public navigable waters. But Lord Blackburn in Fletcher v. Rylands,'n 
indicated that the rule applies as much as in navigable waterway as to 
highway on land, and concluded that people or property adjoining to the 
traffic at sea are subject to taking inevitable risk or injury upon 
themselves. He continued that such people could not recover, ''without 
proof of want of care or skill occasioning the accident". Thus, under the 
rule, as a defence, the defendants would not be liable for an action or 
omission which they could not control, e.g. because of an explosion in 
the ship which was not itself attributable to any fault on their parts or to a 
80 All judges in, Id. 
81 TIlls is known as the "Traffic Rule" Goodwyn. v. Chevley (1859) 28. L.J. Ex. 298~ 4 H & N, 
631. It was adopted in Gayler & Pope Ltd. v. B. Davies & Son Ltd. [1924] 2 K.B. 75. 
'n (1866) 1 L.R. Ex. 265 at p. 286. 
34 
collision for which they were in no way to blame or have been brought 
deliberately for a reason of necessity. 
This concept was approved by Devlin J, in the Southport 
Corporation,83 in which he said that, "owners whose property adjoins 
the sea, equally with owners whose property adjoins the highway, take 
the risk of damage being done by users of the sea or of the highway who 
are exercising with due care their rights of navigation or of passage". 
This judicial endorsement of the rule is weakened by the fact that he did 
not give any reason for the extension of the rule from land to sea. 
Generally speaking, there is no clear and absolute evidence that the 
rule applies to a navigable water as well as a highway. Welsh J said, in 
the Wagon Mound (No. 2),84 that "the spillage came about from the 
ordinary use of the harbour waters by the Wagon Mound and not from 
any unreasonable or excessive user, or that this was a risk which other 
users of the harbour must be regarded as having taken upon 
themselves". Although he did not reject the application of the rule where 
there is unreasonable or excessive use of navigable waters, 
nevertheless it seems to be wrong to apply the rule to marine pollution 
cases which mostly arise from ordinary use of the sea and through 
accident. Non application of the rule to navigable waters can also be 
justified because it is technically impossible to guard adjacent property, 
e.g. beaches, against marine pollution, whereas providing such 
protective measures against property adjacent to highway is easily 
possible.85 
83 Esso PetroleUll1, supra No. 79, p. 227. 
84 [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep, 402 at p.429. 
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1.4. Nuisance as a basis of pollution liability. 
The essence of the tort of nuisance is interference with use or 
enjoyment of land.86 In modern times, nuisance has closely been 
concerned with protection of the environment against pollution.87 An 
actionable nuisance, whether public or private, has been defined as an 
unjustifiable interference with the exercise or enjoyment of a right 
belonging to public or individual.88 However, whether an action of 
nuisance lies for interference with an interest depends on further 
considerations, because nuisance cases often deal with a conflict of 
interest between neighbouring landowners. The issue has been 
expressly addressed by the House of Lords.89 
"A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do 
what he likes with his own, and the right of his neighbour not to be 
interfered with". 
In principle, one should consider whether what has been done is 
reasonable, not merely from the defendant's viewpoint, but from 
plaintiff's also. Reasonable conduct has been defined as conduct, 
"according to ordinary usages of mankind living in society, or more 
correctly in a particular society."~ Thus, whether an act constitutes a 
nuisance cannot be determined merely by an abstract consideration of 
the act itself, but by reference to all the circumstances of a particular 
case. 
85 As it was expressed by Abecassis in Oil Pollution from ships, 1985, at p. 362 
86 H. Street, The Law of Torts ,7 ed., 1983, p. 229 
87 e.g. see Esso Petroleum. .. supra No. 79. 
88 Clerk and Lindsel on Torts, 14 ed., p. 803. 
89 Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880, p. 903. 
~ Lord Wright, Sedleigh- Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] A.c. 880 at p. 903. 
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Different views have been expressed in attempting to determine the 
standard of liability in nuisance. Lord Reid, in the Wagon Mound (No. 
21 91 argued, "it is quite true that negligence is not an essential element 
in nuisance. Nuisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious 
acts or omissions and in many, negligence in the narrow sense is not 
essential. .... And although negligence may not be necessary, fault of 
some kind is almost always necessary and fault generally involves 
foreseeability .... " Denning L.J. in Southport Corporation v. Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd,92 without getting into the nature of liability said, "In 
an action for a public nuisance, once the nuisance is proved and the 
defendant is shown to have caused it, then the legal burden is shifted on 
to the defendant to justify or excuse himself." 
What is clear from these two arguments is that both judges have 
accepted that fault in the sense of negligence or deliberate or reckless 
act is generally necessary for liability in nuisance and have not given any 
support to the view that there may be an element of strict liability in 
cases of nuisance. In Scots law, nuisance is also an offence which could 
be occasioned by a single incident,93 and the courts saw that, "the 
proper angle of approach to a case of alleged nuisance is rather from 
the standpoint of the victim of the loss or inconvenience than from the 
standpoint of the alleged offender; and that, if any person so uses his 
property as to occasion serious disturbance or substantial inconvenience 
to his neighbour or material damage to his neighbour's property, it is in 
91 [1967}1 A.c. 617 atp. 639. 
92 [1954}2 Q.B. 182, at p. 197. 
93 James Peter S1aterv. A & J M'Lellan, 1924 S.C. 854. 
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the general case irrelevant as a defence for the defender to plead 
merely he was making a normal and familiar use of his own property."94 
Thus it was easier to succeed in a claim for nuisance caused by pollution 
in a Scots court than an English one. In 1985, this precedent was also 
considered in, RHM. Bakeries (Scotland} Ltd. v. Strathclyde Regional 
Council,95 in which it was held that an accident giving rise to damage 
was sufficient at common law to constitute a nuisance, but it was open to 
the defendant, by proving that some other person or things over which 
they had no control was responsible for the nuisance created, to escape 
liability. This decision ended some doubts which have been raised that, 
under nuisance, fault is not required as a claim for liability and 
established fault as a necessary means of imposing liability under 
nuisance. 
Generally speaking, the law of nuisance plays an important role in 
imposing liability for harm caused to other people and their property. 
However, there are some restrictions in the law of nuisance which 
reduce its effectiveness in the pollution cases which may affect many 
rights. The only person who can act as a plaintiff is the person whose 
legal rights have been damaged. The only right of action is to protect 
enjoyment of one's property. There is therefore no right of action against 
certain types of pollution harms, such as oil or chemical pollution which 
has killed sea animals and birds but has not harmed property. The 
nuisance also does not ensure that preventive steps are taken to 
94 Wattv. Jamieson, 1954 S.L.T. 56 atp. 57. 
95 [1985 S.L.T. 3. 
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prevent or reduce pollution harm. Thus, if such steps are taken there will 
be no compensation. 
1.4.1. Public nuisance 
Nuisance is public where an act or omission affects the life, safety, 
health or reasonable comfort of a class of the subjects in public. 96 The 
question of what number of people constitute a class of the public is a 
question of fact in every case. 'J7 It always remains a possibility that a 
neighbourhood affected in a particular pollution incident is too small to 
constitute a public nuisance. 98 Different views have been given to the 
question of neighbourhood, how many people should be affected in 
order to constitute a public nuisance. Denning L.J, while declining to 
answer the question how many people make up Her majesty's subjects, 
said99 that, "Public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its 
range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to 
expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a 
stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the 
community at large". Lord Radcliff, considered1°O it may possibly be a 
public nuisance if pollution affects a small area. 101 From these views it 
can be concluded that there is no public nuisance if only one particular 
96 Romer L.J, Attorney General v. P.Y.A Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, at p. 184. 
'J7 Id. 
98 D.W. Abecassis, The Law and Practice Relating to Oil Pollution From Ships, 1978, p. 117 
99 Attorney General. v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 Q.B. 169 at p. 191. 
100 Esso Petroleum. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.C. 218 at p. 242. 
101 Devlinj, in an unexplained remark, approved it. Id. at p. 225. 
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individual is affected by pollution incident. However it will be regarded as 
a public nuisance even if a few people are affected. For example, where 
there is a public right of way over the foreshore, its obstruction by oil 
pollution might be regarded as a public nuisance, even a few people are 
affected. The same result can be applied where a hotel, in a remote 
tourist village with 50 inhabitants, is closed, because of polluted coast, 
and a few people whose economic life depends on the hotel are 
affected. 
It may be said, in general, that the escape of oil into the water and 
pollution of sea and coastal environment constitutes a public nuisance, 
provided there is prejudice and discomfort to the members of public as 
a group. However, oil pollution does not constitute a public nuisance, 
even if polluted area is a large stretch of coastline not habitually used by 
more than a few people. This is probably correct having regard to views 
which were expressed by different judges in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
v. Southport Corporation,l02 Lord Denning J said: 
"Applying the old cases to modern instances, it is, in my opinion, a public 
nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in such circumstances that it is 
likely to be carried on to the shores and beaches of our land to the 
prejudice and discomfort of Her Majesty's subjects."l03 
1.4.1.1. Special damage as a condition for recovery of individuals 
Private individuals have a right of action in respect of public 
nuisance if they can prove that they have suffered special damage which 
is different from others, the general public. As Lord Denning said,l04 the 
102 [1956] AC. 218. 
103 [1954] 2 Q.B. 182 at p.197. 
104 Esso Petroleum v. Southport Corporation [1954] 2 Q.B. 197. 
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discharge of oil at sea was a public nuisance and people can only 
recover if they show that they have suffered greater damage than the 
public. Although the requirement of distinct or personal injury is well 
accepted, it is arguable whether the individual's injury must differ from 
that suffered by general public in kind or merely in degree. It is quite 
clear in oil pollution cases that the owner of land may suffer special 
damage for the cost of clean up and contamination of land itself, 
because it is clearly different in nature and extent to that suffered by the 
general public, but a fisherman is in a different position if he does not 
own a fish farm. However, special damage cannot be shown if damaged 
property is owned by public. 
1.4.1.2. The possibility of recovery of pure economic loss under 
public nuisance. 
It is strongly arguable that if pure economic loss is not recoverable 
in negligence, it ought not to be recoverable in public nuisance, since 
courts have tended to equate, in this aspect, the two torts, For example 
in_ The Wagon Mound (No.2), 105 the Privy Council held that the same 
test for remoteness of damage applied in nuisance and negligence. 
Contrary to this decision, there have been some cases which supported 
recovery of pure economic loss under public nuisance. In Walsh v. 
Ervin,t06 Sholl J. fully considered the types of damage recoverable in 
public nuisance. His judgement assumes that the pure pecuniary loss is 
recoverable. The question to be decided was whether or not actual 
105 [1967] 1 A.C. 617. 
106 [1952] V.L.R. 361. 
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pecuniary loss always had to be shown in order to recover; Sholl J. 
answered the question in the negative. 107 
The application of the same test for remoteness to both negligence 
and public nuisance may also be subject to criticism where the possible 
reason for failing to recover for pure economic loss under negligence is 
considered. The main reason for irrevocability is, in negligence, said to 
be public policy108 under which the law considers that it would be 
undesirable that the liability should be cast so wide so as to encompass 
those who have suffered mere economic hardship. If it is regarded as 
the right explanation for the rule, then it is possible to see why a similar 
rule should not apply to public nuisance in which recovery has been 
already limited by public policy to those who have suffered "special 
damage". This rule was designed to keep down the number of possible 
claimants. It is not then necessary, as a matter of public policy, to cut 
down the number of claimants still further by refusing claimants who 
have suffered purely economic loss. 
1.4.2 .. Private nuisance 
In private nuisance, the plaintiff must prove unreasonable 
interference with his reasonable enjoyment or use of land or some right 
over, or in connection with it.109 This clearly raises a number of 
questions. What is reasonable? What would be unreasonable? These 
questions are answered by balancing the reasonableness of the 
107 See also judgement of Slade J. in Gravesham Borough Council v. British Railways Board 
[1978] Ch. 379. 
108 Per Lord Denning and Lawton L.J. in the Spartan Steel Case. supra No. 47. 
109 Winfied and Jolowicz on Tort, 12 ed., p. 380. 
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defendant's activity and its impact upon the plaintiff's proprietary right. 110 
Such a balance can be made by considering the circumstances of the 
place where the thing complained of actually occurred. What is clear 
from these answers is the large degree of uncertainty involved in 
bringing an action in private nuisance. 
To give a cause of action in private nuisance, the plaintiff must have 
exclusive possession of or a proprietary interest in land which has been 
interfered with. In the other words, anyone who has no interest in the 
property affected, such as a licensee, cannot maintain an action based 
on private nuisance. 111 Where there are several interests in one property, 
in each case protection is limited to the interest of plaintiff.112 
The argument may be advanced as to whether the owner of land 
has property rights in the water beneath his land, and therefore cause of 
action for pollution of water. The argument was raised in Ballard v. 
Tomlinson, 113 in which it was held that having right to water beneath the 
land was a natural right incidental to ownership and that the plaintiff had 
a right to extract water beneath his land, and the defendant had no right 
to contam inate what plaintiff was entitled to get. 
It has been suggested in order to constitute an action, the 
defendant must have used his own land or some other lands in such a 
way as injuriously, and not in just a slightly annoying way, to affect the 
110 As it was done in Sanders- Clark. v. Grosvenor Mansions Company Limited and G. 
D' A11essandri [1900] 2 Ch. 373. 
111 Devlin J, Esso Petroleum v. Southport Corporation, supra No. 76, p. 224. 
112 W. Prosser, Torts, 4th ed., p. 593. 
113 (1885) 29 Ch. D. 115. 
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enjoyment of plaintiff's land. 114 It was, therefore, concluded that 
discharge of oil was not a private nuisance, because it did not involve 
the use by the defendant of any land.ll5 However, this restriction has not 
prevented many successful actions being fought by litigants. Devlin J, in 
the Southport Corporation, believed116 that there is no principle that 
nuisance must emanate from land belonging to defendant. This is 
contrary to the view which was given by Denning L.J, in the same case, 
who said that, "it is clear that the discharge of oil was not a private 
nuisance, because it did not involve the use by the defendants of any 
land, but only of a ship at sea".117 However, both views are weak 
because none of them give any detailed reason for the approach they 
take. It seems to me, since private nuisances, at least in the vast 
majority of cases, are interference by owners or occupiers of land with 
the use or enjoyment of neighbour land, it would be unreasonable if the 
right to complain of such interference extended beyond the occupier or 
the owner of land. 
1.5. Liability without fault: application of the rule in, Rylands v. 
Fletcher 
Under the rule which was formulated in Rylands V Fletcher, 118 
there is liability which is independent of intention or negligence. This is 
114 Denning LJ, Esso Petroleum, supra No. 79, p. 196. 
115 Lord Wright, Sedleigh- Denfield v. O'Callaghan [1940] AC. 880 at p. 903 
116 Esso Petroleum. v. Southport Corporation, supra No. 71, pp. 224-5. He took the view that a 
nuisance was committed where oil was discharged from ship and canied by wind and tide on 
foreshore. 
117 Southport Corporation. v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 182. at p. 196. 
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called liability without fault or strict liability. In this case, Rylands v. 
Fletcher, it was held that a person is prima facie responsible for damage 
done by the escape of dangerous things accumulated for some non-
natural purpose of his land, however careful he may have been and 
whatever precaution he may have taken to prevent damage. In the other 
words, such a person is strictly liable for damage done by him unless he 
can excuse himself by showing an act of God or act of stranger, e.g. a 
plaintiff. This judgement was based on the view which was given by Lord 
Blackburn J, who said: 
" ...... The true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes 
brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do 
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do 
so, is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural 
consequence of its escape."119 
This broad concept was limited when the case went to the House of 
Lords. Lord Cairns said that the rule only applied to non-natural use of 
, 
the defendant s land, as distinguished from: 
"any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment 
of the land be used. 11120 
In Rickards v. John Inglis Lothian,121 Lord Moulton said that a 
non-natural use "must be some special use bringing with increased 
danger to others and must not merely be the ordinary use of land or 
such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community." Thus 
118 (1866) 3 L.R. Ex. 265. A similar point arose in West. v. Bristol Tramway Co., [1908] 2 K.B. 
14. This rule was recently considered in Cambridge Water Company v. Eastern Country Leather 
PLC, [1994] W.L.R 53, in which House of Lords uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal on 
the basis of rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 
119 Id. at p. 279. 
120 Rylands. v. Fletcher (1868) 3 L.R, 330 at p.338, see case in Wier. T, A Casebook on Tort, 4 Th. 
ed., 1979, p. 365. 
m [1913] A.C. 263 at 280. 
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liability under the rule is strict, not only must the substance be dangerous 
if it escapes, but it must also be something which is not naturally on the 
defendant's land. The concept of non-natural use has been defined by 
reference to how the substance arrived on the land, not by reference to 
its use, but in the light of particular circumstances of the user and the 
environment in which he is operating. 122 
It appears that the principle applies to the escape of dangerous 
things from land and, thus, extension to a discharge of pollutant by a 
ship, either on the high sea or within territorial water is probably 
unwarranted because the bringing of the ship to sea and the 
maintenance of it in the usual way seems to be an ordinary and 
reasonable use of the ship and if, in consequence of it, a pollutant 
escapes without any negligence or fault of the owner, it is not thought he 
would be liable for any damage that may ensue, unless the plaintiff 
establishes that the carriage of the pollutant is a non-natural or 
exceptionally hazardous use of the sea. The difficulty with this argument 
is that if the sea is regarded as a highway in which the traffic rule 
applies, the plaintiff would not be able to succeed under the rule 
because of consenting to that risk by having property adjacent to the 
navigational water, unless he can show negligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
Ryland's rule does not seem, because of its many limitations and 
exceptions, to form the basis of a successful claim in modern times. The 
defendant can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to 
122 See Case Law Analysis, Strict Liability for Environmental Law: the DefiCiencies of the 
Common Law, Journal of Environmental Law, 1992,81, atpp. 94-97. 
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the plaintiffs fault or was in consequences of an act of God; 123 or where 
a plaintiff has expressly or impliedly consented to the presence of the 
source of danger and there has been no negligence on the part of 
defendant;l24 or the source of danger is maintained for common benefit 
of the plaintiff and defendant;125 and the escape was caused by an 
unforeseeable act of a stranger. 126 
The usefulness of the rule was also reduced when the House of 
Lords ruled that foreseeability of harm was a prerequisite of the damage 
under the rule. This point has been illustrated in_ Cambridge Water Co. 
v. Eastern Countries Leather Pic and Huchings & Harding Ltd,127 in 
which was held that, since those responsible at the defendant's 
company, E.C.L, could not at the relevant time reasonably have 
foreseen that the damage in question might occur, the claim of plaintiff, 
C.W.C, must fail. l28 The introduction of foreseeability into the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher, moves Rylands' liability very close to negligence. 
Thus, if someone brings onto his land something which he knows will do 
a particular type of harm if it escapes and then allows it to escape is it 
not likely he will have been negligent? 
123 CheaterY. Cater [1918] I K.B. 247. 
124 KiddIe v. City Business properties [1942] I K.B. 269. 
125 Gilson v. Kerrier District Council. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 904. 
126 Box v. Jubb (1879) 4 Ex. D. 76. 
127 [1994] W.L.R. 53. 
128 See lei, Lord Goff of Chievly, at P. 81. There are, however early authorities in which 
forseeability of damage does not appear to have been regarded as necessary, see. e.g. Humphries v. 
Cousins, (1877) C.P.D. 239. 
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Although, theoretically, there may be some merit in a system of 
strict liability for pollution risk, in comparison with a fault based system, 
practically its effectiveness depends on the econom ic situation of the 
defendant or the practicability of insurance. The normal sequel of the 
imposition of such liability is that the persons potentially subject to 
liability will protect themselves against its consequences by insurance, 129 
otherwise it would be unjust and unfair to make someone liable without 
giving sufficient opportunity, except some limited defence, to defend 
himself against the plaintiff. This may be supported by the fact that torts 
which are based on strict liability are subject to compulsory insurance up 
to statutory lim it. 130 
5. 7. Concluding remarks 
The major barrier to the efficacy of the tort system in the context of 
pollution damage is the ineffectiveness of those doctrines of liability 
available to plaintiffs. Trespass was primarily designed to deal with 
unauthorised physical entry from one person's land to another's. 
Extension of this from land to ship is doubtful. Even if it is applied, it has 
no practical use in pollution cases because in such cases the injury, 
even in intentional discharge, is rarely sufficiently direct. Trespass may 
not lie where the pollutant accidentally or involuntarily discharges at sea, 
on the ground that trespass generally lies where the defendant causes 
129 This self-evident truth appears sometimes to be overlooked. See Lord Denning M.R. in S.C.M. 
(United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall and Son [1971] 1 Q.B. 337 at p. 344, who said that the risk 
should be borne by the whole community who suffer the losses rather than the defendant who may 
or may not be insured against the risk. 
130 e.g. see the liability under the Nuclear lnsta11ation Act 1965; The Merchant Shipping (Oil 
Pollution) Act 1971 as amended by the Merchant Shipping Act 1988. 
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the trespass through a voluntary act, whether intentional or negligent. 
Even if trespass lies, in the case of pollution at sea causing damage on 
land, it is unlikely to succeed without overcoming the enormous difficulty 
in proving negligence. Even if the negligence is proved, the plaintiff has 
to fight against availability of the defence of "necessity" and "traffic rule". 
Trespass as an intentional tort is not also regarded as a good basis for 
establishing pollution liability under an insurance contract, since liability 
insurance has never supported wilful misconduct. 
Nuisance may have more potential application in establishing 
liability in pollution at sea, provided the question of fault can be obviously 
established on the basis of strict liability. There is a possible ground of 
such change in common law due to the existence of the principle of res 
ipsa loquitur, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and the view that 
negligence, in the narrow sense, is not an essential element in nuisance, 
but so far there is evidence that the courts are willing to develop the law 
so as to bring the nuisance clearly into the line of the strict liability. 
However, nuisance is potentially capable of founding an action for 
pollution damage, without proof of negligence, in spite of the remaining 
possibility that a court may follow the "Traffic Rule" and consequently 
hold in some cases that the plaintiff must prove negligence. In practice, a 
plaintiff, in application of nuisance without proof of negligence, may face 
enormous difficulties, because of widespread economic and 
environmental damage which is caused pursuant to the causing of 
pollution incident at sea, when it is realised that he must show that the 
defendant was or ought to have been aware that the damage to his 
interest was inevitable or was the likely consequence of the defendant's 
activity. 
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Most pollution victims, with regard to the deficiency in other torts, 
are forced to base their claims on the tort of negligence. This principle 
may also lose its effectiveness because of the extreme difficulties of 
proving negligence by pollution victims. Even when a defendant has 
been negligent, it is extremely difficult for pollution victims to prove that 
harm was foreseeable, in particular, in pure economic loss. However, 
liability based on the tort of negligence has more practical use, than the 
other torts, in providing the liability insurance where the major purpose of 
a liability is to insure against liability in negligence, unless policy 
otherwise provides. 
Insurance differs from tort compensation in many ways. Insurance, 
as a method of compensation, is almost entirely optional, except in a few 
cases where compulsory insurance is demanded by law. A second major 
contrast with the tort system is the fact that in the case of insurance, the 
method of compensation normally depends on what has been lost, 
without regard to the fault, whereas in the tort system, it is an essential 
element, for recovery of compensation, that the negligence be proved by 
the plaintiff. A third difference between tort compensation and insurance 
is that the latter, unlike the former, does not offer "full compensation". 
The extent of insurance coverage is usually optional, but there are many 
types of insurance in which the standard policy requires the insured to 
bear part of the loss himself. Another major difference between these 
two compensation systems is the fact that contributory negligence, in 
contrast with the tort compensation, is normally immaterial under an 
insurance claim, because buying insurance means buying protection 
against the risk of the assured's negligence, as well as the risk of loss or 
damage by other means. 
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Strict liability, as introduced in Rylands v. Fletcher, or the 
possibility of its introduction in nuisance, may have an enormous role in 
establishing liability in favour of pollution victims and the environment. 
This principle may lose its effectiveness when it is realised that there is 
no obligation at common law to finance damage in advance. Thus, 
changing the common law to some form of compulsory insurance cover 
based on strict liability agreement seems to be necessary, in order to 
provide sufficient compensation for pollution victims. Even if such 
insurance is provided by statute, there is still problems, similar to causal 
problems which so often arise in tort compensation case, which need to 
solved by the common law. However, there is a major difference in 
establishing causal connection between tort cases, in which the courts 
are compelled to choose two sets of causal principles: those supplied by 
the usage of ordinary language of policy and those supplied by the 
independent consideration of the policy, and in the case of an insurance 
contract, in which the standard of ordinary language of policy is in almost 
all cases the correct one to be applied. 
As a general conclusion, it is clear that to recover compensation on 
the basis of tort liability is problematic whether or not that liability is 
based on negligence, strict liability, trespass or nuisance. This is in the 
main because of the widespread results of pollution at sea which provide 
the difficult task of proving any claim. There are almost certainly bound 
to be problems relating to the ambit of the duty of care in every case and 
similar problems relating to the causation of loss caused through 
negligence or some other concept giving rise to liability, and there are 
the more difficult questions of remoteness of injury and remoteness of 
damage. In these circumstances the inevitable conclusion is that there 
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requires to be some form of compulsory insurance based on strict 
liability or an insurance fund from which claims can be met without 
having to satisfy the rigorous criteria laid down in the common law of 
negligence or some other tort giving rise to liability. 
Chapter 2. Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for 
Oil Pollution- TOVALOP 
2.1. Introduction 
After the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, the government, the public, and 
industry became actually aware of the dangers of oil pollution.! It was felt by 
many in the industry that constructive action was needed to fill the gaps in the 
law, and that waiting for the entry into force of any international treaties which 
may be adopted was not good enough, both from the point of view of the 
plaintiff, who needs compensation, and of the industry, in which there were 
many who felt the need to respond to public opinion positively and to arrange 
insurance for any removal cost voluntarily incurred. The influence of this 
concept originated in TOVALOP, Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement 
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution,z and its supplement CRISTAL, Contract 
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker for OIL Pollution.3 
TOVALOP is the earliest of the voluntary compensation schemes set up by 
tanker industries in order to take constructive measures to mitigate and provide 
compensation for damage by oil pollution from tankers, on the basis of mutual 
promise. In 1969, seven major tanker companies4 signed TOVALOP. It is a 
voluntary agreement only as regards the decision whether or not to partiCipate. 
As soon as becoming a party, there is an obligation to meet all the terms and 
conditions of the Agreement. The enforcement of the terms of Agreement 
! Brown, E.D. The Lesson of the Torrey Canyon, 21 Current Legal Problems. [1968] p. 113. 
2 See text in 6 Bendict, Ch VI, Revision 1993, 6-11. 
3 See text in, Id. 6-12. 
4 BP Tanker Company Ltd, Esso Transport Company Inc., Gulf Oil COIporation, Mobil Oil 
Corporation, Shell International Petroleum Company Ltd, Standard Oil Company of California and 
Texas Inc. 
52 
directly by third party beneficiaries is doubted, since as a rule where there is a 
contract for the benefit of a third person, the third person cannot sue alone in 
his own name; nevertheless it seems there is no difficulty in joining as a third 
party, as a co-palintiff, to one of the contracting parties and, therefore, 
judgement given for the plaintiff will go to the third person.5 
In May, 1978 TOVALOP underwent a fundamental change to reflect the 
coming into force of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, CLC,6 and the 1971 
Fund Convention, FC, which forms an international legal regime providing a 
system of compensation under which, irrespective of fault, the owner of a 
tanker spilling oil is liable for damage caused thereby, up to a certain limit and, 
if this is insufficient, supplemental compensation is provided by means of the 
Fe. In order to make TOVALOP more efficient, effective and consistent with 
1984, as adopted by 1992, Protocol to CLC and FC, it underwent another 
revision, in February 1987, which resulted, among the other things, in a higher 
limit of financial responsibility through the additional supplement to the 
Agreement. It is felt that bringing TOVALOP into the line of CLC and applying it 
to those countries that have not taken the trouble to accede to the Convention, 
will give such countries a windfall of the rights offered by the Conventions, 
without their being required formally to assume the burdens, such as the 
uniform certificate procedure. 
TOVALOP is similar to the CLC and, indeed, was designed to operate in a 
jurisdiction where the CLC is not in force. Restriction of the operation of 
TOVALOP in jurisdictions where CLC is not in force may lead to unfair results 
5 This is supported by the opinion which was given by Lord Denning, M.R in Beswick v. Beswick, 
[1966] 3 All E.R 1. 
6 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, see text in Ch. IV, 6 Bendict 
Revision. 1993, 6-3,6-4,6-4A,6-4B. 
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for victims of pollution in the CLC participating countries, in particular where the 
costs of threat removal measures, discharge from bunker and unladen taker 
and bareboat charterers are involved. Since all of these events are not covered 
by the 1969 CLC and, in consequence, the victims of such incident remain 
uncompensated in the CLC jurisdictions. 
The voluntary character of TOVALOP suggests that any right or obligation 
thereunder could only arise in as much as the voluntary fund is accepted by a 
potential claimant. Therefore, there would be nothing to stop one or more 
claimants refusing the package offered to him and raising a case in the courts. 
TOVALOP is administered by the International Tankers Owners Pollution 
Federation Limited, (the Federation), which is an association of which all the 
parties to TOVALOP are members.7 It is important to note that the Federation 
is not a party to the agreement and thus has no responsibility under TOVALOP 
to take direct measures or compensate third parties. Therefore, the Federation 
does not provide any insurance or guarantee for payment, and requires that the 
parties establish their financial capability to the satisfaction of the Federation in 
order to meet their obligations under the agreement. Hence, the Federation 
only decides when a person files a claim, whether the tanker involved is subject 
to TOVALOP, and what the liabilities of parties are to each other on the basis 
of mutual promise. It means a member of TOVALOP is regarded as the insured 
and the insurer at same time, the same as ship owners under P & I Clubs. It 
may be asked what is the premium for which the member, as insurer, 
undertakes the other liabilities. In response, it may be said that the premium, 
the same as "call" in P & I Clubs, consists of liability, as a guarantee, to 
contribute to the loss of the other members of TOVALOP's mutual society. 
7 TOVALOP (SA)., Revision 1990. clause l(c). 
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However, TOVALOP is not a contract of insurance. The parties to 
TOVALOP undertake to maintain their financial responsibility to meet their 
voluntary obligations, as a fundamental condition of participation in TOVALOP.8 
They can do so by means of insurance (usually through the traditional 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs), self insurance, or by obtaining a guarantee. 
They may arrange any combination of these methods in order to satisfy their 
limitation liability.9 However, it should be indicated that insurance liability 
against tanker pollution is in general not looked upon favourably by the 
insurance industry.10 
Since TOVALOP is world-wide in its application, any oil pollution liability 
insurance cover which is subject to geographical exclusion, trading warrant or 
any other restriction that might result in a party being unable to meet his full 
obligations, financial and otherwise, under the Agreement (including 
supplement) cannot be considered as satisfying the insurance condition. 
Accordingly, an applicant with oil pollution insurance cover which is qualified in 
such a way might be refused entry into TOVALOP. 11 Thus, tanker owners and 
bareboat charterers who wish to remain party to TOVALOP should therefore 
ensure that they have unqualified oil pollution insurance cover. 
8 A fundamental condition of participation in TOV ALOP is that each party shall "establish and 
maintain his financial capacity to fulfil his obligations under this Agreement to satisfaction of the 
Federation". Clause II(B) (3). 
9 Having satisfied itself that an applicant's insurance arrangement are satisfactory, the Federation will 
issue TOV ALOP Certificate in respect of the entered vessels. this certificates merely demonstrate that 
the named tanker owner or bareboat charterer and vessel satisfied the entry requirements at the date of 
issue. A TOV ALOP certificate is not a certificate of financial security. For fmther details, see: 
TOVALOP & CRISTAL, A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation Produced by the rrOPF and CRiSTAL 
Limited, second ed., 1990. 
10 Comment, Compensation for Oil Pollution at Sea: An Insurance Approach, 1975, San Diego Law 
Review, 729-731 
11 This point was raised by ITOPF, see the letter, dated 8 January 1991, which was sent by White, 
I.e. managing director, to members under the title of "Urgent/or Immediate Attention". 
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TOVALOP was supplemented by The Contract Regarding an Interim 
supplement to Tanker for Oil Pollution ,CRISTAL,12 which is an oil industry 
scheme to compensate the victims of oil pollution and provide financing for 
damage not covered by TOVALOP. Under CRISTAL, oil companies which are 
signatories, contribute to the fund to provide supplemental compensation up to 
a maximum of $135 million for ships exceeding 140,000 tons. 13 The CRISTAL 
fund provides compensation for oil pollution claims on a very similar basis to 
that set out in the Fund Convention and the scheme remains of particular value 
in relation to the incidents occurring in countries where the Fund Convention is 
not in force. CRISTAL is not funded by insurance but pays claims by making 
calls on its members, on the basis of imported oil. 
2.2. Services 
2.2.1. Under the TOVALOP Standing Agreement. 
1969 TOVALOP in its preamble reflects the opinion of its signatories that 
traditional maritime law did not always provide adequate means for 
compensating national governments which incur expenditure to avoid or 
mitigate damage by pollution to coast lines from discharges of oil as a result of 
marine casualty, or for reimbursing tanker owners14 who incur such 
expenditure. TOVALOP also represents a voluntary effort on the part of tanker 
owners, including bareboat charterers, to establish their responsibility, on the 
basis of mutual promise, to assume certain obligations for which they might not 
otherwise be legally liable, to governments, for paying compensation for clean 
12 It was adopted in 1971 and has been amended several times 
13 CRISTAL, Revision 1987, clause IV(D)(5)(a). 
14 It includes Bareboat Charterer if the tanker is under Bareboat Charter. clause I(A). 
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up costs,15 and to assure tanker owners' capability to fulfil this responsibility. 
Under the original TOVALOP Standing Agreement, SA, no recovery was 
allowed by the Federation for private persons or for any property damage. This 
was amended, in the subsequent SA, so as to include all damage and threat 
removal measures, regardless of person and the kind of pollution damage, 
subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 16 
Such a gratuitous payment may be criticised on the principle that the law 
will not recognise any transaction, savouring of "maintenance" and 
"champerty."17 The question is, would such payment be held to be 
maintenance18 or champerty19 and therefore illegal? At one time doctrines of 
"maintenance" and "champerty" were so strict that no man could pay 
another's costs. In 1797 Lord Loughborough L.e. said that "every person 
must bring his suit upon his own bottom and his own expenses."w These 
doctrines have changed considerably with the passage to time. Dankwerts J. 
in Martell and Others v. Consett Iron Co. Ltd.,21 said: 
"Support of legal proceedings, based on a bona fide community of pecuniary 
interest or religion or principles or problems, is quite different and, in my 
15 It includes cost of threat removal measure taken as a result of incident, clause. IV (A). 
16 Clause IV, 1990 amendment to TOV ALOP. 
17 Compania Colombiana de Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] I Q.B. 101. 
18 Maintenance has been defined "as improperly stirring up litigation and strife by giving aid to one 
party to bring or defend a claim without just cause or excuse." See Lord Denning M.R. In re Trepca 
Mines Ltd. (No.2) [1963] Ch. 199 atpp. 219. 
19 Champerty is the particular form of maintenance which exist when the person maintaining the 
litigation is to be rewarded out of its proceeds. As a crimes and as torts, maintenance and champerty 
have now been abolished, see Criminal Law Act. 1967. Ss. 13 (1)(a), 14(1). Note that a champertious 
agreement is still void for illegality so far as the law of contract is concerned, see, Id. S. 14(2). 
W Wallis v. Ducke of Portland [1797] 3 Yes. 494 atp. 502. 
21 [1955] Ch. 363 at p. 387. 
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view, the law would be wrong and oppressive if such support were to be 
treated as a crime or a civil wrong. But I do not believe that the law is in that 
condition." 
It was held at first instance, and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, that an angling 
association could support an action by an angler to prevent pollution of a river 
because there was a sufficient "community of interest" in the subject matter of 
the action. 
The courts would, therefore, would be likely to hold that TOVALOP has a 
legitimate and bona fide interest in such a payment which is for a common 
interest. Such payment may also be justified under the charity law whereby a 
neighbour is allowed to assist the suit of a poor neighbour. Gratuitous payment 
may also be defended when it is realised some particular agreement, in the 
course of legitimate business, has not been regarded as "maintenance." It has 
been held that an insurer defending actions against policy holders, or banks 
lending money at interest to a customer to finance his litigation, are not 
maintainers.22 
There are some indications that the common law takes a rather harsher 
view of champertous maintenance (where the maintainer takes a share of 
proceeds of the action.23 This is because the champertous maintainer might be 
more tempted for his own personal gain, e.g. to suppress evidence. In these 
circumstances, it is thought it would be advisable that the payment, under 
TOVALOP, is not repaid out of the proceeds of the action, when the right of 
action is assigned, but is to be repaid out of the damage party's own pocket the 
exact amount paid, regardless of the amount recovered in the action, and, 
22 See Donoran L.J., In re Trepca Mines (No.2) [1963] Ch. 199 at p. 224. 
23 Lord Denning MR, Id. at 219. 
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therefore, the damaged party may reapply to TOVALOP if they are still 
unsatisfied, i.e. if the recovered less from third party in action than they 
expended. 
Under TOVALOP SA, participating owners agree, among themselves, to 
reimburse victims of pollution to the amount of US. $ 100 per GRT or $ 10 
million limit whichever is the less.24 This amount was, in order to get close to 
the limit of CLC, raised by a 1986 amendment to $ 160 per ton or $16.8 million 
whichever is the less, in respect of one incident. In 1989, the TOVALOP SA 
was amended25 to make it clear that where, as a result of an incident, the 
participating owner or his insurer has paid claims, those amounts will be taken 
into account in determining the maximum amount of the participating owner's 
financial responsibility under the Agreement. It is clear, so far as insurance is 
concerned, that the maximum liability of an insurer is the sum fixed by the 
policy. Where there is no prior agreement to fix maximum liability, it is 
impossible to establish the extent of insured's liability, except in damage to the 
property in which the value of the property lost or damaged can be regarded as 
a maximum liability. 
The maximum financial responsibility under TOVALOP agreement has 
been fixed in respect of anyone incident. 26 The term "incident" has been 
defined as, "any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin." 
Difficult questions of construction may arise where the insurance is worded so 
as to cover a fixed amount in respect of claims arising out of anyone 
occurrence. Thus, the clarification of the term of occurrence seem necessary in 
24 Clause Vll. TOVALOP (SA) 1990. 
25 By the members of ITOPF in annual general meeting on 25 October 1989, with effect from 20 
February 1990. This was done following decision of Esso Bericia, see case and decision in infra p. 26. 
26 Clause Vll(A), 1990 amendment to TOV ALOP (SA) 
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determining the limits of indemnity in respect of one claim or a number of 
claims under the policy. 
The term "occurrence" may find a different meaning if it is looked at from 
the point of view of the tortfeasors, insureds, or of the victims, and third parties. 
A number of persons may be injured or damaged by a single act of negligence. 
On the one hand, it seems, from the victims' point of view, there are different 
occurrences; on the other hand, there is, from tortfeasors' point of view, only 
one single occurrence. The question was raised in_ Fornev v. Dominion 
Insurance Co. Ltd,27 where the policy limited to insurers' liability in respect of 
anyone claim or number of claims arising out of the same occurrence to £ 
3,000. Donaldson J. held that the policy contemplated that a number of claims 
might arise out of the same occurrence and observed:28 "This seems to me to 
indicate that a number of persons may be injured by a single act of negligence 
by the insured- in other words that "occurrence" in this context is looked at from 
the pOint of view of the insured." Thus, it seems that the number of occurrences 
is the number of times the insured in negligent. If there is only one negligent 
act, there is only one occurrence and the policy limit will apply regardless of 
how many individual claims may be made by the third parties as a result of the 
incident. 
The meaning of "occurrence" may, in the ordinary sense, overlap with the 
term "accident". In a popular sense, both mean an incident or an event that 
happens without being designed or expected.29 It seems to be necessary to 
make a distinction between these two terms in the consideration of insurance 
27 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 928. 
28 Id, at p. 934. 
29 See definition of occurrence in Black's Law Dictionary, 5 Th ed., p. 947; and the term of accident 
in the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897. 
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liability in which each of them has got different consequences. As was 
mentioned, the number of occurrences in a legal meaning, was to be 
determined by asking how often the insured's negligence occurred. The word 
"accident" has not received any legal meaning, other than its ordinary sense. 30 
Lord Lindley said in, Fenton v. J. Thorlev & Co. Ltd,31 "The word "accident" is 
not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, 
but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and 
unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss."32 Thus, the word 
"accident" was confined to such an unforeseen event, misfortune, loss, act, or 
omission as is not the result of any negligence or misconduct by the insured. In 
South Staffordshire Tramways Co. Ltd v. Sickness and Accident 
Assurance Association Ltd,33 a policy indemnifying the insured against 
liability for accidents caused by vehicles had a limit of "£ 250 in respect of one 
accident." One of the insured's trams overturned injuring forty passengers. It 
was held that "accident" in the policy meant injury in respect of which a person 
claimed compensation and therefore the insurer was potentially liable for 40 x 
£250. As a result, an occurrence cannot be called an accident unless it is due 
neither to design nor to negligence of the party who has committed it. 
It has been a well established law and practice to allow ship owners to 
apply for limitation of their liability, in circumstances where they are found to be 
30 Macnaghten, in Fenton C.P. Auper v. Thorley & Co. Ltd. [1903] A.C. 443 at p. 448 said, " The 
expression "accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for 
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." 
31 [1903] A.C. 443 at p. 453 
32 This obiter dictum was affinned in, Regina v. Morris [1972] 1 W.L.R. 228; Mills v. Smith (Sinclair, 
Third Party) [1964] 1 Q.B. 30. 
33 [1891] 1 Q.B. 402. 
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legally liable for loss suffered by others. 34 The right to limit is, under the U.K. 
Law, available only when the loss or damage has taken place without the 
defendant's "actual fault or privity."35 Thus, the owner will loss the right to limit if 
the fault giving rise to the claims is one for which he was legally responsible. 
The position is however different under the voluntary insurance arranged under 
TOVALOP in which the voluntarily assumed limited financial liability cannot be 
broken by the pollution victims, even if the owner is actually at fault since under 
TOVALOP, the owners have accepted, irrespective of fault or privity, the liability 
that may not otherwise be legally liable and there is also no provision in the 
Agreement to break the provided financial limit, due to owners' fault or privity. In 
short, the limit of liability is unbreakable under the TOVALOP. It may be 
criticised that the unbreakable limit is not in favour of pollution victims who may 
suffer substantial damage. This criticism does not seem to be fair, since the 
members of TOVALOP are not obliged to provide any source of reimbursement 
for pollution damage. Furthermore, additional financial limit is available under 
CRISTAL, as a supplementary to TOVALOP, to complete the amount of 
recovery under the TOVALOP at a reasonable level. 
2.2.2. Under The TOVALOP Supplement 
Although the Standing Agreement, SA, provided constructive measures to 
mitigate the damage, it did not provide, in all aspects, adequate compensation 
for all legitimate claims. Liability, under SA, did not include the costs for 
environmental damage, following an escape or discharge of oil from a tanker. 
Accordingly, the parties decided to extend compensation for pollution damage 
34 As a matter of U.K. Law, limitation of liability is governed by the Merchan Shipping Act 1894, S. 
504, as amended by the Merchan Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act. 1958. 
35 Id, S. 503(1). See in details, conduct barring right to limit in Part. 4. of Thesis. 
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so as to cover the cost incurred to restore natural resources, in order to 
encourage owners to mitigate pollution damage and, in consequence of it, to 
protect the environment. The supplement provided reimbursement of 
reasonable costs actually incurred in taking reasonable and necessary 
measures to restore or replace natural resources damaged as a direct result of 
an incident.36 They did this without affecting the provision of SA which alone 
shall continue to apply to any incident which is not applicable under the 
supplement37 and does not occur where CLC applies.38 
The TOVALOP supplement, hereinafter TS, provides a substantially 
increased level of compensation to victims of oil pollution from tankers, ranging 
from a maximum $ 3.? million for tanker up to 5,000 gross tons, g.t, plus $493 
per g.t for each ton in excess of 5,000 g.t, and up to $ 70 million for a tanker in 
excess of 40,000 g.t.39 This is a positive development for both claimants, 
victims of pollution damage, and the tanker owner, in particular, when it is 
realised that the TS expanded its geographical application, in contrast to the 
SA, to provide world wide coverage where pollution damage occurs, 
irrespective of whether CLC is in force or whether the spill occurred in territorial 
waters. Since the level of compensation under TS is substantially higher than 
SA, in consequence, it will enhance compensation to claimants within the 
existing CLC jurisdiction beyond that to which they are legally entitled. This 
36 TOVALOP and CRISTAL a Guide to Oil Spill Compensation, produced by ITOPF Limited and 
CRISTAL, 2 nd ed., 1990, p. 3. 
37 Applicable incident means any occurrence or series of occurrence having the same origin which 
cause pollution damage by, or creates the threat of an escape or discharge oil carried as cargo in the 
tanker and owned as defined in CRIST AL, by an oil company parties to it. TOV ALOP supplement, see 
clause. 1 (A). 
38 There is no liability whatsoever under TOV ALOP when CLC applies to pollution damage resulting 
from an incident. Clause IV(B)(a). 
39 TOVALOP Supplement (IS)., clause. 3(c)(3). 
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increase in compensation has a major advantage for tanker owners 
participating under the CLC, who might become liable for unlimited amounts 
where their right to limit liability is broken by claimants or under local legal 
regimes. 
TOVALOP Supplement will only be available to a claimant where the cargo 
spilled by the tanker is owned by a member of CRISTAL. TOVALOP SA, with 
its maximum compensation of $16 million, will continue to be available to 
claimants when non-CRISTAL cargoes are carried.4O These two different 
conditions are very likely to lead to problems, both for victims of pollution 
damage and for tanker owners. \tVhen a tanker owner charters his vessel, 
frequently the charterer will not own the cargo. Even when the tanker can 
ascertain the owner of the cargo on loading, the cargo may be sold many times 
during the voyage. Thus, a tanker owner may find himself at one point with 
supplemental pollution damage compensation provided by CRISTAL and at 
next moment with only SA. 
, 
Therefore, the claimant s rights, such as that of off-shore fisherman who 
might sustain an economic loss occurring on fishing grounds outside territorial 
waters, would be subject to the lottery of who owned the cargo when the 
damage was caused. If the cargo was being carried by a tanker which 
belonged to a member of CRISTAL, the claimant would be able to receive his 
rights under TS, but if it is not, his recovery would be impossible under SA 
because under TS, the application of pollution damage, contrary to SA,41 has 
40 Id, clause. 1 (2)(D). 
41 under TOV ALOP (SA) only a spill causing pollution damage on territory or 
territorial waters of a state not party to CLC would be compensated. Art. I(G), TS. 1990. 
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not been restricted to territorial sea and, thus, can apply wherever damage 
occurred.42 
What can be done to solve this potential problem? It might be suggested 
that tanker owners insist on a type of CRISTAL clause in their charterparties 
requiring the charterer to warrant that at all times during the voyage the oil 
carried will be "owned" by a CRISTAL member. While this solution may have 
some merit, it is subject to legal limitation as well as market dynamics which 
may force the tanker owner to delete the clause in order to gain a charter. 
Moreover, while the tanker owner might have a right of action against his 
charterer in the event of an incident after which it was determined that a 
warranty had been broken, it does not ensure against the financial insolvency 
of the charterer. It is also unlikely that claimants would be able to pursue the 
charterer under some form of third party beneficiary doctrine. 
The word "owned" can include a situation where a party to CRISTAL does 
not actually posses legal title to the oil cargoes. Thus, the cargo may be the 
subject of a contract under which a non CRISTAL party owning the cargo has 
agreed to sell it to a party to CRISTAL. For the purpose of CRISTAL, the cargo 
will be considered "owned" by a party even if legal title to the oil is still with a 
non CRISTAL party.43 A CRISTAL party, therefore, may also elect to be 
considered the owner of oil cargo, even if the title had been transferred to a non 
party. Further, a CRISTAL party or one of its affiliates whose tanker is carrying 
a cargo owned by a non party to CRISTAL can elect to be considered the 
owner of that cargo. In both instances, the election has to be made in writing to 
CRISTAL Limited prior to any incident.44 
42 TOV ALOP ( SA) clause N(B)(a). 
43 Clause V(4). 1987. 
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Pollution damage is defined in the TOVALOP as covering physical loss or 
damage, e.g. oiling of fishing boat, caused by contamination resulting directly 
from the escape or discharge of oil, and by preventive measures. It also 
extends to proven economic loss actually sustained as a direct result of a spill, 
even without accompanying physical damage.45 However, the definition does 
not cover damage to non-commercial natural resources or claims which are 
theoretical or speculative. Reasonable costs actually incurred to restore or 
replace natural resources damaged as a direct result of an incident may be 
allowable in certain circumstances under the supplement. 46 
In the SA, recovery for economic loss in the absence of physical loss or 
damage, was unclear.47 In TS it appears that there is a right to recover 
economic loss unaccompanied by physical damage, so long as the claimant 
can prove that the loss actually occurred, and that it resulted directly from 
contamination. 48 Although the condition of recovery, the loss should be proved, 
of compensation appears to be heavy burden upon claimants, it substantially 
reduces the deficiency under SA in which economic loss was unrecoverable 
without physical damage. Recovery of economic loss without physical damage, 
under the TS, may be doubted when it is realised that the recovery is subject to 
the phrase, "direct result of contamination to as set out in (I) above" in which 
the pollution damage has been defined as physical loss or damage. This may 
be construed to require a claimant to suffer physical loss or damage in order to 
44 Clause V(2)(3). 1987. 
45 TOV ALOP (SA), clause l(k). 
46 TOV ALOP Supplement ([S), clause I(G)(III). 
47 Clause I(K.), TOVALOP (SA) 1990. 
48 Id, l(G)(I). 
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succeed on a claim for economic loss. If this is the true construction, it will have 
different impact when the insurer is involved in determining pollution damage. 
TOVALOP Supplement also compensate a member of CRISTAL, in an 
amount up to the limit of FC, where oil is spilled by a tanker causing damage in 
a jurisdiction where the provision of FC in force and oil is owned by a member 
of CRISTAL. 49 This provision may be criticised because such payment may 
exhaust the TS fund before victims of pollution damage have been fully 
satisfied. However, it must be realised that the CRISTAL provides substantial 
compensation, supplemental to TS which becomes available as soon as the TS 
fund is exhausted. It may said, if it is so, what is the necessity of the payment to 
CRISTAL by TS fund. It seems that the main reason for inserting such a 
provision in TS may be to place a CRISTAL member in FC States on as equal 
footing with those who do not reside in FC States. 
2.3. Nature of Liability 
Under TOVALOP the tanker owner and bareboat charterer undertake, 
voluntarily and as promptly as practical, to dispose of all valid claims arising out 
of the agreement.so In other words, as a result of becoming a party to 
TOVALOP, tanker owners and bareboat charterers agree to assume certain 
obligations for which they might not otherwise be legally liable. However, the 
TOVALOP party, in making payments, does not thereby admit legal liability for 
the incident, nor does he waive any rights of recovery from third parties whose 
fault may have caused, or at least contributed to, the incident. Thus, TOVALOP 
only facilitates, without recourse to legal proceeding, the payment of 
49 Clause 3(B)(2), TOVALOP Supplement (TS) 1990. 
so TOV ALOP Supplement (TS), clause II(B)( 4). 
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compensation, without in any way transferring the actual responsibility for the 
spill or prejudicing the issue of ultimate liability. This indicates that they are 
liable to pay compensation irrespective of fault, i.e. strict liability subject to very 
lim ited exceptions. 51 
In this sense, the nature of TOVAlOP's liability is very similar to insurance 
in which damage is coverd by the insurer upon the occurrence of a described 
event in the policy, without regard to whether those events were caused by 
negligence of the insured or another.52 Thus, it can be concluded that the 
TOVAlOP is essentially an insurance scheme under which the payments have 
to be made out on the basis of strict liability, i.e. liability without proof of fault, in 
the same way as insurance company. 
The basis, therefore, on which the tanker owner voluntary undertakes to 
accept payment is an assumed strict liability. The question which arises here is 
whether such an established strict liability can be supported under a marine 
insurance contract. Marine insurance, in legal theory, 53 is essentially a contract 
of indemnitY,54 i.e. the amount recoverable is measured by the extent of the 
insured's loss or liability. Thus, where the insured has effected an insurance in 
express terms against any liability to a third party, the measure of indemnity, 
subject to any express provision in the policy, is the amount paid or payable by 
him to such third party in respect of such liability.55 In other words, in indemnity 
51 See exceptions in clause IV(B). 
52 The development of no-fault insurance in this narrow sense was an outgrowth of public 
dissatisfaction, the same as creation of TOV ALOP, with the performance of the system for 
compensation of losses in traffic accident, which in tmn led to a succession of legislative measures. 
See, Keeton, RE, Basic Text on Insurance Law, 1971, at p. 246. 
53 It has been pointed out that in practice, marine insurance is not perfect contract of indemnity. See. 
David Aitchison and AF. Brandt v. Haagen Alfsen Lohre [1879] 4 App. Cas. 755. 
54 S. 1, MIA 1906. 
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insurance, in which it is not necessary that the issue of the assured legal 
liability should have been adjudicated upon or decided against or that he should 
have paid damages 56 (unless the policy otherwise provides), place an 
obligation upon the insurer to reimburse or indemnify an assured only to the 
extent that the assured has incurred and discharged his liability.57 The insurer 
is, therefore, only concerned when it is proved that the assured has legal 
liability. 
To provide this, there is a condition precedent to liability, in the most 
standard liability policy, that the insurers "will indemnify the insured against 
damage all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay ... in 
respect of ... damage to property." Thus, until the liability and quantum of the 
damage has been determined by the agreement or the judgement, the insurer 
or third party, under Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930, has no 
cause of action against insurer under the policy. 58 Devlin J in West Wake Price 
& Co. v. Ching,59 said, "The assured cannot recover anything under the main 
indemnity clause or make any claim against the underwriters until they have 
been found liable and so sustained a loss." Thus, the member of TOVALOP, 
who may pay without establishing liability, and who wishes to claim under his 
own liability insurance policy, may fall into difficulty if the liability has not been 
proved in the court or arbitration process or has not been accepted by prior . 
agreement between the member and his insurer, since acceptance of such an 
55 S. 74, :MIA 1906; see Cunnard Steamship Company Ltd. v. Marten, [1902] 2 K.B. 624 at p. 629. 
56 In re Law Guarantee Trust and Accident Society, Ltd. v. Liverpool Mortgage Insurance Co's Case 
[1914] 2 Ch. 617. 
57 See West Wake Price & Co. v. Ching [1957] 1 W.L.R. 45, especially per Devlin, at p. 49. 
58 Post Office v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. [1967] 2 Q.B. 363 
59 [1957] 1 W.L.R 45 atp. 49. 
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established liability by the insurer deprives him of his legal right to conduct the 
defence under the insurance policy. 
Assumed legal liability may be accepted under the policy, provided that the 
insured is able to get the insurers prior written consent. A condition in the most 
standard liability policy made it clear that, "No admission, offer, promise, 
payment or indemnity shall be made or given by or on behalf of the insured 
without the written consent of the [insurance] company." Thus the insured 
cannot establish their claim to indemnity by bringing an action setting up their 
own liability to the third party, unless they have the insurer's consent for 
admitting the liability. It may be argued that such a condition may not 
encourage persons, natural or legal, to assume liability in favour of the victims 
or society who may otherwise receive nothing for sustained damage. This is not 
a proper argument, because it does not prevent liable persons from insuring, it 
only means that the insured should have the insurers prior consent which can 
be achieved, without difficulty, in the competitive insurance market. It may also 
be said that there is no need to have the prior consent of the insured if 
adm iss ion of liability does not prejudice the insurers' interest. In other words, 
an insurer cannot rely on breach of the condition unless he suffer actual 
prejudice. The question was raised in Terry v. Trafalgar Insurance Co. Ltd, 60 
in which it was held that the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiff's 
admission of liability because he was shut out from any chance of negotiation 
or favourable settlement. Thus, the defence is defeated, since there is 
inevitably prejudice in every case to the insurer because of his deprivation of 
the proper conduct of the defence. It should, therefore, not matter on principle 
whether or not insurer has in fact been prejudiced by an admission of liability. 
60 [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524. 
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A difficult problem could arise where TOVALOP is dealing with a liability in 
a possible general average situation where, a mixture or motives lead to off-
loading part of the cargo from a stranding vessel in order to avoid pollution and 
to permit continuation of the voyage to the destination. It may be asked would it 
be appropriate for a TOVALOP underwriter to reimburse off-loading expenses 
and then, as the owner's subrogee, to claim a portion of general average cargo 
and freight? The question will be more clear when it is realised that threat 
removal measures have been assumed as one of the basis of responsibility of 
the participating owners,61 provided it "has occurred for the purpose of 
removing the Threat of an escape or discharge of oil."62 The question arises as 
to what extent the tanker owner can claim the cost of anti-pollution measures 
he has taken as general average. The answer must be looked for in the Rule VI 
of The York Antwerp Rules 1974, which say that, "Only such loss, damages or 
expenses which are the direct consequence of general average act shall be 
allowed as a general average." Thus any expenditure, e.g. cost of off-loading, 
incurred to remove pollution threat or any liability arising from such pollution 
would be allowable in general average, provided such expenditure or liability 
would be the direct consequence of the general average act, in order to save 
cargo ship. The application of the test of direct consequence may bring 
difficulties in some pollution cases in which the purpose of the expenditure is 
very mixed in the case of taking the threat removal measures. The answer to 
this question could be "no" if the objective of the threat removal measure is not 
to preserve from peril the property involved in a common Maritime adventure, 
but is solely to prevent pollution. On the other hand, the answer could be "yes" 
61 Clause IV. 
62 Clause 1(0). 
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to the question by arguing that the property, ship, could not have been saved 
without the removal oil. 
No responsibility shall arise under the TOVALOP unless written notice of claim 
is received by the participating owner within two years of the date of the 
incident. 63 Limiting notice of claim for a period of time may give rise to 
difficulties where the cause of loss, incident, comes into operation prior to the 
time limit but the actual loss, pollution, for which the liability is sought occurs 
after that limit. Suppose a vessel laden with oil sinks but no or little cargo 
escapes. A number of years later, e.g. after three years, oil is released from the 
rusting hull. The question could arise, as to whether the tanker owner still has 
any liability under TOVALOP, particularly when the owner has abandoned the 
vessel to his hull underwriter as a constructive or actual total loss. The answer 
could be found in some insurance cases which could, by analogy, be applied to 
TOVALOP. In the case of Meretony v. Dunlop/>4 it was held that where 
damage is caused within the limit of time policy, but the extent of it is not 
ascertained until afterwards, the insurer is not liable. In Knight v. Faith65 
however, Lord Campbell66 doubted this rule and stated: 
"If a ship, insured for time, during the time received damage from the perils of the 
sea, though the amount thereof be not ascertained till the expiration of that time, 
and she is kept afloat till then, upon the assured taking proper steps, there does 
not appear any good reasons why they may not, according to the facts, proceed 
against the underwriters either for total or for a partial loss." As a result, by 
63 Clause VIll. 
64 See Willes 1. in Lockyerv. Offley (1786) 1 T.R 260. 
65 (1850) 15 Q.B.D 649. 
66 Id.667 
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analogy, if an incident occurs which is subject to coverage of TOVALOP and 
causes a loss which may not occur or be fully ascertainable until after the 
expiration of notice limit, the TOVALOP ought to be liable. The underwriter, 
therefore, who has paid compensation for pollution damage, after the 
abandonment, will receive the amount of that payment in respect of that 
incident. 67 
The other problem which may come into existence in performance of 
TOVALOP is where the salvors are involved to haul the vessel off the strand 
and the tanker owner is obliged to provide insurance against salvor liability for 
pollution damage which may occur during the salvage effort. Is the cost of such 
insurance included within the TOVALOP's definition of "Owner's Clean up 
Costs" and expenditure reasonably incurred in "Removing the Oil"? The basis 
of TOVALOP is that when a participating tanker spills, or threatens to spill, the 
owner or bareboat charterer takes appropriate action in response to the 
incident. Measures taken include attempts to eliminate the threat, an action to 
prevent or minimise loss or damage which results directly from the escape or 
discharge of oil. Thus, it can be concluded, that if the salvor'S effort is primarily 
directed to prevent or minimise pollution damage or eliminate the threat, it may 
be included as costs for which the owners are responsible under the 
TOVALOP. Otherwise, salvage costs are not recoverable under the owner's 
insurance policy since salvage charges, as a general principle of marine 
insurance law, are not included under "The expenses or services in the nature 
of salvage rendered by the assured or his agents, of any person employed for 
hire by them for the purpose of averting a peril insured against", 68 unless the 
67 Clause VII(C)(a) 
68 S. 85(2). MIA 1906. 
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policy expressly so provides. 69 It must be noted that such expenses may be 
recovered as particular average or as a general average loss, according to the 
circumstances under which they may incur. 
2.4. Waiver of subrogation rights 
It is established in law that a person, by virtue of an indemnity given by him 
to some other persons, is subrogated to the rights and remedies of that person 
assured in relation to subject matter, and only can recover the sum which has 
been paid and not more than it.70 Thus, the right of subrogation is based on 
principle of indemnity71 and can, therefore, arise quite independently of a 
contract. This is supported by doctrine which says that nobody can make profit 
from his loss, i.e. prevention of unjust enrichment. It must also be emphasised 
that it can be modified, excluded or extended by contract. 
The insurer, in the absence of a special contract, must exercise all rights 
and remedies arising from subrogation in the name of assured.72 If the assured 
refuses to allow the insurer to use his name as a plaintiff, the insurer may 
institute an action against the defendant in his own name, and join the assured 
69 S. 85(1), MIA 1906. 
70 This principle is based on the fundamental rule of insurance law which say that, "The contract of 
insurance contained in a marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and 
that this contract means that the assured, in the case of a loss against which the policy has been made, 
shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified." See Brett L.J. in Castellian 
v. Preston (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 380 at p. 386; S. 79 MIA 1906. 
71 per Brown LJ said, at Castellain v. Preston, Id, at p. 401, that subrogation is an equitable doctrine 
which is "a corollary of the great law of indemnity". 
72 Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Nisbet Shipping Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B, 330. 
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as a second defendant.73 The insurer can proceed directly against a third party 
in his own name if that right of action is assigned to him, under special contract, 
by the assured. 74 The assignment of the right to sue from assured to insurer is 
necessary in order to avail the insurer to take action in his own name, provided 
that the assignment is complete, i.e. notice is given to the defendant in 
accordance with Section 136 of Law of Property Act 1925. A bare cause of 
action, that is, the right to sue another in his own name, is not, in general, 
assignable, but one enforced by the insurer is legitimate because it is 
supported by the insurer's interest in respect of the amount of the loss he has 
paid out as a result of the wrong of the defendant. 75 
This insurer's established right has been incorporated in the TOVALOP in 
terms that any payment to a person, "shall be conditional upon either that 
person assigning that Participating Owner his right of action, or authorising him 
to proceed in the name of that person." Such an assignment may encourage 
insurers not to accept liability under TOVALOP. Because, insurers, due to 
some disadvantage of assignment, may not be interested to use the 
assignment as an alternative to subrogation. If insurers take action in their own 
name, it may bring bad publicity following an unsuccessful action. This 
disadvantage seems to have disappeared where the insurer uses the names of 
their insureds. However, assignment does have advantage over subrogation. In 
particular, there will be no requirement that the insured be fully indemnified 
before the insurers can keep everything they recover from the action because 
73 In re Miller, Gibb & Co. Ltd. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 703, 707 
74 Compania Colombiana De Seguros. V. Pacific Steam navigation Co., [1965] 1 Q.B. 101. See also S. 
79 MIA 1906. 
75 Compania Columbiana De Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 Q.B. 101 at p. 112. 
Lord Edumnd Davies. 
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the cause of action is entirely the insurers and the insured has forfeited all 
interest in it. 
Although most cases of subrogation are related to insurers, this doctrine is 
not restricted to the law of insurance.76 It undoubtedly extends to other 
contracts of indemnity such as guarantees given to a creditor on behalf of a 
debtor, although in the former case the indemnifier is subrogated to the rights 
and remedies of the assured or other person indemnified whereas, in the 
latter, he is subrogated to the right of creditor. What is absolutely clear from the 
authorities is that the rights and remedies to which the indemnifier is 
subrogated are those which were vested in the person to whom payment has 
been made, no more no less, and that the rights and liabilities of third parties 
unconnected with contractor are not affected. 
The question which arises is whether the doctrine of subrogation entitles 
tanker owners to recover sums paid to damaged parties in terms of the 
TOVALOP. In the other words, whether the doctrine of subrogation is extended 
to the TOVALOP agreement or not. The consideration of TOVALOP shows that 
tanker owners voluntarily agree to indemnify people affected by oil spillage. In 
contrast, under a marine insurance contract, the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify, under the principle condition that subrogation rights are granted by 
the assured" in manner and to the extent thereby agreed. 1m Thus, a unilateral 
agreement, such as TOVALOP, cannot be treated as a marine insurance 
contract under which the insurer would have automatically, without assignment, 
a right of subrogation, if the insured is fully indemnified. In addition, further 
consideration of TOVALOP indicates that they are also under no statutory or 
76 Lord Diplock in , Orakpo V Manson Investment Co. Ltd, [1978] AC. 95 at p. 104; per Diplock J. in 
Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nisbet Shipping Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 330 atp. 339. 
77 S. 1. MIA. 1906. 
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general duties to make payment. The parties agreed voluntarily, for a 
commercial purpose, to indemnify a person affected by oil spillage. From this it 
can be deduced that TOVALOP is a gratuitous contract of indemnity so far as 
damaged parties are concerned; accordingly, the tanker owners are not entitled 
to recover those sums, if both the owner and the indemnified person suffer 
physical damage as a result of the action of the relevant third person. However, 
this does not mean that tanker owners have no right of recourse, out of the 
Agreement, against third parties, since nothing in the Agreement "shall 
prejudice the right of recourse of participating owner against third parties or 
vessels. "78 
The Agreement, until 1990, contained no provision whereby a participating 
owner can require from a claimant to whom he has made payment, an 
, 
assignation of the claimant s rights of action against third parties responsible in 
law for the relevant damage. A clause79 , in 1990, was inserted in to the 
TOVALOP Standing Agreement, and by reference in to the TOVALOP 
Supplement, which entitles a party to TOVALOP to require assignation or an 
authority to proceed in the name of the person to be compensated as a pre-
condition to payment. The assignment of the right of action may be criticised 
because a bare right of action, such as a mere right to damage for wrongful 
conduct, is not assignable since to allow such an assignment would be to 
encourage undesirable speculation in law suits. Damages in the assigned 
action are too uncertain at the date of assignment and the assignee may be in 
a great protection to procure the court to give him greater damages. Indeed, 
such an assignment would savour of "maintenance" and "champerty" which 
78 Clause VIll(B) 
79 Id. 
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provide a defence to the assignee's action. The position, as mentioned earlier, 
seems to be that a person generally will be allowed to take over another's rights 
by assignment provided that he can show that he has a legitimate commercial 
interest in doing so. r«J The House of Lords, in the Trendtex Trading 
Corporation and Another v. Credit Suisse,81 a case of assignment of a claim 
for breach of contract, which might apply, by analogy, to the tort,82 said that an 
assignee who has a "genuine commercial interest" in the enforcement of a 
claim may take a valid assignment of it so long as the transaction is not 
champertous and it seems that a genuine commercial interest may be 
presented simply because the assignee is a creditor of the assignor. 
This seems to be true, since it is of paramount importance that TOVALOP 
have absolute charge of the running and conduct of the action against the third 
party, and must also avoid the risk of being held champertous, as mentioned 
earlier, and illegal, because only TOVALOP can ensure that the third party is 
fought with maximum ferocity. However, there is no argument as to assignment 
of the fruits of litigation i.e. the assignment of judgement in action. Such 
assignment was held, in Glegg v. Bromley,83 not to savour of champertous 
maintenance because the assignee had no right and the assignor had an 
absolute right to compromise the litigation. 
It may also be argued that what has been paid by the TOVALOP is a mere 
gift, i.e. a gratuitous payment. Thus, assignment of the right of action is 
unenforceable because the assignor, the person whom has been paid, has 
r«J See. YL. Tan. Champertous Contracts and Assignment, 1990, L.Q.R. 656. 
81 [1982] A.C. 679. 
82 Lloyd. L.J., said in Brownton Ltd. v. Edward Moor Inbucon Ltd. [1985] 3 All E.R. 499 at p. 509, 
that the principle of the Trendtey applies to contract and tort alike. 
83 [1912] 3 K.B. 474. 
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suffered no loss. Such an argument may not be correct because there are 
strong authorities (which apply by analogy to the TOVALOP) to the effect that, 
in assigning damages in personal injury cases, the court will make no deduction 
in respect of moneys gratuitously conferred upon a plaintiff from private 
sources. In Cunningham v. Harrison,84 a gratuitous payment by an employer 
to his employee who had sustained personal injuries was not deducted by the 
Court of Appeal from the damaged received. The main reason behind this 
decision was that it would be iniquitous if the kindness and generosity of the 
third parties was to ensure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. Further, in Parry v. 
Cleaver, &5 where the House of Lords held that a police pension should not be 
deducted from damages, Lord Reid stated the principle as follows: 86 
"It would be revolting to the ordinary man's sense of justice, and therefore 
contrary to public policy, that the sufferer should have his damages reduced so 
that he would gain nothing from the benevolence of his friends or relations or of 
the public at large, and the only gainer would be the wrongdoer." 
It may be a useful idea to apply this principle to the case of fund set up to the 
devastating damage caused by oil pollution. It would be in the interests of 
public policy to encourage such a scheme as TOVALOP or CRISTAL by the 
assignment of right of action. 
The question of TOVALOP as a gratuitous agreement was raised by the 
House of Lords in the Esso Bernicia,87 On 30 January 1978 the unladen 
tanker, the Esso Bernicia, was being berthed at an oil terminal at Sullom Voe in 
84 [1973] Q.B. 942. 
&5 [1970] AC. l. 
86 Id.atp.14. 
87 Esso Petroleum v. Hall Russell & Co. (The Esso Beroicia) [1988] 3 W.L.R 730. 
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the Shetland Islands, with three tugs. A fire which broke out in one of these 
tugs caused the towing line to the stern of the vessel to be cast off, resulting in 
loss of control by the other tugs. As a consequence, the vessel came into 
contact with the jetty, causing damage to the vessel and jetty, and the escape 
of a large quantity of bunker fuel. Damages were claimed by a crofter whose 
sheep grazed a seaweed on the polluted foreshore, and cleaning-up expenses 
were claimed by the terminal operator. As the owner of the vessel, Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd (Esso), was a party to TOVALOP, and as the tanker was 
unladen at the time of the incident, compensation was paid to the crofter and 
terminal operator under the terms of TOVALOP, without proof of fault. Having 
made the payment, Esso then commenced legal proceedings in order to seek 
recovery of the sum paid, inter alia, from Hall Russell & Co. Ltd, the builders of 
the tugs which had caught fire and, in Esso's view, the party whose negligence 
was responsible for the incident. Esso was unsuccessful in this action. In the 
House of Lords, Lord Jauncey stated that Esso had been under no statutory 
liability or general duty in law to the crofter and, so far as the crofter was 
concerned, the payment received by them had been entirely gratuitous. The 
payment had been made because Esso had chosen, by entering into and 
remaining a party to TOVALOP, to assume a voluntary obligation to the crofter, 
and not because of any alleged negligence on the part of Hall Russell. 
However, this did not mean that Esso never had a remedy in respect of the 
sum paid under TOVALOP. They could either have obtained from the crofter 
and the term inal operators assignation of their claim against Hall Russell and 
sued that company in their own name. Alternatively, they could have sought 
permission to sue in their names.88 
88 Id. Lore Jauncey of Tullichettle, atp. 745. 
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The decision in the Esso Bernicia may cast doubt over the existence of the 
general insurers' rule of subrogation rights, under which the insurer is 
subrogated to the right of the insured whom he has indemnified. It has been 
well established in insurance law that subrogation applies only where the 
insured has a right of action. 89 In other words, if the insured , apart from 
agreement or compromise, has no right of action under which he could pursue, 
surely the insurer would not be in a better position. The question which arises is 
whether the tanker owner, the insured, has any right of action against the 
person whom he paid and who acted negligently. According to the decision of 
the Esso Bernecia, the tanker owners are not, after payment, entitled, unless 
under assignment of the right of action, to sue the negligent person, i.e. the 
third party, in order to recover the sum which they have paid, since what has 
been paid is entirely gratuitous. As a result, the insurer has no right of 
subrogation, under TOVALOP, against the third party, after indemnifying the 
tanker owner, the insured. However, if before the participating owner has 
satisfied in full his financial responsibilitySU under the Agreement, the insurer 
paid compensation for pollution damage or costs of threat removal measures, 
he, up to the amount paid, acquires by subrogation the right which the person 
so compensated would have enjoyed under the Agreement. 91 
The waiver of the right of subrogation may also be criticised, since tanker 
owners, the insureds, have, by waiver, done something to prejudice the 
insurers' right. This is perhaps because of the general principle that the right of 
89 Simpson and Co. et al. v. Thompson, Burrell et al (1877) 3 App.Cas. 279; Midland Insurance v. 
Smith and Wife [1881] 6 Q.E.D. 561. 
SU Refrence to "liability" have been amended, in 1990, to "financial responsibility" in view of the fact 
that between claimant and defendant scheme is voluntary. 
91 Clause VII(D), 1990 TOVALOP (SA) 
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subrogation potentially exists for the benefit of the insurers, therefore, the 
insured must not do anything which might prejudice those rights which he is 
liable to repay to the insurer as damages for the amount which the insurers 
have paid, or where the insurer is able to avoid liability. This criticism may be 
removed if the insurers voluntarily agree, in the policy, not to exercise the right 
of subrogation. In other words, the insurer may not take advantage of 
indemnities, if they have either agreed to waive subrogation or have not 
included the provision in their contracts. The above mentioned argument may 
be also applied where the tanker owners have prejudiced the right of 
subrogation by acceptance of liability for occurrence brought about by a third 
party without their fault. 
It is unclear in CRISTAL, which is also a voluntary agreement, whether, 
there is a right to sue a responsible party, i.e. the vessel owner, for 
compensation which it has paid to a claimant. Traditionally, CRISTAL has 
required a claimant to exhaust all legal remedies against third parties before 
receiving paymentfrom CRISTAL.92 On some occasions, this has caused some 
temporary delays in recovery by claimants. Nevertheless, the revision of 
CRISTAL attempts to permit it to consider each case and to make payment to a 
claimant without the latter having to exhaust their legal remedies,93 in exchange 
for appropriate assignment, as discussed in TOVALOP, of a" rights of any 
nature or kind, i.e. assignment of the cause of action or the fruits of litigation, 
and transfer of claims against third parties to CRISTAL. 94 Otherwise, CRISTAL 
92 Lawrence F, Cohen, Revision of TOVALOP and CRiSTAL :Strong Ships for Stormy Sea [1987] 
J.Mar. Law & Comm.. 525 at p. 534. 
93 Clause IV(D)(8). Revision 1987. 
94 Clause. IV(D)(9)(a). Revision 1987. 
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does not subrogate rights because its indemnity, the same as TOVALOP, is 
entirely on a voluntary basis. 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL have provided useful voluntary compensation 
systems for assisting victims of pollution damage resulting out of oil spills by 
tankers, without the creation of a large bureaucracy of administrators and 
without the generation of excessive funds by means of tax. They offer the 
potential third party claimants a simple and prompt vehicle for recovery of 
damages without resort to protracted litigation and excessive legal costs which 
were involved in the tort liability based on the proof of fault and foreseeability of 
risks and damages. In this sense liability without fault, it is like insurance in that 
there is no need to prove fault and the insured is indemnified on the occurrence 
of certain special events which are not foreseeable. 
One of the most important characteristics of the TOVALOP is that the 
tanker owners, the members, mutually promise to insure, risk-sharing, each 
other against the liability which they have voluntarily assumed. In other words, 
a person by entering his tanker becomes a member of TOVALOP and whilst his 
liability is insured by the TOVALOP he is also regarded as an insurer of the 
liability of the other members. Thus, the TOVALOP is essentially an insurance, 
i.e. a contract of indemnity where the parties to the scheme indemnify each 
other. However, under the TOVALOP scheme, in contrast with the insurance 
(as a bilateral contract) in that the assured is entitled to claim an indemnity, it is 
the third party who actually makes the claim. 
The Federation that runs TOVALOP, normally requires that financial 
capability, as a fundamental condition of membership in the Agreement, be 
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demonstrated by oil pollution insurance cover, which is provided by one of the 
recognised insurance companies, or a guarantee of a nature which satisfies the 
Federation that an applicant who wishes to become a party to the Agreement is 
in every way able to meet the maximum potential claims under TOVALOP, 
including the supplement. Under this condition, there is a difference between 
TOVALOP's insurance scheme and other insurance contracts in which usually 
an applicant of insurance becomes an insured, or member, only by signing 
insurance contract, without showing financial ability. 
The voluntary nature of the arrangement may cause disputes between 
tanker owners, as insureds, and insurance companies, as insurers, over the 
undertaken liability under the Agreement. Therefore an insurer should take a 
cautious attitude in providing insurance cover for the gratuitous payment which 
is made by TOVALOP's members. The assumed legal liability under TOVALOP 
is far from the general principle of liability insurance under which no liability 
must be admitted by the insured without the insurer's prior consent in writing. 
Disputes may also arise when the insurer is dealing with TOVALOP liability in a 
possible general average where a mixture of motives are involved. Every claim 
must be notified to the Federation within two years of the incident. This time 
limit illustrates a difference between insurance companies and TOVALOP 
where each company has its own time limit for notice of claim. The other 
problem which may come into existence in performance of insurance is that 
when the insurer is obliged to provide insurance against salvor liability for 
pollution, damage may be caused in the process of the salvage effort, as a 
preventive measure which is payable under the TOVALOP and is not covered 
by the tanker owner's liability insurance, unless it expressly provides so. The 
waiver of the subrogation right, under TOVALOP, is a diversion from the 
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general principle of insurance law under which the insurer has subrogated the 
rights of those whom he has indemnified. 
Generally speaking, on the one hand, TOVALOP is like insurance in that 
there is no need to prove fault. It is essentially a contract of indemnity where 
the parties to the scheme indemnify each other. On the other hand, it is not like 
insurance because of problems which appear to arise in relation to subrogation 
of claims which is an automatic insurance right. Again, it is perhaps not like 
insurance in that the tanker owners cannot become members of the 
Federation without proving financial stability and insurance back-up. Again, it is 
like insurance in that the question of foreseeability of the risk does not appear 
to arise if the occurrence actually happens. However, it is unlike insurance in 
that insurance is a bilateral contract between an insured and an insurer, 
whereas under the TOVALOP scheme, it is the third party who is not a party to 
the main agreement who actually make the claim. All these similarities and 
differences indicate that tanker owners, in the performance of their liability 
under the Agreement, need a special insurance contract. To do this, it is 
suggested that the terms on TOVALOP liability are automatically incorporated 
in to the insurance policy. 
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Chapter 3. Possibility of compensation for pollution victims under the 
International Convention for Protection of Pollution from Ships: MARPOL 
73ns 
3.1. The problems 
While devastating accidental pollution receives sensational publicity, a 
much greater amount of oil and other pollutants is being discharged 
deliberately. Most figures estimate that the percentage of operational discharge 
is higher than the total of other ship generated pollution discharge. 1 
The tanker in which the oil is carried is normally cleaned while the ship is 
returning to its loading port. In modern ships the normal procedure is to use 
special machines which blast jets of high pressure water on the tank sides 
removing the oily residues which are left after the oil has been unloaded. This 
procedure results in a mixture of oil and water at the bottom of cargo tanks. 
Some of tanks are also filled with water on the return voyage, to make the 
ship low enough in the water in order to be properly manoeuvrable. The water 
used in this way also becomes contaminated with oil residues. In either case, 
the mixture of oil and water has to be disposed of before a fresh cargo of oil is 
loaded. In the past the normal practice was to pump these directly to the sea. 2 
Pollution problems may also arise regarding ships which burn heavy fuel 
oil. During of the voyage, the purification of the fuel oil produces a quantity of 
sludge, normally this sludge is kept in sludge tanks but eventually the content of 
tanks must either be discharged to a shore reception facility or at sea. 
1 National Academy of Science, Petroleum in the Marine Environment 1975, cited in R, Michael M, 
Goingle & Mark Zacher. Pollution Politics and International Law, 1979 Berlcely University of 
California Press. 
2 The International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention, 1978, IMO Publication, p. 
14. 
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The nature of the maritime business mandates multilateral attention to 
resolve the pollution problem which stems from commercial activities. 3 Although 
unilateral action by a port state or ship owning states may begin to correct the 
problem for that state it does not encourage international standards. Unilateral 
action also subjects the ship and its matters to conflicting standards of liability. 
The International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(1973),4 and its 1978 protocoi,s hereinafter MARPOL 73178, which became 
effective on October 1983 are an international response to the threat of 
contamination of the marine environment. The goal of the Convention is to 
reduce and ultimately to eliminate both forms of accidental and operational 
pollution from ships at sea by regulating all technical aspects of disposal, and 
all kinds of pollutants listed in (5) Annexes to the Convention. 6 
MARPOL has been implemented in the UK by the Merchant Shipping (Oil 
Pollution) Order 1983 which repealed some of provisions of the 1971 Act and 
the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1974. 
The MARPOL has tried to prevent operational pollution through introducing 
anti- pollution measures into design-e.g. segregated ballast tank, clean ballast 
tank, crude oil washing and inert gas system and double bottom-, equipment 
and operation of ships. Reduction of accident is principally achieved by 
introducing strict standards and navigation procedures on a world-wide basis. 
Thus, while it is primarily designed to reduce operational pollution damage it 
3 Abecassis, D. Marine Oil Pollution in Law in the View of Shell International Maritime Limited, 8 Intl 
Business Law, 1980, p.3. 
4 12 I.L.M., p. 1319. 
5 17 LL.M., p. 546. 
6 Originally a ratifying state had to accept Annex (I) (II) but 1978 Protocol deleted Annex (II) as a 
condition for ratification, See !MCO Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention 1978, 7 
March, Do, TSPP/Conf/l0/add, 1. 
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has also the secondary advantage of reducing pollution resulting from an 
accident. 
MARPOL aims to prevent all forms of pollution from ships by providing 
special technical standards and equipment. The interesting question which may 
arise is whether lack of such technical equipment makes the vessel 
unseaworthy for particular marine adventure insurance. Marine insurance law 
generally provides that the insurer may avoid liability in respect of claims which 
may arise by virtue of unseaworthiness. In all voyage policies there is an 
implied warranty that the vessel must be seaworthy at the commencement of 
the voyage. 7 In a time policy there is such an implied warranty, but where, with 
the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in a unseaworty state, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness.8 It may be 
argued that the Marine Insurance Act, MIA, 1906 merely reflects seaworthiness 
to policies on ship and cargo but not to policies which cover liability. Donaldson 
J. in Campania Maritime San Basilio SA. v. The Oceanus Mutual 
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. (The Eurysthen es), 9 held that the 
Act, by section 74, also applies to liability insurance and there was no reason 
why the provision should not apply to such policies. 
Section 39(1) MIA 1906 provides, " A ship is deemed to be seaworthy 
when she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the 
seas of the adventure insured." It is, therefore, obvious that there can be no 
fixed and positive standard of seaworthiness, and it must vary with regard to 
each particular adventure. Lord Cairns in Steel v. The State Lines SS. CO,10 
7 S. 39(1)(2) MIA 1906. 
8 S. 39(5); see also Alexander John Dudgeon v. Pembroke (1877) 2 App. Cas. 284. 
9 [1976]2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 at p. 174. 
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said that the ship "should be in a condition to encounter whatever perils of the 
sea a ship of that kind, and laden in that way, may be fairly expected to 
encounter" in a voyage, even the extent of warranty may be different for the 
same voyage at different seasons, for the same voyage at the same season 
according to whether the ship is in ballast or loaded with one kind of cargo or 
another.11 Thus it can be said the ship is not seaworthy if she is not, due to lack 
of required equipment, fit to carry the oil or other substance to the destination 
contemplated by the policy.12 As a result, it can be said that although MARPOL 
is not itself an insurance scheme, but its technical standards may have direct 
effect on the insurance of a tanker carrying oil or other substances, then if 
tankers do not come up to MARPOL standards, they will become unseaworthy 
for particular voyage and they are not, therefore, covered by the insurance. 
3.2. Discharge standards 
MARPOL 73178 permits operational discharge as long as the tanker is fifty 
nautical miles distant from the "nearest land, "13 or is not in a designated "special 
area". This area is defined as an area where for a recognised technical reason 
in relation to its oceanographic and ecological condition and to the particular 
character of its traffic,' the adoption of special mandatory methods for 
prevention of sea pollution by oil is required. 14 Special areas include the entire 
Mediterranean sea, the Baltic sea, the Red sea, and the Persian Gulf. 1s In 
10 (1877) 3 App. Cas. 72 atp. 77. 
11 Per Cur. Daniels v. Harris (1874) 1 L.R. C.P. 1 at p. 6. 
12 S. 40(2) MIA 1906. 
13 Nearest land is defined by Art.I (9) so that the Great Barrier Reef is protected by measuring the 50 
miles from its outer edge. 
14 MARPOL 73, Annex 1, Reg, 1 (10). 
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these areas all discharges, except clean ballast and segregated ballast, are 
prohibited. 16 A 12 miles discharge ban is provided for ships other than tankers 
A stipulation of a restriction in the ability to discharge oil in special areas, 
may relieve the insurer from liability under a policy against oil pollution. This is 
because any restriction imposed on the type of trade or navigation of a ship to 
a geographical limit are generally regarded as warranties17 the breach of which 
will relieve the insurer from liability. In Colledge v. Harry,18 a rule providing that 
a vessel should not sail on specified voyages at specified times was held to be 
warranty. Thus, the insurer will be relieved from liability, under a policy covering 
pollution liability at sea, if the policy states that discharge of oil is not allowed in 
a special area under MARPOL. It may be said that such a restriction is not a 
warranty, but a mere exception to cover, the effect of which is not to discharge 
insurer from liability but merely ensure that the insurer is not at risk while the 
exception is operating. The question was raised in Birrell and Others v. Dryer 
and Others,19 in which it was assumed without argument that such a restriction 
clause was a warranty, so that the underwriters were not liable for a loss 
occurring after it had ceased to be infringed.20 In this case a time policy 
contains the clause "warranted no St. Lawrence between on October 1 and 
April 1", and the vessel was in St. Lawrence on October, but emerged without 
loss, and during the currency of the policy a loss occured. It was held that the 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Reg. 10 (4). 
17 S. 38 of :MIA 1906. 
18 (1851) 6 Exch. 205. 
19 (1884) 9 App. Cas. 345. 
20 See also Scrutton 1. in Morgan v. Provincial Ins. Co. [1932] 2 K.B 70 at p. 80; and Pollock C.B. in 
Colledgev. Harry (1851) 6 Exch. 205. 
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underwriter could not avoid payment on the ground that between October 1 and 
April 1 the vessel was in St. Lawrence, i.e. breach of warranty, since such a 
warranty merely defines the risk insured against something and does not mean 
a condition or promise that breach voids the whole policy. It seems that in 
deciding where a restriction is warranty or exception, much attention must be 
paid to the manner in which the particular restriction is phrased. 
The Convention also set the total quantity of the oil a tanker may discharge 
outside of the prohibited area. Tankers would only be allowed to discharge up 
to 60 Litres ,100 PPM, per mile, and the total quantity could not exceed 1/1500 
of the cargo carried for an existing tanker and 1/30,000 for a new tanker.21 
Thus, there is illegal discharge if the spilled oil is over the permitted level. This 
illegal discharge cannot be subject to an insurance policy even where there is 
an implied warranty that adventure insured is a lawful one and will be carried 
out in a lawful manner.22 The main reason behind this principle is that, if the 
original contract being invalid and, therefore, incapable of beig enforced, 
meant that a collateral contract founded upon it could not be enforced. Thus, 
the question of illegality not only affects the insured but also the insurer, so that 
where illegality is established the insurer will be unable to recover his premium, 
and if the risk is illegal, the insurer will be discharged from allliability.23 
However, whether a statute is such as to render any adventure, in violation 
of its terms illegal or whether its scope is limited to the mere infliction of penalty 
is often a difficult question to determ ine, and depends upon a proper 
construction of the statute concerned in order to determ ine what was the 
21 Id. Reg., 9(l)(a)(v). 
22 S. 41 MIA 1906. 
23 The court has refused to give an effect to an insurance which is seen to be illegal. See Gedge v. 
Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation, [1900] 2 Q.B. 214. 
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intention of the legislation. It is clear from the MARPOL, as implemented in the 
U.K. that the violation of its terms, e.g. illegal discharge, do not render the 
adventure illegal but only provides that a person found guilty of an oil pollution 
offence is liable on a summary conviction to a fine. 24 This indicates that the 
Regulation has made a distinction, as it was made by the MIA 1906, between 
an illegal adventure and adventure carried out in an illegal manner. Thus, the 
discharge of oil, as an adventure, is not illegal up to a certain level and, 
therefore, any liability which arises from such a discharge can be subject to an 
insurance policy. But such a legal adventure may be rendered illegal when 
discharge is over a permitted level and in consequence is only subject to a 
penalty which may be covered by an insurance policy. As a result, if the 
adventure can lawfully be performed, and some illegality is committed in the 
course of it, which was not intended at the time when the policy was effected, 
the right of the underwriter and assured may be wholly unaffected for legal 
adventure. 
There is a possibility that illegal discharge may occur purely because of an 
act of the master. It may be asked is there any liability for the assured's owner 
against the master's illegal act? In Wilson v. Rankin 25 it was held, that where 
the act complained of as being illegal was the act of the master, there must be 
circumstances from which the knowledge of the owners may be presumed, in 
order that they may be affected by such act. The rule of this decision, however, 
seems to have been somewhat extended by the MIA 1906, ss. 41, where it is 
stated that an assured will not be excused from the consequences of some 
illegality, on the part of the master, unless it is clear that not only was the act 
24 Reg. 34, the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Order 1983. 
25 (1865) 1 Q.B.D. 162. 
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done without his knowledge and consent, but that nothing in his own conduct 
was conducive to the illegality being committed. The decision and principle 
seems to be in contrast with the decision of the House of Lords in Federal 
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. and another v. Department of Trade and 
Industry,26 in which it was held that the owner and the master could each be 
convicted of an illegal discharge of oil. This decision was reflected in the 
Regulation of 34 of the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Order 
1983, in which it was stipulated that, "the owner andZ7 master of the ship shall 
each be guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction." This was 
because the Regulation intended to act as deterrent not only to the master of 
offending ship but to the owner as well. 
It would be very difficult to identify the discharge of oil from a particular 
tanker if no sample is taken. The tests have shown that effluents with oil 
contents produce no visible traces of 100 PPM discharge, and are undetectable 
by remote sensing equipment.28 Therefore, it may be concluded that whenever 
remote sensing equipment indicates the presence of an oil slick, the oil content 
in this slick is always more than 100 PPM, and constitutes clear evidence of 
violation of discharge by ships other than oil tankers. 
It is difficult to say what measures should be taken in order to remedy this 
problem. One measure that might be useful is to "decrease the discharge norm 
for all ships. It would certainly be a good idea to set the discharge norm, of 
26 [1974] 2 All E.R. 97. 
27 The word "and" was replaced to the word "or" in the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1974, 
in order to be more consistent with the decision of the Federal Navigation ... , id, in which it was held 
that the word "or" was used in conjunctively and not in an alternative and exclusively sense. 
28 The test was held in the framework of the European Communities and the Bon Agreement 
Organisation. This is quoted from Ton Ijltra,. Enforcement of the MARPOL: Deficient or Impossible? 
1989, Marine Pollution Bulletin, No. 12, p. 596 at p.597 
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discharge of oil, on the same level which has been set for special areas- i.e. on 
15 PPM".29 This also would contribute to an overall decrease of inputs of oily 
substances and it might contribute to more satisfactory enforcement of the 
discharge proviso of the Convention. 
The Convention also required that the ships must have a discharge 
monitoring and control system, oily water separating equipment, and an oil 
filtering system. Such equipment will ensure that any oily mixture discharged at 
sea after passing through it has an oil content not exceeding 100 PPM for any 
ship of 400 ton, grt and above. 
3.3. Criminal liability for pollution offence and compensation 
for damages resulting from such offence 
Any violation of the requirement of the present Convention is prohibited 
and sanctions are established under the law of administration of the ship 
concerned wherever the violation occurs.30 Subject to certain exceptions,31 the 
Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1983, which 
implemented the obligations of MARPOL 1973 and its 1978 Protocols, make it 
an offence to fail to comply with requirements contained in Regulations 12, 13, 
and 16, concerning the discharge of oil or oily mixture. 
A person guilty of the offences shall be liable on conviction by the Magistrates 
Court of a fine not exceeding £50,000 or on conviction on indictment to 
unlimited fine.32 In addition, breach of requirements such as-oil prevention 
29Id. 
30 MARPOL 73, Art. 4(1). 
31 These are set out in Reg. 11 of the 1983 Regulation and include discharges necessary to secure the 
safety of a ship or saving life at sea. 
94 
certificate, oil record book- is an offence punishable on summary conviction by 
a fine not exceeding £10,000 and on indictment by unlimited fine. 33 It is a 
defence to the offence, of contravening of the Regulations, for the owner and 
master of the vessel to show, on the balance of probabilities, that he took all 
reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the 
offence. 34 
One of the difficulties concerning the imposition of fines is that they are far 
from adequate to have any deterrent effect. Morover it still remains legal to take 
out an insurance policy against fines. On the face of the Regulations, the power 
to impose a fine of 50,000 on summary conviction and unlimited fine on 
indictment seems commensurate with the gravity of pollution offences. In 
practice, fines have never approached this level, perhaps, partly because the 
majority of prosecutions take place before Magistrates who are reluctant to 
regard deterrence as the guiding factor in determining the amount of any fine. 35 
Indeed, at least in respect of foreign ships, the only person before the court is 
the master of the vessel, and in such a case the court is obliged to ignore the 
fact that the owner (or his insurer) may be prepared to stand behind the master 
and indemnify him for fines levied on him. To achieve sufficient deterrent 
effect, it is appropriate that the courts treat environmental offences seriously. 
To do this, it is suggested that the courts take into account the circumstances of 
the discharge, the benefit which occurred to the owner of the vessel where the 
discharge was intentional and the damage which has been caused to the 
32 Reg. 34 (2) of the 1983 Regulations. 
33 Reg. 34 (1), Id 
34 Reg. 34 (3). Id. 
35 See. e.g. S. 35 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, which requires a court to have regard to the 
means of the person charged. 
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environment thereby. In addition courts should not relate the sentence to the 
ability of the person charged to pay the sum. 
Regulations channelled liability to master and owner. 36 The question here 
is whether both owner and master can be brought to trial and convicted for the 
same incident. This was discund owner must be construed conjunctively, not in an al 
Navigation Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry.37 It was held that the 
words master avT 
and exclusionary sense. Thus, the question of insurance against fines involves 
not only the shipowner and his P & I Clubs but also the master, even he is not 
personally blameworthy: the fault may be with no one, or with the owner or the 
crew. 
The size of fines imposed by courts vary with the seriousness of the 
offences. In Johtf8vtt"W~Eirl Mcilmie rnertba:hi imip was lWde!aJj Steamship 
under Scottish jurisdiction with discharging some three to six tons of oil from the 
vessel. The master was charged under the section 2 (1) of the Merchant 
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971. He pleaded guilty and fined £250,000 by a 
Sheriff court. He appealed against the decision and it was held that a fine of 
£250,000, imposed on the master of the vessel, was harsh and oppressable 
and a fine of £750 should be substituted. The main reason behind this decision 
was that, the appropriate fine for this particular offence should be determined 
with regard to whole circumstances of the case and it is not proper approach to 
take into account, as the Sheriff did, the total expenses incurred in the cleaning 
operation and add to the personal penalty. 
36 Art. 4 (1) , Id. 
37 [1974] 2 All E.R. 97. 
38 1980 S.L.T. 89. 
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This decision is subject to criticism. If the object of the Act is to make the 
shipowner and master take all possible precautions to avoid oil pollution, as 
was provided by the Convention,39 then the fines imposed must be substantial. 
One of the main factors which should be contemplated in fixing the fine is the 
availability of insurance. If there is insurance, the fine should be high; if there is 
not only a modest fine should be imposed. If there is insurance and the fine is 
high, the insurer has to pay a large sum which, consequently, will increase the 
premium. The master/owner, therefore, will suffer from such an increase. This 
situation will encourage them to take precautionary measurers which eventually 
leads to a deterrent effect. 
It should be remembered that penalising deliberate or negligent acts of 
pollution enables the victim to obtain compensation through civil proceedings in 
MARPOL contracting States. For example in the U.K., the relationship between 
crime and tort compensation became quite obvious when the criminal courts 
were given powerW to order an offender to pay compensation for any personal 
injury, damage or loss resulting from an offence. A compensation order should 
only be made where the convicted person's responsibility is clear.41 In other 
words compensation for pollution damage, resulting from illegal discharge, will 
be awarded only if the offence is established and has led to a conviction, i.e. 
where it is proved that discharge took place within a prohibited zone or that it 
was of a such a quantity that it exceeded those authorised. 
39 Art. 4 (4). MARPOL 73 
40 Power of the Criminal Courts Act 1973, S. 35(8), as substituted Criminal Justice Act 1988. The 
power was extended to Scottish courts in 1981 by Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, part. IV. 
41 R. v. Chapel, [1984] 128 S.l 629. 
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Civil liability is not a pre-condition for criminal compensation,42 so that an 
order for payment of compensation might be made where, for example, there is 
no civil liability for breach of statutory duty. It seems that this procedure is 
unsuitable for pollution cases where there are complex questions of 
quantification of loss and proof. In such cases, civil liability may offer more 
advantage to pollution victims. For example, there is a higher likelihood of 
recovery because the defendant may be able to call on a policy of insurance, 
and a lower burden of proof. The advantage of civil procedure in civil liability, 
as to criminal procedure in which it is necessary to establish the criminal guilt 
as a precondition for compensation order, may become less when it is realised 
that in crime, the award of compensation is ancillary to criminal process. Thus, 
if the damage suffered by the victim is the result of a prohibited discharge by 
the provision concerned and is punished by fines, it will therefore suffice for him 
to establish that the damage was indeed caused by that discharge. 
However, where a compensation order is made, it may be less favourable 
to the pollution victims than a civil judgement because a civil judgement is 
generally for the full amount of the victims' loss, without reference to the 
defendants means, whereas a compensation order should not be beyond the 
means of offender.43 It is certainly better for pollution victims to receive some 
compensation rather than none at all. Yet, there is a loss to be borne, why 
should it not be borne by the offender rather than by victims? Why should the 
victim's right be subordinated to the offender'S convenience by a statutory 
provision which requires the court to take into account the "means" of the 
offender when making a compensation order? The "means" principle may be 
42 Id. 
43 S. 35(4) of the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973. 
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defended, as being in the public interest, where imposing large financial 
burdens on poor offenders may increase future offences, thereby victimising 
more people.44 However, there is not such a defence where the imposed 
sentence is a fine and the offenders are shipowners with huge investments. But 
where offending shipowner's means are limited and the imposed sentence is a 
fine, it is suggested that the court gives priority to the compensation order, 
since where the punishment is restricted only to a fine the public interest is not 
so great as to call for immediate carrying out of the sentence. 
It seems, at first glance, that it is against public policy that a punishment 
imposed upon an offender should be shifted on to the shoulders of another, 
e.g. an insurer. This concept may be well justified when it is realised that, as a 
general rule of law, nobody can benefit from his wrong or crime. 45 The 
application of this concept with respect to insurance policy may be questioned 
in some instances. It may well have application in the first party insurance 
where the insured is claming in respect of a loss suffered solely by him, then it 
is clear that he cannot recover, or benefit from the insurance policy, if the loss 
was caused by his deliberate act. But the idea of the insured benefiting from his 
own wrong does not seem to have justification in the third party (liability) policy 
where any indemnity received by insured goes to his third party, e.g. pollution 
victims or society as a whole, not to the insured himself. 
The law, statutory or common law, has made a distinction, in the 
application of the rule of public policy, between the insured's deliberate act, 
mens rea-a guilty mind, and negligent act, with no mens rea. Although 
44 Asworth. A Punishment and Compensation, [1986] 6 O.J.S. 86 at p. 110. 
45 TIris concept has been based on the famous dictum of "ex turpi cause non oritur actio"(no action can 
arise from a wrongful cause). See it in Burrough J, Richardson v. Mellish, [1824] 2 Bing. 229 at p. 252. 
For further public policy consideration, see. Shand, Unblinking the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the 
Law of Contract, [1972] 30 C.L.J. 144 at 161. 
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insurance is not available for those who intentionally, wilfully, commit a crime,46 
there is no clear rule that public policy prevents a man from insuring against the 
consequence of his own negligence. In Tinline v. White Cross Insurance 
Association,47 the insured who had a third party policy in respect of injury or 
death arising out of the use of his car was involved in accidents resulting in 
death of pedestrians, because of driving at an excessive speed. The court held 
that the insurer were liable to indemnify, despite the fact that the insured had 
acted in a grossly negligent manner.48 This verdict is subject to doubt with 
regard to the decision in Gray V. Bar, Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (Third 
PartyJ,49 It was held that an insured who deliberately embarks on a course of 
conduct which is criminal and likely to occasion a loss under the policy as the 
foreseeable and probable result of that conduct, may not on the ground of 
public policy seek to be indemnified for that loss even though it was 
unintended. 50 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is not possible to draw a simple 
line between a loss intentionally caused by a criminal act, in respect of which 
no indemnity is permitted, and a loss caused by a negligent act of the insured, 
also criminal, in respect of which a claim is maintainable. As a result, a correct 
distinction should be sought in terms of the requirement of the public policy in 
each particular case. 
46 S. 55(2) MIA 1906. 
47 [1921] 3 KB. 327 
48 See also James v. British General Insurance Co. [1927] 2 KB. 311, which involved similar fact. 
49 [1971] 2 Q.B. 554. 
50 Similar decision was reached in Haseldine v. Hosken [1933] 1 KB. 822 
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It may be asked whether, on the ground of the public policy, a shipowner 
be allowed to recover a fine imposed by the court for strict liability offence of oil 
pollution under the 1983 Regulations from insurers. It is suggested that if a fine 
is imposed following an intentional, mens rea, discharge of oil, there is no doubt 
that the rule of public policy may prevent the insured for enforcing the claim, 
simply because the courts should not allow someone to profit from his 
intentional criminal conduct. There is no rule, in common law or marine 
insurance law, which prevents a shipowner or master from insuring against 
such a fine imposed after negligent discharge of oil, or the strict offence, for 
which he can be prosecuted whether or not he is in a way to blame, or in 
special circumstances in which the discharge has happened, e.g. when the ship 
is holed in a storm or by another vessel while it is tied up. It may be said, that 
the rule of public policy may not allow such a cover since it ignores the 
deterrent effect, to prevent tortfeasor and others from doing the same thing 
again, which is usually expected from imposition of criminal fine. In other words, 
offering insurance against a fine may escape criminal liability and therefore, 
would be illegal and unenforceable as being contrary to the public policy.51 The 
effect of this criticism may be reduced when it is realised that a deterrent effect 
may remafn since claims for payment of fines will be reflected in the increased 
"call" (the P & I Club equivalent of a premium) made on him when he wants to 
renew his cover. 
It is, therefore, concluded that a conviction under the 1983 Regulations, 
which inevitably carries with it the message that the defendants have failed to 
disprove negligence, would normally be sufficient, because of the seriousness 
of the offence, to prevent them from enforcing an indemnity against fines. This 
51 As it was said by Rowlett J, in R Leslie v. Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency Ltd. (1915] 
1 K.B. 652 at p. 658-9. See also Lord Denning in Asky v. Golden Wine [1948] 2 All E.R 35 at p. 38. 
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is because the law recognises that, in the public interest, such an act should be 
deterred and moreover that it would be shock to the public conscience if a man 
could use the insurance policy to pay such a fine. This is why, it is suggested 
that, in order to prevent insuring against a fine, to make such insurance 
criminal, despite being of some unfairness in outlawing insurance against all 
fines without exception, is due to the absolute nature of the offence of causing 
pollution. 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
MARPOL considered that the allowance of discharges of pollutant in the 
past, was as a result of the absence of proper compliance mechanisms, 
technical equipment and enforcement. In response to this dilemma, it has 
provided for the right of control of discharges and installation of monitoring and 
recording devices. It has also modified the traditional jurisdiction regime for the 
high seas in order to give coastal and port states certain rights of inspection. 
There is of course a relationship between insurance and the standard of 
construction and equipment prescribed in the Convention tend to be adopted 
by classification societies for ships seeking insurance on normal terms. 
Similarly, such standards in the Convention may in time be referred to as the 
criteria by which the insurer may judge whether the seaworthiness warranty in 
his policy has been observed. 
Although MARPOL is not, in its origin, a compensation regime, penal ising 
illegal discharge, it enables the victims to obtain compensation in the criminal 
courts, with regard to civil proceedings, of contracting states. This does not of 
course deprive a pollution victim of his right to sue an offender for damages 
and losses in a civil court if he so wished, although there should be no double 
recovery. However, incorporating a compensation order into the criminal 
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process does not secure compensation in cases where the offender is not 
convicted or may not be found. Thus, it is recommended that Contracting 
States, through their national legislation, set up a crim inal pollution 
compensation fund, which is financed by a recoverable fine for illegal discharge 
and a levy on the entered vessel which is carrying oil or other hazardous 
substance in their territory, in order to cover those who have suffered pollution 
damage from unknown resources or unconvicted offenders. 
An imposed fine, within UK law, is not adequate to discourage violation of 
Convention. In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary that the amount of the 
fine is substantially increased. The pollution offence is very often dealt with in 
lower courts which do not have substantial powers. Thus, sensible provision 
should be made to transfer the competence to the courts which are involved in 
trial of serious crime. 
Though it is probably not criminal to insure against fines which are 
imposed on to the master or owner for the negligent discharge of oil, such 
insurance should almost certainly be illegal and unenforceable because of 
being contrary to the rule of public policy. To solve this confusion, it is 
suggested that insurance of this type, should be criminalised through 
Parliament, even insurance against fines imposed following the negligent 
discharge of oil, as a serious offence. This would also remove the criticism that 
prevention of insurance against such a fine, which is imposed following an 
operational discharge, is contrary to the liability insurance policy which aims to 
cover the negligent insured for pollution damage resulting from accidental 
discharge. 
Chapter 4. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, CLC. 
4.1. Historical background 
The shock of the Torrey Canyonl incident in March 1967 revealed the fact 
that, at that time, inadequate provisions existed in international law to enable 
government and others affected by marine oil pollution damage to recover the 
considerable damage and expenditure involved in the preventive measures and 
cleaning-up operations. Following this disaster the International Maritime 
Consultative Organisation, IMCO, began an urgent investigation of the problem. 
On the 29 of November 1969, a new international agreement, The International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, hereinafter referred to as 
CLC, was signed.2 
In 1976 a protocol was adopted and amended the units of account in which 
limits of liability are expressed. It came into force on April 1981. Following the 
Amoco Cadiz incident and the effect of strong inflation, it became clear in early 
1980, that the compensation available for oil pollution was in need of revision. 
Accordingly on 29 May 1984, a further protocol was adopted by the 
International Maritime Organisation, IMO, in order to increase the liability limits 
of the treaty. The 1984 Protocol was, due to difficulties in bringing it into force, 
amended by the 1992 protocol which retained much of the substances of the 
1984 Protocol but the qualifications for membership were lowered. 
1 The vessel was owned by the Barracuda Tanker Company of Bermuda which was associated with the 
Union Oil Company of Los Angeles and for taxation purpose was registered in Liberia at the time of 
incident, the ship was on lease to the Union Oil Company, but had been chartered by British Petroleum 
Co. Ltd for a voyage from the Persian Gulf to Milford Haven. It was stranded on the Seven Stones, off 
the west coast of England: see details in, Home Office Report: The Torrey Canyon (Cmnd. 3246) 1967. 
2 It entered into force on June 1975 and until 16 February 1993 the CLC had 79 contracting states. See 
Convention in 6E. Bendict on Admiralty 6-62. 133. 1990; 9 I.L.M. 45. 1970. The Merchant Shipping 
(Oil Pollution) Act 1971 incoIJ>orated into United Kingdom domestic law many of provisions of the 
CLC 1969. 
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4.2. Nature of liability 
During the preparatory work to the 1969 CLC conference, it was debated 
whether the Convention be based, from a liability point of view, on fault or strict 
liability. Most of the delegations were in favour of the fault based liability, 
although some of them argued that strict liability should be applied in the case 
of oil pollution, and a few suggested a compromise plan.3 
Protection of maritime risks against negligence, because of some of the 
special risks involved in maritime adventure, the difficulty of coverage of 
insurance for the victims who use the beaches, and the difficult task of proving 
marine fault by non-marine victims were among the important reasons which 
were given by those who were in favour of the strict liability.4 In addition, the 
avoidance of difficulties which may arise for victims of the damage by a 
complex series of cross actions; preventing multiple coverage of the same risk 
if this were required; and the ultra hazardous nature of the carriage of oil by 
tanker; were also three important factors which were named for the justification 
of adoption of the principle of strict liability.5 
The supporters of the fault liability concept argued that the liability should 
be based on fault because, it would not be fair to give preference to those who 
suffer pollution damage as compared to those who sustain personal injury, 
death, and property damage resulting from other maritime casualties. 6 It was 
also argued, that the rule of strict liability which is imposed on the risks ariSing 
out of the operation of nuclear ships could not be extended to the risks of oil 
3 Nicholas, J. Healy, The CM! and IMCO Draft Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, [1969] 
lMar.Law & Comm., p. 93. 
4 As explained chapter. 1. 
5 Brown, E.D. The Lessons of the To"ey Canyon, 1968, Current Legal Problems, at p. 118. 
6 This was the opinion of The British Maritime Law Association, 1968 C.M.!. Doc, part 3, at p.50. 
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pollution from ships, because nuclear material is something which is dangerous 
in itself,7 whereas crude oil is not inherently dangerous.8 
A compromise solution to the problem suggested liability based on the 
fault, with the onus of proof reversed. 9 Though such a proposal may solve part 
of the problems facing the claimants, there are certain circumstances where the 
claimants might still be unable to recover damages; e.g. where a tanker owner 
or charterer proves that the tanker from which oil escaped had been the 
innocent party in the collision. 10 
The concept of strict liability was finally adopted, with some exceptions,t1 
for any pollution damage caused by a ship carrying bulk oil as a cargo.12 Thus, 
a claimant does not have to prove that the ship owner was in any way at fault or 
negligent in causing pollution. The significance of strict liability is not only that 
the claimant is relieved from having to prove negligence, it applies equally 
where questions of proof are not at issue and where it is perfectly plain that no 
, 
fault is involved on the ship owner s part. It must be noted that the strict liability 
is not an alternative to the fault, but merely eliminates the fault as a necessary 
condition of liability. 
The principle of strict liability connects liability to activities creating risk, 
without regard to fault. In other words, it is based on "cause in law" namely in 
extending the strict liability to the shipowner it is assumed that he would be held 
7 Heuston, R.F.V & Buckley R.A Salmond and Heuston on Law of Torts, 19 ed., London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1987, at pp. 367-368. 
8 Lord Devlin, as the chairman of the C.M.!. subcommittee, 1967, C.M.!. Doc, part 1 at pp. 76-8. 
9 Proposed by the British Maritime Law Association, C.M.!. Doc, part 1. at p. 54, 1968. 
10 Id. 
11 Art. ill. 1969 CLC. 
12 Art. IV. 
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to have caused discharge of pollutant. This, of course, does not mean that the 
owner intended to cause the damage. In deciding whether a certain enterprise 
should carry the cost of damages caused by its activity embraces several 
factors. The likelihood of damage, the extent of potential damages, and 
feasibility of insurance can be named as examples of such factors. Generally 
speaking, an activity creating risks in the environment should bear such risks 
rather than the injured parties who are not responsible for the activity 
undertaken and do not have the same possibilities of avoiding danger or 
protecting themselves against it. Therefore, it seems to have an immediate 
impact on the protection of environment 
The practical effect of holding a shipowner strictly liable can be said to shift 
the burden of the proof of the origin of the oil pollution from the claimant to the 
vessel owner. Only if the shipowner can bring himself within the exceptional 
cases provided in the Convention, he can escape liability under strict liability 
standard. However, a similar result can exist when a negligence standard is 
used by insurers, since the major purpose of a liability policy is to insure the 
insured against liability. Similarly, the strict liability, under the CLC, aims to 
ensure that that adequate compensation is available to a person who suffers 
damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from 
ships. Despite this similarity in aims, underwriters have always been fearful of 
the application of the strict liability. Their fear has not been based on the 
increased liability for pollution damage under an strict liability. The insurance 
industry argues that if strict liability is imposed on shipowners for oil pollution 
damage, it may be imposed in respect of other risks.13 In practice, almost all 
tankers are insured for liability under the Convention with P & I Clubs. 
13 See the opinion of James J. Reynolds, President of the American Institution of Merchant Shipping, in 
Susan L. Waggener, Compensation for Oil Pollution at Sea: an Insurance Approach, 12 San Diego Law 
Review, 1975, 717 at p. 736. 
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should not exempt the owner from liability where the loss caused by his own 
government in the time of peace. 16 The question was raised in Janson v. 
Driefontein Consolidated Mine, etc., 17 an insurance case which can by 
analogy to applied to this issue, in which it was held that where a subject of a 
foreign Government insures treasure with a British underwriter against capture 
during its transit from the foreign state to this country, and the foreign 
Government seizes the treasure during the transit, and war is afterwards 
declared between the foreign and the British Governments, the insurance is 
valid, and an action may be maintained in this country against the underwriters 
after the restoration of peace and such an insurance is not against public 
policy. 
There is also exemption from liability if the discharge or escape was due 
wholly to anything done or left undone by a third party with intention to damage. 
A vital aspect of this defence is that there must be intent to do damage. If a 
third party has only been negligent, then this will not provide a defence. The 
question which may arise here is whether the defence of a third party act is 
available to the owner, if that act or omission is done by the servant or agent of 
the owner. There is no such a defence because CLC provides18 that neither the 
servant or agent of the owner nor any person perform ing salvage operations 
with the agreement of the owner shall be liable for any such damage or cost. If 
a spillage is caused by the negligent act of a party not being a servant or agent 
of the owner, the shipowner will be able to claim from the third party in 
negligence. It is also necessary to mention that the defence of third party act is 
16 Aubert v. Gray (1862) 3 B & S. 163 at p. 169. 
17 [1902] AC. 484. 
18 Art. ill(4). 
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only available to the owner if "wholly" caused by the third party. There is, 
therefore, no defence where there is a contributory cause. A clear example of 
this is a collision where both parties are to blame and cause discharge of oil. In 
this case both will be subject to "cross liability" under the insurance policy, 
based on the proportion of liability which attaches to each defaulting vessel. 
The natural phenomenon exception seems to be more limited than an act 
of God, despite of being similar, because both are occasioned by an 
unanticipated natural disaster. But the key words in the definition of natural 
phenomenon seem to be "inevitable" or "irresistible"19 act which may indicate 
that it obligates the owner to prove not only that the accident could not have 
, 
been avoided by the master s exercise of reasonable care but also that it would 
not have been avoided by anyone under any circumstances,w whereas, there 
is no such restriction in the case of an Act of God. The common law demanded 
the satisfaction of two requirements before it would recognise an Act of God: 
the occurrence must have taken place without the intervention of any human 
agency and it must have been of such a nature that "it could not have been 
prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be 
expected .... "21 of the defendant. Thus, there is at common law no requirement 
that the Act of God should be inevitable in the common sense of being beyond 
all human power to prevent. Mansfield. J. in Trent and Mersey Navigation v. 
Wood,22 said that, "The Act of God is a natural necessity ..... which arises from 
19 It seems in practice, that there is no difference between the word "inevitable" or "irresistible," 
because both are clearly a specific reference to the particular liability of an individual defence to 
overcome the damage. 
20 Abecasiss, David. W. The Law and Practice Relating to Oil Pollution from Ships, 1978, at p. 182 
21 Per Mellish, L.J. in Nugent v. Smith (1876) I C.P.D 423 at p. 444 
22 [1785) 4 Dougl. 286 at p. 290. 
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natural causes and is distinct from inevitable accident." The defendant under , 
the Act of God, might escape liability if he proved only that he did all which 
could reasonably be expected of him to avoid that occurrence, but failed to do 
so. That another may have succeeded where he failed or that, in other 
circumstances, he may have succeeded himself was of no relevance. All he 
had to prove was that he had done his reasonable best. 
A further difference between the natural phenomenon defence, under the 
CLC, and the Act of God lies in that, it was not necessary, to establish an act of 
God, to prove an exceptional occurrence.23 Yet, the CLC requires that, in order 
to relieve a shipowner of his liability, the phenomenon must be of an 
exceptional nature. It may be that, where a ship sailing at sea in an area where 
cyclone storms are unusual but not unknown is cast away and damage is 
caused of the type envisaged by the shipowner, the owner may still be liable, 
although at common law he may well have escaped liability if he were able to 
show that he took reasonable precautions and was not otherwise at fault. 
The risk of "natural phenomenon," which is uninsurable, is restricted to 
those risks which are with an "exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character. 
Thus, the owner will be liable for pollution damages which are caused by the 
natural phenomenon without these characteristics. This brings the meaning of 
natural phenomenon in to line with the definition of the "perils of the sea" in the 
context of insurance. There is no clear definition of a peril of the sea, because it 
is generally regarded as unsafe to attempt a complete definition of the 
expression which may in practice lead to further questions. Lord Herschell in 
the_ Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. v. Owners of the Cargo Per, The 
'Xantho",'1A in defining the perils of the sea suggested that: "The term "perils of 
23 Forward v. Pittard (1785) 1 Term. Rep. 27 at p. 33. 
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the sean does not cover every accident or casualty which may happen to the 
subject matter of the insurance on the sea. It must be a peril "of' the sea. .... It 
is not every loss or damage of which the sea is the immediate cause that is 
covered by these words. They do not protect, for example, against that natural 
and inevitable action of the winds and waves, which result in what may be 
described as wear or tear. There must be some casualty, something which 
could not be foreseen as one of the necessary incidents of the adventure. The 
purpose of the policy is to secure an indemnity against accidents which may 
happen, not against events which must happen ..... , if a vessel strikes upon a 
sunken rock in fair weather and sinks, this is a loss by perils of the sea. And a 
loss by foundering, owing to a vessel coming into collision with another vessel, 
even when the collision results from the negligence of that other vessel, falls 
within the same category". In brief, an insurable peril of the sea is a danger 
arising from the accidental, fortuitous and unexpected action of the sea, not 
ordinary wear and tear or natural cause, which cannot be expressly guarded 
against, such as storms, or leakage of the vessel, whether caused by agencies 
working from without or from within.25 
There is in the Convention the provision that the owner will be exempted 
for liability if damage resulted from "an act of war, hostilities, civil war, 
insurrection ... ". Most of the activities this article suggests seem to be qualified 
as an act of war if undertaken by governments. The broadening of the 
language of an act of war seems to aim to extend the exception to collective or 
individual activity, such as terrorism. This extension does not seem necessary 
with regard to the third party conduct exception in the Convention. 
24 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 503. at p. 509. 
25 See, e.g. Hamilton, Fraser & Co. v. Pandorf & Co. (1887) 12 App. Cas. 518; Rule 7 of the Rules for 
Construction of policy set out in the First Schedule to:MIA. 1906. 
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Normally, where a vessel caused the pollution damage following an 
accident, the loss is presumed to be due to maritime perils. But, where the 
owner is claiming exemption from liability under the Act of war, he has the 
affirmative burden of the issue and thus the burden of proving, on a balance of 
probabilities, that loss was caused by a war risk. To do this, the clear definition 
of the Act of war and its distinction from maritime risk is necessary. The CLC 
has no definition of war risk, but this term has been comprehensively discussed 
in the marine insurance law in considering the exclusion of war risk from policy 
cover. 
The word "war" in a policy of insurance is not used in any particular 
technical sense. It was held there was a "war, n for the purpose of charterparty, 
between China and Japan, irrespective of whether HM Government have 
recognised a state of war or whether diplomatic relationships had been 
broken.26 So the Irish rebellion was held to amount to "war" within the meaning 
of insurance policy.27 The word "war" in a policy of insurance includes civil war 
unless the context makes it clear that a different meaning should be given to 
the word.28 Where goods were insured for a voyage which includes incidental 
land risks and the insured abandoned the goods on the basis that their loss 
seemed to be unavoidable because the town in which the goods were being 
held was surrounded by the enemy forces, there was a constructive total loss 
by war risk.29 It has also been held to cover an embargo on the export of oil to 
certain countries during time of war even if certain of those countries were not 
26 Kawaski, etc. v. Bantham SS. Co. [1939] 2 KB. 544. 
27 Curtis and SODS. v. Mathews. [1919] 1 KB. 425. 
28 Per Lord Morton, Pesquerias Y Secaderos de Bacalao de Espana, S.D. v. Stanley Groham Beer 
(1949) 82 L1.L. R. 501 atp. 514. 
29 Radocanachi v. Elliot (1874) 9 L.R. C.R. 518. 
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involved in the conflict. 30 A loss through the activities of terrorists, however, 
would clearly not fall under the heading of "war."31 Lord Newbury in Britain 
Steamship Co. v. The King ( The Petersham),32 stated that the word 
"hostilities" does not mean "the existence of a state of war." but means "acts of 
hostility" or .... "operation of hostility". Warlike operation was defined33 as, "one 
which forms part of an actual or intended belligerent act or series of acts by 
combatant forces. It part may be performed preparatory to the actual act or acts 
of belligerency, or it may be performed after actual act or acts of belligerency, 
but there must be a connection sufficiently close between the act in question 
and the belligerent act or acts to enable a tribunal to say with at least some 
modicum of... common sense that it formed part of acts of belligerency." Plainly 
it does not include all operations in war, or even all operations for the purpose 
of war. 
\lVhat is clear from all these authorities is that no claim may be made under 
a war risk policy, or in any other form of insurance, unless the loss was caused 
by the risk insured. Proximate cause has never been given an exhaustive legal 
definition and the courts have not evolved any philosophical theory of cause 
and effect. Words such as "direct" or "immediate" have been used to explain 
the meaning of proximate, but essentially they mean the same thing, namely 
that some event leads to the loss without the intervention of other factors of 
sufficient importance as to supersede the first event. This will always be a 
30 Seabridge Shipping Ltd. v. Antco Shipping Ltd. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep, 367. 
31 Pan American World Airways. INC. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. and Others [1974] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 207. 
32 [1921] 1 A.C. 99 atp. 133. 
33 See Atkinson J in Clan Line Steamers Ltd. v. Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance 
Association Ltd., [1943] K..B. 209 atp. 221. 
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question of fact. 34 Difficulties may arise in cases where the final cause of loss is 
a marine peril, such as stranding or collision, whilst the vessel was involved in 
an war or warlike operation. The final outcome of a long line of cases was that 
all the surrounding circumstances must be looked at to discover which was the 
dominant cause of loss, so that war risk underwriters could find themselves 
paying for loss in which marine perils played a large, but not dominant part.35 
Recent conflicts within the world naturally raise new practical problems in 
the definition of war risk and for its underwriters. There is no doubt that any 
vessel damage resulting in a polluted sea as a direct result of acts by either of 
the combatant parties will clearly fall within the definition of war risk and exempt 
the owner from liability under the CLC. The question may arise when the 
pollution damage is suffered through the detention of the vessel. Suppose the 
vessel was detained before the breaking out of war. During the detention the 
vessel was holed by marine perils and began discharging of oil. The simple 
answer may be that if the owner were deprived of control of the vessel for a 
long time and the vessel was under the control of one of the warring parties, 
naturally the discharge would be regarded as a result of war for which the 
owner is not liable under the CLC, provided he can prove constructive total loss 
of the vessel. 36 This means that the owner must prove the subject matter has 
been reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss being 
unavoidable. In the_Evia (No. 2),37 an 18 month charterparty was held to be 
34 Lord Dunedin, in Leyland Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. [1918] 
AC. 350 at p. 364. 
35 e.g. see Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Minister of War Transport, The COJrn·old, [1942] 
AC. 691. 
36 Cf. the judgement of Robert Goff 1. in The Antaios [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 284; see also S. 60 of the 
MIA 1906. 
37 Kodros Shipping Corporation v. Empresa Cubana de Fletes (The Evia. No.2) [1983] 1 AC. 736. 
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frustrated after the vessel had been trapped for six months. In the Wenjiang, 38 
the detention of a vessel chartered for 12 months under a shelltime form for 
just over two months was also held to frustrate the charterparty. 
4.3. The scope of liability under the CLC. 
4.3.1. The extent of liability in respect of the pollution damage. 
The definition of pollution, as contained in the CLC 1969,39 has very 
general wording. The nature of the definition gave rise to the problem of 
differing interpretations as to loss or damage in various jurisdictions subscribing 
to the Convention. The considerable risk of varying interpretations gave rise to 
the view that some uniformity of interpretation would be desirable. This is why 
the IMO in a diplomatic conference in the 1984 Protocol to the CLC, as 
provided in the1992 Protocol, adopted a new definition of pollution damage, in 
order to have a comprehensive and more clarified definition of the notion of 
damage. Under article 2(3) of the protocol, pollution damage is defined as: 
(a). "Loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from 
the escape of discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of the profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to the cost of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to 
be undertaken 
(b). The cost or preventive measure and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures." 
38 International Sea Tanker INC. v. Hemisphere Shipping Ltd., The Wenjiang) [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
128. 
39 The CLC 1969, Art. 1(6). 
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The requirement of "escape or discharge" as a condition for the pollution 
damage or preventive measures indicates that both accidental and intentional 
discharge are covered and this leads to the deduction that the Convention does 
not apply to a "pure threat situation," i.e. where a stranded tanker may present 
the threat of an escape of oil, but at the moment no oil has escaped. Thus, 
there is no remedy for the coastal state and owners who incur substantial 
expenditure to prevent the escape of oil. This may be challenged when it is 
realised that the cost of preventive measures is recoverable under Convention 
even where there is no spill. This challenge will not succeed if it is considered 
that prevention measures are defined to be those taken after an incident has 
occurred and incident means any occurrence which causes pollution damage 
for which the owner is liable, i.e. the damage which is caused by an escape or 
discharge of oil. The exclusion of pure threat has been remedied by the 1984 
Protocols, as adopted by the 1992 Protocols, to the CLC by extending the 
definition of incident to "grave and imminent" threat, i.e. something near to point 
of happening, or causing a pollution damage.40 The phrase "an imminent threaf 
may be criticised because it does not include the situation where there is a 
serious fear of spill in time. Suppose where a part of wrecked ship sinks with oil 
aboard and there is no "imminent" threat of an escape of oil from the sunken 
part, but it is rightly feared that in time there will be a leak. This criticism might 
be removed by replacing the word "serious" with "imminent." 
The notion of pollution damage only covers damage by contamination; in 
consequence fire damage caused by the initial or subsequent ignition of oil is 
not caused by the contamination and so is irrecoverable under the Convention 
as pollution damage.41 In other words the requirement of contamination 
40 Art. 1 (8) of the 1984 Protocol to the CLC. 
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excludes damage from oil which subsequently ignites. But damage by oil 
contamination following a fire or explosion aboard ship is recoverable, because 
damage in such a case is caused by oil not explosion or fire. 
Direct damage to property, e.g. boats, fishing gear, beaches and coast 
line, caused by oil contam ination clearly falls within the notion of pollution. The 
question which arises is whether consequential loss suffered by the owner or 
user of property is recoverable under CLC or not. For example, the owner of a 
polluted fishing boat may be prevented from using his boat for the time during 
which the boat is being cleaned, thereby suffering loss of income. Although all 
legal systems recognise, under the principle of foreseeability, causation and 
remoteness, claims for loss of this kind, the CLC does not provide any answer 
to this question and usually leaves the solution to national law, the IOPC Fund 
or P & I Clubs' practices.42 
Leaving the question of determining the meaning and scope of loss or 
damage to a municipal court or P&I Clubs and IOPC Funds may have two 
unfortunate results. First, it creates uncertainty as to the intended scope of the 
pollution damage covered by the Convention, and this uncertainty can be 
reproduced by the states parties in the legislation through which they have 
incorporated the conventional rules in their municipal law. Secondly, there is a 
danger that different interpretations are put upon the same concepts.43 
41 Oil floating on the water has subsequently ignited and caused damages in many cases, e.g. see,The 
Wagon Mound (No.1) [1961] AC. 388 and (No.2), [1967] 617; The Kazimab [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
163; Easter Asia Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Fremantle Harbour Trust Commissioners [1951] 83 C.L.R. 353. 
42 See, Mans Jacobson and Norber Trots, The Definition of Pollution Damage in 1984 Protocol to 1969 
CLC and 1971 FC, [1986] lMar.Law & Comm., p.467. 
43 Brown, E.D., The International Protection of the Environment in Regional Level, 1982. Institute of 
Public International Law and International Relation, the Thesaloniki, pp. 64-5. 
117 
Physical damage has always been subject to insurance cover, so 
insurance of property or liability arising out of the property prima facie has 
been subject to insurers liability under a policy. The insurers, broadly speaking, 
are exempted from liability for consequential loss unless the policy otherwise 
provides. In Maurice v. Goldsbrough Mort Co. Ltd,44 where consignee of 
wool insured it as a trustee for the owners so that they were liable to account to 
them for the insurance money received following a loss, they could not recover 
in respect of their loss or commission. Similarly, in the case of Re Wright and 
Pol, 45 an insured inn was destroyed by fire but the insured was unable to 
recover in respect of the loss of customers, and the hire of other premises while 
the insured premises were being repaired, since such a consequential loss was 
not one of the perils insured against under the ordinary form of insurance 
policy. The same principle was applied in Scottish case of Menzies v. North 
British Insurance Company,46 in which it was held that the insured could not 
recover in respect of the wages of servants engaged on the premises when the 
occupier was bound to pay, even though in consequence of the destruction of 
the property he received no return for those wages by way of services. 
As a result, there is no recovery of loss of profit or earning by the hoteliers 
whose premises have been contaminated by oil if the policy does not so 
provide. Non- recovery of the consequential loss may be justified because in 
this case the hoteliers interest is not a direct interest of the subject matter of 
the insurance. In other words, consequential losses are recoverable unless 
they are separately insured.47 In America, it seems to have been held in certain 
44 [1939] A.C. 452. 
45 (1834) 1 A & E. 62l. 
46 (1847) 9 D. 694. 
47 Priviy Council, in Maurice v. Goldsbrough Mort & Co. [1939] A.c. 452 at p. 466. 
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cases that a policy on property might cover a right to certain share in a cargo 
as profits.48 It has also been stated that "an insurance on ship or goods 
specifically without any indication that another subject is intended, cannot be 
applied to expected profits. "49 It must also be noted that insurance against 
prospective and anticipated profit neither ascertainable nor certain at the date 
of the insurance is contrary to the general rule which says that the insured must 
be interested in the subject-mater insured at the date of contract or be 
expected to acquire such interest at least at the time of 10ss.50 Despite this the 
insurability of such profit is well recognised. 
As the notion of "pollution damage" only covers damage by contamination, 
therefore, personal injury and death claims are of minor importance in the CLC. 
But, since pollution damage includes the cost of preventive measures and 
further loss or damage caused by preventive measures, it appears that 
personal injury and death caused during preventive measure operations would 
be covered by the definition of pollution damage. 
The notion of pollution damage covers damage by contamination caused 
outside the ship carrying oil. The question arises as to whether damage 
resulting from pollution that happens inside another ship falls within the 
definition of pollution damage under CLC. During the transfer of heavy fuel oil 
from a tankefl to a fishing boat, a crew member erroneously put the nozzle of 
the supply line into a cargo hold instead of into the bunker tank. As a result of 
48 Maurice ... , Id., at p. 466. 
49 Id. See also Philips on Insurance, vol. 1, S. 462. 
50 If there is no interest nor reasonable expectation of acquiring such interest, the policy is void. See. S. 
4 of MIA 1906; John Anderson v. James Farguhar Maurice. [1876] 1 App. Cas 713. 
51 T Subame Maru 58, Japan 18 May 1989; see, in IOPC Fund, Annual reports, 1990, p. 4l. 
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this mistake about seven tons of the oil entered into cargo tank and polluted 
about 140 tons of fish which had been loaded as cargo in that tank. No oil 
escaped into the sea as a result of incident. The Executive Committee of IOPC 
decided that the damage in this case should also be considered as being 
covered by the definition of pollution damage.52 
The operation to clean the hull and deck of the polluted vessel did not fall 
within the definition of pollution damage and preventive measures laid down in 
CLC and FC because the notion of pollution damage covered damage by 
contamination outside the ship carrying oil, and the cost of preventive 
measures, i.e. measures to prevent or minimise pollution damage after the 
incident. 53 
4.3.2. Liability as to pure economic loss 
The definition of pollution damage has included damage and 10ss.54 This 
indicates that it was the intention of those who drafted CLC that some kind of 
claims, e.g. loss of profits associated with physical damage should fall within 
the Convention's scope, provided that the "loss or damage" was caused by the 
contamination. 55 What is less clear is whether it was intended to cover pure 
pecuniary loss which is not connected with any physical damage to person or 
52 This decision was also applied in, Subame Maru No. 16, Japan, 15 June 1989, in which the spilt oil 
polluted some fish which had already been unloaded fonD. the fishing vessel on to pier. No oil escaped 
into the water, see, Id., at. p. 42. 
53 Nancy Orr Gaucher, Canada, 25 July and 10 August 1989, see, in IOPC Fund annual report, 1990, at 
p.43 
54 The expression of damage in S. 20(1) of the 1971 Merchant Shipping (oil pollution) Act, also S. 1(3) 
of the 1974 Merchant Shipping Act has included the loss 
55 This view was shared by British Department of Trade, see Memorandum of Liability and 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage in TISC Report, vol. ill, P. 85 at para. 50 
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property, e.g. hotelier's lost profits or holiday maker's 1055 of holiday value 
resulting from the fouling of a beach which they do not own. 
The wording of the definition of pollution damage in the CLC does not 
clearly give any guidance as to whether pecuniary 1055 is covered by the 
definition or not. There is also generally a reluctance in both civil law and 
common law countries to recognise claims of pure economic 1055, i.e. the 1055 
which is not attached to physical damage. The reason for this attitude is fear of 
the far-reaching consequences that acceptance of such claims could have. 56 In 
most countries, a claim for compensation is generally accepted only if it relates 
to damage to a defined and recognised right, e.g. a right to property or a right 
of possession. Therefore, damage suffered by someone by the 1055 of use of 
, 
the environment is not damage to an individuals recognised right and in 
consequence is not compensated unless the person in question has a specified 
right of use. 57 
At first sight, it might be suggested that a claimant could be covered for 
only pecuniary 1055 which is associated with physical damage, i.e. 
consequential 1055; but this poses the question of physical to whom? Can a 
hotelier who has not suffered physical damage claim for 1055 of profit, i.e. pure 
economic 1055, caused by contamination of a public beach? In other words, can 
a hotelier claim for damage caused by contamination resulting from the escape 
of the oil within the meaning of pollution damage? It may be argued that 
hoteliers' claims are not within the meaning of pollution damage on the ground 
that their claims are for pure economic 1055 and the word damage does not 
56 D. Silverston, Ship Source of Oil Pollution Damage, a Canadian Perspective on Recoverability of 
Economic Loss and Damage to the Marine Environment, 1985, Marine Policy International Journal of 
Ocean Affairs 108. 
57 Mans Jacobsson and NoIbert Trots, The Definition of Pollution Damage in the 1984 Protocol to the 
1969 CLC and 1971 FC, J.Mar.Law & Comm., 1986,467 atp. 477. 
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encompass pure economic loss. 58 This might be criticised because there is no 
indication in the clause defining polluting damage under the CLC, that loss is 
only recoverable where there is also physical damage. On the contrary, the 
wording of the clause which includes the loss or damage indicates that 
economic loss is recoverable independently. It is quite logical to say that the 
natural and ordinary meaning of "loss" would include economic loss. The courts 
have also tended to construe the words "loss or damage" widely so as to 
include pure economic loss. The phrase "loss or damage to or in connection 
with goods" is found in Article III rule 8 of the Hague Rules. It was held in G.H. 
Renton & Co. Ltd. v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama,59 that these 
words were apt to cover economic loss, since the words were not limited to 
actual loss of or physical damage to goods.60 Thus, all that can be said with 
certainty is that there is no reason in principle why economic loss may not be 
recovered in an action under the CLC. It can, therefore be concluded that the 
hoteliers claims are recoverable if they establish that their losses were caused 
by contam ination. Although there is no close degree of proxim ity between 
contam ination and such loss, such losses may easily be shown to be 
foreseeable consequence of the beaches' contam ination. 
The problem of pure economic loss has often been considered in the IOPC 
Fund. It has been decided that only economic losses which are suffered by 
those who directly depend on earnings from coastal areas or seas, e.g. loss of 
earnings by fishermen,61 and any hotelier at a seaside resort are recoverable. 62 
58 See Abecassis in Oil Pollution from Ships, 1985, p. 185. 
59 [1957] A.C. 149 atp. 150. 
60 See also Adamstos Shlpping Co. Ltd .. v. Anglo -Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1959] A.C. 133 at pp. 
157, 181 and 186. 
61 e.g. The Fukutohn Mare no. 8, Fund Executive Committee, EXC. 10. 3, para. 9. 25. 
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However, claims for compensation for damage to fishing grounds due to the 
other effects of oil pollution on fisheries have been rejected by the lope Fund 
because the claimants were not able to produce sufficient data to prove that 
any damage was actually sustained. 63 
In practice, claims for economic 1055 by individuals such as hoteliers and 
fishermen have been accepted by insurers, as already mentioned, as pollution 
damage, if the policy specifically so provides. To succeed, a claimant would 
have to be able to prove his 1055 and to quantify it. To do this, he must prove 
that 1055 is not too remote from the incident which caused it. In other words, it 
should result directly from the pollution. 64 For example, 1055 of earnings 
suffered by fishermen, hoteliers and restaurateurs at seaside resorts would be 
recoverable, but losses suffered indirectly, e.g. 1055 of tax revenues by the local 
authorities, as a result of damage to tourism, would not be recoverable as a 
result of their being too remote from pollution damage. As has been noted 
several times in the course of this thesis, it is not sufficient in order that an 
insured should recover for a 1055 that the 1055 fall within the cover provided as a 
matter of construction or definition. He must also show that the loss was 
proximately caused by an insured peril. The proximate cause does not mean 
the last cause, but the effective or dominant or real cause which is foreseeable 
by a reasonable man.65 Working out what is the proximate cause in any 
situation is strictly a question of fact. 
62 Fund, EXC. 10, WP. para. 7. 
63 The Koho Maru No.3 case, Fund EXC. 141, Annex para. 7.4. 
64 Department of Trade, Liability and Compensation for Marine Oil Pollution Damage, Report of Inter-
Departmental Group, February 1979 p. 20. 
65 See the judgement of the Lord Summer in Becker, Gray & Co. v. London Assurance. Corp. [1918] 
A.C. 101 atp. 112-13. 
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4.3.3. Cost of preventive measures and coverage of pure threat removal 
measures. 
The cost of preventive measures and further loss caused by such a 
measures, e.g. damage to the marine life by spraying of oil with detergent, 
constitutes a special kind of pollution damage for which the shipowner is liable 
under the Convention. The CLC covers reasonable measures taken to prevent 
or minimise pollution damage after an incident has occurred. 66 The question of 
what is reasonable and how far the cost of measures is to be considered in 
deciding whether it was reasonable has nowhere been defined in the 
Convention. The measure must be considered reasonable from an objective 
point of view in the light of information available at the time when the specific 
measures were taken. The measures taken must be seen in relation to the 
threat that existed.67 However, it must be recognised that the authority 
concerned and parties involved in the operation often have to decide very 
rapidly and without full knowledge of the circumstances when they want to take 
preventive measures. This is why it appears that when the test of 
reasonableness is to be applied, the parties involved in the operations should 
be allowed a certain margin of error in their judgements. 
Definitions of pollution damage which state that contamination must result 
from the escape or discharge of oil prove that the CLC does not apply to pure 
66 Art. 1(7). 
67 Abecassis, D.W. The LCfW and Practice Relating to Oil Pollution From Ships, 1978, p. 137. 
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threat removal measures, i.e. measures which are taken before the actual spill 
of oil from a tanker has occurred and are so successful that no spill takes place 
at all. Therefore, the cost of measures taken before any spill has occurred are 
not compensated. So, if a ship has been stranded but no oil spilled, the costs of 
sending boats with detergent spraying capability, of laying booms and other 
such measures, will not be recoverable. 
It has been observed that to68 cover pure threat removal measures, the 
definition of preventive should be read in conjunction with the definition of 
incident which is as follows: 
"incident means any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same 
origin, which caused the same pollution or creates a grave and imminent threat 
of causing such damage." 
From this definition it can be construed, on the one hand, that an occurrence 
which has not resulted in a discharge is hardly an incident. On the other hand, it 
seems clear that a stranding which results in discharge of oil is an occurrence 
which may cause pollution damage, regardless of whether the oil is discharged 
immediately upon stranding or sometimes thereafter. From these two 
arguments it can be concluded that, although the cost of pure threat removal 
measures cannot be recovered as compensation, because there is no incident 
and no discharge, it is also possible to say that an occurrence which 
subsequently causes pollution damage is an incident. 
The question which may arise here is whether the insurer is to be liable for 
the prevention cost under the pollution liability insurance. The problem may be 
considered in two ways: If liability is insured against pollution damage, can the 
insured recover if the loss does not actually operate upon the insured's liability, 
68 In IMO Diplomatic Conference in May 1984. 
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but it is lost or damaged in circumstances when the insured peril was 
imminent? If there is no loss, but only because the insured incurs expenditures 
in preventing what would have been a certain loss, can the insured recover 
these expenditures? 
There is clear authority in marine insurance cases that once the risk 
insured against has happened, and is so imminent that it is about to operate 
upon the insured's liability, damage or loss to the subject matter due to efforts 
to prevent the progress of casualty, is covered, since the proximate or real 
cause of such damage is the risk insured against. In Symington v. Union 
Insurance of Society of Canton Ltd.,69 cork was insured against fire. A fire 
broke out some distance away and to prevent its spreading local authorities 
threw some of the cork into the sea. It was held that the loss of this cork was 
covered, on the ground that damage by water to save the consequences of fire 
and the destruction of property by preventing its spreading were both 
proximately caused by fire. In other words, in this case, a loss was certain to 
occur in the absence of precautions such as those which were quite properly 
taken, and the insured peril was actually operating at the time. Thus , if the 
sunken oil tanker started leaking oil and the laden oil was pumped in to another 
vessel the cost of pumping and taking oil to distinction would be covered as a 
prevention cost. 
The answer to the question where the risk insured against is not in fact 
operating in any way, seems to be more problematical. Suppose the shipowner 
is insured against pollution damage. In a voyage his tanker is stranded. No oil 
is spilled but in the circumstances it is certain that it will happen unless 
measures are taken. The insured's expenditure in a salvage operation 
successfully prevents discharge. Can he recover such cost from his insurer, as 
69 (1928) 31 Ll.L.Rep. 179. 
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a prevention cost? In marine insurance, a "sue and labour" clause would permit 
recovery, provided that the insurance policy expressly perm its this and he could 
prove that if he had done nothing, the pollution would have happened as a 
result of an insured peril and the insurer would have been liable.70 But in the 
absence of an express "sue and labour" clause it is not clear whether 
prevention costs are recoverable in marine insurance. In The Knight of St. 
Mitchae/,71 a case involving a freight policy, a cargo of coal which had heated 
was unloaded to prevent spontaneous combustion and sold, as the 
continuation of the voyage with smouldering coal could have imperilled ship 
and cargo. Recovery was allowed for the lost of freight on the theory that 
imminent damage of fire existed, although not a loss by fire. Gorell Barnes J. 
said: "The condition of things was such that there was an actual existing state 
of peril of fire, and not merely a fear of fire."72 It was a loss by ejusdem 
generis73 covered by the general words "all other loss and misfortunes." The 
problem with regarding this decision as clear authority is that the judge not only 
based his decision on the loss by fire, but also on the general head of cover in 
the policy covering "other loss". As a result it is suggested that such prevention 
costs should be recoverable, even in the absence of express coverage, 
provided that there is an actual existing state of the peril insured against is 
certain. Mere danger of such a loss would clearly not be sufficient. 
70 Pyman Steamship CO. v. Adntiralty Commissioners [1919] 1 K.B. 49 atp. 53. 
71 (1888) P. 30. 
72 The mere apprehension or fear of fire however reasonable it may have been, is not a peril by fire. 
See. Joseph Watson and Son, Ltd. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco [1922] 2 K.B. 355. 
73 It is a general rule of construction where the general word are linked with particular words they must 
be construed as limited to the same genus as the particular words applies of insurance. See Lord 
Coleridge CJ IN Mair v. Railway Passengers Assurance (1877) 37 L..J. 356 at p. 358. An insurance of a 
vessel against the "all other perils" has been held not to cover the explosion of a donkey boiler. See. 
Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. Hamilton Fraser, & Co. (1887) 12 App. Cas. 484. 
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Another important question which must be considered by an insurer is 
whether, and if so to what extent the cost of the salvage operations fall within 
the cost of preventive measures. The P & I Clubs have maintained the view that 
salvage operations could be considered as preventive measures only if the 
primary purpose was to prevent or minimise pollution damage.74 Neither the 
CLC nor its protocol has discussed this problem. But the relationship between 
salvage operations and preventive measures was considered in the Fatma 
incidenf5 which was dealt with by the IOPC Fund. In its pleadings to the Italian 
court, the IOPC Fund took the position that an operation can be regarded as a 
preventive measure only if the primary purpose was to prevent or minimise oil 
pollution damage. The court held that the salvage operation could not be 
considered as a preventive measure, since the primary purpose of such 
operation was to rescue the ship and cargo.76 
4. 3.4. Liability as to the environmental damage. 
One of the most important aspects of pollution damage is the extent to 
which ecological damage should be recognised. The text of the 1969 CLC was 
not clear as to whether damage to the natural resources of the marine 
environment and the cost of its restoration would be paid. But in practice, this 
was not allowed because of the lack of any reasonable and generally accepted 
economic and mathematical model which would enable those concerned to 
translate into monetary terms the value of a clean environment. Furthermore, 
74 Jacobsson, M. and Tvots, N., The Definition of Pollution Damage in the 1984 Protocol to the 1969 
Civil Liability Convention and 1971 Fund Convention, 17 J. Mar. Law & Comm., 1986,467 atp. 475. 
75 It occurred in the Messina Strait in Italy in March 1985 
76 6 Jacobsson, M. and Tvots, N. supra. No. 74, at p. 47 . 
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the other problem with many claims of this type is that no damage can be 
shown to have been suffered, because there are legal problems with 
establishing a legal interest for individuals in the marine environment allegedly 
damaged. It is clear that only rights over individual possessions can be subject 
to injury by private action and the right of sovereignty over territorial water 
cannot be injured by private persons. This does not of course mean that 
damage to State-owned property cannot be claimed by the public authorities, 
because such rights over such property are not sovereign rights. However, the 
Convention did not contain any provision excluding or lim iting the right to 
compensation for environmental damage. The definition of pollution damage in 
the 1984, as adopted by the 1992, protocol to CLC clarifies this very important 
and controversial issue. It provides, on the one hand, that claims for damage to 
the marine environment are not admissible, and on the other hand, that the 
costs incurred in restoring the marine environment, after a pollution incident, 
are recoverable.77 
Attention may be drawn in relation to recovery of environmental damage to 
the fact that the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention were 
Conventions in the field of civil law adopted for the purpose of providing 
compensation for pollution victims regarding damages which are capable of 
quantification. For this reason, it may be maintained that claims which do not 
strictly relate to quantifiable damages will not fall within the scope of the 
Conventions, for example, vague claims for general damage to the 
environment. Since claims of this kind do not relate to quantifiable 
compensation, such claims may be pursued outside the Conventions on the 
basis of national law system, subject of course to the restrictions which all 
77 Art. 1(6)(a), 1984 Protocol to CLC. 
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national laws place on the recovery of damages or loss especially where loss is 
based on fault. There are obvious problems of causation and remoteness 
where general claims relating to damage to the environment are being 
pursued.78 
Compensation for restoration of the marine environment is limited, in order 
to prevent speculative claims, to the cost of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken.79 Therefore, damage to 
the marine environment cannot be compensated unless the actual cost, (not a 
purely mathematical calculation) of reinstatement is proved.80 By limiting 
compensation of environmental damage to the reasonable costs of 
reinstatement, argument over the unquantifiable or unquantified environmental 
claims was eliminated. Further, by limiting environmental compensation to the 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement, it may be argued that this 
definition is not sufficiently broad to allow compensation where marine oil 
pollution incident causes economically irreparable environmental damage of a 
kind which is extensively mitigated by natural generation. If no such costs are 
recoverable then it becomes apparent that shipowners who cause mild 
environmental damage must pay compensation, whereas shipowners who 
cause massive and irreparable damage to the environment need pay nothing, 
since nothing can reasonably be done to reinstate or restore the affected area. 
78 These problems are dealt with in chapter 1 of the thesis dealing with common liability in general 
tenns. 
79 Id. The inte:rpretation that might be given to the words " to be undertaken " worried the P & I Clubs 
in 1984!MO conference, see LEG. Conf. 6SR provo at. 4. 
80 IOPC Fund assembly in 1980 unanimously adopted a resolution stating that, " the assessment of 
compensation to be paid by the IOPC Fund is not to be made on the basis of an abstract quantification 
of damage calculated in accordance with territorial models." 
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Thus, the definition of compensable environmental damage requires further 
modification in order to contain clearly mentioned argumentative problems. 
In some cases, measures to reinstate the environment may be deferred due 
to a lack of financial resources. To solve this difficulty, the words to "be taken" 
were added to help those who can only take measures of reinstatement after 
compensation has been paid by ship owner or IOPC Fund. The payment is only 
made if the reason for those measures not having been already undertaken is a 
lack of funds on the part of claimant. Such compensation is paid by the IOPC 
Fund or the shipowner and his insurer, provided it is actually used for payment 
of measures indicated by the claimant in the support of his claim.81 
The word "reinstatement", as a measure for compensation of 
environmental impairment, may raise the question whether the insurer can 
make good the loss, as a mode of discharging liability under the policy, by 
reinstatement, i.e. by replacing what is lost or repairing what is damaged,. 
Insurance is often described as a contract of indemnity. This means that the 
assured can, subject to provisions of insurance contract, be expected to be 
placed in a position equivalent to that which he would have occupied, in relation 
to subject matter of insurance, if the event against which the insurance was 
concluded had not occurred. As a general rule and practice, the liability of the 
insurer to make good the loss under the policy is a liability to do so by a 
payment in money. This dose not, of course, mean that the insurer is not 
entitled to refer to the other compensation vehicles, e.g. reinstatement, and 
indemnify the assured if the policy so provides. Such a reinstatement is not a 
perfect indemnity under the CLC because the costs of reinstatement of 
81 The interpretative statement refer to, LEG. Conf, 6/ SR 4. p. 4. Statement of the delegation of the 
united states of America. LEG. Conf. 6/c. 2/SR 16. p. 4. 
Missing pages are unavailable 
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would seem that this process of election changes the nature of the insurance 
contract from a contract of indemnity to pay money to a contract to reinstate the 
subject matter insured. Such an election may put a heavy burden on the insurer 
when dealing with the environment. To reduce this burden, it may be a good 
idea to insert in the policy a clause to the effect that reinstatement will be "as 
circumstances permit and in a reasonably sufficient manner". This burden has 
already been reduced under the CLC by limiting the costs or reinstatement to 
costs of reasonable measures actually taken or to be taken, and not all the 
costs which are needed for reinstatement of the environment. However, the 
insurer is liable for the consequence of failure to perform reconstruction work 
adequately.85 The insurer's liability is for a remedy in damages,86 i.e. the full 
value of the property even if originally the loss was a partial one because the 
insurer who has elected to reinstate is in a position of a contractor, and he, 
therefore, must bear any loss or damages occurring while they are in 
possession for that purpose. 
The most difficult job in establishing liability for environmental damage, as 
distinct from commercially valuable resources, is the scientific method of 
ascertaining what damage has been caused and how it could be quantified in 
money terms. Although such a remedy cannot be calculated with the high 
degree of certainty which might be expected, several methods have been 
provided to quantify such damage. In the U.S.A, the appellate court held that 
"the primary standard for determining damages in a case such as this is the 
cost reasonably to be incurred to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the 
affected area to its pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is feasible 
85 Davidson v. Gardian Royal Exchange Assurance [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 406. 
86 Taylorv. Caldwell (1836) 3 B & S. 826. 
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without grossly disproportionate expenditure.'187 This decision has been 
reflected in the controversial methods of Natural Resources Damage 
Assessment in which a category of loss has been developed which enables a 
value to be placed upon the lost use of the damaged environment. These 
values are assessed by a process known as "Contingent Valuation 
Methodology". This standard is very similar to the definition of pollution damage 
used in the 1992 Protocol to the CLC and FC. In the former Soviet Union, this 
matter has been dealt with in special legislation. Under this legislation the 
amount of damage is calculated on the basis of the assumption that each ton of 
oil that escapes from a ship pollutes a given quantity of the sea water and 
damages are then awarded in an amount corresponding to a given sum per 
cubic meter of water that is considered to be polluted.88 
3.4. Owners' liability and compulsory insurance. 
The establishment of strict civil liability is of little effect if the owner, as 
defendant, is unable to pay the damages awarded. Accordingly, the 1969 CLC 
requires owners of the ships, registered in contracting states and non-
contracting states who have vessels which enter or leave contracting states' 
ports or offshore terminals within the territorial sea, to maintain insurance or 
other financial security, which can include self insurance, to meet the limit of 
liability for pollution damage which is imposed on any ship which carries a bulk 
87 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. v. T SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F. 2d 652 (lst Cir) 1980 at p. 675. 
88 Section 5 of the study published by the commission of the European Economic Community; The 
Scope and Concept of Compensable Damage Caused by Marine Pollution with Special Reference to 
Environmental Damage, December 1981. See also Antonio Grasci Case, lope Fund Annual Report 
1979. 
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cargo of more than 2000 tons of persistent oil. 89 It seems to be good idea, in 
order to ensure that pollution victims are compensated, that there should be an 
additional guarantee of solvency of persons responsible for the damage. In 
order to give the best protection to third parties, a compulsory insurance 
system, which creates an obligation on the person liable to take out insurance, 
is one the best measures which can be taken. A compulsory insurance system 
may also be justified where there is a system of strict liability, since only in this 
way can justice and equity be ensured. In addition, compulsory insurance has 
advantages for the shipowner because it increases the number of parties 
insured with a" bearing one another's risks under the compulsory insurance. 
The figure of 2000 tons may be criticised because it deprives a large number of 
sma" ships of the security provided by the insurance even although such ships 
may cause considerable pollution damage. 
Compulsory insurance, in order to be enforced, must be certified. oo 
Evidence of insurance which satisfies the requirements of compulsory 
insurance, in the Convention, is usually given by the P & I concerned through a 
"blue card" which has been accepted by a" contracting states. The blue card is 
addressed to a named authority, i.e. the competent authority which is charged 
with the responsibility of issuing the Convention certificate. It also certifies that 
in respect of the ship named therein, there is in force the requisite insurance 
cover. This certificate of insurance is the document which provides lega"y valid 
evidence of the existence of insurance coverage of the CLC liability. Thus, 
great care must be exercised to ensure the accuracy and adequacy of it. States 
89 Art. VII. The figure was controversial, but it seems that it has been chosen so as to exclude the bulk 
to the coastal trade and those dry cargo ships which occasionally carry up to 2000 ton of oil in their 
deep tanks. See, LEG/CONF/C.2/SR. 14, see also, D.W. Abbecassis, Oil Pollution From Ships, 1985, p. 
224. 
90 Art. VII(2) 1969 CLC. 
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may, therefore, refuse to certify if there is doubt about the financial stability of 
the insurer to cover the amount of the insured's potential liability.91 Contracting 
states may cancel the certificate if it is established in legal proceedings that the 
certificate is invalid.92 
Every ship, except state owned ships which are in non commercial 
service,93 to which the Convention applies must carry a certificate of insurance 
on board and copies of it should be deposited with the authorities who keep 
, 
records of the ship s registration, or if the ship is not registered in a contracting 
state, with the authorities of the state issuing or certifying the certificate.94 The 
requirement of the certificate of insurance, as a condition of compliance with 
the insurance obligation is to indicate that merely a contract of insurance or a 
policy is not enough to satisfy the Convention provisions. The certificate of 
insurance contract usually incorporates part of the insurance contract, in order 
to be easily verifiable. If there is any conflict between these two documents, 
policy and certificate, the question arises as to which of them should be 
preferred . The question was raised in Biddle v. Johnston,95 in which it was 
held that the policy prevails, since the certificate itself is not a contract of 
insurance. 
In order to give states the power to stop a ship proceeding to sea, the 
Convention provides that "a contracting state shall not permit a ship under its 
flag to which this article applies to trade unless a certificate has been issued 
91 Put. \nIT(6),ld. 
92 Put. VII(7), Id. 
93 A state owned ship must carry a certificate saying that the ship is owned by the state and that its 
liability is covered up to the limit of the Convention, Put. \nIT(12), 1969 CLC. 
94 Put. \nIT(4), 1969 CLC. 
95 [1965] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 121. 
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under. ... this article.'196 The penalties for non-compliance amply reflect the 
gravity of the offence, as failure to have such insurance cover exposes the 
master or owner, under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 in the 
U.K., to a fine up to £ 35000 on summary conviction or an unlimited fine on 
indictment. en The master of vessel must, when requested to do so, produce the 
certificate to a customs or other officer98 and failure to do so or failure to carry 
the certificate on board, may result in a fine on summary conviction up to 
£400. 99 A contracting state may withhold the right to enter one of its ports or the 
right to leave one of its ports to ships who have insufficient security. In some 
cases however, such action may contravene an existing treaty concluded by 
that state and in these cases it may be difficult for such states to maintain their 
membership of the convention. 
From the requirement of the shipowner's name in the certificate100 it can 
be construed that the insurance must be given to a specific shipowner. If there 
is a change of ownership the insurance will, therefore, fall away. This may 
mean that the insurance is insufficient, in particular when the ownership 
changes whilst the ship is at sea. The situation will be more complicated if the 
ship changes to· a new flag and even more so if the new flag is a non-
contracting State's flag. The CLC has channelled liability to the owner and has 
not included those who might use the ship. Thus, compulsory insurance is not 
extended to those who use the ship, e.g. bare boat charterer. This does not, of 
96 Art. VII(lO), Id. 
97 S. 10(6). The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971. 
98 S. 10(5). Id. 
99 S. 10(7), Id., For discussion insurance against fme, see supra. chapter 3 at pp. 97-99. 
100 Art. VII (2)(b). 
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course, mean that the charterer would not be able to take the advantage of any 
insurance which has been provided by the owner. It is common to extend a 
policy, for commercial convenience, to cover more that the insured's owner. At 
common law, the insured can enforce the contract in so far as it confers a 
benefit on a third party, there being in effect a waiver of any requirement of 
insurable interest and presumably the insured then holds any money recovered 
on trust for third party.10l However, whether or not a third party, e.g. charterer, 
himself can sue, if the insured declines to do so, is open to some doubt. In 
Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York, 102 
the privy council held that a third party was prevented from suing by the 
doctrine of privity of contract, unless that third party can establish an exception 
to this doctrine. To establish this, he has to prove that he was the intended 
beneficiary in trust. On principle there is no reason why the third party cannot 
claim that the insured contracted as his agent. If a person expressly contracts 
on behalf of another, even though the other is not actually named, provided he 
was in existence and capable of being ascertained at the time of contract or at 
least at the time of the loss, that other can ratify the acts of the agent and sue 
on the contact. 103 
In order to avoid the possibility of circulatory litigation, the compulsory 
insurance scheme is taken further by permitting proceedings directly against 
the insurer or other person providing financial security for the owner's liability 
for pollution damage. This right was implemented by Article VII(8) of the CLC 
which provides a right of direct action against insurer for pollution damage, 
101 Williams v. Baltic Ins. Ass. of London Ltd. [1924] 2 K.B. 282. 
102 [1933] A.C. 70. 
103 See generally, Bowstead on Agency, 19 ed., pp. 37-36. 
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irrespective of the actual fault or privity of the insured owner. With regard to this 
right, it can be said that liability insurance is for the benefit of suffering third 
parties rather than for the protection of insured. Where a third party can enforce 
the insurance contact directly, this is subject, of course, to any right of the 
insurer to avoid liabilityt04 and is not dependant on the owner insuring as his 
trustee or agent. In effect he is by statute a party to the contract. 
Marine policies usually provide that the insurers are not liable when the 
vessel, the subject-matter of liability insurance, is unseaworthy for a particular 
voyage. The question which arises here is whether the insurer will be able to 
rely on a breach of seaworthy condition or warranty and avoid the liability under 
the compulsory insurance which is issued to cover the owner's liability against 
pollution liability under the CLC. As a general rule, on a breach of a seaworthy 
warranty, the insurer will retain the right to repudiate the contract from the date 
of the breach, provided that the repudiation does not take effect until written 
notice has been served on the insured. To do this, the insurer must show that 
there is a causal connection between the breach of warranty and loss. By not 
allowing the insurer, under the CLC, to avail himself of any other defences 
"which he might have been entitled to invoke in proceedings brought by the 
owner against him", it seems that the Convention does remove from the 
insurers an important protection which they had under the seaworthy condition 
or warranty. Thus, insurers cannot rely on breach of the seaworthy warranty 
and escape liability where an action is brought against them by a third party 
claimants. 
The notion of direct action crystallised in the present Convention is not 
without precedent in national law. In Scottish private law, there are exceptions 
104 Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sutherland [1939] 2 All E.R. 246. 
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to the general rule that a contract only creates rights and liabilities between the 
parties to it. For example a contract between two parties may be held in 
appropriate cases to confer a 'Jus quaesitum tertia" on a third party. 105 
Nevertheless, it represents a departure from the English common law principle 
of privity of contract whereby only parties to the contract are perm itted to sue 
upon it. Statute, in England has under the Third Parties (Rights against 
Insurers) Act 1930, provided a direct right of action for victims of an insolvent or 
bankrupt assured. 106 In the U.S.A. various direct action statutes have been 
enacted which differ in terms and effects. 107 
The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 operates where an 
assured under a liability policy has become bankrupt or , in the case of a 
company, goes into administration or liquidation. This condition may be difficult 
to interpret in the operation of the 1930 Act. In _Braley v. Eagle Star Ltd,108 
the third party, an ex-employee of the assured company, did not become aware 
of her right of action against the insured until after the insured had been wound 
up and removed from the Register of Companies, and had therefore ceased to 
exist. The House of Lords held that it was not possible to sue a company which 
has ceased to exist, even for the limited purpose of establishing its liability to 
facilitate an action against its liability insurer under the 1930 Act. There is no 
such criticism against the provision under the CLC regarding the right of direct 
105 See Gloag on Contract, 2 ed., 1929. pp. 234-247; Walker, Principle of Scottish Private Law, 1970, 
pp.567-569. 
106 By Section 1(1) of the Act 1930, as amended by Insolvency Act of 1985 and 1986, its provisions 
apply to all contract of insurance under which a person is insured against liability to third parties. There 
are two exceptions namely: contract of reinsurance [Section 1 (5)] and contract of employers liability 
insurance [Section 1 (6)(b)]. 
107 The Louisiana Direct Action is the most celebrated one; it has been the topic of numerous legal 
articles. 
108 [1989] A.c. 957. 
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action against the insurer, since the right in no way depends on the insolvency 
of the insured. 
The third party is not, under the 1930 Act, placed in any better position 
against the insurer than the assured himself would have been, since only the 
insured's rights against the insurer under the contract in respect of liability are 
transferred to and vest in the third party to whom liability was so incurred. 109 
Thus, despite its title, the Act does not confer direct right to the third party 
against insurers. \lVhat the third party acquires by operation of the Act is the 
transfer to him of the rights which the insured has or had against his insurer 
under the relevant contract of insurance. This may be compared with the direct 
right of the injured party against the insurer under the CLC, where the only 
restriction is that the claim is to "the owner's liability for pollution damage." This 
means that the third party cannot claim against the insurer for unlimited liability, 
with reference to the provision which has given a right to limit to the owner, 
unless the owner's right to limit is broken by his actual fault or privity. This 
requirement may also bring an obstacle in the way of claimants pursuing direct 
action against insurers. The right of a third party claimant against the insurers, 
does not arise until the assured's owner's liability is established to the claimant, 
by judgement or arbitral award. Lord Denning M.R. in Post Office v. Norwich 
Union Fires Ins. Society. Ltd./10 said, "It is clear to me that the injured person 
cannot sue the insurance company except in such circumstances as the 
insured himself could have sued the insurance company. The insured could 
only have sued for an indemnity when his liability to the third person was 
established and the amount of the loss ascertained." Thus, a third party 
109 s. 1(4)(a)(b) of The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930. See also, Farrel v. Federated 
Employers' Association [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1400. 
110 [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 216 atp. 219. 
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claimant who wants to sue the insurer directly must first bring an action or 
arbitration against the insured under the Article VII(8) of the CLC. Commencing 
such an action where the assured's owner is already bankrupt or in liquidation 
is itself not without complication where there is an unascertained claim for 
damage in tort which could not be proved in bankruptcy or liquidation. It may be 
argued that obtaining an award, as a condition precedent, to the insurers' 
liability, only binds the assured as a party to an insurance contract and is not 
extended to the third party. In rejection of this argument it can be said that the 
provision of direct action against the insurers not only transfers to the third 
party the right of the action itself but also the contractual rights of the insured. 
Where these contractual rights are subject to obtaining an award, then the third 
party claimant is bound by it as well. HI The same argument may be applied 
where the insurance contract contains a provision requiring the insured to give 
notice to the insurer of any incident which gives rise to a claim 112 and a 
provision that it is a condition precedent to right of recovery that the prem ium is 
fully paid. Similarly other conditions, warranties and exceptions in the insurance 
policy may affect the right of the third party. In all these cases, a third party 
claimant may be deprived of his right of action because he is standing in the 
shoes of an assured who has failed to comply with requirements which have 
been expressed or implied as conditions precedent in the policy of liability 
insurance. These requirements do not seem to stand if it is understood that 
compulsory insurance is provided to cover the owner's strict liability, i.e. liability 
without fault, against an injured third party. Thus, the insurer will be liable, even 
if the loss is related to the breach of condition or warranty. Although, the 
III See, Leggatt 1. in The Padre Island [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 408 at p. 414. 
112 See, Mocatta. 1. in the, C.Y.G. Siderurgicia del Orinoco S.A v. London Steamship Mutual Owners' 
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd, (The Vainquemjose). [ 1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 557 at 566. 
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insurers will not be able to rely upon breach of warranty against an injured third 
party and escape compensation, they have a Conventional right to recover 
from the insured as damage for breach of warranty the money he has to pay to 
the third party, since nothing in the Convention prejudices any right of recourse 
of the owner against third parties. l13 It must, however, be realised that it, the 
absence of such Conventional or statute right, will not deprive insurers of such 
remedy, since they have a remedy in a case of non-compulsory insurance 
under which they pay a third party for property damage where not legally 
obliged to it because of the breach. 114 
The insurers under the 1930 Act are under the same liability to the third 
party as they would have been to the assured, except where the amount for 
which they are liable to the assured exceeds the amount of liability to the third 
party. The assured remains entitled to the excess and if the amount for which 
they are liable to the assured is less than the amount of his liability to the third 
party, the assured remains liable to the third party for the balance. l15 Unlike the 
1930 Act which put the insurer and insured at the same position against third 
party, Article VII(8) of the CLC provides some defences, for the insurers against 
third parties, which are not available to the insured. For example, the insurer is 
allowed the limit of liability prescribed in the Convention, irrespective of actual 
fault or privity of the owner, whereas there is no such a right for the insured's 
owner. Furthermore, the insurer may avail himself of the defence that the 
pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct of the insured's owner; in 
contrast the insured's owner is liable irrespective of fault. As a result, it might be 
113 Art. ID(5) 
114 National Farmers' Union Mutual Insurance Society. v. Dawson [1941] 2 K.B. 424. 
115 S. 1(4)(a)(b) of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930. 
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said that the 1930 Act does not apply where compulsory insurance is provided 
under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, which has implemented 
the CLC in U.K. law, because both Acts do not have the same effect as to third 
parties in all cases. 
There was some doubt as to the application of 1930 Act to the P & I Clubs. 
This doubt arose when it was realised that the Act applied only to a "contract of 
insurance," i.e. contact of indemnity. In other words to bring a case within direct 
action, there must be a direct right to indemnity for the insured: a right which 
can be enforced either at law or in equity. It was thoughe 16 that the suing and 
labouring clause in the policy "is not a contract of indemnity in any proper 
sense; it is a contract to pay the assured expenses which he may incur, but not 
to indemnify him against any claims made by other people against him." A third 
party claimant, therefore, has no right to take direct action for the expenses 
which incurred by the order of the insured. Beyond this, a further question was 
whether the relationship between club and member, which is based on the 
contribution from the member, could be regarded as a contract of insurance. 
This was considered in the "Allobrogia" 117 where Slade J. decided that 
although the 1930 Act made no attempt to define a contract of insurance, the 
arrangement between a P & I club and its members was a contract of insurance 
within ordinary legal terminology and within the meaning of Section 1 (1) of the 
1930 Act, as a result of it being a mutual promise to indemnify each other's 
liability.118 A third party claimant, in order to succeed in his action against an 
116 See Lindley, L.J. in lolmston and Others. v. The Salvage Association and McKiver, (1887) 19 
Q.B.D. 458 at p. 460. 
117 Re A11obrogia Steamship COlporation, (The A11oborogia) [1979] 1 Lloyd's. Rep. 190. 
118 Id., at p. 194. It may also be noted that mutual insurance is expressly brought within the ambit of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
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insurer, must make out a prima facie case showing that the insured is entitled 
to a "contribution" from or "indemnity" against the insurer. It might be argued 
that a contract which only promises an assured that he will be indemnified at 
the insurer's discretion is not a contract of insurance in this particular sense.ll9 
In the case of those risks for which a member of club is covered only at the 
discretion of the committee, therefore, it may be considered that there would 
appear to be no "contract of insurance" to which the 1930 Act can apply. This 
argument cannot have any application to the Article in the CLC regarding the 
third parties' rights against the P & I Clubs, since the Article has directed third 
party claimants to the insurer rather that to the "contract of insurance." 
A liability insurer would not be liable to a third party, under the 1930 Act, if 
the contract of insurance contains a clause that "the assured would not be 
indemnified unless payment to the third party is made", i.e. a pay to be paid 
clause which is provided in most marine insurance agreements and which was 
devised to indemnify the insured, as opposed to the liability insurance. Thus, in 
such circumstances, the insolvency of the assured prior to payment and his 
consequent failure to pay, prevents any right of indemnity from being 
transferred to a third party. It may be argued that such a construction would 
mean the 1930 Act could never be invoked: because if the assured has paid 
the third party the Act would be superfluous, and if he has not paid then the Act 
will not be applied. It seems that the pay to be paid clause does not attempt to 
evade statute in the same way as, e.g., a term which entitled the insurer to 
terminate the policy on the insured's insolvency, because allowing the policy 
term to override the Act would defeat the purpose of the legislation. However 
the decision of the House of Lords in the case of the Pardre Island,12O has 
119 Medical Defence Union Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry [1979] 2 W.L.R 686. 
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finally, without distinction between the indemnity insurance and liability 
insurance, established that the so called "pay to be paid" provision, which made 
payment of any liability to third parties a condition precedent to the member's 
right to claim an indemnity against the club, creates a contingent right of 
reimbursement for the claimant and accordingly, where the member was 
wound up before discharging the liability to the claimant, no cause of action 
occurred, since there was no existing right to an indemnity which could be 
transferred to or vested in third parties under Section 1 (1) of the 1930 Act. This 
can be more easily justified when it is realised that Section 1 (1) does not 
purport to place a third party in a better position against an insurer than the 
insured. 121 
In contrast to this decision, most American jurisdictions having direct action 
statutes have outlawed this type of clause which purports to make it a condition 
precedent to an assured's right of indemnity that he should have first paid the 
claim and requires a claimant to proceed against the insurer after first obtaining 
a final judgement against the assured. Legislation l22 and cases123 in most of the 
American jurisdictions negate the "pay to be paid" clause (known in the U.S.A. 
as the uno- action" clause) as being contrary to public policy.124 The effect of 
these developments in both U.S.A. and the U.K. would be conversion of an 
120 So cony Mobil Oil Co. Inc. and Others. v. West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd. (The Pardre Island) [1990] 2 All E.R 705. 
121 The decision in Pardre Island can also be applied where a member has not paid an outstanding call 
as payment of all such calls is a condition precedent to recovery. 
122 See, e.g. The louisiana Direct Action, discussed in Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, vol. VII, 
para. 4831. 
I23 See, e.g. Saunders v. Austin Fishing Corp. [1967] A.M.C. 984. 
124 Raymond. H. Kierr, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I Insurance, on Various of the 
Insurances of Maritime Liabilities and on Limitation of Shipowners' liability, 43 Tulane Law Review, 
1969, p. 638. 
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indemnity policy into a liability policy whereby insurers will be liable on the 
happening of the specified event, since the philosophy behind such insurance 
is to protect all victims to whom the insured is liable. 
One of the most controversial aspects of direct action concerns the legal 
confrontation between a contract of liability and a contract of indemnity. In the 
U.S.A. policies of liability insurance have been subdivided into categories 
according to the nature of the insurance, i.e. contract of indemnity and contract 
of liability. In the case of a contract of liability, the amount recoverable is not 
measured by the extent of insureds' loss and is payable whenever the specified 
event happens. 125. Unlike the contract of liability, a contract of indemnity is 
solely for the benefit of the insured in that it reimburses the insured for the 
claims in respect of his liability. Specifically, the happening of the event does 
not itself entitle the insured to payment of the sum stipulated in the policy: the 
event must in fact result in a pecuniary loss to the insured who then becomes 
entitled to be indemnified by the insurer. In other words, the insured cannot 
recover more than he established to be the actual amount of his loss.126 They 
should, therefore, be treated separately in applying direct action legislation. 
However such subdivision does not exist in the U.K. jurisdictions. Fletcher 
Moulton L.J. stated that a contract of liability insurance was a contract of 
indemnity. 127 
With regard to this distinction, it would seem that the CLC may give cause 
for concern, in particular when it is realised that each contracting state has the 
125 See 44 Corpu, Jurisecundum 481-482. 
126 Whether direct action can be brought against the insurer, under a contact of indemnity, depends on 
the respective statute and case law. See e.g. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cusing, 347 U.S. 409 (1957). 
127 British Cash and parcel Conveyors Ltd. v. Lamson Store Services. Ltd. [1908]2 K.B. 1006. at pp. 
1014-1015. 
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power to choose the type and terms of the insurance. The CLC while giving a 
right of direct action against the insurer also provides some defences. These 
defences may raise legal confrontation between contracts of liability and 
contract of indemnity where third parties are involved in direct action against 
the insurers. Separate treatment of these two contracts in their application of 
direct action may raise the question of whether the Article applies to a contract 
of indemnity without any qualification, as it might be in the case of contract of 
liability. There are occasions in which the insurer is entitled to limitation of 
liability whereas the owners are denied the benefit of limitation. For example, if 
the damage occurred as a result of an act or omission by the owner himself, or 
was done deliberately with his actual knowledge that pollution damage would 
result, the owner is not entitled to limitation of liability.128 In that situation, 
however, the insurer's right to limit his own liability, which should be 
distinguished from the owner's, remains unaffected. The owner's liability then 
becomes unlimited. The insurer may also avail himself, under the present 
Article, of the defence that pollution damage resulted from wilful misconduct of 
the owner. This, together with the fact the insurer's entitlement to limitation is 
unaffected may contribute to the belief that the protection for the third parties 
under the present Article is in effect of no great significance. Generally 
speaking, it might be argued that with such an approach, the distinction 
between a contract of indemnity and a contract of liability, is not consistent with 
the Article on which the right to direct action is based. 
The right of direct action may raise the proposition that a third party 
claimant is a subrogee of the insured's owner and is entitled to all rights and 
subject to all defences of the insured's owner, under the CLC, as if he was 
insured. Thus, it could be said that a third party claimant, as a successor of 
128 Art. V(2). 1969 CLC. 
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insured's owner, could be liable to other pollution victims, as the owner was 
himself. In support of such view, it has been held that mortgagees claiming 
under a "Ioss- payee" clause are bound by the rules as "successor".129 It seems, 
in application of this point, to be more logical to draw a distinction between the 
position of a third party who is accorded certain unwaiveable rights to sue an 
insurer directly and a named "loss payee" who bases his right not upon a 
statute, but upon the contract of insurance, which limits his right to what the 
contract accords itself. Thus, where a third party gains the right to sue an 
insurer from a source or basis outside the contract (from a statute for instance) 
he may acquire the rights of the insured in a manner modified by statute. 
It has been argued that the right of direct action against the insurer, under 
CLC, does not apply in cases where the ship is carrying less that 2,000 tons oil 
as a bulk cargo at the time of incident. l30 The question was raised in the Akari 
case, in which a vessel was carrying only 1899 tons of oil at the time of 
incident. The Club argued that under Article VII. 1. of the CLC, the owner is 
required to maintain insurance in respect of any ship registered in Contracting 
State and carrying more that 2000 tons of the oil in bulk as cargo. The owner 
was, therefore, not under any obligation to maintain insurance in accordance 
with the Convention. As a result, no direct right of action existed. This argument 
was not accepted by the Director of IOPC Fund who maintained the view that a 
right of direct action against the club as the shipowner's liability insurer did 
exist. 131 This case does not give clear evidence as being in favour of direct 
129 Wells Fargo Bank International C01:poration v. London Steam-ship Owners' Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd, (The John W. Hill). [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213 especially 215. 
130 P& I Club view in the case of The Akari which caused pollution damage in the United Arab 
Emirates, 25 August 1987. See, International Oil Pollution compensation Fund, Annual Report, 1990, 
atp.30-34. 
131 Id. 
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action where the vessel is carrying less than 2000 tons of oil, since the action 
was given up by the Director IOPC Fund after accepting an ex gratia payment 
which was offered by the Club. However, it seems that the Director is right in 
his decision because the right of third party direct action under the CLC 
depends on the existence of the insurer, not owner's liability to provide 
compulsory insurance to cover his liability for pollution damage under the 
Convention. This construction is strengthened if it is realised that the 
convention has provided the direct action can be brought against "any claimD 
for compensation for pollution damage resulting from owner's liability, not only 
to the claim, in respect of the owner's liability, where the ship is carrying more 
that 2000 tons of oil in bulk as a cargo. Furthermore an owner, under Art. III, 
will be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been 
discharged regardless of amount of oil which is carried. 
4.4. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund as supplementary 
scheme to CLC 
In 1971 Fund recognised the view which emerged during the CLC 
conference that some form of supplementary scheme in the nature of an 
international fund was necessary to ensure that adequate compensation would 
be available for victims of large scale oil pollution incidents.132 The provisions of 
the Fund are, therefore directly tailored to supplement those of the CLC, so that 
in most cases the same definitions are adopted. 
In contrast to the CLC regime, under which the ship owner carries the 
entire financial burden, the Fund treaty is designed to balance the responsibility 
132 Misc. No.8, [1970] Cmnd. 4403, p. 32. 
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for oil pollution damage between ship owners and oil cargo interests.133 The 
Fund pays compensation if a person suffering pollution damage has been 
unable to obtain full and adequate compensation for damage under the 
CLC. 134 This may happen where there is135: 
(a) exoneration of liability of an owner under the terms of the CLC; 
(b) financial inability of an owner to meet its CLC liability limits; and 
(c) damage in excess of the amount for which offender may be held liable 
under the CLC. 
It was suggested l36 that the Fund's role should be limited to situations 
involving catastrophic damage which exceeded the limits of liability of the ship 
owner under CLC. The majority of states were of the view that this proposal 
was too radical because: (a) such cases would be very rare in practice; and (b) 
it closes the door on the pollution of the sea as a new risk of property 
insurance, e.g. the all risk policy for commercial fishermen. 
The second function of the Fund is the indemnification of shipowners 
against additional financial burdens imposed upon them by CLC. 137 Such relief 
is subject to conditions designed to ensure compliance with safety at sea and 
other conventions. l38 This provision may create an unnecessary complication 
, 
by giving the Fund an administrative role to watch shipowners behaviour in 
compliance with various requirements. Furthermore, the shipowners' additional 
133 Art. 2, para. 1. 
134 Art, 4(1), 1971 FC. 
135 rd.,4(1)(a)(b)(c). 
136 By the Polish delegation, in LEG/Conf. 5/ 22. 
137 Art. 2(1)(b) 1971 FC. 
138 rd. 
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liabilities under the CLC are insurable and therefore they suffer no extra 
financial burden because they can recover their insurance cost through their 
freight revenue. 
The need to establish a uniform approach as to the meaning of words in 
the Fund; the existence of few judicial precedents in the settlement of disputes 
under CLC; and the solving of most claims under CLC through negotiation 
between claimant and P&I Club have resulted in close co-operation between 
the director of the Fund and the P&I Clubs. The co-operation is based upon 
the terms of a memorandum of understanding concluded between the Fund 
and the international group of P&I Clubs on November 5 1980.139 
Under the procedure the claims are met by taking joint action and use of 
the same survey, wherever applicable to investigate the reasonableness of the 
measures taken to deal with oil spills. The result of this co-operation is a saving 
of time and prevention of a duplication of efforts. Claimants negotiate a claim 
once, receive compensation, and leave the club and Fund to work out the 
distribution among themselves. 
In order to mitigate undue financial hardship to the victims of pollution 
damage, the Fund's internal regulations have authorised the Fund to make 
provisional payments. This is done even before the establishment of the 
limitation fund, when the Director is satisfied that the owner is entitled to limit 
his liability, or has no liability under CLC. The payment is restricted to a 
maximum 60 percent of the amount, (not to exceed 90 million Francs in any 
incident,) which the claim ant is likely to receive from the Fund. 140 
139 The text is at Annex II of the lOPC Fund, Report on the Activities of the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund during 1980, and Fund/A/ES. 1/3. 
140 Internal regulation for the International Fund, regulation 8.6. 
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The provisional payment may exceed the limit of 90 million Francs if the 
Assembly decides that this amount is insufficient to mitigate undue financial 
hardship to victims. 141 Before making a provisional payment, the Fund Director, 
as a condition can obtain from the claimant any right, up to the amount of the 
provisional payment, that he may have done under the liability Convention 
against the owner or his guarantor. 142 
An examination of the Fund's claim practices confirms that additional 
costs143 and fixed costs l44 may be paid, and this has been done in several 
cases so far145 • The exception to this general practice is the issue of additional 
insurance costs. The Fund Assembly agreed that a reasonable proportion of 
fixed costs should be paid, since that is in the interest not only of the particular 
state but also the Fund. In the calculation of the relevant fixed cost only those 
expenses which correspond closely to the clean up period in question and 
which do not include remote overhead charges l46 are covered. 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
The CLC has attempted to determine liability and ensure adequate 
compensation for pollution damage resulting from ships, by creating a system 
141 Id. regulation 8.7. 
142 Id. No. 5.6 
143 Costs incurred solely as a result of the incident, e.g. salaries of personnel specially used for the 
operation 
144 Costs related to the incident but which would have arisen had the incident not taken place e.g. value 
of material or equipment that were stored and maintained for contingency pmposes. 
145 Fund W. GR. 5/2, 15 January 1981, p. 8. 
146 FUndi A4116, 20 October 1981, p. 6. 
153 
of strict liability which alleviates the burden associated with establishing and 
proving common law causes of action. To give more effect to the strict liability, 
compulsory insurance has been devised, whereby the insurer becomes liable 
for those amounts which insured's owner is legally liable. The strict liability, 
from the insurer's point of view, has meant high premiums and less coverage. 
The effect of this has, in practice, been little because of the limited liability for 
owners under the CLC. 
The advantage of the institution of compulsory insurance becomes obvious 
when it is appreciated that within the limit of the insurance cover provided 
persons who have suffered damage or injury of pollution are not left without 
compensation. Further, it offers advantages to many one-ship or small fleet 
companies in existence whose total assets are insufficient to cover the oil 
pollution damage which could be caused. However, the effect of compulsory 
insurance is reduced in many cases in which a duty to insure does not arise. 
The persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the 
escape or discharge from ships carrying less than 2000 tons of oil in bulk as 
cargo may find themselves uninsured for pollution damage which may be huge 
in some cases. Claims for pollution damage under the CLC can be made only 
against the registered owner of the tanker concerned. This means that those 
who might use the tanker, e.g. bareboat charterers, are not obliged to carry a 
compulsory insurance on board the tanker. The compulsory insurance is 
subject to prescribed maximum amount of cover, as provided in the Convention 
and above that, therefore, the victims remain uninsured. The Convention 
applies only to ships which actually carry oil in bulk as cargo, i.e. normally laden 
tankers. Spills from tankers during ballast voyages are therefore not covered by 
the compulsory insurance, nor are spills of bunker oil from ships other than 
tankers. The CLC liability applies only to damage caused or measures taken 
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after an incident has occurred in which oil has escaped or been discharged. 
Thus, the compulsory insurance scheme does not apply to pure threat removal 
measures, i.e. preventive measures which are so successful that there is no 
actual spill of oil from the tanker inv~lved. Damage caused by non-persistent oil 
is not covered by the CLC. Therefore spills of gasoline, light diesel oil, 
Kerosene, etc., do not fall within the scope of the compulsory insurance. The 
notion of pollution damage is not clear as to damage to natural resources as it 
might be and does not extend to all damage to the ecological system of the sea 
which may result from an oil pollution incident. 
Although most of the exemptions of cover from the compulsory insurance 
may be remedied by Fund Convention, through the IOPC Fund, this remedy is 
only available against the shipwoners whose States are members both CLC 
and FC. Therefore, there is still a possibility that victims in the CLC Contracting 
States, which have not acceded to the FC, will remain uncompensated under 
the compulsory insurance schemes for pollution damages in many cases. 
Setting up a provisional Guarantee Fund, which is financed by shipowners in 
the CLC Contracting States which have not acceded the FC, may be a good 
idea for meeting the claims not covered by the compulsory liability insurance 
under the CLC. In addition, asking the owners to take additional liability 
insurance which covers damage which is outside the compulsory insurance is 
also suggested. 
The other difficulty which may arise from compulsory insurance is the 
problem of enforcement. The CLC adopted the view that the state of registry 
should determ ine the conditions of the insurance and the validity of certificate. 
This may raise problems for the authorities of the registry states in trying to 
estimate the financial security of an insurer who is resident abroad, acting 
under foreign law and insurance conditions. Thus, the state may refuse to issue 
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a certificate when it believes that the insurer or guarantor named in the 
certificate is not financially capable of meeting the obligations imposed by the 
Convention. To reach the correct decision, the registry state needs reliable 
information about the financial capability of the insurer or guarantor who 
resides in another country. Consultation with other Contracting States, in which 
the insurer or guarantor resides may provide some help in finding the truth, but 
such consultation may not be available at all times, in particular where the 
insurer or guarantor lives in a non-Contracting State, where delays could 
results. To reduce this difficulty, it may be a good idea to suggest that the IMO 
provides a list, which can be kept up-to-date in the light of financial capability, 
of creditable insurers or guarantors, which can be consulted by the shipowners 
and their registry states. 
Allowing direct action against the insurer gives an opportunity to victims of 
pollution to claim compensation even where an insured is insolvent or bankrupt. 
Its effectiveness may be reduced, however, where there is a distinction 
between a contract of liability and a contract of indemnity or where the contract 
of liability insurance is regarded as a contract of indemnity. There are 
occasions in which the insurer is entitled to a limitation of liability whereas the 
owner is denied the benefit of limitation. This may lead to different results from 
third party claimants if the contract of insurance and contract of liability 
insurance are treated separately, or where the contract of liability is treated in 
the same manner as a contract of indemnity. These differences may be 
removed if the compulsory insurance is regarded as a liability insurance 
whereby the insurer is liable after the happening of loss, regardless of the 
insureds' fault, as it is owner under the Convention. 
Missing pages are unavailable 
Chapter 5. Draft convention on liability and compensation for damage 
caused by the carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances, HNS Draft 
5.1. Necessity of having HNS convention 
The increase in the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances, hns, at 
sea, growing environmental awareness of the public at large, and the economic 
cost of maritime casualties both at sea and in port have increasingly given rise 
to the consideration of liability and compensation in respect of damage caused 
by hns carried by sea. This issue was given serious consideration, by IMO, 
under the Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Convention with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1 , hereinafter as 
Draft HNS Convention. The main issue which was brought forward, by those 
who were involved in the preparation of the Draft HNS Convention, was 
whether there was any need for internationally agreed and uniform rules and 
standards to deal with issues of liability and compensation in respect of 
damage caused by hns, or whether national law was sufficiently capable of 
dealing with these issues. 
There was opinion that an international convention was not necessary, 
because of the great difficulties in defining which types of cargo should be 
subject to it. Whereas in the case of the conventions dealing with oil pollution, 
there was no doubt as to type of cargo involved it would seem that no such 
certainty existed for hazardous and noxious substances because of the 
difficulty in specifying which materials were inherently dangerous or noxious.2 
In addition, present domestic legal remedies, as provided by the tort system, 
are broadly sufficient to provide adequate redress to victims of catastrophe. On 
1 IMO Doc. Leg/Conf. 6/3. Jan. 13. 1984 
2 Committee Maritime Intemationa.l, Report on Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 
HNS-3. II-81, para. 3. 
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this basis, a victim of incident arising out of carriage of hns must rely on the 
normal legal remedies based on the tort or contract for bringing an action 
against a wrongdoer. 3 
It could be said that whilst common law remedies do provide an acceptable 
system of compensation, they do not provide victims with prompt compensation 
for damages resulting from release of hns into the environment or from related 
fires and explosions. Furthermore, a victim of pollution may not be allowed to 
recover at all because the nature of the hns product generally imposes an 
onerous duty of care on the carrier and, therefore, it would be very difficult for a 
victim to prove sufficient negligence on the part of the carrier. 
It may also be argued that there is no need to consider special regulation 
at an international level to provide civil liability and compensation for damage 
caused by the maritime carriage of hns, as long as there is a general lack of 
maritime accidents involving substances other than oil and insufficient judicial 
experience in dealing with hns incidents.4 This view may be criticised, however, 
because it is not logical and reasonable to do nothing until an accident happens 
which may affect a large area of the sea situated between different countries. 
It has been pointed out that although there is not enough data available 
concerning all possible types of substances capable of causing pollution 
damage of a specific and serious nature, it would nevertheless be undesirable 
and dangerous to wait for a major catastrophe before taking action with respect 
to the development of the legal regime covering liability and compensation. 5 
3 British Maritime Law Association, (BMLA,) Submission to the CW on the Proposed !MCa Draft 
Convention on the Carriage ofHNS by Sea, Montreal, 1981, para. 1. 
4 See decisions of the Legal Committee ofIMCO, at its seventh session in January 1970. 
5 IMCO, LEG, XVIIIl5 para. 5.1. It was suggested by the delegation of France, Mexico, Netherlands 
and Sweden. 
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Difficulties in the definition of each hns substance can be solved by 
categorising and listing the substances on the basis of their nature, 
It may also be argued that there is no real need for the creation of a new 
liability and compensation regime because the scope of most types of marine 
pollution caused by hns substances is so small that clean up costs are unlikely 
to be high; and the higher limitation amount adopted by 1976 International 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims has provided sufficient 
cover for civil liability problems that could arise in connection with pollution 
damage, other than oil, resulting from transportation. 6 
This view may be rejected because there is no real experience to prove 
that the clean up cost of pollution damage resulting from carriage of hns at sea 
is too low. In addition, damage arising out of hns is not confined to pollution, but 
may extend to fire and explosions which increase pollution liability. Moreover, 
the 1976 Limitation Convention on liability is not applicable to non contracting 
states. In consequence, it does not solve problems of incidents arising form 
carriage of hns everywhere. Therefore, it is still necessary to have a new 
liability and compensation regime for carriage of hns. 
It has been said that the extension of the CLC to substances other than oil 
woulargued that it would be 
desirable to have an entirely separate convention to cover all hazards and 
liabilities relating to oil substances as comprehensively as possible8 because 
6 Discussed by IMCO, 18-19 session of Legal Committee, May and June 1973. 
7 IMCO, LEG/ XIllI7, para 18-19. 
8 Id. LEG/ XXIXl5, para. 6. 
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the risk and the nature of damage which can be caused by other noxious and 
hazardous substances differs considerably from the risk and nature of damage 
from persistent and other oil. Moreover, the system contained in the CLC, 
which places primary liability on the shipowner, might prove to be inappropriate 
in respect of damage arising from the inherent quality of the hns rather than 
from the fact of transportation, under which it would be more appropriate to put 
primary liability upon a party other than the carrier, such as the manufacturer, 
the consignor, the owner of the substances or any other party interested in the 
cargo.9 Moreover, the view was expressed that the CLC only covers damage 
arising out of pollution, whereas damage resulting from the carriage of hns is 
not limited to pollution. Damage may also result from other hazards such as 
toxicity, fire and explosion.10 
To provide more protection to the marine environment, it would be 
desirable to have an international convention to deal with problems resulting 
from carriage of hns, rather than rely on national law because in many legal 
systems liability is based on the concept of fault under which a potential plaintiff 
has to make his choice as to the person or persons against whom the claim is 
to be raised and as to the acts or omissions on which he wishes to base his 
claim. To do this, he has to assume at least a substantial part of the burden of 
proof. Ther~fore, a new convention might help such victims by directing claims 
against a specified person or persons, without too many difficulties in terms of 
proof. 
With regard to what has been mentioned, it can be concluded that the 
need to establish an international legal regime to deal with civil liability and 
9 Id. 
10 LEG! XXXIIl3, para. 8. 
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compensation for damage arising out of the carriage of hns is quite obvious, 
provided some questions such as the drawing up of a special list of substances, 
the nature of liability, the party liable, the type of damage, limitation of liability, 
compulsory insurance are properly answered in advance. To achieve this, it is 
necessary to continue the consideration of the Draft HNS until a satisfactory 
outcome is achieved which is both largely adequate and widely acceptable at 
an international level. It is also felt that the establishment of such an acceptable 
international system would discourage proliferation of unilateral and 
uncoordinated national schemes. 
5. 2. Form of liability 
To secure prompt and adequate payment of compensation, the Draft HNS 
Convention provided that claimants did not need to prove that the shipper or 
ship owner was negligent but only to prove that hazardous substances caused 
damage, i.e. strict liability.ll In limited circumstances the responsible party may 
escape liability altogether. 12 The application of strict liability could be seen as 
testifying to a firm intention to allocate personal and direct liability to third party 
damage covered by the Draft Convention on the basis of consideration of the 
harmful nature of cargoes carried by sea, rather than of merely the 
transportation standard or the existence of fault. 
The overriding argument was that the liability imposed under a new 
convention would be more appropriate if it were strict, i.e. liability without proof 
of fault but subject to a limited number of defences as contained in the CLC. l3 
II Arts. 3, 7. Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO Doc. LEG Conf. 6/3 (Jan. 13. 1984). Hereinafter is 
cited as Draft HNS Convention. 
12 Art. 3 Para. 2,3. Id. 
13 LEG XXIXl5, para 47. 
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The effect of the strict liability is , in practice, very similar to the fault principle in 
insurance contract whereby the insurer would be liable for damage resulted 
from negligent act of the insured. This is why only this kind of legal regime 
would be able to provide full, adequate and speedy recovery for victims, 
especially in those cases where catastrophic damage results from the maritime 
carriage of hns other than oil. 14 This principle may also be preferred because it 
provides a greater incentive for the prevention of pollution and, as a 
consequence, better protection of the environment. 
5.3. On whom does liability fall? 
The choice of the person to be made strictly liable may be based on 
grounds of morality or of expediency. These two considerations do not 
necessarily yield the same answer. If the cargo interests are to be held liable 
because they share with the shipowner the responsibility for putting the noxious 
substances into maritime commerce, then there is a case for saying that the 
consignee also shares in this responsibility, for he will often be the initiator of 
the transaction under which the goods are shipped. The choice of the 
consignee would have practical advantages as regards policing in relation to 
shipment from a non-convention country. It must however be acknowledged 
that the identity of the consignee may change in the course of transit and that 
he is not usually the person with whom the shipowner has direct contact. 
Equally, it might be said that it is the producer who has the greatest moral 
responsibility for any damage ultimately caused by a noxious products which he 
has put into circulation. Perhaps the moral responsibility attaches to all those 
14 LEG XXXIV17, para 20. 
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who deal with the goods as principals in which case what is called for might be 
more in the nature of a "product insurance" rather than a "shipper insurance". 
The Draft suggested a mixed shipowner and shipper, or cargo interest, 
liability system. 15 The choice of the two-tier system indicated a general 
awareness of the main principle of underlying liability insurance based on 
limitation of liability and operation of "risk spreading" mechanisms. It states that 
the whole question of a sustainable insurance market capacity to absorbs the 
risks of potentially catastrophic levels is dependent on the amount of premium 
that assureds can afford and the limit of liability per incident for persons 
involved in liability. 
It would be reasonable to put liability primarily on the ship owner16 because 
the majority of incidents which give rise to liability in maritime affairs are caused 
by the actions or omissions of the ship owner/operator. This may also be well 
justified with regard to the principle that to incur legal liability there must be a 
degree of negligence. Since the cargo is in the care of the carrier under a 
contract of carriage any liability incurred in relation to the cargo would lie with 
the carrier. This is also consistent with the Common Law rule which says that 
the shipowner, as a carrier, has a strict liability for cargo carried on board his 
vessel and obliged to act in the capacity of insurer of the safety of the goods, 
with the exception of Act of God, perils of the sea, King's Enemies and inherent 
vice. 
15 Arts. 3, 8. Draft HNS Convention. supra. No. 10. 
16 The ship OWller is "The person or persons registered as the owner of the owner FO the ship or, in the 
absence of registered, the person or persons owing the ship". Art. 1, para. 3. Draft HNS Convention. 
supra. No. 10. 
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Extending liability to the shipper!7 may also be justified by the view that he 
gains an economic benefit from hns trade. This justification may be 
strengthened by suggesting that the risk inherent in hns does not arise only 
from carriage but also from the substances themselves. 18 Furthermore, putting 
part of the liability on the shipper may make available an additional insurance 
capacity for victims of pollution incidents. 19 Assuming that the decision is taken 
to impose strict liability on the shipper, the. question as to who should be 
named as the shipper is controversial. If the person who delivers the goods for 
shipment, otherwise that a forwarding agent or other person acting in a purely 
ministerial capacity is named as a shipper the result may differ depending on 
the nature of contract of shipment, e.g. FOB (Free on Board) or. FAS (Free 
Alongside Ship). If the shipper is identified with whom the contract of carriage is 
made, such a choice may lead to capricious results and, therefore, make the 
scheme of the Convention unworkable in practice. It might also be suggested 
that those who are able to take out insurance for goods are named as a 
shipper. This may be opposed as a result of being difficult and impracticable. It 
is difficult because the identification of the party who is to take out the 
insurance might call for study of the contract of sale and the law governing that 
contract in conjunction with the contract of carriage. This would be quite 
impracticable since the "shipper" would have to be identified before shipment. 
17 The shipper is "The person on whose behalf, or by whom as principle, the hazardous Substances are 
delivered for carriage". Art. 1. para. 4, Draft HNS Convention. supra. No. 10. 
18 The only precedent for such an approach involving personal and direct liability of the shipper has 
been in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear substances. See, The 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability fro Nuclear Damage and 1971 The Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field 
of Carriage of Nuclear Materials which extend the liability of "operator" of nuclear installation to 
damage caused by a nuclear incident during the transportation of nuclear substances by sea. 
19 Since success of dividing liability between shippers and ship OWllers depend much on availability of 
compulsory insurance, thus, further discussion is provided in chapter four, at pp. 133-148. 
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Thus, as a result, the Convention, for practical purposes, should identify "the 
shipper" as the person who delivers the goods for carriage, as was 
contemplated in the Draft Convention, despite having performance problems in 
law. For example, to say "the shipper" is the person named in the bill of lading 
is unacceptable, for this person might be a forwarding agent or there may be no 
bill of lading; nor is it an answer to identify him as the person named in the 
certificate of insurance because, quite apart from the fact that this does not 
accommodate the case where no certificate is issued, the definition is circular: 
the person liable as shipper is the person insured and the person who is 
insured is the person liable. 
5.4. Substances subject to the Draft of HNS Convention 
The HNS Draft Convention only addresses the bulk carriage of a limited list 
of substances.20 The bulk criterion was defined, ''when carried without any 
intermediate form of containment in a hold or tank which is a structural part of 
ship or in a tank or container permanently fIXed in or on a ship.21 
Restriction of HNS Draft to bulk cargo may be justified on the assumption 
that HNS Convention should primarily deal with catastrophic damage caused 
by highly harmful substances, because catastrophic damage would not be 
caused unless there was a great quantity of hazard substances, i.e. quantity 
carried in bulk and not in package.22 The choice of the bulk criterion may also 
be justified because of the existence of difficulties with the formulation of a 
practical definition of term of the shipper. It could be felt that the shipper would 
20 Art. 1. para. 5. and annex. xx. Draft HNS Convention. supra. No. 10. 
21 Id. see definition of hazardous substances. 
22 LEG/Com. 6/3, art. 1, para. 5. 
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be relatively easily identified in the case of bulk transport which normally 
involves only a very limited number of consignments carried by each vessel. 
This would greatly facilitate the identification of the party liable over and above 
the ship owner in the event of an incident, as well as the enforcement of 
compulsory insurance requirement.23 
In providing a list of substances, which are going to be included in the Draft 
HNS Convention, it may be asked whether it should be short or extensive. A 
short list may be supported for practical purposes and so that the Convention is 
completed speedily on the other hand too small a list could prove problematic 
because of the problems of spreading the insurance risks.24 
The Draft HNS Convention excluded substances carried in packages, 
because it was practically impossible to produce a list of substances carried in 
packaged form and the inclusion of all of them in a expanded list of substances 
would create complicated administration and implementation problems. Despite 
this it has to be said that some substances carried in packages in some 
circumstances cause catastrophic damage.25 Exclusion may also be justified 
because only bulk cargo is likely to produce catastrophic damage requiring 
compensation in excess of the limits available under the 1976 Limitation 
Convention. This is rejected because the HNS Draft contemplates covering fire 
and explosion damage, in addition to pollution damage. This might lead to the 
idea that the Lim itation Convention would not be able to provide adequate 
compensation in the case of fire and explosion, e.g. possible explosion of gas 
carrier at a port. Exclusion of hns transported in packages may be criticised 
23 Aline, F.M.D Biever, Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
HNS by Sea, (1986) 17 J.Mar.Law & Corom., p. 82. 
24 9 LEG, XL VII7, para . 
25 LEG, XXJXIW, p. 10. 
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because of the view that the packaged substances may cause the greatest risk 
of widespread environmental damage. Many of the most dangerous chemical 
substances are shipped only in packaged form and large quantities of such 
substances may be transported on a single ship and discharge of such 
substances may cause enormous damage after a maritime accident. 
It has been suggested that the risk covered by the convention should 
include that of fire and explosion partly because these may be the most serious 
risks relating to the carriage of hns and also because the inclusion of this risk 
would enhance the value and acceptability of the convention. In connection with 
explosions, it would be desirable to extend coverage to residues of hns in an 
unladen tanker.26 
5.5. Extension of definition of damage 
The HNS Draft provided that damage means "Ioss of life or personal injury 
on board or outside the ship carrying the hazardous substances, caused by 
those substances, and any other loss or damage outside the ship caused by 
those hazardous substances .... ".27 In this definition there is no distinction 
between damage suffered by people, damage to property, and damage to the 
environment. 
It is suggested that loss caused by fire, or personal injury, should be covered 
by the Convention without regard to whether such loss or injury occurred on 
board or outside the ship carrying hns. There is also a strong feeling that the 
term "damage" must include loss or damage to property if such property was 
outside the ship carrying hns.28 
26 Committee Maritime International, Report ofHNS by Sea, HNS-3, 11-8L 
27 Art. 6. Draft HNS Convention. supra. No. 10. 
28 Id. This view was adopted by many delegations to the meeting 
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The proposed definition of pollution damage indicates that the convention 
was intended to apply to any damage caused by the dangerous nature of the 
substance.29 Generally speaking, there is no duty in effecting insurance on a 
ship to disclose the nature of cargo shipped or intended to be shipped, 
although with regard to the safety of the vessel and prevention of potential 
liability one kind of cargo may be much less desirable than another. This 
general idea may doubted in some particular cases. Disclosure seems to be 
material if the cargo is hazardous, unless it is clearly be waived by the 
underwriters. In Mann. McNeal & Streeves Ltd. v. Capital and Counties. Ins 
Co. Ltd,JO policies were effected by brokers on a ship for a voyage from the 
United States to France and back. At the date of insurance her ow~rs had 
engaged her to carry a large quantity of petrol in an iron drum, but this fact was 
not disclosed to the underwriter. In an answer to a claim on the policies the 
underwriters pleaded non-disclosure of the engagement for the carriage of the 
petrol. Greer J. in the court of first instance, held that there had been non-
disclosure of a material fact and gave judgement for the underwriter. In the 
Court of Appeal, Bankes and Atkin L.J, whilst refraining from overruling this 
finding of Greer. J. held that the requirement of disclosure had been waived. 
The court were, therefore, unanimous in allowing the appeal. As a result, it can 
be said that in the case of goods of dangerous kind the duty of disclosure 
exists. 
The definition of damage is extended to cover "the cost of preventive 
measures31 and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.'132 It 
29 Id. 
30 [1921J 2 K.B. 300. 
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may be asked whether the cost of preventive measure and clean up should be 
included in the convention or not. It was strongly felt that the convention should 
apply to preventive measures, wherever such measures are taken, provided 
that the measures aimed to prevent damage which might occur within the 
geographical scope of the convention. 33 
The geographical scope was closely linked to the definition of damage. In 
other words, the geographical scope may vary according to the type of damage 
involved. The Convention has restricted the application of geographical scope 
to damage caused in the territory, including the territorial sea of a contracting 
state and preventive measures wherever taken to prevent or minimise such 
damage.32 It would be more appropriate that the convention apply to incidents in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of a contracting party or parties. This would be 
more desirable with respect to prevention of damage which may be caused by 
contamination. It is necessary to extend the EEZ to cover non pollution 
damage, such as damage cause by fire and explosion. 
In consideration of types of damage, attention also should be given to 
relationship between a salvage award under the Salvage Convention and the 
compensation to which a salver might be entitled in respect of expenses 
incurred in a clean up operation. With regard to the nature of hns, which does 
not usually follow substantial damage in the case of an incident, it can be said 
that it would be necessary to avoid a situation in which a salver could be 
31 Preventive measure means "Any reasonable measures taken by any person ..... after such an incident 
has occurred to prevent or minimise the damage". see. Art. 1(7) of the Draft HNS Convention. supra. 
no. 10. 
32 Art.l(6). Id. 
33 Id. 
32 Art. 2. Draft HNS Convention. supra. No. 10. 
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entitled to obtain payment for the same service, under the proposed HNS 
Convention and Salvage Convention 
The concept of economic loss, as opposed to consequential loss arising 
out of property damage, is treated differently in various legal systems and 
therefore, it would be too difficult to harmonise the different national legal 
system. It is suggested that the treatment of pure economic loss be left to 
national legal systems. 
3.5. who is the assured and how insurance operates. 
The Draft of HNS Convention provided that, at the first stage, ship owners 
were to maintain insurance or other financial security to meet the limits of their 
liability for damage caused by ships which carried bulk cargo of more than a 
certain amount of hns34 because they have custody of goods for reward and 
would be parties who can be easily identified and effectively provide 
compensation. The question which may arise here is whether a shipowner, as a 
carrier, has an insurable interest in the dangerous goods which he carries and 
may cause pollution liability. Although the shipowner is not the actual owner, 
but his insurable interest in the goods committed for carriage has been well 
recognised in the marine insurance.35 It is worthwhile to mention that the 
shipowner's right to insure against liability not only arises from an insurable 
interest in the goods, but also from the marine adventure in which the risk is 
involved. 
It has been said that although shipowner's compulsory insurance was 
desirable for achieving adequate financial cover for the Convention, it was not 
34 As it was proposed by 1969 CLC. See Article 11(A), Para 1.2.3, Draft HNS Convention 1984. 
35 Section. 3(2) of MIA 1906; Secallso Hill v. Scott (1895) 2 Q.B.D. 713. 
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necessary in practice, because practically every ship owner at present carries 
adequate liability insurance, usually through P&I Clubs, and it is unthinkable 
that any shipowner who would be likely to carry the types of cargoes envisaged 
by the Convention would not have the usual liability insurance.36 It must 
however be recognised that the existing levels of liability insurance for vessels 
involved in catastrophic accidents are inadequate. Moreover, in recent years, 
most underwriters have excluded pollution liability cover from their general or 
public policy. 
Thus it would be desirable to devise a workable system of compulsory 
insurance for shipowners' liability because of the limited number of ships 
involved and the existence of P&I Clubs. This could be justified by the fact that 
there are no such P&I Club facilities for shippers, although many substantial 
shippers of hns may have access to a liability insurance market.37 This is not to 
say, however, that the shipowner has no means available to protect himself 
against claims which might arise from incidents involving damage caused by 
hazardous cargo. For instance in the case of transportation of dangerous 
goods by sea it is a very long-standing practice that the cost of additional 
insurance protection taken out by the shipowner is imposed on the cargo 
interest. Such ure-insurance" arrangements are, however, very different from 
the concept of shared or exclusive shipper's liability, whereby the cargo interest 
is made personally and directly liable for loss or damage in spite of the fact that 
they have no custody over the goods during their transportation. The extension 
of shipowner compulsory insurance to the shipper, as additional insured, may 
36 B.ML.Aproposal to Conference of the CM, Montreal, May 1981. 
37 See TIIE XXXII Conference of the Committee Maritime International, CMl, regarding HNS Draft, 
Montreal, 81. 
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be criticised because it creates confusion and because of coverage problems 
and increased costs. It may be desirable, from the insurers' point of view, that 
there be no duplication of cover in respect of anyone incident which involved 
substantial liability. Such an extension may also create problems in dividing the 
limit of compulsory insurance between the shipowner and the shipper because 
of the different objectives each has in the carriage of goods by ship. 
The channelling of compulsory liability insurance exclusively to the 
shipowner does not, of course, mean that he would not be able to take 
insurance for shippers. This is usually done by a system under which a ship 
owner takes out an open cover policy for shippers' liability, and for the shippers' 
ultimate account. It seems improbable that the insurer would accept the risk 
which would be consequential upon certificates being issued by the people 
whose main day-to-day work is not insurance or acting as an agent for insurers, 
in their name, without it being possible for them to have some effective 
supervision and control of the issue of certificate. This problem could be solved 
if the insurance provided is transferable. This can be done by providing an 
open cover insurance, for the shipowner for shippers' liability, in which the 
assured is mentioned in a general way, for example: " those who may be found 
liable" or similar wording. This gives authority to the operator to issue a 
certificate in the name of individual shipper.38 Issuing of such certificates is not 
unusual in cargo insurance, because the essential point in this kind of 
insurance would be the existence of insurance for cargo liability and not so 
much the identity of the interested party.39 
38 Such insurance certificate, in effect, would be consignment insurance rather that shipper insurance. 
This is why it is suggested, this kind of insurance certificate be called as " HNS Green card for operator 
" 
39 The XXXII conference of the Committee Maritime International, eMI, regarding HNS Draft, 
Montreal 1981. 
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The Draft convention replaced the "strict personal liability" of the shipper 
with a system of compulsory "cargo" liability insurance.40 This system whilst 
preserving the principle of compulsory insurance, which is essential to 
guarantee payment when civil liability has been imposed, prevents the difficulty 
of identification of the shipper by permitting the claimant to proceed directly 
against the cargo insurance compensation fund. This approach might be 
criticised on the basis that the removal of personal liability may threaten an 
insurer's right of recourse against the shipper. It should also be noted that the 
absence of direct accountability of the shipper in the event of an incident 
causing damage may seriously hamper the ability of insurers to vary a premium 
on the basis of the client's experience, as well as discouraging the exercise of 
care and loss prevention practices on the part of the assured.41 
There might also be the problem of identifying the insured in the case of 
shippers compulsory insurance and of proving an insurable interest. The 
shipper has been defined in the Draft of the HNS convention as "the person on 
whose behalf, or by whom as principal, the hazardous substances are delivered 
for carriage. '142 Although under this definition a shipper may be easily identified, 
it unfairly places the burden of insurance on the person who has no custody 
over the cargo during the carriage. A shipper may also be defined as a person 
or persons who have the highest degree of control over cargoes during 
carriage at sea. It would be difficult to identify the shipper under this definition 
because of the complexities of shipping activities involving a great number of 
different cargo interests and intermediaries who interact with one another 
40 1984 LEG/Conf. 6/C. l/w p.22, art. 13. 
41 As it was discussed :in, LEG/Conf. 6/c/l WP. 24 and WP. 25. 
42 Art. 1, para 4, Draft HNS Convention 1984. 
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through sophisticated contractual arrangements. This attempt would also lead 
the shipper to a situation whereby the person made liable would be different 
from those who are operationally responsible. 
It is necessary under compulsory insurance to assure that cargoes are 
carried with proper insurance. To do this, it has been that contracting states 
should be satisfied as to the adequacy of the insurance and such certificates 
should be acceptable to them. This proposal was not adopted because, on one 
hand, there is no balance between the measures of control and enforcement, 
and on the other hand, on the account of the fact that a certificate would have 
to be issued for every consignment. In addition to this, it would not cover 
certificates issued in a non contracting state.43 
In order to solve this problem it was suggested that a policing role should 
, 
be imposed on the shipowner. He was required to bear shipper s liability if he 
failed to prove that an insurance certificate had been properly issued in respect 
of the hns consignment taken over for carriage on board his ship.44 This 
proposal may be opposed by ship owning interests and insurers because of the 
belief that only governments could fulfil the task of acting as the guarantee of 
solvency. In the view of the International Chamber of shipping, it would be 
unfair, as well as very unreasonable, to propose that a "shipowner could 
receive legal penalties for failing to perform impossible tasks. '145 It may also be 
doubted whether it would be possible for a ship owner to take effective steps 
against the shipper, in particular in cases where loading took place in an non-
contracting state. 
43 IMCO, LEG XLVIWP. 7, 5 March 1981,p. 11. 
44 LEG/ Conf. 6/3 Article 2 para 2- Alternative IT. 
45 LEG/Conf. 6/11. 
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For the establishment of international insurance schemes for hns incidents , 
it was proposed that an international insurance scheme should be organised. 
This would use its income to purchase insurance cover in the insurance market 
against the claimant to whom the ship owner would be liable.46 It would also 
cover claims for single incidents which exceed the shipowner's limit of liability 
up to the limit of the scheme. Therefore, it would be necessary for the 
international insurance scheme to provide a fixed limit on the compensation 
which it would pay for an hns incident. The scheme's fixed limit would have to 
include the amount of the shipowner's liability and specific insurance cover 
may be needed for it.47 
The success of international insurance schemes in practice would depend 
on having an effective financing system. Several alternatives have been 
examined for establishing the basis on which the levy should be charged: (a) 
the weight or the volume of the cargoes, (b) the degree of hazard presented by 
the cargo, (c) the freight payable on the cargo, (d) the value of the cargo. 
A levy based purely on weight volume of the cargo offers simplicity of 
assessment and collection. It could be regarded as unsatisfactory in terms of 
equity, under which the amount of substances present would not necessarily 
reflect either its capacity to cause damage or its value.48 A levy on the degree 
of hazard presented by a cargo would produce a complicated system that 
would be cumbersome to operate. A levy based on freight also offers 
reasonable equity because it reflects to some extent both the amount of the 
46 V.K. delegation view at the request ofIMCO, Document LEG 60/3/4. 
47 IMO, LEG 60/3/4,28 Sep. 1988. 
48 IMO, Doc. No. LEG 60/3/A, 22 Sep. 1988. 
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cargo carried and nature of the substances, but it may lose its credibility in the 
competitive nature of the shipping industry. 
The value of cargo seemed to be the most suitable basis for calculating the 
hns fund levy, despite the fact that it may not be suitable in the case of waste 
cargo or where the cargo has no commercial value. It might be feasible to base 
the calculations of levy on the cost of the freight for the carriage. Such a system 
would reflect to some extent the amount of cargo carried and the nature of the 
substances and hence the degree of the risk involved. The most serious 
problem of such a system is the competitive nature of the shipping industry 
which could cause considerable variation in the freight rate by different carriers 
for the same route. 
5.S. Concluding remarks 
A number of countries have for several years been discussing the question 
of the establishment of a convention for pollution liability resulting from 
hazardous and noxious substances other than oil and this question have been 
based in the Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances which is being considered 
by IMO, but has not been approved so far. \tVhether or not any HNS Convention 
on liability and compensation will actually come out of this melting pot is still 
open to question. Potentially catastrophic pollution damage in transport of 
hazardous and noxious substances make the need for an effective liability and 
compensation scheme for hns damage apparent, despite the view that the 
present domestic legal remedies may be broadly sufficient to provide adequate 
compensation for the pollution victims suffering from hns incidents. Under these 
domestic regimes, a plaintiff will usually base his claim in tort and therefore has 
to choose which person or persons he will make his claim against and the facts 
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on which he wishes to base his claim. He would, therefore, have to bear a 
substantial burden of proof of fault which would seem to be very difficult, since 
the nature of hns carried at sea would impose an enormous duty of care on the 
shipowner. Thus a HNS Convention, under which victims would be able to 
direct their claims to specified person without being obliged to prove fault will 
help victims to achieve adequate guaranteed compensation. The desirability of 
the having HNS Convention is even more apparent when one considers that 
the nature of maritime carriage of hns and resulting damage, following and 
accident, is international and therefore cannot be solved by national laws which 
in many legal systems are based on the concept of fault. 
If it is assumed, as has been done, that some sort of HNS Convention is 
created, the next point is to consider whether or not it can be implemented in 
practice. It seems to be practicable, provided that some technical questions are 
resolved in advance. The most important question which needs to be 
considered is the availability of insurance. It has been observed that although 
there might be a problem of the spread of risk if the scope of the convention is 
limited, insurance capacity is available for the shipper provided that it is limited 
to a reasonable sum and provided that the first part of liability is borne by the 
shipowner. Since shipper liability insurance would probably be placed at least 
initially in a different sector of the market from shipowners' liability insurance, 
greater overall capacity might be available than if the complete liability were to 
be placed on the shipowner. 
The second question which needs to be clarified is the identity of the party 
to be insured. In order to avoid uncertainties as to whether the right party has 
been named in the certificate it would be legally and practically feasible to effect 
an insurance on any person who might incur liability under the Convention. On 
the one hand a one-tier system of shipowner liability may be defended because 
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such a system would be simple to implement, and provide a high limit of 
insurance cover, rather than a divided system. On the other hand it might be 
advisable to have a two- tier system of shipper and shipowner liability, as a 
result of the view that shipping is a joint venture. In spite of the superficial 
appeal of a two-tier liability system because it is equitable and provides greater 
incentive to the shipper to select more a responsible owner, the preferred view 
is for a one-tier system of shipowner liability. This is because such a system 
first, removes the complicated problem of identification of the many shippers 
that can often be involved in a single ship, secondly, focuses on the party in the 
best position to prevent Maritime disaster, thirdly, does not require each cargo 
to have a separate insurance policy, and fourthly, recognises that the marine 
insurance market appears to have the capacity to cover shipowner liability 
limits, and the shipowners' insurance costs can easily be absorbed by shippers 
through a higher rate structure. 
In last ten years effective steps have been taken towards reaching 
agreement on a Draft HNS Convention. Consideration of current discussions 
and negotiation on the Draft reveals that agreement has been reached on the 
basic requirements listed in the Draft. The Convention states that it should be 
applied to substances carried in bulk as well as substances carried in package 
form; liability should rest with an easily identifiable party; as far as practicable 
liability should be strict; and any limit of liability should sufficiently high to 
provide adequate compensation for hns damage. Despite agreement on these 
basic questions, it seems that further work needs to be done in order to 
implement these general agreements in practice. It is advised that while 
continuing these efforts, further steps should be taken towards the 
establishment of an international system of liability, which would be both legally 
and widely acceptable, prior to any major catastrophy involving hns 
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substances. Until reach the conclusion of the convention is reached, it is 
suggested that shipowners and shippers consider voluntary compensation as 
an alternative to the HNS Convention, as a scheme to protect victims suffering 
pollution damage caused by highly hazardous and noxious substances carried 
by sea. 
Chapter 6. Place of liability in the marine insurance market 
6.1. Liability insurance in respect of pollution 
An insurance contract is legally valid only if the assured has an insurable 
interest at risk. If there is no interest, the assured does not expose himself to 
any loss and there would be nothing for the insurer to agree to indemnify.1 An 
insurance policy without interest at the time of the incident is in effect gambling 
insurance and is not legally valid in the United Kingdom where the assured 
should be interested in the subject matter insured at the time of loss, although 
not necessarily when the insurance is effected.2 By comparison in the United 
States, an insurance policy is not rendered void if it is proved that the assured 
does not have an insurable interest at the time of the incident. 3 
The right to insure liabilities, as an interest, comes into existence where 
there was a lawful adventure. There is a marine adventure, inter alia 
''where ... any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or any 
other person interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by reason of 
maritime perils. ,,4 A person is interested in a maritime adventure, ''where he 
stands in any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable 
property at risk therein, in consequence of which he may ... incur liability 
thereof.',s Thus, a man is interested in a thing to whom advantage may arise or 
prejudice happen from the circumstances which may attend it.6 Pollution 
liability resulting from discharge or escape of oil and other substances can be 
I S. 5. Marine Insurance Act 1906, hereinafter MIA 1906. 
2 S. 4. MIA 1906. 
3 Republican of China, China Merchant Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. U.S.A National Fire Insurance 
CO. [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 578. 
4 S. 3. MIA 1906. 
5 S. 5(2). MIA 1906. 
6 Lucena v. Craufurd (1806) 2 Bos. & P.N.R. 269; (1805) E.R. 630. 
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regarded as an insurable interest, provided that the shipowner is legally liable 
for damages. 
One of the categories of liability in respect of which someone may insure is 
pollution liability. Liability for pollution is a liability which may fall upon the 
shipowners as a result of law or contract or voluntary agreement. Insurers do 
not tend to insure contractual liability arising out of breach of contract, except 
by special agreement. The insurers' attitude towards liability resulting from 
voluntary agreement, e.g. TOVALOP, is the same as insurance against 
contractual liability. In Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. v. Duder,7 a shipowner in 
hiring a tug had agreed to pay damages where as a result of its own negligence 
it collided with the ship. It was held that the liability of the shipowner under the 
contract was not covered by the Running Down Clause, since it is a condition 
precedent in the liability insurance that the insured should not admit liability or 
offer or promise payment, whether expressly or impliedly, without the written 
consent of the insurer.8 The obligation of the insurers is in respect of all sums 
which the assured is liable to pay as damages. In this context the law is 
generally taken to mean the general law, i.e. the general duty of the assured as 
expressed in the law relating to tort, or civil wrong, and the public law as 
contained in statutes, bylaws and the like. 
Thus, there is pollution liability insurance where there is a legally binding 
potential liability in law to pay damage to another. This does not mean that the 
assured should be liable to pay, and has paid, the damages in question. It is 
enough that the liability exists although the sum in question has not been paid. 
Pollution liability insurance, therefore, provides that the insurer will indemnify 
7 (1936) 2 K. 461. 
8 This gives the insurer the right to control any proceeding against the insured; see. Groom v. Crocker 
(1939] 1 K.B. 194. 
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the assured against, or pay on his behalf, the sum and the costs then set out. 
This means that the option for payment is for the insurer and not one which is 
offered to the assured. In practice no such choice may be necessary. If the 
assured is indemnified, then he will be reimbursed in respect of the sums for 
which he is liable and which he had paid out. However, in contradiction to this 
argument, the principle enunciated in the MIA 1906 provides, in the absence of 
words in the policy to the contrary, that the assured is entitled to an indemnity, 
even where he has not made a payment to the third party. 
6.2. Pollution damage and collision liability insurance 
Although collision has been regarded a peril of the sea,9liability arising 
from collision is not recoverable as a peril of the sea since it arises not from the 
sea but from the law of the nations. The word "collision" is generally applied to 
an accidental contact, usually resulting in damage, between one ship and 
another ship. Grove J. in Hough and Co. v. Head,10 said" "collision" appears 
to me to contemplate the case of a vessel striking another ship or boat, or 
floating buoy, or other navigable matter, something navigated, and coming into 
contact with. It, so to speak, imparts, as it were, two things. It may be that one 
is active and the other is passive, but still, in one sense, they each strike the 
other. That does not apply to striking on the ground at the bottom." 
The open insurance market is not prepared to extend the marine policy to 
cover all forms of liability but has agreed to extend hull insurance to cover part 
of any amount the assured has paid in respect of legal liability consequent upon 
collision between the insured vessel and another ship. In De Vaux v. 
9 De Vaux v. Salvador. (1836) 5 L.l.K.B. 134. 
10 (1885) 53 L.T. 861 at p. 864. 
183 
Salvador11 _it was decided that under the ordinary from of policy underwriters 
were not liable for the balance which the insured vessel had to pay to the other 
when both were to blame for the collision. The insurance for collision liability is 
thus one which is separate from the insurance of the property itself. The 
significance of this is that there are two separate limits of liability, and that the 
cover offered by the collision liability clause is not reduced by the extent to 
which there are claims for a total loss or for other matter covered by policy. The 
collision liability cover is embodied in a supplementary insurance contract 
termed the "Running Down Clause," ROC. Thus the plain form of marine policy, 
that is an Ship General policy form without clause attached thereto, does not 
extend to liability to the third parties. The clause limits the underwriter to certain 
types of loss, i.e.; 
(I) loss of or damage to any other vessel or property on any other vessel 
(II) delay to or loss of use of any other vessel or property therein 
(III) general average of, salva~~ of, or salvage under contract of, any such 
other vessel or property therein. 
The clause specifies that liability, for which cover is provided, must be as a 
result of the vessel insured "coming into collision with any other vessel." What 
constitutes a collision with another "ship or vessel" is a matter of judicial 
decisions. An insured vessel collided with a pontoon crane when it was 
permanently moored to a river back in a naval dock yard. It was held that the 
pontoon was not a ship or vessel, because the primary purpose for which it had 
been designed and adopted was to float and to lift, and not to navigate. The 
Judge held that whatever other qualities are attached to a ship or vessel, the 
adaptability for navigation, and its uses for that purpose, is one of the most 
11 (1836) 5 L.J.KB. 134. 
12 See, Running Down Clause, e.g. in clause 8 of the Institute Time, Hull clauses, 1/10/83. 
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essential elements for bringing the craft within the definition.13 It has been held 
that contact between an insured ship and the anchor of another ship constitutes 
a collision within the meaning of "Running Down" clause. 14 lt seems unlikely 
that a situation could arise in which only a part of a ship came into contact with 
another ship or vessel. But if it did; if, for example, the situation in the case of 
the anchor was reversed, so that a negligent act on the unit caused its anchor 
to foul an adjacent supply ship, it cannot be said with certainty that the assured 
would have a right of recovery against insurer under the clause. 
As to whether contact with a sunken vessel constitutes a collision with 
another ship or vessel depend upon the facts of each case but some guidance 
can be obtained from previous cases. In_ Chandler v. Blogg,15 the insured 
vessel ran into a barge, which was lying half-submerged following a recent 
collision with another vessel. This was held to be a collision within the terms of 
policy. In_ Pelton Steamship Co. v. North of England Protecting and 
Indemnity Association, The Zelo, 16 the collision was with a vessel which had 
been sunk and was lying at the bottom of the sea, but salvage operations were 
in hand and the salvor had a reasonable expectation of raising her. This was 
held to be a collision with a ship or vessel within the terms of Collision Clause. 
The test to be applied to any vessel which has sunk appears to be that if 
salvage operations have been abandoned, or were never contemplated, the 
wreck ceases to be a ship or vessel within the term of the clause. 
13 Merchants' Marine Insurance Co. v. North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association, (1926) 
25 Ll.L.Rep. 446. 
14 Re Margetts & Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation [1901] 2 KB. 792. But contact with 
fishing nets dragging a mile behind a fishing vessel was held not to be a collision for this purpose; 
Bennet SS Co. Ltd. v. Hull Mutual Steamship Protecting Society Ltd. [1914]3 KB. 57. 
15 (1898) 1 Q.B.D. 32. 
16 (1925) 22 Ll. L. Rep. 510. 
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In the event of a collision, it is possible that large quantities of other 
chemicals carried as cargo may be released at sea. In common with British 
underwriters the Americans do not undertake pollution liability resulting from 
collisions. In other words, insurers partiCipating in ordinary hull pOlicies are not 
prepared to extend ROC to cover amounts paid in respect of pollution or 
contamination.17 The Running Down Clause, provides that it shall in no case 
extend or be deemed to extend to any sum which the assured may become 
liable to payor shall pay in respect of: "(c) pollution or contamination or any real 
or personal property or thing whatsoever (except the other vessel with which 
the insured vessel is in collision or property on such vessel)." This provision 
contains an exception within an exception. It can be argued that the inclusion of 
the phrase "except.. .. " to the paragraph does not seem to be necessary 
because the ROC expressly refers to "loss or damage to any other vessel or 
property on any other vessel." Thus the cover extends to liability for other ships 
and to property on other ships, so that the omission of the extra word makes no 
difference to the cover. However the cover in question is also subject to 
exclusion in that liability for protection of other vessels or property for "any real 
or personal property or thing whatsoever, " could include property on either ship 
or other property at sea, including property on other ships. 
6.3. Liability under General Average Act 
General average is an incident of marine adventure and is related to 
marine insurance by reason of the fact that through the operation of the 
principle of subrogation the insurer who has to pay the loss on the interest 
sacrificed is, on payment of loss, entitled to the contribution due from the owner 
17 Clause 8.4.7, Institute Time Hull Clause, Draft 28/1/83. 
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of the interest saved. The insurer of interests saved has to make good the loss 
incurred by his assured by having a contribution to general average if the loss 
is due to a peril insured against. General average, as a matter of law, exists 
quite independently of marine insurance and rights of contribution are 
unaffected by any insurance of general average contribution or lack of it. 
Nevertheless, in practice, various parties to the adventure, ship, freight or cargo 
are usually insured against general average contributions.18 
Liability as to a general average act emerges whenever a sacrifice of 
property or an extraordinary expenditure is reasonably and voluntarily made or 
incurred for the common safety and benefit of interested parties concerned in a 
maritime adventure.19 An example of this principle may be quoted the case of 
Austin Friars 5.5. Co. Ltd. V. Spillers and Bakers, Ltd.2O In this case a 
vessel was leaking so badly after having become stranded, that the master and 
pilot decided to dock her immediately, although tide was not suitable. In doing 
so they realised that they would strike the pier. Bailhache J. allowed the 
damage to the ship as a general average as well as the liability to the dock 
authorities for the damage done to the pier, the liability being a direct 
consequence of the general average act. Therefore damage to the property in 
the course of action deliberately taken for the common safety would be a 
liability recoverable in general average if it arises as a direct consequence of 
the general average act. 
18 Leslie J. Buglan, Marine Insurance and General Average in United States. 1973, p. 202. Most 
insurance on cargo provides the same coverage for general average, see Institute Cargo Clause (A), The 
all risk fonn, 111182, clause 2. 
19 N.G Hudson and lC. Allen, Marine Claims Handbook, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 4th edition, 
1984, p. 2; see also definition of general average loss or general average act in Section 66 of MIA 1906. 
20 [1915] 3 K.B. 586. 
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Expenditure incurred to avoid or minimise pollution liability would be 
payable as a general average expenditure provided such expenditure liability 
was the direct consequence of the general average act. The liability can be 
regarded as a direct consequence of the general average act if there is a 
distinct possibility that pollution is foreseeable, and there is no breach in the 
chain of causation. 21 A novus actus interveniens would break the chain. For 
example, any pollution directly resulting from the jettisoning of oil, whether 
cargo or bunker, for common safety would be allowable as a general average 
act. Similarly, when a vessel is obliged to enter a port of refuge for common 
safety following an accident which has resulted in the vessel leaking oil, any 
expenditure incurred to avoid or minimise such pollution or any liability arising 
out of such pollution would be treated as a general average.22 
As a result it can be said that general average would apply where pollution 
damage occurs from the direct consequences of an operation and such an 
operation is done for common safety. But a difficulty may arise where, in the 
application of the general average rule, liability does not occur but is avoided or 
minimised by services rendered which are rewarded by salvage remuneration. 
Ship owners can claim salvage expenses from the cargo interest through a 
general average contribution, unless the salvage operation is necessitated 
directly by actionable fault on their part.23 The question may, however, arise as 
to what extent the ship owner can claim the cost of anti- pollution measures as 
a general average, and how the enhanced award, i.e. an additional award, to 
21 Lord Demring in, Australian Coastal Shipping Commission. v. Green and others, [1971] 1 Lloyd's. 
Rep, , 16 at p. 22-25. 
22 For more examples see, Buglass, L. Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States, 
2nd ed., 1981, atp. 196. 
23 Christopher Hill, Maritime Law, 2nd ed., 1985, pp. 203-205. 
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what is paid for salvage of vessel and cargo, for efforts which has been done to 
minimise or prevent damage to the environment while is saving the vessel or 
cargo under Lloyds Open Form (LOF) agreement would be treated in general 
average. 
Salvage expenses are allowed in general average, "to the extent that the 
salvage operations were undertaken for the purpose of preserving from peril 
the property involved in common maritime adventure."24 It woUld, therefore, be 
arguable whether expenditure incurred prior to the commencement of a 
salvage operation, e.g. the costs of removal of oil from a tanker prior to starting 
the salvage operation, is regarded as a general average or not. Such 
expenditure would be so regarded, according to the definition of general 
average expenditure, if the objective of the operation is to preserve from peril 
the property involved in a common maritime adventure, but not solely the 
prevention of pollution. Thus there would be no salvage expenses if the action 
prior to commencement of salvage operation is done by the governmental 
authority or by regulations relating to pollution or by the duty of best 
endeavours to prevent the escape of oil under the LOF agreement, unless it 
can be shown that the salvage operation could not have proceeded without the 
removal of the pollution. 
Under the LOF agreement, the salvor is under the duty to use his best 
endeavours to prevent the escape of oil from ships. Since Rule VI of the York 
Antwerp Rules allows in general only those expenditures which were incurred 
to preserve the property from perils, it might be argued in some cases that the 
salvor'S actions, or part of them, were for the purpose of fulfilling the duty of 
best endeavours rather than for the purpose of preserving property from perils, 
24 Rule VI, The York Antwcrp Rules, 1974. 
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so that the resulting salvage award should be wholly or partially disallowed in 
general average. 
Rule VI in the York Antwerp may be subject to criticism when it is 
compared with the LOF agreement. First, the Rule is not clear as to whether 
the salvor is motivated both to secure property from peril and to prevent the 
escape of oil. Secondly, the Rule does not deal properly with the situation 
where the salvor acts purely to prevent the escape of oil rather than to save 
property from perils. 
6.4. Salvage liability and marine insurance 
A salvage operation on a stranded oil tanker is often a very risky venture. It 
is risky, "for the salvage master and his crew because of the hazardous 
conditions under which they have to manoeuvre. It is also involves another kind 
of risk which is a possible aggravation of pollution damage. ,,25 Thus it seems 
necessary for the principle of salvage to be extended to reward those who 
prevent or minimise damage to the environment from the vessel pollution, i.e. 
known as "liability salvage". 
In March 1978 the Amoco Cadiz suffered a steering failure and became a 
total loss near the French coast, causing massive pollution along the Brittany 
coastline. The accident led to prolonged litigation in the United States, where 
claims were brought against various parties including the salvage company, 
Bugsier. Their tug Pacific had attempted unsuccessfully to save the tanker. In 
that event, the claims against Bugsier were dismissed on the ground that a 
salvor whose efforts are unsuccessful is not liable for loss sustained either by 
the owners of the property he has endeavoured to salve or by third parties, in 
25 Bernard. A Dubais, The Liability for a Salvor Responsible for Pollution Damage, [1977] 8 J.M.L.& 
Comm.p.375 
190 
the absence of proof of causation, gross negligence or wilful misconduct. The 
case highlighted the legal risks facing salvors who are called on to assist 
stricken tankers and raised the question that whether the salvors are entitled to 
reward their efforts to prevent or minimise pollution damage, where there is no 
success to save the ship or property thereon. 
The essential qualification for an award for salvage charges is that the 
salvor acts voluntarily and independently of contract. 26 The term "save" in the 
definition of salvage indicates that the salvage service must be successful, 
even partially, i.e. "no cure- no pay".27 This could have harsh results when a 
salvor undertakes to act in a situation wherel pollution is present. A salvor who 
unsuccessfully tries to salve the pollutant and reduce pollution cannot get any 
reward for his efforts and expenses.28 
Although it is not easy to define categorically what pieces of property may 
be subject to maritime salvage, one of the many classes of salvage service is 
the protection or rescue of a ship or her cargo and the lives of the persons on 
board together with saving of property. Where a salvor renders service to the 
vessel and her cargo and life is also saved, it has been the practice of the 
courts to give an enhanced award which reflects the value of the services 
rendered in the saving of Iife.29 Accordingly, where a salvor succeeds not only 
in saving the ship and or cargo and or life, but also in preventing pollution 
26 J. Kenneth Good care, Marine Insurance Claims, 2nd ed., 1981, p. 475. 
27 The Rene [1955] 1 Lloyd's. Rep. 101. 
28 Abecassis, David. W. Some Typical Consideration in the Event o/Casualty to Oil Tanker, [1979] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 449 atp. 451. 
29 Nourse. v. Liverpool Sailing Ship Owner's Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association. (1896) 2 
Q.B.D. 16; see also Grand Union Shipping Ltd. v. London Steamship Owners' Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd: The Bosworth (No.3) [1962]1 Lloyd's. Rep. 483. 
191 
liability, as a consequential damage,30 he should expect to receive a suitably 
enhanced award, provided that there is a chain of causation between physical 
damage to the cargo or ship and pollution damage. 
This enhancement award is payable by the shipowner or cargo owner, or 
by their insurer, whose property has been saved aside from the fact that oil 
pollution has been prevented or minimised. This payment may be disputed on 
the legal basis of "no cure-no pay", whereby there is no "equitable 
remuneration" where there is no saving of ship or property. The argument may 
be weakened when it is considered that the owner's liabilities have been 
avoided or minimised. This argument is supported by the case of the 
Whippingham31 in which the potential damage, and financial liability to 
pleasure yachts and third parties caused by the salved ship was taken into 
account in the calculation of award. In addition, the service of any best 
endeavours, whether or not the liability has been abated, has been regarded as 
salvage service and has become part of the criteria by which the size of any 
award is calculated.32 In both forms, however, there is no scope for 
enhancement if no property with a settled salved value is saved. 
Thus saving life, and by analogy pollution liability, do not of themselves 
entitle the salvor to a reward except where legislation has provided for this.33 
This may raise problems when the incentive for salvage is mixed. For example, 
30 The "Eschersheim" [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 
31 (1934) 48 Ll.L.Rep. 49; see also The Gregorso [1973] Q.B. 274. 
32 Clause l(a)(II), Lloyds Standard Form of Salvage Agreement, 1990, commonly referred to as the 
Lloyds Open Form or LOF, because it leaves open the amOlmt of any salvage reward to be decided later 
by arbitrator. See the text of LOF 1990 in the document section of article which was written by Michael 
Allen, The International Convention of Salvage and LOF [1990] J.M.L. & Comm. vol. 22, no. 1, 
January 1990, 119 at pp. 159-164. 
33 Sections 544 and 545 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1984 has made salvage payable for saving life. 
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where an oil laden tanker strands and begins to leak oil into water, salvage may 
be done to save the vessel and minimise and prevent an oil spill, and 
consequently reduce the amount of possible oil pollution liability and clean up 
costs. The question which arises here is which party out of hull insurer, cargo 
insurer or Protection & Indemnity club would pay salvage expenses incurred to 
prevent or minimise pollution. 
In an American case, the court considered the issue and observed that 
although the salvage service may have prevented a disaster for which the club 
cover could have been liable for substantial amounts, any calculation based on 
the possibility of explosion was "extremely hypothetical. ,,34 The court concluded 
that services were primarily directed to the benefit of the other insurer and any 
benefit to the club from preventing of pollution damage was in a sense 
incidental. In the other words, only some of the expenses were incurred solely 
to avert those occurrences or protect those interests for which the club was 
solely liable. 
The conclusion to be drawn from what is discussed above is that it can be 
said that if the owners' potential oil pollution liability becomes the object of 
salvage itself Oust like the ship and cargo) so that it is saved, a salvage award 
may be made in respect of it. With regard to the insurance offered by hull 
underwriters for the ship's contribution to salvage, it can be construed that the 
shipowner's liability underwriter alone would cover this award. Thus if a salvage 
effort was effective to a stranded laden tanker and no oil is spilled, under 
liability salvage policy, the salvor is entitled to get an award because no 
pollution liability has resulted, and the same reasoning is applied where oil 
pollution liability is reduced. However, if no pollution is prevented or reduced, 
34 Sea Board Shipping Corporation. v. Jockarme Tugboat Corporation, 461 F2d 500, [1972] AM.C 
2151, at p. 2155 (2nd Cir). 
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despite considerable efforts by the salvor, he is left without award since there is 
"no cure-no pay" in liability salvage too. 
To remedy this problem a provision was proposed in The Lloyd's Standard 
Form Salvage Agreement (more commonly referred to as the Lloyd's Open 
Form-LOF)35 under which the salvor gets his expenses plus up to fifteen 
percent, as a safety net, even where the salvage services are not successful36 
provided that the salved vessel is a tanker with oil. The 1990 Lloyds Open 
Form extended coverto all types of hazardous substances and to oil pollution 
from all ships, rather than merely laden tankers. The "Safety-net" has also been 
extended to allow a make-up of 30 %, with scope in some cases for a 
maximum of up to 100%. Thus under this scheme, if the salvor through no fault 
of his own fails to earn any award, or earn an award which does not cover his 
expenses, he would receive a form of "special compensation.,137 This would 
consist of his reasonable expenses38 which would not exceed a maximum of 
30% of such expenses incurred by him. However, the tribunal may increase 
such special compensation, "but in no event all the total increase be more than 
100 % of the expenses incurred by a ship owner. ,139 
35 Because it leaves open the amount of any salvage award to be decided later by arbitration. 
36 1980 Lloyds Open Form Salvage Agreement (LOF 80), reprinted in, D. Steel & F. Rose, Kennedy's 
Law of the Salvage, 5th ed., 1985, atp. 1451-63. see clause l(a). 
37 Special compensation was known as a " safety net " in LOF 1980, see clause 1 (a). It said that in 
circumstances where the services were unsuccessful or only partially successful or the salvors were 
prevented from completing the services, the salvors were entitled to an award against the tanker owners 
of reasonably incurred expenses together with an increment not exceeding 15% of such expenses. 111.is 
was only recoverable to the extent that such expenses, together with the increment, were greater than 
the amount which would be otherwise be recoverable under salvage agreement. 
38 Such reasonable expenses should be fixed in case of dispute by arbitration in a manner prescnbed in 
the form of art. I(c), and 6, 1990 LOF. 
39 Clause 14 (1)(2), id. 
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This appears to contemplate two different situations. If there have been 
salvage operations on a ship and cargo which threatened damage to the 
environment then the salvor is entitled to special compensation limited to 30 % 
of his expenses. If, on the other hand, his action has prevented or minimised 
damage to the environment then his reward will include not only his expenses 
but also an uplift of up to 100 %.40 
Payment of a "special compensation", that is compensation which is paid 
if the salvage operation (which is carried out in respect of a vessel or its cargo) 
has actually prevented or minimised damage to the environment, is for the 
account of the shipowner only, with no right to a General Average contribution 
from the cargo owner. 41 Thus, where departure from the " No cure- No pay" 
principle exists, the rule that all salved interests should contribute rateably to 
the award has to be waived. It is right that the shipowner alone should pay the 
"special compensation" award since it is the owner who has been saved the 
possible expenses of claims in respect of pollution because the "special 
compensation" is only payable if and in so far as a payment under it exceeds 
any other sums recoverable.42 A salvor who preserves a cargo of oil and thus 
presumably prevents pollution still recovers his award for preserving the cargo 
from cargo owners. If this were not so an unfair situation would arise whereby 
the shipowner, through the special compensation provisions, would subsidise 
the salvage of the cargo. 
The payment of special compensation is conditional upon first, the property 
salved being bunker stores and any other property therein.43 Therefore, it is 
40 Michael Allen, The International Convention on Salvage and LOF [l990}, J.M.L. & Comm., vol. 22, 
January 1991,p. 119 atp.125. 
41 Art. 14(1)(2) 1990 LOF. 
42 Id. 
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not applicable to a tanker in ballast or to an unladen tanker. In consequence, 
the owners are able to retain the no cure no pay principle in other 
circumstances such as those involving freight and passenger vessel. Secondly, 
it is conditional upon the fact that there must have been no negligence on the 
part of the salvor in failing to prevent or minimise damage to the 
environment. 44 It would be difficult to prove negligence, particularly in non 
contract cases, because salvors vary greatly in expertise and often act under 
different circumstances. Under contract, however, a negligent professional 
salvor may be liable to the owner for breach of an implied warranty of 
reasonable skill and care.45 The other condition is that the vessel, not only the 
tanker laden with oil, must by herself or her cargo, threaten damage to the 
environment. The definition of damage to environment has widened the scope 
of special compensation by the extension damage caused by "pollution, 
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major events.,,46 
One of the conditions for recovery of the "special compensation" is that the 
salvor must have failed to earn a reward under Art. 13.47 This requirement 
could potentially lead to some procedural difficulties when put in practice. This 
is because the tribunal will have to go through two-stage process before 
deciding whether "special compensation" is payable. In such a case time will be 
wasted and so expensed will be unreasonably incurred not only in hearing 
submissions on "special compensation", but also as a result of the arbitrator or 
judge having to calculate the amount of "special compensation". One possible 
43 Art (l)(a)(I), 1990 LOF. 
44 Art. 14(5), 1990 LOF. 
4S See e.g. Tojo Maru [1972] AC. 820. 
46 Art. l(d). 1990 LOF. 
47 Art. 14(4). 1990 LOF. 
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solution would be for the tribunal to allow salvors to reserve their position in 
respect of Art.14 to make an award under Art.13. and then to leave it to the 
salvor to claim special compensation at a further hearing, if he so desires. 
Reference to LOF shows that the salvor should use his best endeavours to 
prevent the escape of oil from the vessel performing salvage services. This 
provision is intended to make it clear to what extent the services earn 
remuneration. When it becomes likely that the salvor will be able to claim for his 
reasonably incurred expenses under the "safety net" clause, it is provided that 
the owner of the vessel shall provide security on demand.48 The required 
security is normally given in the form of a guarantee. In practice the guarantee 
can be given by an insurance company, broker, Clubs or banks. This has been 
made possible by the agreement of an insurer to accept shipowner's liability 
under the "safety net" clause as a new risk coming within the scope of 
insurance cover. 
An overlap may occur between the P&I Club, hull and cargo insurer over 
oil pollution liability salvage, where expenses are incurred for joint interest. 
There was much discussion between Hull, Cargo, P&I Clubs and liability 
underwriters as to who should be properly concerned in the safety net payment 
and enhancement of the award for traditional saving whereof there had been 
some degree of pollution avoidance in the same salvage operation. After long 
discussion, the Clubs, as a liability insurer, agreed to bear the full cost of the 
safety net, on the basis of a so called ''funding agreement. ,,49 
48 Art. 4(a) 1990 LOF. 
49 This is based on the agreement which was reached by the International Group of P & I clubs, London 
Hull and Cargo Insurance (Institute of London Underwriters and Lloyd, underwriter Association) and 
International Salvage Union. see" funding agreement clause" in, S.l. Hazelwood, P & I Clubs Law and 
Practice, 1989, Lloyds of London Press Ltd, at p. 279. 
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Lloyd's Open Form does not require the shipowner to provide security to 
the salvor, in respect of salved property other than the vessel. 50 The question 
may arise as to who gave security for the cargo. It has been an established 
practice in Maritime Law that the shipowner put up the security for an award on 
behalf of the cargo as well as the ship, by taking a counter-security from the 
cargo interest or their underwriters. This may not prove satisfactory in all 
situations. The cargo owner may dispute payment of their proportion of the 
award, alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel. For these reasons, the 
shipowner may become reluctant to put up the security for cargo. It may be 
advisible to insert a provision in LOF making the shipowners responsible for 
such security, since the shipowner will always be in a better position to pursue 
the cargo owner than the salvors. The present wording of LOF51 merely 
imposes an obligation on the shipowner, their servants or agents, to use their 
best endeavours to ensure that the cargo owner provides the required security. 
This will, no doubt, be of practical benefit to the salvor in the majority of cases 
without imposing an unacceptable burden on shipowners. 
There are occasions when the distressed vessel suffers damage due to 
negligence on the part of the salvor and difficult conditions under which the 
rescue operations are undertaken. Although it has long been established that a 
duty of care exist for every body, it has been suggested that the standard of 
care should not be high in the case of salvage operation.52 The reasoning was 
that every policy of salvage, to encourage the salvor, might be undermined if 
they were not treated with great leniency by the courts. Is it equitable for the 
salvor to be liable for such damage resulting from his negligence, for example, 
50 Clause 4(b) 1990 LOF. 
51 Clause 4 (d) 1990 LOF. 
52 See, e.g. The Delpbinula [1947] 80 Lloyd's Rep. 459. 
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increased pollution damage due to the negligence of the salvor in the salvage 
operations. The question was raised in the Tojo Maru.53 This tanker was in 
collision with another tanker in the Persian Gulf, as a result of which the vessel 
sustained extensive damage, a fuel tank and the engine room being flooded. A 
tug offered her services which were accepted in terms of Lloyd's Standard 
Form of Salvage Agreement "No cure-No pay". In the course of the services the 
water was pumped from the engine room, the cargo of crude oil was 
discharged. The plate needed to be bolted to the hull and it was intended to do 
this by firing bolts from a bolt gun. Before this could be done, however, it was 
necessary to free gas from the adjoining tank. The salvor's chief diver, contrary 
to instruction, attempted to use a bolt gun, causing an explosion and 
subsequent fire. The House of Lords decided that there should be no award of 
the salvage remuneration, but the shipowners were entitled to damage, subject 
to the deduction of the hypothetical salvage remuneration which would have 
been rewarded if the salvor duly performed the contract. Thus one should 
asses the salvage remuneration as if there had been no negligence and 
against a salved fund which took no account of the cost of damage caused by 
the salvor's negligence. One then sets against the award the damage for which 
the salvor was liable by reason of his negligence. If, therefore, the damages 
exceeded the salvage remuneration, the salvor was liable to shipowner in 
damages for the net balance. 
Although the decision in the Tojo Maru that a salvor is liable in damages 
for his negligence is undoubtedly correct, the method it adopted for assessing 
the salvage remuneration and the damage seems at least open to question if it 
is thought of as laying down any general principle. One may ask whether it will 
53 [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 341. 
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be permissible to calculate the amount of salvage remuneration in a case of 
involving a salvor's negligence by reference to a hypothetical salved fund and 
in particular to make a notional award greater than the actual salved fund? 
Further, if a salvor wishes to limit his liability to damages, does that limit apply 
immediately to all the damages or does one first set off the salvage 
remuneration against the sum of damages and then limit only with respect to 
the net balance, i.e., if the damages exceed the salvage remuneration? 
A strange result may be reached if the application of the hypothetical 
method is adopted as a general rule. Suppose the salvor salves a ship and 
cargo but negligently causes major damage to the ship. With regard to this 
method, taking a salved ship value, the cargo owners will pay their proportion of 
an award based on an artificially inflated salved value. If there is a non-
negligent co-salvor, his award is presumably based on the actual salved value, 
whereas the negligent salvor has an award assessed on the basis of no 
negligence and artificially inflated value. The problem becomes even more 
acute if the salvor is allowed to limit his liability to a large amount of damages 
and then set off the limited damages against an award of salvage made on an 
inflated notional fund. Difficulty may also arise regarding assessment of 
damage if a ship were in such a dangerous situation that it was very doubtful if 
she could be kept afloat but the salvor in such a situation negligently sank her, 
i. e. contributory negligence. 54 
As a result, although there are cases in which it is fair to all parties to adopt 
the method applied in the raja Maru. for example, where there is an isolated 
act of negligence damaging the ship or cargo and which does not seriously 
deplete the ship or cargo salved fund. But in most cases it would be fair to 
54 For a more detailed discussion of this problem see Brice, G. The New Salvage Convention: Green 
Seas and Grey Areas, [1990] LMCLQ. 32 at pp. 45-50. 
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adopt the solution to assess salvage remuneration by reference to actual 
salved value. 55 In this case the owner of the damaged salved property is not 
being asked to pay more than a reasonable reward of salvage. He is for this 
purpose assumed to receive full compensation for loss sustained. 
The question of right to limit is very complicated where the shipowner is 
involved in a salvage operation. It has been, as a general rule of Maritime law, 
the case that shipowners have the right to limit their liability to damages. The 
same right has been given to the salvors.56 Can salvage remuneration be 
regarded as a damage, and consequently subject to limitation. Salvage 
remuneration is a reward, not compensation for damage, which is paid to 
salvor. There is, therefore, no right to limit liability in respect of it. Thus, it is 
supposed that the shipowner is only entitled to set off the limit damage against 
salvage remuneration. It is worthy to mention that the salvor can only limit their 
liability to damage which is caused as a result of their negligence. In practice, 
the salvor could not limit their liability in respect of any pollution liability claims 
for negligence, because they do not fall within the definition of an "owner" in the 
Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971.57 
The salvor, under the LOF, may be deprived of the whole or part of any 
special compensation if he has been negligent and thereby failed to protect or 
minimise damage to the environment. Although the Convention addresses the 
question of depriving the salvor of the whole or part of the salvage 
remuneration, it leaves unstated the extent of the liability of the salvor for 
55 As it was provided by Art. 13(3) of 1990 LOF. 
56 See Art. 17(1) Merchant Shipping Act 1979, which incoIporated the provision of the International 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, The London Convention. 
57 It has incoIporated the provisions of the CLC 1969 whereby the pollution liability and right to limit 
is only channelled to the owners who are not included salvors. 
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damage due to his negligence. In the other words, the penalty for negligence 
by the salvor is limited to forfeiture of the special award, and nothing more.58 
Regarding the oil pollution damage following the salvors' negligence It is 
worthy of note that under the CLC liability is confined to the owner of a vessel, 
and servants, agents are exonerated from liability. 59 The agents are defined in 
the CLC and it is not clear to what extent the Convention applies to salvors. 
However, the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971,60 which was 
designed to give effects the 1969 CLC, besides exonerating the servants and 
agents of the owner, also specifically relieves from liability "any person 
performing salvage operations with the agreement of the owner" in order to 
provide encouragement to salvors who might otherwise find themselves 
involved with astronomical pollution liabilities. It must be realised that the 
decision in the raja Maru, as mentioned above, may give the idea that the 
CLC exception would not enable salvors to escape liability in consequence of 
their own negligent actions. An indemnity clause may be required to be 
incorporated in salvage contract in which the salvor may be made an additional 
insured, or a pollution cover be provided by the insurer for professional salvors. 
The salvor's ability to secure adequate insurance has become a 
contentious issue since their potential liability for negligence rose with the size 
of tankers. Shipowners and their Clubs were reluctant to agree to protect 
salvors, as additional insured without payment of call, for all claims which might 
be brought against them for any pollution caused by the salvor in the course of 
his operation, because of the unlimited liability which such protection may place 
58 Donald A. Kerr. The 1989 Salvage Convention, Expediency or Equity? [1989] J.M.L. & Comm., vol. 
20, p. 505 at p. 516. 
59 Art. ill (2)(4) 1969 CLC. 
60 S.3 (b). 
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on them. As a result, the salvors should look for independent insurance to 
secure their potential pollution liability.61 A salvor is also protected, against 
liabilities resulting from oil pollution, by TOVALOP which requires shipowners to 
pay the cost of certain private efforts to remove the threat of pollution.62 
6.S. Underwriters liability as to suing and labouring. 
Underwriters would, given the opportunity, take measure to preserve the 
insured property from loss for which they would otherwise be liable. The 
underwriters do not have this opportunity because they have no direct control 
over the insured property. It follows that, by imposing this duty on the assured, 
the underwriter is, in effect, asking the assured to represent him in preserving 
the property from insured losses; and in exercising legal rights against parties 
other than the assured who may be responsible for the loss. To this end, a 
clause perm itting the assured, his factors servants and assigns to use labour 
and travel for the purpose of preserving the insured property first appeared in a 
policy called The Tiger in 1613. In the UK it was incorporated as an integral part 
of the Lloyd's Ships General policy and read as follows "and in the case of any 
loss or misfortune, it shall be lawful to the assured their factors, servants and 
assigns to sue labour and travel for in and about the defence safeguards and 
recovery of the said goods and merchandises on ship etc. or any part thereof 
without prejudice to this insurance; to the charges thereof we, the assurer will 
contribute each one according to the rate and quantity of the sum herein 
insured." Modern Institute Clauses for use in the new form of Lloyds policy put 
upon the assured the duty to seek to mitigate loss to the subject-matter in a 
61 This is usually done by P & I Clubs under special agreement. 
62 Clause IV (a). 
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more positive way.53 The Marine Insurance Act 1906, in section 78, both for the 
interpretation of a clause in a policy and, quite separately, a duty on the 
assured to take all reasonable measures to minimise the loss. 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906, in section 78(4),64 provides" It is the duty 
of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to take such measure as may be 
reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss." The wording of 
this section might suggest that an express sue and labour clause has outlived 
its usefulness, and that any assured is protected to the extent of recovering his 
expenses for suing and labouring whether a clause exist in the policy or not. 
The point was considered in the Australian case of Emperor Goldmining Co. 
v. Switzerland General Insurance CO. 65 in which a cargo of explosives was 
insured from Sydney to Figi on All Risks terms. The policy, however, did not 
contain a sue and labour clause. It was held by Manning, J. that despite the 
absence of a sue and labour clause, the statutory provision entitled the assured 
to recover his expenses and that there was nothing in the Act which compelled 
the court to read section 84(4) (ct. Section 78(4) of the 1906) as imposing a 
duty on the insured to be carried out at his own expenses. The effect of the 
judgement would therefore make the sue and labour clause unnecessary and 
surplus to the assured's rights. However, it is difficult to see why Section 84 in 
Australia (cf. 78 of the 1906 Act) refers extensively to the sue and labour clause 
if its existence was not thought necessary to the insured's rights. It was 
suggested66 that certainly a term can be implied into a policy which would 
63 Clause 13. Institute Time Clause, Hulls (1110/83) 
64 Which has been reproduced in many Commonwealth Statutes on Marine Insurance, e.g. Australia. 
65 [1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 348. 
66 Arnould on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 16 tho ed., p. 194 
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enable the insured to recover certain expenses in the face of a likely loss but 
that in the absence of a sue and labour clause in the policy this is limited to 
those cases where it can possibly be said that the need for the expenditure is a 
direct natural result of the casualty. 
It can also be construed from the wording of Section 78(4) MIA, 1906, that 
the insured is indeed under a positive duty towards the insurer. Consequently 
the insured who fails to use sue and labour clause. to prevent or minimise loss 
to the subject matter, will provide the insurer with a defence for that particular 
claim. To succeed in such a defence, however, the insurer must show first, that 
the action which they alleged assured failed to take was reasonably necessary 
for the preservation of the subject matter, and secondly, that the fault in failing 
to take action lay on the assured or his agent. Thus in Irvine v. Hineffl _ the 
insured vessel having been damaged, it became necessary to dry dock the 
vessel to ascertain the precise amount of the damage. The assured, however 
failed to undertake such dry docking. This was held not to be a breach of 
section 78(4) as dry docking would not have minimised or averted the loss. 
Similarly, in the House of Lords case of Stephen v. Scottish Boat Owners 
Mutual Assurance Association68 it was held that the skipper and owner of 
the insured vessel, a trawler, which was left in a sinking condition after the sea 
cocks had opened, was not in breach of duty in failing to send a "May Day" 
message after it became apparent the vessel could not be saved. The sending 
of such a message could not have averted or minimised the loss, and the 
Captain himself was at the time more concerned with the saving of the crew. 
67 [1949] 2 All. E.R. 1089. 
68 (1989) S.L.T. 283. 
205 
Section 78(1) of MIA, 1906, clearly states that the obligations arising 
under the sue and labour clause are supplementary to the contract of insurance. 
Hence, the insured may recover more than the basic indemnity agreed to be paid 
under the policy.69 This also indicates that the clause was to encourage the 
insured to take steps to preserve the property which, in the absence of any such 
undertaking by the underwriter, would involve the insured in expenses which he 
might never recover. If it is not so provided, the simple answer from the assured 
might well be that he preferred to see the property lost and recover in full under 
the insurance. As a result, the charges recoverable from underwriters under the 
clause are additional to any other claim under the policy. Further, it is not 
necessary, in order to recover, the sue and labour charges to be successful. In so 
far it is reasonable under the policy, even though it fails to achieve its purpose. 
Thus, a sue and labour charge differs from a salvage contribution or General 
Average contribution which are not recoverable where the act is unsuccessful. 
The sue and labour service is also not a general average nor salvage, because of 
being the sole benefit of the ships' underwriters. 
From the phrase "in case of any loss or misfortune" can be construed 
that it is necessary, in order to claim under the clause, to find that as a result of 
the operation of insured perils, the subject matter of the insurance has been 
brought into such danger that without unusual or extraordinary labour and or 
expenses a loss will probably fall on the underwriters. This is an essential 
prerequisite to avoid a claim for expenses reasonably and prudently incurred by 
the assured before any loss or danger had been experienced but without which a 
loss may well have occurred. Such expenses are part of the cost of owning and 
69 Aitcheson v. Lome (1879) 4 App. Cas. 755. 
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operating the insured property and in the absence of an insured peril creating a 
loss or danger of loss, are outside the ambit of insurance. 
Concluding remarks 
Marine insurance is stated to be in respect of ship, goods, freight and 
liability of shipowner as to owner of the cargo and third party. There are many 
way in which a shipowner may incur third party liability and in all of these he 
has an insurable interest. Generally speaking, the marine insurance policy is 
related to collision liability, and liability to sue and labour, general average and 
salvage expenses. The insurance given by the hull policy is a separate 
insurance from the insurance given by the same policy in respect of collision 
liability and for the sue and labour clause, general average, and salvage 
expenses. This is of particular importance in connection with the limitation of 
liability to the insurers. This is not the same as saying that the assured can 
recover and the insurer will be liable, whatever the liability of the insured may 
be in such cases. The limit of liability is subject to insured value. 
Oil pollution arising from a collision is largely excluded from the cover 
provided by the marine insurance policy. The collision liability clause, RDC, has 
excluded any sum which the assured may become liable to pay in respect of 
pollution or contamination of any real or personal property or thing whatsoever, 
except another vessel with which the insured vessel is in collision or property 
on such a vessel. Thus collision liability insurance does not extend to liability for 
pollution or contamination of the environment, costs of any action taken to 
avoid, minimise or remove pollution hazards, or damage to the third parties, 
except the owner of the other vessels or property on such a vessel. This cover 
is also considerably less than traditional cover by the collision clause, since 
under the exclusion liability is limited for the damage or contamination to the 
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vessel other than the vessel (or cargo thereon) with which the insured vessel 
collides. As a result, the assured is not sufficiently protected by the collision 
liability clause in marine insurance policy. 
Expenditures in general average, for common safety of ship and cargo, are 
not confined to the part of the vessel or cargo which was first selected to bear 
the voluntary sacrifice, but extend also to such other losses as are direct 
consequences of the general average act. Therefore, pollution expenses, 
following a general average act, is subject to marine insurance and general 
average when such a pollution is the direct consequence of general average 
act. The only problem in extension of such cover is establishing causation and 
remoteness between the act and damage. This may put many pollution 
liabilities outside general average and marine insurance policy. 
The sue and labour clause is one of the most important clauses in a 
marine insurance policy. It often comes into play by making provisions 
regarding expenses incurred in salving or attempting to salve the vessel and 
other property. Thus, sue and labour expenses are recoverable to the extent 
that they can be regarded as having been incurred in respect of the vessel, 
whether successful or not in averting or minimising the loss. Therefore, the hull 
underwriter would not be liable for any part of the sue and labour charges 
which is done to reduce or minimise the liability, e.g. pollution, unless it is 
expressly provided in the hull policy. 
The principle of salvage applies only to maritime property. Thus, under the 
marine insurance there is no award given for "pollution liability" salvage by 
itself. Therefore, if pollution liabilities are saved but no property is involved 
marine insurance makes no provision for paying the salvor's award. If the 
property is saved as well as pollution liability, marine insurance provides an 
enhanced award, for pollution liability salvage, against the owners of salved 
208 
property. Award for pollution liability salvage may be given, even no property is 
saved, provided that there is special agreement between the salvor and 
insured. The amount of such award is limited to "special compensation" as 
provided under the LOF. 
As a general conclusion, it can be said that marine insurance is not 
prepared to provide cover for damage or injury arising from pollution. With a 
few rare exceptions, the existing marine insurance arrangement do not give a 
complete guarantee of compensation for those who suffered pollution damage. 
To provide sufficient compensation for pollution damages and losses, marine 
insurance needs substantial changes in its nature so as to extend its cover to 
pollution liability as a property. 
PART II. BASIC INSURANCE SCHEMES 
Chapter 1. The Place of pollution liability cover in a General Ships Policy 
1.1. Pollution liability cover arising out of collision. 
Under the Running Down Clause,1 the underwriter agrees to insure the risk 
of liability of the insured vessel for damage done by the vessel as a result of a 
collision with another vessel. The clause, in the English standard insurance 
policy form, only covers 3/4 of the owner's liabilitY,2 whereas an assured under 
the American Hull form can recover collision liability in full. 3 Cover being limited 
to 3/4 may be useful in case of pollution liability resulting from collision, at least 
it encourages taking of care on the part of the assured by insisting upon 1/4 
being self insured. The argument becomes less cogent, when one bears in 
mind that in practice, the remaining 1/4 is now invariably covered by the P & I 
Clubs. It might be arguably suggested that the ROC should contain a warranty 
to the effect that the other 1/4 of collision liabilities will remain uninsured in the 
case of pollution, in order to encourage shipowner to take more caution. 
The ROC does not extend to cover any sum which the assured may 
become liable to pay in consequence of "pollution or contamination of any real 
or personal property or things whatsoever, except to the other vessel with 
which the insured vessel is in collision or property on such other vessel. ,,4 The 
assured, in order to be entitled to claim for damage to other vessel or property 
thereon, must pay first under the clause, i.e. a condition precedent to recovery, 
1 Clause. 8, Institute Time Clause, Hulls, 1-1-83 
2 Id.8(I). 
3 American RDC covers four-fourth of the owners, collision liability. American Institute Hull Form. 1977. 
4 Institute Time Clause, Supra. No .1, clause. 8.4.5. 
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although in cases subject to the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 
1930, there could be circumstances in which a third party may resort to a direct 
claim against the policy. However, this payment must be made by the assured. 
This indicates that payment by others, e.g. servant or master, will not satisfy the 
condition for recovery. The payment must also arise by reason of the assured 
becoming legally liable for the damage. Thus, the ROC only covers liabilities 
arising by virtue of law. Therefore, when a shipowner entered into an 
agreement for the hire of a tug on terms that he should be liable for all damage, 
including pollution damage, to the tug, however caused, the payment made by 
the shipowner under the agreement, following a collision for which the tug was 
wholly to blame, was held not to be recoverable under the c1ause.5 
The underwriters agree, under the ROC, to indemnify the assured for "loss 
or damage to any other vessel" following collision. This indicates that there 
must be physical contact between the insured vessel and other vessel. Thus, if 
the other vessel is damaged in some way other than by physical contact with 
insured vessel, e.g. by spilling chemical substances from insured vessel, for 
which there is a legal liability on the part of the assured, the liability is not 
covered under the clause. For example, if a ship, as a result of negligence on 
the part of those responsible for her, breaks away from her position and 
damage, without contact, results to another ship or vessel because it has to 
take avoiding action, then the clause does not give the assured a right of 
recovery. 
The consequential loss of a collision can be more far-reaching, in particular 
in pollution cases, than the actual damage sustained by the vessel itself. Thus, 
the consideration must also be given to the position of underwriters as to 
liability of the assured "in consequence" of a collision. The underwriters, under 
5 Furness Withy & Co. v. Duder (1936) 55 Ll. L. Rep. 52. 
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the ROC, have made it clear that the damage or loss consequences of collision 
are restricted to: (I) loss or damage to any other vessel or property on any other 
vessel; (ii) delay to or loss of use of any such other vessel or property thereon; 
(ii) general average, salvage of, or salvage under contract of any such other 
vessel or property thereon. From the wording of these provisions it would 
appear that consequential damages suffered by another vessel or property 
thereon can be claimed from underwriters, subject to the limit of 3/4 of the 
damage and the principle of causation. Thus, the Running Down clause is 
capable of covering any sum which the assured pays in respect of 
consequential loss which follows from pollution or contamination of the vessel 
with which the insured vessel is in collision. It seems pollution exclusion 
clauses, in way they have routinely been written, does not extend to the far 
reaching consequences of damage which may be done to the another vessel 
following a pollution incident because it has been held by the courts that, if any 
item is included in the claim which is not considered to be direct consequence 
of the collision, it will not be allowed.6 
Under the Running Down Clause, underwriters agree to pay 3/4 of legal 
costs, in addition to the maximum liability for collision damage, provided that 
such costs were incurred with the prior written consent of underwriters. What do 
legal costs include? Are they limited only to cost of legal professionals? Do it 
extend to any costs which is related to the taking action? It may be construed 
that inserting the word "legal" before cost mayor may not have been intended 
to limit the recoverable costs to the fees and disbursements of members of the 
legal profession. Such a broad interpretation would include numerous properly 
6 As an example, see The Canadian Transport (1932) 43 Ll. L. Rep. 286. 
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claimable items examples of which are: P & I Clubs correspondents' fees, 
master's travel expenses in connection attendance at hearings, etc. 
In the vast majority of collision cases, both ships are partially at fault. It 
may be asked how pollution liability is to be apportioned in such cases. Under 
general maritime principles, it has long been settled that although each 
shipowner has liability to the other to pay damage in proportion of her degree of 
fault, in fact, there is only a "single liability. ,,7 This means that only one payment 
was made and the vessel with greater liability has to pay the balance over to 
other party. 
When it was realised that the insureds could be disadvantaged by applying 
the method of one single payment,8 it was made a term of policies of insurance 
that adjustment should be made on the basis of "cross-liability," that is to say 
treating each vessel's liability to pay damage to other as a separate process 
without the lesser liability being set off against the greater.9 There are 
limitations to the application of cross-liability, namely, when the liability of one 
or both vessels is limited by law, because the limited liability distorts the figures 
if cross-liabilities are applied. 
The rule of single or cross liability has no application in most conventional 
pollution cases, which are based on strict liability. In such cases each vessel 
would be separately liable if a specific proportion of the damage could be 
7 Stoomvaart Maatschappy Netherlands. v. P & 0 Steam Navigation Co. The Khedive (1882)5 App. Cas. 
876 
8 This idea became first apparent in London Steamship Owner' s Mutual Ins. v. The Grampian Steamship 
Co. [1890] 2 Q.B. 663, where it was held that, having received a payment of the balance due from other 
vessel, the insured vessel was unable to recover under its RDC any part of the amount deducted by the other 
vessel for damage done to it because the insured vessel had not made any payment as to that amount to any 
other vessel. 
9 Greystoke Castle (cargo owners). v. Monison Steamship Co. Ltd. (1946) 80 Ll. L. Rep. 55. 
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attributed to her. If the damage cannot be easily apportioned, the owners of 
both ships will be jointly and severally liable for the whole damage. 1o The rule 
of joint and several liability, therefore, has no application where there has been 
a collision between a laden tanker and a dry cargo ship or between two laden 
tankers and where therefore the source of pollution damage can easily be 
identified. 11 
1.2. General Average in relation to marine policies. 
Generally, a policy of marine insurance provides an indemnity against 
general average loss and contribution, subject to any express proviSion in the 
policy. 12 Section 66(4) of the MIA, 1906 gives the assured right to "recover from 
the insurer in respect of the proportion of the loss which falls upon him; and in 
the case of a general average sacrifice he may recover from the insurer in 
respect of whole loss without having enforced his right of contribution from the 
other parties liable to contribute." This section draws a distinction between the 
right of an assured to recover for sacrifice and expenditure. A sacrifice by 
definition, is something which is incurred to avoid loss consequent upon a peril 
insured against and, as such, is one for which insurer are liable. 13 Thus, the 
owner of sacrificed property can expect a full indemnity from his insurers and is 
not obliged to give credit to the insurer for contributions which he may later 
receive from other parties to the venture. Where the insurer has indemnified the 
10 Art. v. 1969 CLC. 
11 The Eleni. v. Roseline, which was involved a collision off the Norfolk coast, in May 1978. 
12 S. 66(4) of the MIA 1906. In general the subject of general average insurance is codified in S. 66 of the 
MIA, 1906. It must be remembered, however, that the Act is not compulsory and may be varied by the 
terms of the particular policies which are applicable. 
13 S. 66(2) of the MIA 1906. 
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assured, he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the assured against the 
owners of other interests who are liable to contribute. 14 
It may be argued that there could be no case for general average 
contribution where all the interests at risk were owned by the same person. 
However, this argument was rejected by the MIA, 190615 in which it was 
provided that "where ship, freight and cargo, or any two of those interests, are 
owned by the same assured, the liability of the insurer in respect of general 
average losses or contributions is to be determ ined as if those subjects were 
owned by different persons". Thus, whether the interests are in the one hands 
of one assured or of several makes no difference to the liability of the insurer. 
The insured's expenditure is treated differently where there is no "loss" of 
the insured subject-matter; consequently, the extent of the obligation of the 
underwriters is only to indemnify for the proportion of expenditures which the 
insured must still bear after taking into account contribution from the other 
interests involved in general average act. Since the underwriters have not paid 
for "loss" to the subject-matter insured, they have no claim by way of 
subrogation for such contributions. 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that where the loss was incurred not 
for the purpose of avoiding a peril insured against, the insurer is not liable for 
such a general average loss or contribution, unless the policy expressly 
provides SO.16 Thus, before underwriters become liable it must be determined 
whether the peril that threatened the venture was one which the policy insured 
14 Dickenson v. Jardine (1868) 3 L.R.c.P. 639 
15 S.66(7). 
16 S.66(6). 
Missing pages are unavailable 
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the purpose of averting or minimising a loss which would be recoverable under 
the insurance policy two aspects have to be contemplated. The first is that the 
peril must be one that is covered by the policy. Thus, in_ Cunnard SS Co. v. 
Marten,19 where the operator of a vessel carrying a number of mules, insured 
not the cargo itself but his own liability for loss of the mules through the 
negligence of himself or his servants it was held that the policy was a liability 
policy and not a policy on the merchandise or the ship. The policy contained a 
sue and labour clause but omitted the negligence clause which exempts 
carriers from the effects of negligence of their servants or agents. The vessel 
was stranded during the voyage owing to the negligence of the plaintiffs 
servants and the plaintiff incurred expenses in saving the mules and in 
attempting to save others which were ultimately lost. The plaintiff sought to 
recover this expense under the sue and labour clause but his claim was 
rejected on the ground that the sue and labour clause only related to the 
averting or minimising of loss to the subject matter of a standard Lloyd's Policy 
namely the ship or the goods, and did not relate to liability. The sue and labour 
clause was held totally inapplicable in such a case. 
The second condition is that there must have been a danger of loss which 
would have been covered by the policy. In_ Weissberg v. Lamb,2o a claim was 
made in respect of an All Risks policy covering the removal of furniture from 
Holland to the United Kingdom. Some furniture was damaged during carriage. 
The insured complained that the carriers refused to deliver the furniture unless 
they were paid their carriage charges in cash. The insured thus paid the 
charges, this being the only way he could recover his furniture. He then sought 
19 [1903] 2 K.B. 511. 
20 (1950) 84 Ll. L. Rep. 509. 
217 
to recover these charges under the suing and labour clause in the policy. It was 
held that the assured could not recover such payment, because payment in 
cash would not have been a loss which he could have recovered under the 
policy when it was issued. 
The clause covers only the expenses which are incurred by "the assured, 
their factors, servants and assigns". It was established in the Gold Sky,21 that 
the master and crew of the vessel were not to be regarded as the servants and 
agents of the assured for the purpose of Section 78(4). The same reasoning 
has been held to apply in the context of re-insurance. Thus, in_ Uzielli v. 
Boston Marine Insurance CO.,22 a case decided under the Lloyd's SG policy 
which referred to "factor, servants and agents", it was held that the term did not 
extend to insurers who had effected a re-insurance policy. Here the insurers on 
a Hull policy re-insured with a French re-insurance Company which was in tum 
re-insured with further company. This second re-insurance covered only total 
loss and contained a clause requiring the re-insurers "to pay as may be paid on 
the original policy" as well as a sue and labour clause. The vessel ran ashore 
and was abandoned by the isured's owner to the first underwriters who in tum 
refloated and repaired her at a considerable expense and sold her. The insurer 
recovered from the first re-insurers who sought to recover from the second re-
insurers under the sue and labour clause. It was held that they could not 
recover as the insurers were not the "factors, servants or assigns" of the first 
re-insurance company. 
Sections 78(1) and 65(2) of MIA 1906 provides "proper expenses" as 
expenses which is interpreted as being limited to cover such expenses as were 
21 Astrovlanis Compania Naviera S.A. V. Linard, Gold Sky, The, [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 331. 
22 (1884) 15 Q.B.D 11. 
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reasonably necessary for the preservation of the subject matter or minimisation 
of the loss in the circumstances. Thus in Lee v. Southern Insurance CO.,23 a 
vessel loaded with a cargo of palm oil and bound for Liverpool became 
stranded on the Welsh Coast near Pwllheli. To salvage the vessel it was 
necessary to land her cargo. The salvage operation was successfully done and 
the vessel was then towed to Carnarvon and made seaworthy for the 
remainder of the voyage. The shipowner sent the cargo overland by rail to 
Liverpool incurring expense of over £200. It was discovered by the insurers that 
had he waited until the ship was repaired and taken the cargo to Liverpool by 
sea, the freight could have become no more than £70. It was held that the 
insured was therefore entitled to recover only £70 under the sue and labour 
clause. 
Section 78(2) of MIA 1906, specifically excludes general average losses 
and contributions, and salvage charges, from scope of the sue and labour 
clause. The exclusion of salvage charges was necessitated by the definition of 
salvage charges in Section 65(2) as covering only charges recoverable under 
Maritime Law by a salver independently of contract. A salvor is clearly not the 
assured~ and of their factors servants and assigns as described in the Lloyd's 
SG Policy nor their agents as described in the new Institutes Clauses. This was 
held to be the case in Aitchison v. Lohre,24 where the assured was not 
permitted to recover salvage charges paid by him for the recovery of the 
vessel. Charges incurred for contractual salvage, on the other hand, may be 
recoverable under the sue and labour clause. The established distinction 
between "salvage charges" and salvage under special contract would seem to 
23 (1870) 5 L.R . C.P. 397. 
24 (1879) 4 Ap.Cas. 755. 
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be a simple matter. Difficulties may arise, however, with respect to so called the 
"no cure no pay" form of salvage agreement issued by Lloyds under which the 
amount of salvage remuneration falls to be determined by arbitration, if not 
agreed beforehand. The question arises as to whether contractual salvage, in 
which the amount of remuneration is not determined beforehand but is agreed 
to be submitted to arbitration for assessment under the general Maritime Law 
falls within the sue and labour clause or not. The problem is arguably 
compounded by Rule VI of the York Antwerp Rules of 1974 which states that 
"expenditure incurred by the parties to the adventure on account of salvage 
whether under contract or otherwise, shall be allowed in general average to the 
extent that the salvage operations were undertaken for the purpose of 
preserving from peril the properly involved in the common maritime adventure." 
The effect of this Rule is that the established distinction is now of little practical 
importance. VVhere such expenditure does amount to general average it would 
normally be excluded from the scope of the sue and labour clause. It must be 
pointed out that on the other hands the distinction should hold good where the 
Rule does not apply, as is the case, for example, where the ship is the only 
interest imperilled at the time when the services are rendered. 
In any event sue and labour expenses are, as a general rule, covered 
under liability policies.25 The liability policy, however does not cover expenses 
for prevention of pollution, if the it does not contain a sue and labour clause. 
The point arose in a case26 where salvage was carried out as to the ship's hull 
in order to save the cargo and prevent an explosion occurring from a leaking 
25 Ivamy. E.R.H. Marine Insurance, 3rd ed., 1979, at p. 480. 
26 Seaboard Shipping Corporation. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corporation et al, and Oceans Mutual 
Underwriting Association Ltd. [1972] A.M.C, 2151 (2nd Cir.). 
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vessel. It was held that the P & I club was liable for the expenses incurred to 
save its interests. However under the policy, it is not liable to the expenses 
which incurred for the prevention of pollution liability because it did not contain 
a sue and labour clause. 
Every P & I Club under its ordinary cover allows a member to recover 
extraordinary costs and expenses reasonably incurred, after the happening of 
an accident, for the purpose of avoiding or minimising any liability. The club by 
reference to the phrase an "extraordinary", effectively excludes sue and labour 
expenses of general operation, e.g. the cost of keeping equipment for the 
prevention of pollution. A further requirement for bringing such expenses within 
the sue and labour clause is that a club will cover only expenses which have 
been incurred in avoiding or minimising any liability or expenditure against 
which the member is insured by the club, i.e. only in respect of insured risk 
insured against. For example, the Club Rules generally state that the club, by a 
deductible clause, would be liable to indemnify the member for part of the 
insurance claim, so the club shall be liable for sue and labour expenses only 
for the proportion of the costs and expenses incurred in relation to that claim. 
However, the Committee of general managers of the club are generally given a 
discretion,27 which will often exercised in favour of the member's claims, so as 
to award the full amount of costs. 
It is a matter of some doubt, however, whether the ship owner's P & I club 
would indemnify the assured for expenses which were incurred in order to save 
two or more interests involved in a maritime adventure, e.g. vessel, freight, 
27 Discretion of the club manager or committee plays an important role in P & I cover. There is similar 
importance in case of non coverage. Such a discretion, which is based on the concept of mutuality that 
insured and insurer are the same people, symbolises the club attitude, contrary to market attitude, that if 
possible a member's claim should be brought within the cover even though it does not fall neatly in one of 
specified risks. 
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cargo and third party liability, or in order to save only one interest, but one 
which incidentally saves or benefits one or more of the other interests, e.g. 
where an oil laden tanker becomes stranded and begins to leak oil into the 
water, a short distance off-shore salvage may be rendered primarily to save the 
vessel, but it will also succeed to prevent or minimise an oil spillage, which 
would consequently reduce the amount of possible oil pollution liability and 
clean up costs to be covered by the P & I club. The basis, for recovery with 
regard to, of both cargo and hull liabilities is the sue and labour clause. 
Although the salvage service may well prevent a disaster for which the club 
, 
might incur substantial liability, the club s cover for such liability is not allowed, 
since any calculation of award based on the possibility of preventing of pollution 
liability would be "extremely hypothetical. ,,28 
1.4. Insurance against salvage charges. 
In fact, the Lloyd's Ships General, S.G, Policy does not expressly mention 
"salvage charges". However, the assured is entitled to an indemnity in respect 
of "salvage charges", for section 65(4) of the MIA 1906 states: "Subject to any 
express provision in the policy, salvage charges incurred in preventing a loss 
by perils insured against may be recovered as a loss by those perils". Salvage 
charges are the charges recoverable by a salvor under Maritime Law, 
independently of contract, and do not include the expenses of services in the 
nature of a salvage rendered by the assured or his agent, or any person 
employed for hire by them, for the purpose of averting the peril, 29 since they 
are incurred in preventing a loss by a peril, not perils alone. It is worthy of note 
28 See Seaborne Shipping Corporation v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corporation, et a1; Oceanous Mutual 
Underwriting Association Ltd. [1972] A.M.C. 2151 atp. 2155. 
29 S. 65(2) of MIA 1906. 
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that underwriters are not liable for salvage charges under the policy if the 
charges were incurred in preventing a loss which is otherwise not covered 
under the policy. For example, if the reason for the salvage services was the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel and this was within the privity and knowledge of 
the shipowner, the underwriters are not liable as the services were not 
rendered by reason of an insured peril. 30 
In order to recover salvage charges, the assured need not, and in fact 
ought not, to claim for a loss by payment of salvage, rather he should claim in 
respect of the loss which occasioned the payment of salvage, e.g. loss by perils 
of the sea.31 Thus, the liability of the underwriter for salvage charges depends 
not on his having engaged to indemnify against them by any express words in 
the policy, but upon the general Maritime law, as a direct and immediate 
consequences of perils against which he expressly insure. 
As a matter of practice, the determination of a salvage award is tied to the 
salved values. This creates a double restriction on recovery against 
underwriters, because not only is the claim limited to 100 percent of the insured 
value, but if the property is under insured the claim is proportionately reduced. 
The former principle is demonstrated in the Aitchison v. Lohre,32 where a 
vessel was insured for £1200 and was salved by salvors with whom no contract 
was made. They obtained a salvage award for £800. The assured elected to 
repair the vessel and the cost of repairs became £1200. He claimed an 
indemnity in respect of this amount and also of the salvage award. It was held 
30 Ballantyne v. McKinnon (1897) 2 Q.B. D. 455. This principle is reiterated in clause 11.4 of the Institute 
Time Clause, Hulls (1/10/83) which reads: "No claim under this clause 11 shall in any case be allowed 
where the loss was not incurred to avoid or in connection with the avoidance of a peril insured against". 
31 Aitchison v. Lome (1879) 4 App. Cas. 755. and is now declared to be so by S. 65 of the MIA 1906. 
32 (1879) 4 App. Cas. 755. 
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by the House of Lords that the insurer was only liable to pay the £1200 as this 
was the full sum insured. Thus when the contributory interest is under-valued in 
the policy, or only part of it has been insured, the payment by the insurer will be 
reduced in proportion to the under-insurance. 33 
It was observed that remuneration, as an enhanced award, is payable for, 
life salvage, by analogy to liability salvage, if the life salvors also salve property. 
It would appear that the shipowner, having to pay such an award, could recover 
it from his underwriters, subject, of course, to a deduction in proportion to his 
under-insurance. In Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steamship 
Owner's Mutual Insurance Association, Ltd: The Boworth (No.3), 34 where 
salvors rendered salvage services to a ship and her cargo in distress in the 
north sea, and saved the lives of all her crew, it was held that the enhanced 
award payable by reason of life salvage was recoverable from the insurer 
under a Hull policy. This was based on the view of the McNair. J.35 "It needs 
possibly a little stretching of the language to say that a salvage award in so far 
as it reflects an element of life salvage give rises to a charge incurred in 
preventing loss by perils insured against. I think the answer to that is that by the 
practice of the Admiralty Court an award made in these circumstances is 
treated as being, and is in fact, an award for services rendered to the ship and 
cargo". However, it must be realised that this decision has no application where 
the assured is liable to pay a salvage award to a salvor in respect of life 
salvage only.36 
33 Balmoral Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Marten. [1902] A.c. 511. This principle is now reflected in section 
73(2) of MIA 1906 which provides that where the insurer is liable for salvage charges the extent of his 
liability must be determined on the same principle as is applied to general average. 
34 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 483. 
35 Id. at p. 490. 
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1.5. Pollution coverage under Institute Time Clauses, Hulls. 
Since government action was taken to destroy the Torrey Canyon and her 
cargo to reduce the risk of pollution, it was realised that such action could result 
in difficulties in determ ining the extent of the cover provided by the standard 
hull clause. To clarify the situation where a similar issue arises the Institute of 
London Underwriters has published a standard pollution hazard clause in their 
hull policies. 37 The Institute Pollution Hazard Clause was first introduced on 1 st 
August 1973 to provide the assured with additional cover to the extent that 
action is taken by a governmenea against the vessel to avoid or reduce the risk 
of pollution, provided, "such act of governmental authority has not resulted from 
want of due diligence by the assured, Owners, or Managers of the vessel or 
any of them to prevent or mitigate such hazard of threat. ,,39 The clause, 
therefore extended the insurance to cover loss or damage to the vessel in the 
following circumstances: 
(1) The loss or damage must be caused by a governmental authority when 
acting to prevent or mitigate real or threatened pollution hazard, and; 
(2) the pollution hazard must result directly from damage to a vessel covered 
by the policy.40 
Intervention of governmental authority is confined to those cases in which 
there is a real and imminent threat of large scale oil pollution at sea. In such a 
36 See Matthew J. in Nourse v. Liverpool Sailing Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association 
(1896) 2 Q.B.D. 16 at p. 19. 
37 Robert. H. Brown, Marine Insurance, vol. 3- Hull Practice, 1975, pp. 354-5. 
38 Such a power accorded by 1969 International Convention on Intervention, in the High seas in cases of 
pollution casualties. 
39 Clause 7, Pollution Hazards, Institute Time Clauses, Hulls, 1110/83. 
40 Id. 
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case the governmental authority give directions to the shipowner or salvor, with 
objective preventing or reducing oil pollution. If shipowner measures prove 
inadequate, a governmental authority will take control of the ship, as it 
happened in Torrey Canyon, and does whatever it is necessary for prevention 
or reduction of pollution. Regard must, however, be given to any risk to human 
life; and unreasonable loss or damage caused as a result of the governmental 
authorities' intervention, when compensation and insurance is claimed. The 
pollution hazards clause only covers loss or damage to the insured vessel itself. 
Thus, it excludes liability in respect of the cargo, loss of life, personal injury and 
so on. However, it seems it was not intended to exclude damage to a vessel, 
other than vessel directly involved, provided the damage to was for which the 
underwriters are liable under the clause. 
Chapter 2. The poll~tion liability cover under Comprehensive General 
Liability, CGL policy. 1 
2.1. In general 
Shipowners' liabilities may arise out of any operation of their vessels which 
might result,' for example, in loss of life, personal injury, damage to property, 
damage to cargo or damage to the environment. To provide themselves with 
cover in respect such liabilities, shipowners hold policies of standard form 
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance, which provides that the 
41 Although there is a certain amount of pollution liability cover in the U.K. insurance market, the 
American underwriters, and courts, have been more involved with the Comprehensive General Liability 
policy. This is why, despite the similarity in principle, most of discussion of the pollution liability insurance 
has been focused on American practice. 
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insurer shall "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insure shall 
become legally obligated t pay as damages because of ... , property damage 
" 
Initially pollution claims were, prior to the mid-1960s, few in number. This 
was so, because neither public opinion nor the shipowning industry nor insurers 
appreciated the magnitude and gravity of the pollution problem. In 
consequences no exclusion conditions nor any specific form of insurance were 
provided in the case of pollution damage. Whenever pollution occurred 
suddenly and accidentally it was automatically covered by the Comprehensive 
General Liability policy (CGL policy), covering the activities of the firm 
insured.42 
In the light of experience of the huge loss resulting from accident involving 
oil tankers, in particular the Torrey Canyon, insurers became fully aware of the 
pollution phenomenon and systematically began to exclude the risk of pollution 
or environmental damage from their standard general, public and third party 
liability policies, because the ability to insure against pollution could presumably 
act to lessen the deterrent on the part of polluters to prevent pollution. Pollution 
liability insurance has also been disfavoured by the insurance industry because 
of its general reluctance to accept exposure to liability for risks of unknown 
dimensions. Another basis for the underwriters' reluctance was that along with 
the increased limit of liability, the law sought to make the shipowner strictly 
liable for pollution damage. The clause in policies excluded: 
"bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape of smoke, vapours, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic 
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste material or other irritants contaminates or 
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of 
42 Howrikam, Insurance Coveragefor Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Forum [1980] 551 atp. 552. 
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water, b.ut this exclusion does not .gpply if such discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape IS sudden and accidental". 
The language of this clause appeared to eliminate the insurability for all 
pollution except those which were in the words of policy, "sudden and 
accidental." The term "accidental" in addition to its commonly accepted 
meaning namely (unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event)44, has 
acquired a wider meaning as a result of extensive analysis and interpretation by 
courts.45 In some cases the accidental event has been defined as an accident 
which includes a series of acts and does not have to result out of an isolated 
event.46 In some other cases, in determining accidental nature judges 
examined an event with regard to whether it was intended or foreseen by the 
injured person, i.e. the claimant rather that the insured.47 This view is 
inconsistent with the plain intention of the parties, or at least that of the insurer. 
This confusion was compounded by the tendency of the courts to decide 
doubtful issues in favour of the insured.48 
Ambiguity has also resulted because of the generality in the language 
used in writing standard contracts. This has created theories under which 
courts have permitted the assured to recover for a broad range of 
43 Taylor & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses, Problems in Interpretation and Application Under CGL, 
17 Idaho. L. Rev. 1981 at p. 506. A slight different form of exclusion is used in liabilities policy covering 
oil risks. The last clause is changed to read "whether or not the event is sudden and accidental". See. Goria 
C.F. Compensation for Oil Pollution at Sea: An Insurance Approach, [1975] 12 San Diego Law Review, 
717 at p. 729. 
44 Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979, p. 14. 
45 A number of British cases ruled the meaning of the term "accident". For example in Fenton V. Thorley 
[1903] App. Cas. 443 at p. 453, the House of Lords stated: "the word "accident" is not a technical legal 
term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident 
means any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss". 
46 See cases in Jerry. E. Lordwell, Insurance and its Root in the Struggle between Protection of Pollution 
Victims and Products of Pollution, [1980] Berkley Law Review, pp. 920-1 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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contamination related injuries under the comprehensive policy.49 The rule that 
ambiguities in an insurance contract should be construed against the insurer, is 
an internationally accepted rule of insurance law. This rule is based upon the 
rationale that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion between parties of 
unequal bargaining powerso insurance companies being larger and possessing 
greater bargaining power than the insured with whom they deal. This view is 
open to the criticism that it ignores the fundamental principle that an insurance 
contract, like a" other contracts, should be construed in a manner which gives 
effect to the intention of the parties to the contract rather than against one of 
them. To interpret this intention, the insurance policy must be taken into 
consideration as whole and then a decision must be made as to whether the 
clause is ambiguous or not. If this consideration fails to clarify the ambiguity, 
then, it would be logical to construe the ambiguity against the insurer. 
It has been accepted that the phrase "sudden and accidental" IS 
ambiguous and this ambiguity has not been clarified by the insurance policy. 
The courts have construed this ambiguity against the insurer, in favour of 
finding coverage. 51 However, such a construction has no application when 
actual evidence of the parties' intent is available. Moreover it has been held, in 
many cases, that such a construction has no validity in cases where the insured 
is a large, sophisticated business entity. 52 Thus, it is necessary to delete the 
49 The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous waste Disposal, 575 CAL. RVD, [1984] p. 
475, atpp. 476-9. 
50 Eugene. R. and Evsoam ..... , Liability Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims, Mississippi Law Journal, 
[1989] 699 atp. 705. 
51 See cases which deal with the interpretation of the ambiguity of the clause in, Thomas W. Murphy, and 
Nancy K. Caron, Insurance Coverage and Environmental Liability, Federal Insurance of Co-operation 
Council, FlCC, summer 1988, 353. atp. 374. 
52 e.g. see Mc Neilbine Inc. North River Insurance Co. 654. F. Sup 525 (DNJ 1986). 
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phrase "sudden and accidental" in the clause or substitute it with "occurrence", 
in order to provide better cover for oil pollution liability, since oil spills are more 
often not sudden or accidental. 
Another approach, adopted in a number of cases, has been to construe 
the term "sudden and accidental" as being equivalent to policy definitions of 
"occurrence". The courts, in adopting this approach, construe the pollution 
exclusion clause to restate the definition of occurrence and conclude that the 
term "sudden and accidental" has the same meaning as occurrence, i.e. the 
release "neither expected nor intended. ,,53 Thus, pollution exclusion has been 
construed as equivalent to the definition of occurrence and therefore most 
parties responsible for the em iss ion of pollution, neither expected nor intended 
, may be covered by the insurance policy. This construction may be criticised 
on the basis that the courts have failed to recognise that pollution exclusion 
clauses contain two separate and distinctive sections, i.e. a section which 
excludes from coverage certain pollution and related events, and another which 
covers pollution damage where the cause is "sudden and accidental. " To 
interpret one part of a contract so as to merely restate another part of the 
same agreement runs contrary to a well settled rule of contract law which states 
that an agreement should be read as a whole, giving effect, where possible to 
all of the agreement's parts. 54 It would seem to follow from this that, if the 
pollution exclusion clause truly covers an "occurrence" the pollution exclusion 
will be superfluous. In addition if one reads pollution exclusion clauses and 
definitions of occurrence as synonymous, this contradicts with what the insurer 
intended when drafting the clause. It should be remembered that insurance 
53 See, Richard. F. Hunder, id. atpp. 907-909. 
54 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, 1952. p. 914 
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companies created the pollution exclusion clause to escape liability which was 
imposed by occurrence based polices which lacked the exclusion. Therefore, a 
reading of a policy, without regard to an exclusion clause, would effectively 
leave the insurer in the same position, whether or not the policy had contained 
a pollution exclusion clause. 55 
It may also be argued that the term "occurrence" clarifies the intent of the 
insurer in order to include coverage resulting from a gradual process as well as 
a sudden event. The insurance industry defined this as, "an accident including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result, during the policy 
period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured. ,,56 
This definition poses several questions for an environmental claim. The 
first question is whether pollution damages are or ought to have been expected 
by the insured or not. Different interpretation was given to the word 
"unexpected". In a number of cases it was held that the result of even gradual 
and anticipated pollution constitutes an occurrence provided that the polluter 
did not actually intend to cause the result. Again, it was also held that, "in order 
for the insurer to prove that an environmental damage does not involve an 
occurrence, they must establish that the policy holder knew with a high degree 
of certainty that the pollution damage would result from its conduct".57 
55 Me Geough, Insurance Coverage of Actions For Environmental Damages, International Law - Defence 
and Insurance Problems, [1977] p. 27. 
56 Soderstom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 Fol1lIIl, 762 at p. 764. 
57 See cases in, Ashley, J. Representation of the Insurers, Interest in an Environmental Damage Claims, 
Defence Council Journal, January 1987. 
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The second question concerns the date of the occurrence (which must be 
known in order to decide whether the occurrence falls within the coverage 
period of a particular insurance policy or not. This question is discussed under 
different theories. The exposure theory states that the date of the occurrence is 
the date on which the process causing the damage commences. The 
"manifestation theory" places the occurrence date at the time when damage 
first manifested itself to the injured party, in order to maximise insurance 
coverage. The "diagnosable theory places the date of occurrence on the date 
when the damage is discovered", in order to hold an insurer liable for indefinite 
period after the expiration of the policies. The "combined theory" puts the date 
of occurrence on the entire period of time of continuing damage,58 in order to 
coverage be available at an any stage in the process. 
The third question concerns the number of occurrences in a claim. This 
question arises because the contam ination is often the result of repeated leaks, 
spills, or emissions of pollution over an extended period of time and most 
insurance polices contain a limit on the amount of coverage for each 
occurrence. The courts have tended to adopt one of approaches. The first is a 
cause oriented approach under which there is a single occurrence when a 
single uninterrupted and continuing proximate cause leads in multiple injuries. 
Therefore a finding of multiple occurrence is possible where multiple causes of 
pollution are established. The second approach is "an effect oriented approach" 
58 For more discussion of theories, see Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the 
Standard Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 
published in Environmental Law. North-western School of law and Clark College, vol. 21, 1991, p. 357 at 
pp. 382-386. 
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whereby multiple injuries will be considered as s multiple occurrences 
regardless of whether one or several causes effected harm.59 
The principles of "indemnity" and "right of defence for Insurers", as major 
characteristics of an insurance contract, may be used as means for the 
extension of a pollution exclusion clause to cover the pollution liability. 60 The 
duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, which is limited to actually 
covered events. The right of defence exists even if any allegation in a suit is 
groundless or false. Therefore, the insurer may be liable to the assured even if 
there is only a potential coverage.61 
In addition to the above mentioned principles, the courts have established 
several other principles in order to find insurance cover for injuries caused by 
pollution. One of these was to limit the subject matter of the pollution exclusion 
clause. By examining the manner and the type of emissions listed in the initial 
phrase of the clause which describes the scope of potentially uninsurable 
pollution, the court implied that the clause applied only to injuries directly 
caused by industrial contamination of the environment at large.62 This is simply 
a particular application of the" Ejusdem Generis" rule of interpretation which 
allows courts to infer that specific words restrict the meaning of more general 
terms when specific terms proceed the general terms in a given phrase. 
59 See related cases and more details of methods in, Jerry Hougland Stewart, The Pollution Liability 
Insurance, A Problem- Suggestionfor a Solution, Capital University Law Review, 1988, p. 677, atpp. 686-
8. 
60 Brook Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution- Claims: Avoiding Litigation Wasteland, Tulsa Law 
Journal, vol. 26,1990,209 atp. 212. 
61 Jonathan C. Averback, Comparing the Old and New Pollution Exclusion Causes in General Liability 
Insurance Policy: New Language the Same Result, Journal of Environmental Affairs, [1987] 601 atp.611. 
62 Id. atp. 616. 
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The subject matter of pollution exclusion is also limited when the insured is 
not alleged to have injured other parties by environmental contamination. The 
language used in the initial phrase of the pollution exclusion clause eliminates 
coverage for injuries caused by pollutants emitted "in or upon land, the 
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water. .. ". This implies that emissions 
which do not enter the general environment, the land, water or air at large, are 
covered. 63 Therefore, injury from explosions arising out of the discharge of 
petroleum are covered because they do not result from contamination of land, 
water or atmosphere. 
An additional rule which the courts apply in construing an insurance policy 
, 
is the doctrine of the insured s reasonable expectation of coverage, i.e. the 
policy covers an insured when an average insured would have thought that the 
, 
policy covered the insured s business against a damages claim which a third 
party has brought against the insured. Various factors must taken in to account 
in determining the reasonable expectation. These include the nature of the 
insured's business, the type of the property, strict liability of the insured even 
though the insured acted without fault, and the favour ability of court towards 
coverage are important factors which foster the belief that the insured expected 
coverage.64 
In determining whether the exclusion applies or not, attention has often 
been focused upon the polluting event rather than the resulting damage 
because, the phrase "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden and 
accidental, II and "occurrence" both refer to unexpected and intended events 
rather than to consequential injuries. But since the phrase "sudden and 
63 Id. P. 618. 
64 Richard F. H1lllter, The Pollution Exclusion the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance policy, 
University ojIllinois, [1986} at p.914. 
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accidental" has been construed as equivalent to unexpected and unintended, it 
can be concluded that the phrase can be extended to cover only damages 
which are neither expected nor intended. 
2.1. Clean up costs under CGL policy 
The general provisions of a standard CGL policy usually provide that the 
insurer "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured should become 
legally obligated to pay as damage because of injury to or loss, destruction, or 
loss of use of property.,,65 The question then arises as to whether such a policy 
, 
,has been taken out by polluter s assured years before pollution clean up , 
covers expenses incurred in cleaning up pollution, and if it is so whether the 
claim should be classified as property damage which is recoverable under the 
CGL policy. 
This policy defines property damage as "physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property which occurred during the policy period, including loss of use 
thereof.,,66 It has been found that response costs are not property damage, 
response cost being viewed as economic loss.67 This view was not without its 
opponents, and in some cases the courts considered that environmental 
contamination might indeed amount property damage, since the discharge of 
pollution into water causes damage to the tangible property in which a 
government has a property interests or at least, which is not owned by the 
insured.68 
65 Scoderstron, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 Forum, [1970] 762, 764. 
66 D. Lay lock, Modem American Remedies, [1985] p. 5. 
67 Mavz. v. Canadian Universal co., 804 F, 2d 1355 (4th err. 1986). This is quoted from, Jonathan Bank. .. , 
The Reinsurance of Environmental Claims, published in Leading Developments in International 
(Reinsurance and Pollution Insurance and Industrial report, 1991, Lloyds of London Press Ltd, at p. 103. 
68 See cases at Id. p. 76. 
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Clean up costs are usually imposed by statute.69 Accordingly it may be 
argued by an insurer that since clean up costs are imposed by government, 
they are a mandatory form of relief which are not covered by the insurance. It 
follows for this that, there would be no room for a defence. In consequence 
insurers would have no obligation to provide coverage for expenses incurred as 
a result of complying with mandatory injunctions to which they have no 
defence. It was also argued, that claims for reimbursement of costs are 
equitable relief not damages insured by CGL policy.7o 
In finding that an action for recovery of clean up costs constitutes an 
equitable form of relief, it is noted that the clean up cost might not be covered 
under the terms of an insurance policy.71 The reason for this is that under the 
terms of the policy, the insurer is not liable to pay all sums the insured was 
legally obligated to pay in damages. This is construed from a technical 
interpretation of damage which differentiates between recovery of clean up 
costs and recovery for damage to natural resources.72 
An insured might equally argue that damage is not itself a defined term in a 
CGL policy. Consequently, in the absence of a limiting definition, damage is a 
broad enough term to include the clean up costs which the insured pays for 
governmental action. There has been something of a divergence as between 
the courts in different jurisdictions over the question of whether the equitable 
injunctive relief, sought by many environmental claims, includes damages 
69 For example. 1980 U.S.A Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
known as Super Fund Act 
70 Lonnei Anne Jones. Insurance coverage for Hazardous Waste Clean up, Catholic University Law 
Review, vol. 39, [1989] 195 at pp. 203-4. 
71 Id. p. 206. 
72 See Brook Jackson, in supra. No. 60. 
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which are payable under a CGL policy. To date "a variety of courts have held 
that clean up costs are not damages within the meaning of the CGL 
agreement. ,,73 
The question may also arise whether the costs incurred by the insured to 
prevent further pollution should be paid by the insurance company or not. The 
insurer may argue that such costs are not covered under third party general 
liability policies because the insured has incurred no liability damage. The 
insured may respond by arguing that the costs of clean up were incurred in 
order to prevent the spreading of pollution to surrounding property owned by 
other parties for whom contamination could constitute property damage 
, 
covered by the policy. The insured s position on this point has been supported 
by cases involving preventive costs necessarily incurred in order to prevent 
imminent damage to other properties.74 
The assured may bear the preventive cost where there damage is not 
imminent but merely potential. In support of this argument, emphasis must be 
put on the policy definition of "occurrence" which requires that damage be 
neither expected nor intended. Since potential damage may be expected in 
dangerous activities it cannot be said to be imminent and it is therefore not 
covered. 
An insured may be compelled to clean up under an mandatory injunction. It 
may be asked whether the costs of complying with it constitute liability for 
damages covered by liability policy. Traditionally, courts have held that the 
assured is not indemnified for such costs. It has been suggested that such 
73 Bruce Rozonowski, Coverage Issues Presented by Clean up Cost, see in the Leading Developments in 
International Reinsurance and Pollution Insurance. An industry report, 1991, Lloyds London Press Ltd, p. 
73 atp. 75. 
74 J. Ashley, Representation of the Insurer's in an Environmental Claim, Defence Council Journal, January 
1987 p. 11 at pp. 14-5. 
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costs could be covered by the policy as the equivalent of damages which could 
be collected by a government for its own clean up work?5 In response to this, it 
may be said that such injunctive relief is not covered because the plain 
language of the policy limits coverage to actual damage. 
Generally speaking, according to the general rule, in insurance contracts, 
ambiguous terms should be construed against the insurer and consistent with 
the reasonable expectation of the insured. Since the term "damage" is subject 
to different reasonable interpretations, it is open to argument as to whether 
denial of coverage based on the technical distinction between legal damage 
and equitable relief might not be inconsistent with the insured,s reasonable 
expectation.76 
Chapter 3. The role of Protection and Indemnity Clubs in pollution liability 
coverage 
3. 1. Introduction 
In spite of the insurers reluctance to accept pollution risks, oil tankers have 
long been protected against third party claims arising from pollution damage. 
Most pollution liability insurance is handled by P & I Clubs, in which each party 
mutually, on a non-profit making basis, agree to contribute to the losses of the 
others. P & I Underwriters seek to achieve this mutuality by ensuring that over 
and above membership of the Club each member pays, a premium the amount 
of which is just enough to cover his claims and the cost of servicing his claims. 
75 Id. 
76 See Michael. C. Rullet, Environmental Clean up Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, Georgia Law 
Review, vol. 27, [1990] 705 atp. 712. 
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The club's involvement arises under the contract of insurance with its 
members, shipowners and charterers, as set out in the certificate of entry, 
coupled with the rules of club.77 The rules of most clubs very commonly include 
an important stipulation that it shall be a condition precedent of members' right 
to recover from the fund of the club, in respect of any liability, costs and 
expenses, that the member shall first have discharged or paid by own calls. In 
other words, the ship owners contract with the clubs is strictly one of indemnity, 
and if it so wishes, the club can insist that it is under no liability unless and until 
the member has first paid the relevant costs or liabilities from his own fund. In 
practice, it is commonplace for clubs to waive this rule in settling claims brought 
against their active members, but a stricter attitude is more likely if there are 
real doubts whether the member could meet his liabilities in the first instance. 
The most common example of this is where the member has already gone 
bankrupt whether as a result of the incident itself or for some other reason. 
The clubs have effectively responded to the liabilities imposed upon ship 
owners for pollution resulting from oil and other hazardous substances. Their 
coverage now embraces civil liability which is governed by CLC and includes 
other statutory and common law and tort liability, criminal liabilities for fines, 
voluntary liability as assumed under TOVALOP agreement, and extraordinary 
expenses which result from government order or action. Clubs have not only 
extended cover for salvors to include not merely P&I Clubs cover for oil 
pollution arising out of the operation of the salvage, but also cover for oil 
pollution liabilities when salvors are engaged in action as professional salvors, 
77 Each club has its own set of rules under which the club conducts its business and provides cover for the 
risks. The Rules of clubs are very similar because the interest of most members are the same. The amount 
and scope of the cover constantly is changing and developing in order to meet better the needs and 
requirements of a club's members. 
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not as a ship owner. Under the heading of "sue and labour clause" clubs cover 
clean up costs not otherwise recoverable under the rules?8 
Most P&I Clubs' cover is limited to oil pollution damage because the risk of 
a catastrophic claim for oil pollution is higher than the risks in other fields. The 
maximum limit is based on the amount of reinsurance which the brokers are 
able to obtain?9 One of the most important aspects of the terms offered by the 
clubs is that the cover, except in relation to oil pollution risk, time charterer risk, 
and fixed premium, is unlimited. The clubs are able to offer such unlimited 
cover because of their participation in the pool and market excess 
reinsurance.80 However a large insurance package which an owner may buy to 
obtain limited cover will always compare favourably with unlimited exposure. 
Heavy claims made against a particular club do not fall only on the 
members of that club, but beyond a certain figure, are shared proportionally by 
the members of the clubs which are parties to the Pooling Agreement. Smaller 
losses are retained by the club whose member caused them. 81 The excess of 
this amount is reinsured by club in the group pool. The group then collectively 
reinsure their risk in excess of the pooling amount. 82 The main advantage 
78 See, AF. Bessemer Clark, The Role of the Protection and Indemnity Club in Oil Pollution, 1980, 
International Business Lawyer, vol. 8, 204 at p. 205. 
79 Id. 
80 PGF. Leader, Protection and Indemnity Insurance, 1985, Maritime Policy and Management, vol. 12, No. 
1, p. 71 at pp. 72-4. 
81 Id. The figure of cover for club, reinsurance company and group pool are varied year by year. Currently 
each member club retains the first US. $12 million per claim. 
82 The figure regarding oil pollution is currently, 1993, up to US. $ 700 000 000. 
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afforded by such pooling arrangement is that the clubs can gain reinsurance 
cover at the cheapest price.83 
P&I Clubs, in addition to their main purpose in dealing with payment of 
claims, have a subsidiary role as well. This is done by providing administrative 
help through issuing certificates of financial responsibility and sending practical 
assistance to vessel owners, after an oil spill. The clubs handle many matters 
consequential upon the accident, e.g. obtaining reinsurance for some of the 
extraordinary risk which flows from the accident, assessing legal responsibility 
of the owners, and supporting their interests. 
3.2. Scope of cover 
3.2.1. Cover for pollution liability 
The Clubs cover extends to the owner of the insured vessel in respect of 
civil liability for oil pollution, which is increasingly governed by CLC84 , and 
includes other statutory liability and common law liability. P & I Clubs also cover 
criminal liability for fines; voluntary liability as assumed under the TOVALOP,85 
and expenses which result from governmental action in prevention of oil 
pollution. It also extends cover to members' liabilities under a salvage 
agreement. Under the general heading of "sue and labour", the Clubs cover 
83 The size of the international group and spread of risk is such that the re-insurance premium is more 
favomable than any individual purchase. 
84 The cover for CLC is granted to tanker members under a "blue card" scheme whereby the standard 
clubs' Ru1es on CLC liability are automatically incorporated in to the insurance cover. 
85 The cover fro TOV ALOP is granted to tanker owners under a "green card" in which the club's Ru1e on 
TOV ALOP are automatically incorporated in to the insurance cover. 
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voluntary clean-up and expenses in the nature of salvage not otherwise 
recoverable under the other Clubs' Rules. 
The Rules of the club extend its cover to liability for "contam ination" or 
"pollution". These terms are not usually defined in an insurance policy. It is 
necessary to look to the popular meanings of these words, and to such 
definitions as have been provided in judicial decisions, conventions and 
contracts, with the proviso that these must all be considered in the context of 
the actual situation, from which they arose or with reference to which they were 
framed. Generally speaking, there are considerable similarities and overlaps 
between the meaning of pollution and contamination. If there has been pollution 
there will usually also have been contamination, and vice versa, even if one 
term rather than the other might seem more appropriate on any given occasion. 
The assured is insured in respect of his liability for contamination or the 
cost of any measures reasonably taken for the purpose of avoiding or 
minimising pollution. There is no specific mention of cover for clean-up costs in 
a Club's Rules. The provision of cover for the cost of reasonable measures for 
avoiding or minimising pollution, in addition to the insurance of the liability for 
contamination, is similar to, and arises out of, the general principle that an 
assured may and should use all reasonable efforts to avert or to minimise a 
loss. Thus, the mere fact that the insured has incurred the costs to avert or 
minimise his loss or damage is sufficient to enable him to recover the costs 
from the insurers. As a result, the right of the insured to recover the clean-up 
costs does not depend upon the existence of the specific words in insurance 
policy. 
The Club covers the liabilities, losses, damage, costs and expenses 
incurred in consequence of the discharge or escape of oil or any other 
substances. The use of the words "other substances" makes it necessary to 
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consider what substances, other than oil, are subject to this reference. The 
words used are found under the heading of Pollution Risks. The same Rule 
also discusses liability for contamination and pollution. From these two it can 
be construed that the words "other substances" refer only to the polluting or 
contaminating substance. Thus if the insured incurred expenditure in 
preventing non-polluting or contaminating substance, from reaching the shore, 
it is conceivable that there would no cover under the Club Rules. 
The cover extends to "costs and expenses" incurred by a member in 
consequence of a discharge or escape from an entered ship in the club, having 
regard to the duty to take measures to prevent, avoid, or minimise pollution 
damage. Generally the phrase "costs and expenses" is not defined in Club 
Rule-Books. However, this phrase and its consequences are compatible with 
the words used in the definition of general average in Section 66 of the 1906 
MIA. The law of general average involves extraordinary expenditures other 
than ordinary disbursements, which are necessary for keeping the ship in an 
appropriate condition to carry out the trade. The definition of the phrase in the 
MIA 1906 Act, by reference to costs which are of an "extraordinary" nature, 
effectively excludes from pollution risks cover expenses of general operation 
costs. The effect of exclusion is that the insured has to bear certain costs which 
he would have to incur in any event. If, for example, a salaried employee were 
to devote a part of his time to the claim in question, the insured could not 
recover from the insurers a proportion of his salary. So also the office 
expenses of the insured, reasonable use of the vessel or her equipment are 
excluded, although they have increased by virtue of the event. This exclusion is 
based on the fact that the club cannot be expected to reimburse an owner for 
work done by crew or officers which the member could have discharged by 
means of regular wages or overtime payor mere ordinary running costs. 
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It is conceivable that a situation could arise in which the insured might 
find it in his interest and in the interests of the insurer to incur special expenses 
for dealing with the spill, rather than to devote part of his retained services. For 
example, additional costs, such as salaries of persons specifically employed to 
deal with the spill, overtime and travel for personnel permanently employed, 
costs of materials used, depreciation of equipment costs used and other costs 
which would not have been incurred if the spill had not occurred; and fixed 
costs, such as salaries of permanently employed, capital cost of equipment 
used.86 Consistent with the general principle of indemnity that a member is not 
allowed to benefit by insurance, clubs normally have a Rule which states that 
when a member, as a consequence of events which may cause him to become 
liable has saved expenses or prevented liability which would otherwise have 
been incurred and which would not have been covered by the club, the club 
may deduct from the indemnity an amount which corresponds to the benefit 
acquired by the member who are the insured and the insurer at the same time. 
Thus, additional and fixed costs which are directly involved in reduction of 
liability or indemnity may be recovered by the club, subject to the Omnibus Rule 
whereby the recoverable costs and expenses depends upon the discretion of 
the clubs' committee. 
The Club's cover has extended to the cost of any measures reasonably 
taken for the purpose of avoiding or minimising pollution liability or any resulting 
loss or damage together with any liability for loss or damage to property caused 
by measures so taken, i.e. a sue and labour clause. The Club's Rules imposes 
the duty to minimise liability after an occurrence of any casualty, event or 
86 The analysis of pollution damage by fixed and additional costs has been developed particularly by the 
OECD, see e.g. Combating Oil Spill, OECD, 1982. Paris; and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 
OECD, 1981, Paris. 
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matter capable of giving rise a claim. In the other words, the sue and labour 
clause does not come into operation until a loss covered by the policy has 
occurred.87 Thus it can be construed that the sue and labour clause does not 
extend cover where there is a cost incurred to remove a threat. To remedy this 
deficiency, another provision extends cover to costs of any measures 
reasonably taken to prevent an imminent danger of discharge or escape of oil 
or any substance which may cause pollution. i.e. pure threat removal 
measures. 
The clubs also extend cover to pollution liability arising out of collision 
through special mutual clubs which are usually designed by tanker owners, e.g. 
TOVALOP. In addition, the clubs cover liabilities and costs incurred as result of 
, 
collision between a member s ship and any other ship to the extent of four-
fourths of the members liabilities, costs and expenses relating to "pollution or 
contamination of any real or any personal property or things whatsoever 
(except other ships or vessel with which the entered ship is in collision or 
property on such other ship or vessel).',ss In other words, the club offers full 
cover for pollution liability which results from collision and which is wholly 
excluded from the ROC. 
3.2.2. Financial limits 
Although in general cover given by clubs is unlimited,89 unlike hull and 
cargo, there is an exception to this general rule. The club's maximum liability for 
claims in respect of pollution shall be limited to a sum which may vary from time 
87 See Lush. 1. in Xenos v. Fox (1868) 4 L.R C.P. 655 at p. 667. 
88 See, e.g. Rule 19(10), The North of England Protection and Indemnity Association Limited, 1991-92. 
89 The Clubs are able to offer such unlimited cover because of their participation in the pool and market 
excess reinsurance. 
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to time. 90 During the period of the insurance the assured may incur liability of 
the same type on more than one occasion, so as to entitle him to make more 
than one claim against the insurer. It has been stated in the Rule that the 
maximum limit of cover is in respect of "each entered ship" or "each accident or 
occurrence". This condition make it clear that the maximum cover is not 
reduced because of the occurrence of an event giving rise to a claim. The full 
figure will be available for each later claim. Even if there is not such a clear 
description in the Club's Rules, the insurer is still liable for each successive 
loss, in spite of difficulties in determining whether or not a continuing series of 
disasters involving a covered vessel is one single accident or occurrence or 
many such occurrences.91 Section 77(1) of the MIA 1906 states: "Unless the 
policy otherwise provides, and subject to he provisions of this Act, the insurer 
is liable for successive losses, even though the total amount of such losses 
may exceed the sum insured". 
It can be argued in favour of limited cover that it would be unwise for the 
clubs to offer their members unlimited cover when they are by no means 
certain that they can meet a claim arising out of pollution which may result in a 
catastrophic accident. Furthermore, there would be a possibility, in the case of 
unlimited coverage for pollution liability, that the club which shoulders primary 
liability would be unable to pay and be forced into liquidation either by its own 
members or by a third party claimant. The effect of this would be disastrous, 
not only for the club, but also for the reputation and general prestige of the P & 
I Clubs system around the world as a whole. Such loss of confidence might well 
bring about the demise of the P&I Club insurance system. 
90 For example, see Appendix A to Ru1e 2(A), The Ru1e of UK Mutual Steamship Assurance Association 
(Bermuda) Limited, February 10, 1990. 
91 For legal definition of "accident" or "occurrence". see chapter. 2. at p. 59-60. 
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The amount of limitation for claims in connection with pollution by oil or 
other hazardous substances, either generally or in relation to any particular part 
of the world, flag or class of vessel, trade, substance, or type of substances, is 
determined by the director or committee which runs the club.92 The limit is 
based on the amount of reinsurance which the brokers are able to obtain. 
Where the entered ship provides salvage or other assistance to another 
ship following a accident or occurrence, a claim by the owner of the ship in 
respect of oil pollution arising out of the salvage, the assistance or accident 
shall be aggregated with any liabilities or costs incurred in respect of oil 
pollution by any other ship similarly engaged in connection with the same 
accident or occurrence against the association which participates in the pooling 
agreement of the International Group of P&I Clubs.93 
Where a ship is separately entered by a member who is the Owner, or 
Demise Charterer, Manager or Operator with the Association, P&I Clubs, which 
participate in the Pooling Agreement and the Group excess reinsurance 
polices, the maximum recovery for each claim for oil pollution following anyone 
occurrence brought against the Association shall be limited to the sum 
determined by Director.94 
Where a ship is entered in a P & I Club by or on behalf of a charterer other 
than a bareboat charterer, the cover provided by the Association in respect of 
any claim is limited to the amount which, in the view of the committee or 
92 For example, see Ru1e 22 of the North of England Protection and Indemnity Association Limited, P & I 
Rules, 1993. The sum approved by the Directors to apply Ru1e 22 as from 20 the February 1993 is US $ 
700/000/000 for each ship and for anyone accident or occurrence. It includes fines and clean up costs. 
93 Ru1e 22 (A), Id. 
94 See, e.g. Ru1e 10.3.2, The Ru1es of the London Steam Ship owners Mutual Insurance Association 
Limited, in force on February 20, 1991. 
95 
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Director, such a charterer would have been able to limit his liability, the same 
as registered owner who had sought and not been denied the right to limit, 
unless the manager, before entry of ship, have agreed in writing to increase the 
Association liability in such a case.95 The Association shall in no circumstances 
be liable for a sum in excess of liability for damages. Where a member is 
entitled to limit his liability, the liability of the Association does not exceed the 
amount of such Iimitation.96 
3.2.3. Cover for criminal or quasi criminal liabilities 
To deter others from offending in like manner, the recovery of punitive 
damages, fines and civil penalties, in excess of compensation for the injury 
suffered to punish the guilty party is recognised in maritime law.97 Fines or 
penalties frequently arise in connection with oil spills. Criminal liability for oil 
pollution, from ships, is imposed by the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil 
Pollution) Regulation 1983, which implemented the obligation of MARPOL 
73178.98 Failure to comply with its Regulations constitutes a criminal offence 
which is punishable on summary conviction by a fine of not more than £ 5000 
and on indictment by a fine without upper Iimit.99 The unlimited fine on 
See, e.g. Rule 23, supra. No. 92. 
96 Rule 8(1), The Rules of the West of England Ship owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association 
(Luxembourg), in force in February 20, 1991. 
97 In English Law see, Wilkes. v. Wood (1763) Loft. 2; la State TV. 1153 . And Huckle. v. Money (1763) 2 
KB. 205. In the U.S.A., it was recognised by the Supreme Court in The Amiable Caney, F Case No.5, 196 
N.D. Dal. (1959). 
98 See more details in chapter. 3. at pp. 85-93. 
99 Reg. 34(2), The Merchanst Shipping (Preventiion of Oil Pollution) Regulation 1983. 
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indictment seems commensurate with the gravity of oil pollution offences. The 
language of the P & I policy is broad enough to include punitive damage, but 
there is a divergence of views on whether it is against public policy to allow one 
against whom punitive damage are personally awarded because of his wilful 
conduct, to recoup his loss from his insurer. 
A corporation's liability is quite independent of the human beings who are 
members of it. Thus, a corporation can sue or be sued for torts committed 
against it or is done, by it, against the others.1°O There are certain crimes, by 
their nature, that is impossible to commit against a corporation, such as assault 
or false imprisonment, or be committed by corporation against the others, e.g. 
wrongs in which the intention is essential. There should, therefore, be no public 
policy principles to bar the corporation from protection itself in respect of 
punitive damages caused by its individual representative, such as servants or 
agents. However, a corporation is responsible for the acts of its servant or 
agents if those acts are done within the "scope of the servant's"/agent's 
authority. The extent to which a corporation is liable for the acts of its 
servants/agents committed outside the scope of their authority, is arguable. In 
Poulton v. L. & S. W. R. y.101 it was held that a corporation could not be 
vicariously liable for the torts of its servants committed outside the express 
powers of corporation. In contrast to this decision, it was considered that if it is 
accepted that a master's liability for his servant's tort is truly vicarious, there is 
no need for technical argument to succeed in case,102 because if somebody of 
such authority in the company acts tortiously on behalf of the company the 
100 For knowing who represent company in such cases, see part. IV. pp. 314-319 
101 (1867) 2 Q.B.D. 423. 
102 See full consideration of the relevant cases in W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, Bed., 
1989 at pp. 586-588. 
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company is liable, not by way of vicarious liability, but because the tortious act 
is that of the company itself. 
In the standard form of liability policy, coverage is usually given with 
respect to "all sums" or any losses.103 The question which arises is again 
whether the language of such policies is broad enough to cover punitive 
damages. Some courts have construed the terms such as "caused by" or 
"arising out of' to indicate that the policy has coverage limited to the 
compensatory damage, i.e. such damages which are the result of the insured's 
conduct and are designed to compensate a third party for the result of that 
conduct, not damages sustained by the insured by way of liability to a penalty. 
In this light, punitive damages do not really reflect damage sustained by the 
claimant, but are a form of punishment inflicted upon the insured defendant.104 
Many courts have held that the policy covers punitive damages because these 
damages constitute a "sum" which the assured becomes legally obligated to 
pay as damages for injuries sustained. 105 Some other courts rely on the 
doctrine of reasonable expectation in order to deny or grant coverage. 106 
The clubs and their reinsuring underwriters are getting increasingly 
concerned at the growth of penal legislation imposing punitive fines on owner, 
which bear no relation to the offence or damage caused. There is legislation in 
some parts of the world which imposes excessive fines on ship owners for oil 
103 For example, see, Harrel. v. Travellers Indem., 567, p. 2d 1013 (1977); Skyline HaIVester System. v. 
Centennial Ins, 331 Now. 2d 106. low. (1983). 
104 e.g. Casperson. v. Webber, 213 N.W. 2nd 372. MinD.. (1973); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 652 s.w. 2d 206. Mo. (1983). 
105 Southern Farm Bureau Cas, Ins, Co. v. Daniel. 440 SW. 2d. 582. Ark. (1969). 
106 Lanzenly. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 SW. 2d. Tenn. (1964); Cislewicz. v. Mutual Servo 
Cas. Ins. Co., 267 NW 2d 595. Wis. (1978). 
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spills. Because of this reinsuring underwriters have insisted that each club 
should make it clear in its rules that the overall figure for oil pollution applies not 
merely to the claims for damage resulting from an oil spill, but also to fines. 107 
The Clubs have extended their cover, expressly to fines in respect of pollution 
by oil or other substances. Even where there is no such express provision for 
cover of fines, the Clubs' cover still extends to fines. This is because the basic 
insuring agreement in a P & I policy provides that the assured will be 
indemnified against any loss, damage or expenses for which the assured shall 
become liable to pay and shall have paid, by reason of any occurrence covered 
by the policy. Thus, in the absence of an express exclusion, it would appear 
that this language is broad enough to include fines in respect of claims 
otherwise covered. 
Is fine included in the word "penalty"? The words "fines" and "penalties" 
seem to differ in meaning in that the word "fine" is more usually employed to 
describe an amount imposed under a threat of the sanction of the criminal law 
by a court for an offence against the law,108 whereas the word "penalty", as a 
fine or money payment, is usually used for breach of the law of a less criminal 
nature, e.g. breach of the condition in a bond or breach of a term in 
contract. 1 09 Therefore, the word "penalty" seems to be more flexible and can be 
used to describe the infliction of a monetary sanction by somebody other than a 
court, for example a port authority. If a penalty is imposed by such a body, it 
would not be recoverable under the P & I policy. Thus, a "penalty" is also a 
"fine", subject to P & I Clubs, if it is imposed by judicial authority. As a result in 
107 AF. Bessemer Clark, The Role of the Protection and Indemnity Club in Oil Pollution, 1980, 
International Business Lawyer, vol. 8, 204 at p. 209. 
108 See the Power of Criminal Courts Act 1973, S. 30(1) and Criminal Law Act 1977, Ss. 289 and 61. 
109 See Roger. Bird, Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 7 the edition, 1983 at p. 249. 
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, 
clubs rules, fines include civil penalties, punitive damages and other 
impositions similar in nature to fines. 
Section 22(e) of the UK P & I club, which is one of the biggest in the world, 
provides cover for fines imposed by courts, tribunals or other authority in 
respect of pollution by oil or other substances. The term "authority" is not 
defined in the Club's Rules. It is unclear whether it is restricted to judicial 
authority or whether it includes any governmental authority. The term occurs 
after the terms "court" or "tribunal" which are judicial or quasi-judicial 
authorities. Thus, it may be construed that the term "authority" only includes 
those who have been delegated judicial power by judicial authorities. Such 
interpretation is justified by the rule of "Ejusdem generis" (of the same kind or 
another). This rule states where a group of particular term has been specified 
followed by more general terms, the latter must be construed as being the 
same kind as specifically mentioned ones. Section 3 of the MIA 1906 defined 
maritime perils as "the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of 
the sea, that is to say, perils of the sea, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, 
captives, seizures, restraints, and detainment of princes and jettison, barratry, 
and any other perils, either of the like kind of which may be signed by the 
policy." The words "any other perils" and "either of the like kind" are added in 
order to expand the cover of the policy to the maritime perils other than those 
expressly mentioned. There are many examples in respect of application of the 
rule of "edjusdem generis".110 For example, in the Davidson v. Burnard. the 
Montezuma,111 water entered the vessel through a main discharge pipe from 
the engine room and damaged the cargo. It was discovered a valve had been 
110 See more examples of the application of the "edjusdem generis" rule to the expansion of the perils of the 
sea, in 1. Kenneth Good Care, Marine Insurance Claims, 2nd. ed., 1981, at chapter. VI. 
III [1868] 4 L.R. C.P. 117. 
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inadvertently left open as a result of negligence on the part of the crew, and in 
the view of Wiles J., this was a loss of a similar kind to one caused by perils of 
the sea. 
The term "other authority" may also includes those governmental 
authorities empowered to take quasi judicial decisions from time to time. Thus 
the fine imposed by the port authority against illegal discharge of polluting 
substances is covered by the P & I Clubs, provided that authority to impose fine 
is given by Government regulation or Acts of Parliament. If there is not such 
authorised power to impose penalties and fines, in the maritime pollution 
matter, this would not be covered under the club rules. The distinction is 
important because fines and penalties imposed by governmental authority on 
insured may not be covered by the insurer. 
No fine shall be recoverable unless it was imposed on the member or on a 
seaman of on entered vessels in circumstances where the member is liable to 
reimburse such seaman who has paid the fine. In respect of pollution by oil or 
other substances, the club does not provide cover for any fines imposed as a 
result of a members failure to comply with provisions relating to the design, 
construction, adoption and equipment of ships.112 To clarify this issue, it is 
necessary to distinguish between criminal fines and civil penalties. Criminal 
fines are generally levied for wilful violation of the law protecting the public and 
the environment. If one were able to insure oneself against losses occasioned 
by such knowing violation, a major purpose of the criminal fines would be 
frustrated, because the insured would never feel the force of punishment. It 
should be noted that there is also clear authority to the effect that insurance 
against the consequence of crime is strictly unenforceable as being it is against 
112 Rule 22(b). UK P & I Club. 
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public policy.113 Thus, it would be wise for clubs not to cover such fines, this is 
simply the true construction of an insurance contract whereby the insured 
cannot recover of a loss which was caused by his deliberate act,114 i.e. the act 
which is committed with the requisite mens rea or negligence. It follows that 
insurance against fines imposed for deliberate pollution would be against public 
policy.115 However, the position is not the same where the conduct of the 
defendant in a civil action contributed in some way to the commission of the 
offence by plaintiff, wholly without blame, who then seeks to recover his 
fine. 116 
Coverage of civil penalties has always been a controversial issue in the 
insurance market. As a matter of principle, civil penalties are intended to punish 
those who committed illegal act. The fact that there has been a violation of 
some measure is generally sufficient to justify imposition of a civil penalty, even 
where the breach of measures was unintentional, e.g. breach of a MARPOL 
regulation. It is arguable whether such civil penalties are covered by insurance 
or not. It may be argued that if insurers are required to indemnify an insured for 
payment of civil penalties, he would have no incentive to comply with 
environmental regulations. On the other hand, it might be argued that an 
insured who wilfully or knowingly fails to comply with environmental regulation 
is subject to a crim inal fine in any event and is, therefore, not qualified for 
insurance coverage. It may also be said that amounts that are levied for 
negligent violation and the payment of civil penalties are the same type of 
113 Gray. v. Barr Prudential assurance Co. (third party) [1971] 2 Q.B. 554. See also, Shand, Unblinking 
Unruly Horse: Law of Contract, 3 C.L.J, 1972, 144. atp. 161. 
114 Beresford. v. Royal Ins. Co. [1938] AC. 586. 
115 See details of insurance and public policy at chapter 3. at pp. 98-100. 
116 e.g. see. Caintal v. Myhan & Son, [1913] 2 K.B. 220. 
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financial liabilities that arise in environmental pollution based on strict liability 
theories. Thus, there is no reason for non coverage of such penalties. This 
argument may, however, be criticised in that, the coverage for negligence 
damages in effect increase the chances of future negligent acts and, in 
consequence, frustrates the entire purpose of the insurance policy. 
It is provided by the P & I Clubs that the fine, which is the subject of 
recovery, must have been imposed upon the members and if was imposed 
upon an agent or seaman must be one for which the member is liable to 
reimburse that person. A problem may arise out of the deplorable practice 
adopted by certain irresponsible masters who deliberately discharge oil into the 
sea. 117 If the master is fined personally, it is necessary to consider the basis for 
fine. If a master has negligently transgressed a statute, for example by sailing 
outside a recognised channel, then grounding and causing a spill, prima facie, 
there would be no reason why he should not be reimbursed by his owner for 
the fine, or if he is reimbursed why the owner should not be able to recover 
from his club. 118 
However, if the master has wilfully and deliberately pumped oil overboard 
in contravention of the law and, as a result, been fined personally, he would not 
have a right of indemnification for his wrongdoing. 119 If he is indemnified by his 
117 This is usually done by tank washing. See, Zoe Colocotroni, [1971] AM.C. 21. Where the master 
pumped oil overboard in order to refloat the vessel following the grounding, in the mistaken belief that it 
was in everyone ,s best interest that he should get the vessel off the ground at once in this way. 
118 Where an agent's or employer's conduct amounts to a tort, but not a crime, he is, at common law, 
entitled to be indemnified against expenses and liabilities if the transaction was not manifestly tortious or 
tortious to his knowledge. See, Salisbury's Law of England, 4th ed., vol. I, Para 809, and vol. 16, para 568; 
Adamson. v. Juris (1827) 4 Bing 66. 
119 An employee has no right to indemnity in respect of a transaction involving a breach of a criminal law if 
the party perfonning it knew that it was illegal, or if he knew the true circumstances which rendered it 
unlawful. See, Smith. v. White (1866) I.R.F.Q. 620; Leslie. v. Reliable Advertising Agency Ltd., [1915] 1 
K.B.652. 
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owners they would not be able to recover from their club. 120 Fines, resulting 
from the wilful misconduct of seaman, may be reimbursed only if either the 
member is compelled by law to pay such fine or has reasonably paid the fine in 
order to obtain the release from arrest of the entered vessel or any other 
vessel. 121 
The insurer does not exempt the insured from liability coverage where the 
insured merely intended to commit a wrongful act which was never carried out. 
In the other words, the assured is not precluded from enforcing the policy if the 
risk subsequently comes into operation without any misconduct on his part.122 
Thus, the insurer would only be exempt from liability if he actually prove that the 
alleged offence was actually committed. The evidence brought must be 
sufficient to justify a conviction on a criminal charge. 123 In the absence of clear 
proof that the act is criminal, the presumption against crime prevails and the 
assured is entitled to recover. 124 
3.3. Exceptions, in general, applicable to the club cover 
3.3.1. Double insurance 
A shipowner wishing to insure his total interests in his vessel will have to 
take out insurance of different types, often with different insurers. \Nhen a 
shipowner's cover is comprised in different policies, it is important that such a 
120 This is merely an illustration of the general rule that an assured may not recover under a policy in 
respect of loss intentionally caused by his own criminal or tortious act. Beresford. v. Royal Insurance Co. 
[1938] A.C. 586; Hardy. v. Motor Insurance Bureau[1964] 2 Q.B. 745. 
121 C. Hill. B. Robertson, Steven Hazelwood, An Introduction to P & I, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1988, 
atp.77. 
122 Barrett. v. Jeremy (1849) 3 Exch., 535. Per Park. B. at 543. 
123 Thutell. v. Beaumont. (1823) 1 Bing. 339. 
124 E.R. Hardy Ivamy, General PrinCiples of Insurance Law, 5th ed., 1986, p.268. 
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various policies do not result in unintentional gaps in his cover. On the other 
hand, it is also important to avoid overlapping insurance covers which is 
obviously uneconomic. 
The club rules specifically exclude from cover certain losses which would 
be covered by other insurance. It is provided that, "the association shall not, 
unless to the extent that Directors in their discretion otherwise decide, be liable 
for any liabilities, costs or expenses recoverable under any other insurance or 
which would have been so recoverable. ,,125 Such a clause used by the club in 
their rules is variously known as the escape clause,126 non contribution 
clause, 127 or other insurance clause. 128 One of the advantages of the Clubs 
adopting the "escape clause" is that it effectively protect and indemnify the 
insured where the cover is not available under any other insurance sources . 
The clause makes it clear that the P&I Clubs cover do not comprise losses 
which are covered under other insurance and is thereby expressly made 
complementary to the latter. It should be noted that the hull insurance which a 
member has already actually purchased does not define the scope of his P & I 
cover. But it is the usual practice of clubs not to be responsible for losses which 
by their nature can be insured under the other insurance. 
It must be realised that the areas of potential overlap between hull and P & 
insurance are relatively few. Hull insurance is primarily directed towards 
indemnifying property damage whereas P & I cover is concerned with 
125 For example, see Rule 5(I) of UK. Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Limited, 
February 10, 1990. 
126 Joseph A Lodrigue. v. Montegute Auto Marine Service, et al, [1978] AM.C. 2272. 
127 Seaboard Shipping COIporation. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corporation, et al, and Ocean Mutual 
Underwriting Association Ltd [1972] AM.C. 2151, especially at p. 2156. 
128 Prudential Grace Lines Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company [1972] AM.C. 2655. 
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indemnifying an assured in respect of his liabilities. In spite of their different and 
distinct areas of risk to which each is relevant, however, there are some 
instances where the two types of cover may overlap. For example, there are 
occasions where hull insurers cover the assured's liability; a shipowner may 
incur liabilities to third parties as a result of efforts to avert or minimise loss for 
the benefit of Hull insurers; Further, Hull insurers cover a shipowner's liability in 
respect of a salvage award. This is an area where difficulties have been 
encountered in categorising particular risks as to whether they fall within hull 
cover or more correctly lie with the owner's P & I Club. One such instance 
occurred in_ Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steam Shipowner's 
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd. (The Bosworth) (No. 3),129 in which 
salvage services were rendered to the entered vessel and the salvage award 
was enhanced by virtue of including an amount in respect of life salvage. The 
court decided that life salvage was not a form of maritime salvage but a species 
of salvage created by statute.130 and that the award was an award against ship, 
cargo and freight for services rendered to ship, cargo and freight, enhanced by 
services rendered for life salvage. The award was, therefore, recoverable under 
the Lloyd's policy and not from the P & I Clubs. 
Most policies for indemnity contain a condition, relevant to double 
insurance, that purports to oust the liability of the insurer if the liability is 
covered elsewhere. Problems may arise if one or both of the policy, covering 
the same risk, contain such condition. If one insurance policy does, but the 
other does not, then the latter should be solely and wholly liable because there 
is no double insurance. If both insurance policies contain such a condition, 
however, the position is more complex. In Gale v. Motor Union Insurance 
129 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 483. 
130 Section 554 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1984 
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CO.,131 L was driving G's car when he caused an accident. L was covered both 
by his own motor policy and by G's policy on G's car. Both policies had 
qualifications which in effect provided that they were not applicable if the 
person concerned was otherwise insured. Both policies also had rateable 
proportion conditions. Roche. J. held that the conditions purporting to oust 
liability were not clear, and that the only way to read them was as referring to 
cases where the other cover gave complete and full indemnity. Here because 
of the rateable proportion clause, neither policy gave complete cover. 
Therefore, neither clause applied and the insurers were both liable rateably. 
Rowlatt. J. in Weddel and Another v. Road Transport & General Insurance 
Co. Ltd,132 went somewhat further than the judge in Gale had gone and held 
that it would be unreasonable to suppose that these conditions would cancel 
each other out. He continued that, "The reasonable construction is to exclude 
from the category of coexisting cover any cover which is expressed to be itself 
cancelled by such coexistence, and to hold in such cases that both companies 
are liable, subject of cover in both cases to any rateable proportion clause 
which there may be". Both judgements seem to admit, that if neither policy has 
a rateable proportion clause, neither insurer will be liable. This is open to 
criticism, on the basis of equitable principle and justice. A person who has paid 
premiums for cover to two insurers should not be left without insurance cover, 
merely because each insurer has excluded liability for the risk against which the 
other has indemnified. 
There is nothing wrong in an insured effecting as many policies as he 
wishes on the same property or on the same risk. However, if he suffers a loss, 
131 [1928] 1 K.B. 359. 
132 [1932] 2 K.B. 563 atp. 567. 
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he is, by virtue of principle of indemnity, entitled to no more than full indemnity. 
The insurer who pays, the whole of sum insured for the same property or 
liability, is entitled to claim contributions from the other insurers, as otherwise 
the latter would be unjustly enriched. 133 In practice, contribution is most unlikely 
to arise by virtue of a standard term in all indemnity insurance which provides 
that if there is any other insurance on the property or the risk covered by the 
policy, the insurer will not be liable to payor contribute more than its rateable 
proportion of any loss or damage. Such a rateable proportion clause does not 
affect the basic legal principle of double insurance, but it is simply prevents the 
insured from recovering all his loss from one insurer. 
3.3.2. Wilful Misconduct of the member 
It is general rule of the insurance 134 emanating from public policy that 
wrongdoers and crim inals should not be allowed to insure against the 
consequences of their wrongdoing. This principle has to be qualified in the 
realms of protection and indemnity insurance because, there is "almost always 
an element of fault involved, in P. & I. claim and if every claim were excluded 
on the basis that the assured was at fault the essential purpose of P & I cover 
would be destroyed.,,135 
All clubs expressly exclude liability to effect a recovery which is the direct 
consequence of an act of wilful misconduct of the member or his managers or 
managing agents, a opposed to misconduct of subordinate employees or 
133 Austin v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. [1945] KB. 250; see also S. 80(2) of MIA 1906 
134 Hazelwood, S J, P & I Club Law and Practice, 1989, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, p. 183. 
135 Id. 
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agents of the assured. 136 However, as an exception to this general rule, clubs 
cover extends to loss which has arisen as a result of the misconduct of the 
assured, provided that the loss is proximately caused by a peril insured 
against. 137 This indicates that some degree of misconduct is ignored by P & I 
Clubs, where misconduct is only one factor in causing the loss, not an effective 
one.
138 Thus, whilst claims arising out of negligence may be allowed without 
qualification, the clubs draw the line at "wilful misconduct". It is obviously a 
matter of some importance for the clubs to make clear exactly what degrees of 
misconduct they would be willing to tolerate. The decision as to the degree of a 
member's fault and the measurement of his conduct generally rest with the 
directors.139 
A member of a club, who is not also a member of crew, will not lose his 
, 
cover where the loss is caused by the fault of the ship s master or crew, for that 
the owner is in privity, in connection with their duties as seamen.140 A club 
member would not have any protection against liability caused by his fault 
committed in his capacity as a member of the crew,141 In the other words, a 
136 e.g. Rille 27(3) of The North of England and Protecting and Indemnity Association Limited, P & I 
Rilles, 1991-1992. It is also based on the M.I.A 1906, in which secction 55(2)(a) provided, " .... the insurer is 
not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of the assured, but unless the policy otherwise 
provides, he is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, even though the loss would 
not have happened but for the misconduct or negligence of master or crew. In the USA it has been held that 
where a ship owners liability policy did not contain such an exclusion and sought to cover the assured in 
respect of all claims however caused, the policy was too wide and void as being contrary to public policy, 
see The Rose Mmphy, Fidelity Phoenix Fire Insurance Co. v. John Mmphy Co.[1933] A.M.C. 444. 
137 Id. 
138 Papadimitrou v. Henderson (1939) 64 Ll.L.Rep. 345. 
139 S.J. Hazelwood, P & I Clubs Law and Practice, 1989 Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, p. 183. 
140 Pipon. v. Cope (1808) Camp. 1012. 
141 Thomas. v. Tyne and Wear Steamship Freight Insurance Association [1917] 1 K.B. 938. 
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club member has no protection if the fault is committed by the member while he 
is a member of the crew. 
Another exception which is based on the conduct of an assured is where 
the Directors "shall be of the opinion that the claim arose out of sending to sea 
of the entered ship in an unseaworthy state with the priviti 42 of the member or 
his manager or managing agents. ,,143 
A shipowner who has paid liability claims and who was denied the right to 
limit liability on the ground of his "privity or knowledge" may not recover such 
losses under P&I Clubs policy covering loss sustained ''without fault or privity of 
the assured. ,,144 These words as used in P&I Clubs policy have substantially 
the same meaning as those in the English and American limitation of liability 
statutes.145 How do behaviour standards of conduct barring limitation weave in 
other wilful misconduct clauses which bar offering liability insurance cover? In 
the "Eurysthen es" ,146 a club entered vessel was sent to sea in an 
unseaworthy state with the prior knowledge and concurrence of the assured 
member this as to debarring him from limiting his liability. The shipowners 
claimed that they should only be deprived of an indemnity if they had been 
guilty of "wilful misconduct" regarding the unseaworthy state of the ship. Lord 
142 Lord Denning at, Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A. v. The Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association(Bermuda) Ltd., The Eurysthenes, [1976] 2 Lloyds' Rep. 171 at p. 179, concluded that privity 
did not mean that there was any wilful misconduct by assured but only that he knew of the act beforehand 
and concurred in it being done. Moreover, it did not mean that the assured himself personally and the act 
but only that someone else did it and that he knowingly concurred in it. 
143 See e.g. Rille 27(4), The North of England .... supra. No. 136. It is also based on the rule contained in 
section 39(5) of MIA 1906, which provided, " ... where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea 
in an unseaworthiness state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness." 
144 Continental Insurance Company Inc. v. Sabine Towing Company Inc., (The "Edgar F Cony's" and Tow) 
[1941] A.M.C. 262 (U.S.). 
145 d I.atp.226. 
146 Compania Maritime San Basilio S.A. v. The Oceanus Mutual Understanding Association (Bermuda) 
Ltd. [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171. 
147 
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Denning M.R. equated this type of conduct with deliberate or reckless 
conduct. 147 The P & I Club claimed that the shipowners were not qualified to 
any indemnity if they had been guilty of negligence and if they ought to have 
known that the ship was not reasonably fit to be sent at sea, i.e. privity. Lord 
Denning said148 that "privity" did not mean that there was any wilful misconduct 
by the assured but only that he knew that someone else had been guilty of 
misconduct and knowingly concurred in it. If therefore, a ship is sent to sea in 
an unseaworthy state, with the knowledge and concurrence of the assured 
personally, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness 
of which the assured know and in which he concurred. This may be criticised 
on the basis that the standards which break a shipowner's right to limit and 
which allow a club to avoid making recovery to its member are radically 
different. If these two principles are treated as being identical, the club will be 
faced with unpleasant task of deciding whether to try to enforce their 
unreasonable conduct rule so as to deprive a shipowner of insurance cover in 
respect of a claim for which he is unable to limit his liability. 
3.3.3. Clubs only cover owner of entered vessel 
The club attempts to confine its cover to the losses which members149 
become liable to pay and shall have paid by reason of the fact that the member 
is the owner of the entered vessel, because the purpose of the P & I Club is, 
Id. at p. 178. 
148 Id. atp. 179. 
149 Charterers Clubs have, in recent years, also provided cover for their members .. 
263 
broadly, to provide insurance to shipowners in respect of the vessel insured,150 
and not in their capacity as employers of stevedores, dock owners, warehouse 
men or in respect of anything else. 151 However charterers may become 
members of P & I Clubs but they are covered only in respect of their liabilities 
which arise in connection with the entered vessel, and not in any other 
business capacity, e.g. as operator of the vessel. 
It is not sufficient, however, that a claim arises merely in connection with a 
member's business as a shipowner, it must also arise in respect of an entered 
vessel. Thus a claim against pollution liability resulting from an entered vessel 
is a claim which is rightly passed on the club. On the other hand, if the pollution 
victim has received damages from a ship not entered in the P & I Club but its 
owner is a member of the Club, this is not the damages for which the club will 
provide cover. 
3.3.4. Liability assumed by contract 
The P&I Clubs policy usually provides that the insurer is not responsible for 
liabilities contractually assumed, unless otherwise agreed, between the 
member and a manager of club, because the club's purpose is to protect the 
assured against liability arising from negligence. For example, in the case of 
towage contracts, special provisions apply whereby the club will exclude cover 
in respect of liabilities resulting from the member or anyone on his behalf 
having entered into a contract that results in greater liabilities than would have 
arisen under the ordinary rules of maritime law unless such a contract could be 
150 For example, Rule 3, The North of England .... , supra. No. 136. 
151 In the U.S.A in the matter of Barge B.W 1933 [1968] A.M.C. 2738, it was decided that a ship owner P 
& I policy insuring an oil company's liabilities a ship owner did not cover liability imposed on it as 
terminal operator and shipper. 
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considered as being customary in the trade concerned or was approved by the 
club manager.152 
There are, however, many special instances where a ship owner, in order 
to meet certain operating conditions, finds that it is necessary to indemnify a 
third person even though the liabilities are those of the third person. Most clubs' 
rules provide that the acceptance of a towage contract under which the ship 
owner agrees to assume liabilities (which ordinarily are those of the tug owner) 
shall not affect the member,s right of recovery under his cover. 153 
3.3.5. Salvage operation 
There has been reluctance on the part of clubs to accept into membership 
salvors in respect of those liabilities which spring from their activities as 
professional salvors, rather than from their activities as traditional tug owners. 
This reluctance is understandable when bearing in mind that the liabilities which 
a professional salvor could incur during a salvage operation are mostly due to a 
negligent act of his employees. In the Tojo Maru incident the salvor tugged the 
entered vessel of one of the club, in a salvage operation. The tug itself caused 
no damage nor was the employee who committed the negligent act on board or 
even near the tug at time. Very considerable damage was done to the already 
crippled T ojo Maru by an act of salvage negligence and the club concerned felt 
itself unable to accept that liability under its ordinary cover. 
It is probable, however, that a tug owner who did engage in salvage 
operations might be able to persuade his club to endorse the certificate of entry 
for his tugs for (I) damage done by the entered vessel and (II) any act or 
152 This basically covers normal part towage of an entered vessel in the ordinary course of trading but does 
not automatically cover ocean towage. Supra. No. 139, at p. 188. 
153 For example, Rule 19(15), The North of England ... , supra. No. 136. 
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om ission of persons a board the entered vessel during salvage operations, 
cover would be extended, so excluding salvage operation only as and when the 
salvage tug is not an integral part for the salvage operation. 154 
However, the liability of an owner to pay "special compensation" to a salvor 
of an entered ship in respect of work done or measures taken to prevent or 
minimise damage to the environment is covered by P & I Clubs, provided that 
the liability is imposed on the owner pursuant to Art. 14, of the International 
Convention on Salvage, 1989, or is assumed by the Owner under a term of a 
salvage agreement approved by the Director of Clubs, and is not payable by 
those interested in the salved property. 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
The agreed value in a marine insurance policy is conclusive of the 
insurable or actual value of the vessel and involves the indemnity payable for 
general average contribution, salvage charges and sue and labour expenses. If 
the agreed value is less than the actual value, then the assured is treated as 
being under-insured for such liabilities and expenses, and indemnity is reduced 
in proportion to the difference between the two values. As a result of the cover 
in the collision clause being limited t 3/4 or 4/4, as case may be, of the agreed 
value of the vessel, there is a risk to the shipowner that he will incur collision 
liabilities which exceed the limit of the agreed value. Thus, in cases in which 
the pollution damage is covered by SG policy, cover is limited to the insured 
value. Therefore, effective protection must be sought through "excess liabilities" 
insurance or through coverage in a P & I Club. 
154 See Hill, c., Roberson, B., Hazelwood, S .. 1. An Introduction to P & I Clubs, Lloyd's of London Press 
Ltd, 1988. 
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The general insurance market, other than P £ I Clubs, has not tended to 
cover pollution liability by reason of the broad definition of occurrence and the 
inconsistency in the interpretation of the terms of "sudden and accidental" 
under the CGL policy. It has also become clear that the cost of defending these 
claims, more significantly the type of clean up costs, were so enormous as to 
threaten the profitability, and in some instances the existence, of the 
underwriters which sold the insurance. Moreover lack of sufficient pollution 
liability insurance has threatened the existence of many insured parties. 
The solution to the problem will depend on a number of factors, including 
economic conditions in the insurance industry as a whole, the ability of the 
insurers to develop data that enables them to assess the risks and to operate 
profitably in pollution insurance market, and also upon judicial and legislative 
trends. The courts could improve the insurance market for pollution liability 
through imposing constraints in the interpretation of liability insurance policies, 
so as to more accurately effect the likely intentions of the parties to a contract 
of insurance. The legislature is likewise in a position to mitigate the harshness 
of insurance crises by providing devices which more effectively implement the 
insurance policy. For example, by the establishment of a fund which is financed 
by a levy on the oil or other substances could assist the insured and insurer in 
reaching an agreement on cost-sharing approach, or by passing statutes which 
ease dispute settlement. The examination of the CGL policy has shown that 
there is, so far, no sign of a close co-operation needed between the different 
bodies mentioned in reaching a common policy for insuring the pollution 
damage. If this trends continue, the only possible solution will be in the hands 
of the industries involving in the transportation or production of oil or other 
hazardous substances at sea so as to provide sufficient insurance cover for 
pollution victims, through insurance club or funding. In this process, of course, 
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the role of the insurance companies in providing reinsurance cover should not 
be ignored. 
Where pollution cover forms under the umbrella of a CGL policy, such 
policies will provide the insurer with an indemnity in respect of liabilities to third 
parties for property or personal injury. Thus, the CGL policy puts clean up costs 
outside of its cover. There are also restrictions in CGL policy in respect of 
insurance cover for criminal liabilities or penalties which may be imposed by 
statute. Insurance cover is normally limited to "accidental events" not 
intentional. 
In providing cover for pollution damages, oil tankers have long been 
protected against third party claims arising from pollution damage by P & I 
clubs which are backed by reinsurance. The protection includes loss or damage 
caused by the discharge of oil or other substances from the entered ship, clean 
up costs, prevention measures and penalties. Members who are parties to the 
TOVALOP are also covered by P & I Clubs with regard to their liabilities under 
that agreement. The Clubs also extend their coverage to extraordinary 
expenses or liability, not recoverable from hull underwriting or any other 
insurance, incurred as a result of the compliance with any order or direction 
given by governmental authorities in order to prevent or decrease the pollution 
damage. Members also receive coverage for their liability under a salvage 
agreement, for work done or measure taken to prevent or reduce pollution, 
provided there is prior approval of the committee or director board of the club. 
Although P & I Clubs provides protection for those who suffer pollution 
damage in most cases, Nevertheless, there are, in fact, cases in which the 
victims are left without actual protection. The basic P & I policy concludes with 
various exceptions and limitations. One of important provision is that which 
excludes cover in respect of assumed contractual liabilities. A double insurance 
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clause is also incorporated in the policy excluding cover where there is other 
insurance in effect which already covers the loss. Among the excluded cover is, 
liability arising from the salvage operation, except "special compensation" which 
is paid to reward a salvor for his best endeavours to avert or minimise pollution 
damage under special agreement. Protection and indemnity policies also 
contain a clause voiding the policy in the event of a loss resulting from the 
"wilful misconduct" of the assured. In the interpretation of this exception it must 
always be remembered that the object of P & I insurance is to protect the 
assured against legal liabilities. However, the restricted interpretation of "wilful 
misconduct" and the extension of it to privity and fault may have the effect of 
depriving the assured of the cover he needs. 
The club cover is limited in respect of oil pollution liability, contrary to its 
general policy which is based on the unlimited cover. Most clubs have 
progressively increased the level of their insurance cover so as to provide 
enough protection for most pollution accidents. The ability of the P & I clubs in 
response to oil pollution liability indicates the clubs vitality and the flexibility of 
the insurance market in providing necessary protection and indemnity. On the 
, 
other hand it must be emphasised that the clubs managers are exposed to the 
increasing uncertainty surrounding the development of liability of ship owners in 
pollution cases. 
PART III. PHILOSOPHIES INHERENT IN WHO PAYS FOR POLLUTION 
LIABILITY 
Chapter 1. The polluter pays principle 
In 1972 DECO, the Council of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, adopted a recommendation on Guiding PrinCiples Concerning 
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies which included the 
polluter pays principle in relation to the allocation in the case of pollution 
damage. 1 The principle is used: 
"For allocating costs of pollution, prevention and control measures to 
encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to 
avoid distortions in international trade and investment.'1'2 
In other words, the polluter pays principle states that the polluter, who is 
responsible for an act of pollution, whether a natural or a legal person, should bear 
the expenses of preventing and controlling pollution, which are included by public 
authorities, to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. Thus, the 
polluter pays principle, as it was introduced by DECO, is not a principle of 
compensation for damage caused by pollution. It merely pays the cost of pollution 
prevention and controls measure which are determined by public authorities. This, 
of course, does not mean that the polluter cannot be held responsible for 
compensation, above the cost of controlling pollution, if a country so decides but 
the principle does not make this additional measure obligatory. 
1 OECD, The Polluter Pays Principle, Definition, Analysis, Implementation, 1975, p. 11. In 1973 EC 
Council of Minister adopted a programme of action on the environment which endorsed the "Polluter Pays· 
principle, and it later recommended that the cost of environment protection against pollution be allocated 
uniformly throughout the Community. See "Declaration on an Environmental Action Programme, 22 
November 1973". I.L.M. (1974), 164 and Council Recommendation on the application of the Polluter Pays 
Principle, 7 November 1974 ", ILM (1975), 138. Article 25 of the Single European Act has now provided a 
new legal basis for EC environmental measure: " Action by the community relating to the environment shall 
be based on the principles that prevention action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter should pay. " See Act, Cmnd 9758 (1986). In England 
the general principle is acceptable, however reference must be made to specific legislation. 
2 Para. 4, Guiding Principle Concerning the International Economic of Environmental policies, Id. 
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Under the principle, regulation and levels of compensation, or possibly a 
combination of the two, are the major instruments of action available to the public 
authorities for the avoidance of pollution. The levels of compensation have two 
functions: to encourage the reduction of pollution (an incentive function) and to 
make the polluter pay his share of collective measure and redistribution charges. 3 
The effectiveness of this principle, regarding the protection of environment, may 
become less if the polluter is allowed to pass the costs of pollution to goods and 
services which cause pollution damages. In addition, the scope of the polluter pays 
principle in practice is confined to major incidents such as collision or stranding 
because it is frequently impossible to associate pollution from low level operational 
discharges with a specific vessel, so that the liability to pay compensation will not 
necessarily influence the behaviour of individual polluters. 
The polluter is defined as "someone who directly or indirectly causes 
damage to the environment or who creates conditions leading to such damage.'14 
The clause concerning damage "directly or indirectly" poses the difficult problem of 
delimiting the damage. Pollution damage may be caused through substances 
which are directly placed at sea, i.e. intentional discharge. Indirect damage covers 
the situation where an intermediary element, such as an accident, intervenes 
between the original human act and the arrival of pollutants at sea. The phrase 
"conditions leading to such damage" enlarges the category of polluter by including 
not only those who have already caused the damage but also those who have 
created risks or possible risks of damage. Applying these terms seems to make 
complication in the application of polluter pays principle because of the 
involvement of many people as polluters. 
3 Id. 
4 Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, A COPS Report 1979, at p. 3. 
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Depending on the instrument used, the polluter would be obliged to bear (a) 
expenditure on pollution prevention and control measures, when these go beyond 
the standard laid down by the public authorities, (b) the cost to be borne by the 
polluter should include all expenditure necessary to achieve an environmental 
quality objective, including administrative costs directly linked to the 
implementation of anti-pollution measures. The costs to the public authorities of 
constructing, buying and operating pollution monitoring and supervision 
installations may be borne by public authorities.5 
The wider concept of the polluter pays principle depends on the amendment 
and improvement of the legal rules on insurance. This is done in order to make 
sure that the polluter bear all the costs of prevention and control of, and 
compensation for damage which would not be met by the application of the 
existing legal rules on third party liability or from compensation otherwise available 
under existing schemes. 6 If the insurance regulation is not changed to be 
consistent with this principle, e.g. by inserting in policies (as the term of insurance 
provided) obligatory clause requiring compliance with the rules concerning design, 
construction, fitting out and maintenance of the vessel and qualification of crew, 
and a clause which require the assured takes substantial amount of the loss, it can 
only be fulfilled partially, because the polluter merely insures against the risk and 
passes on the costs thereof to the rest of society in the price he charges for the 
services or goods he provides. Changes of an insurance pattern by insurers may 
be criticised because it is beyond the insures' duty to provide the financial cover 
for shipowners against the marine risks to which their businesses expose them. 
Though, they do impose conditions and require warranties, the motive for requiring 
5 OECD, The Polluter Pays, supra. No. 1. at p. 6. 
6 Brown, E.D. The International Protection of the Environment on a Regional Level, 1982, at p. 8. 
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their insertion in the policies of marine insurance is purely commercial. Thus, such 
changes should be done by governmental regulation. 
The OECD has endorsed the equal right of access as one means of 
implementing the "polluter pays" principle in transboundary pollution. Equal access 
entails affording equivalent treatment in the country of origin for transboundary and 
domestic victims of pollution damage. It may involve access to relevant 
information, participation in administrative hearings and legal proceedings, and the 
application of non-discriminatory standards for determining the legality of domestic 
and transboundary pollution.? From the phrase "equal access" can be construed 
that this right concerns not only the nationals of the state which is the victim of 
transfrontier pollution but also those who inhabiting in its territory, even if they 
possess another nationality. 
Equal access also requires the removal of jurisdictional obstacles to civil 
proceedings for damages and other remedies in respect of environmental injury. 
The effect of this rule is to favour interstate claims over direct access to national 
courts where the harm originates, which precludes the use of local remedies by 
individual foreign claimants. One argument against this preference is that the 
courts of the state where the harm occurs have a stronger interest in making the 
polluter pay. They are also likely to be in a better position to assess the full extent 
of any damage and to hear actions involving multiple plaintiffs.8 
? Recommendation c(74) 224, 14 November 1974; Recommendation c (76) 55, 11 May 1976; 
Recommendation c (77) 28, 17 May 1977. See in, Francesco Francioni, Tullio Scovazzii. International 
Responsibility for Environmental Harm, 1st Ed, 1991, at p. 370 
8 Thomas 0. McGarity, International Regulation of Deliberate Release of Biotechnology, at Id. p. 371. 
These considerations were decisive in detennining the allocation of jurisdiction under the 1969 CLC, Art. 
IX. See IMCO, Official Records of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 
(1969), 491 (France) and cf. the views of the USA at p.495, and its amendment proposal at p. 569; the 
amendment proposal was adopted: see 697-9. 
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Moreover, it is also apparent that equal access does not necessarily reflect 
a "polluter pays" perspective or guarantee implementation of OECD policy in that 
respect. Although it offers certain advantages over interstate proceedings, and 
reduces the jurisdictional and other procedural obstacles facing transboundary 
litigants, it will advance a "polluter pays" principle only to the extent that national 
legal systems in the place of the origin of the pollution have already adopted this 
approach to the allocation of environmental costs internally, a guarantee of 
national treatment, but no more.9 Thus "equal access" works effectively only 
between legal systems which are relatively homogeneous in their treatment of 
pollution liability or where uniform minimum principles of civil liability are 
established by agreement applicable to all states concerned. In situations where 
these factors are absent, equal access is likely to prove unproductive. 
The limited utility of equal access, as a model for loss distribution, resulted 
in the creation of a special regime of civil liability for oil pollution from ships, e.g. 
1969 CLC. The liability under 1969 CLC is limited in an amount and supported by 
compulsory insurance or security. It also excuses the shipowner from liability in 
certain circumstances. The limitation of liability and arrangements for spreading 
the burden of liability and the exemption of the owner from liability, indicate that the 
CLC does not fully implement the polluter pays principle or recognise the unlimited 
and unconditional responsibility of pollution source states. 
One of major difficulties which is associated with the polluter pays principle 
is how it can be applied where damage to natural resources is involved. Here 
there is a difficult process of quantification of damage, because there is no 
identifiable real market value. The demonstration of causal link and the 
establishment of ownership of natural resources is also problematic. The question 
9 See Thomas O. McGarity. Id. at p. 373-4. 
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was raised in the Zoe Colocotroni case,lO in which there was a claim for recovery 
of various environmental damage and clean-up costs. It was argued by the 
defendant that the State claim ing a right as public trustee, lacked sufficient 
proprietary interests in the natural resources actually damaged. The court rejected 
this argument and held that a sovereign state represents the collective interests of 
the people of its jurisdiction and holding in trust to the public property, including 
living and non-living resources and subsoil. Therefore, the State could bring legal 
actions in court to protect its property and recover damage, like any private 
landowner. 
In the process of measuring the quantum of damage to natural resources, 
several methods were considered by the court. The district court awarded 
damages based on the plaintiffs estimate of the replacement costs of the living 
organisms which had been found destroyed. It was argued by the defendant that 
the common- law diminution-in-value rule had to be applied in the calculation of 
damages. This role stipulates that damages are assessed on the basis of the 
difference in market or commercial value of the property as a result of injury, 
unless full restoration can be accomplished for a lesser amount. The Court of 
Appeal rejected this argument because it restricted recovery to the mere 
diminution of value and offered a new method for measuring natural resources 
damages. II) taking reasonable measures and prudent steps for mitigation of 
pollution damage, a sovereign state should take into consideration many factors 
including, "technical feasibility, harmful side effects, compatibility with or 
duplication of natural generation" and disproportionability of the expenses. 
What is clear from the decision of the court in the Zoe Colocotroni case is 
that a polluter is liable to pay the state which shows suffering damages for injury to 
natural resources, as a direct consequence of oil pollution provided it can be 
10 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et aI v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni et ai, 628 F. 2d (1st Cir. 1980). 
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proved that the state has suffered financial loss in the sense of a fall in the market 
value of property, and diminution of income from the exploitation of resources. If 
however, either particular natural resources are not vested in the State or they 
have no market value or income-generating value, it would appear that a claim 
would not lie against the polluter; in the first case because the State would lack a 
qualifying interest, and in the second case because no "actual damage" had been 
suffered. The fact that the marine environment has suffered physical damage and 
community has been deprived of the enjoyment of that environment would not 
appear to be relevant in law, except in jurisdictions which recognise the "right" of 
the community to a clean environment and empower the State to recover the costs 
of its restoration or replacement in the event of damage to it.ll 
Chapter 2. State liability for payment of pollution damages 
According to traditional international law principles based on the concept of 
state sovereignty, each state exercises exclusive jurisdiction within its territory. 
Pollution which take place or originates on the territory of one state and causes 
damage or infringes the sovereignty of another state, can give rise the conflicts 
between the rights of two states. Can vessels be regarded as a portion of state 
territory on a land on which it has special rights and duties? In the Buenaventura. 
The v. Ocean Trade Company, 12 the Dutch Court of Appeal at The Hague 
stated: 
" VVhatever the position may be with regard to the fiction sometimes heard that the 
ship is, as it were, a piece of sovereign territory of the flag state, such a fiction can 
at most mean that, in principle, the law of the flag state applies on board that ship, 
11 Brown, E.D., Making the Polluter Pays for Oil Pollution Damage to the Environment, A Note on The 
Zoe Colocotroni case, L.M.C.L.Q., 323 at p. 326. 
12 [1984] E.C.C. 183. 
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and in particular does not pose any obstacle to the assumption of Jurisdiction by 
the coastal state where the ship puts in. These coastal states have jurisdiction, 
once the ship enters their territory and there is a conflict in which not only the 
internal order of the ship, but also the legal order of the coastal state concerned, is 
involved". Thus, a ship bearing the national flag of a state is for purpose of 
jurisdiction and it is treated as a if it were territory of that state, since it is in 
principle as a "floating island" .13 Acceptance of the ship as a territory of flags state 
was criticised in R. v. Gordon- Finlavson. ex Pan Officer,14 in which it was 
pointed out that a ship is not part of the territory of the flag state, but jurisdiction is 
exercisable over the ship by that state in the same way as over its own territory. 
What is clear from these authorities is that if oil is discharged from a vessel and 
causes damage, it is deemed that damage has been resulted from the territory of 
a flag state. This jurisdiction is subject to restriction if the ship has voluntarily 
entered a port or offshore term inal of a state, or territory of another coastal state. 
However, while in the ports or internal waters of another state, are in great 
measures exempt from the territorial jurisdiction of another state, the warships and 
public vessels of foreign states. 15 If such vessels are used by a state for 
commercial purposes or non-governmental activities, they are within the scope of 
the local territorial jurisdiction.16 
With regard to the recognised international principle of abuse of right which 
forbids sovereignty to be used in an abusive manner, states have no right to 
13 See R. v. Anderson (1868) 2 L.R. C.C.R 161; The Lotus {1927] Pub PCIJ Series A No. 10. 
14 [1941] 1 K.B. 171. 
15 Chung Chi Cheung. v. R. [1939] AC. 160. 
16 The Philippine Admiral [1977] AC. 373. 
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cause damage to the environment outside the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. 
This concept is well explained in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration: 17 
"States have, in accordance with Charter of the United Nations and 
the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. "18 
Under this principle, states are responsible not only for their own activities, but for 
all those owners over which they exercise control, both public or private. It can be 
construed that the state should apply the same rules not only in places where they 
exercise territorial competence (within their jurisdiction), i.e. on land, but also on 
the territorial sea or everywhere they exercise "control", e.g. ships. 
There is no provision in international law which prevents one state claim ing 
reparation from another state in connection with a pollution incident once a breach 
of international obligation is shown.19 This is objective responsibility, which is 
based on a voluntary act and breach of duty which results in damage.20 The 
question which is important to consider in any particular case is whether the 
pollution incident constitutes a breach of a state's obligation concerning the 
protection and prevention of the marine environment. This was reflected in the 
Corfu Channel Case in which the I.C.J. held that a state has an obligation "Not to 
17 The principle was fonnulated at United Nation Conference on the Human Environment which met in the 
Stockholm in June 1972; see the text of the conference in the Report of the Human Environment, UN Doc. 
Al Conf. 48/14 at 265, 1972. 
18 This was restated, in the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, June 1992 Rio, in which 
it was declared, "States have a sovereign right to exploit their own resources but should not damage the 
environment or others". See Principle two Rio Declaration, Nicholas Schoan, Plan of Action Agreed but 
Who Pays, 15 June 1992, Independent p. 10. 
19 Brownlie, I. PrinCiple of Public International Law, 3rd Ed, 1979, Oxford, p. 433 
20 Various international cases support the objective test, regarding transboundary pollution. Two of them 
seem to be centred: The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.I. R, 4.; Trail Smelter case, [1941] ill 
UN.R.I.A.A. 1905. 
276 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
states" and found Albania liable to pay compensation to the U.K. for damage and 
loss of human life which resulted from the explosion in a mine in Albanian 
territory. In practice, apart from specifically contracted international obligations, 
e.g. the Outer Space Liability Convention21 , there is not general acceptance 
among states that they are responsible or liable for damage or harm caused to the 
environment of other states. 
, 
What is less clear is the exact nature and extent of states liability to 
indemnify environmental injuries suffered abroad for activities under their control 
or jurisdiction, and whether pollution damage claims should be settled between the 
government and private parties directly concerned or whether a state should be 
responsible for transfrontier pollution damage caused by private person resident 
on its territory. It also does not cover responsibility where there is a threat of 
damage. 
Under principle 21, the primary responsibility to ensure that an activity does 
not cause transnational damage is assigned to states. This suggests that if 
transnational environmental injury occurs, the injured nation is entitled to 
compensation directly from the sovereign body which has jurisdiction over the 
activity causing damage. This would be applicable even where the activity which 
has caused damage is privately owned and operated. The question arises as to 
why a state should be liable for activities which are carried out, not by themselves, 
but by private persons on their territory? The probable answer to this is that 
harmony among nations would be jeopardised if individuals were encouraged to 
request their governments to invoke international practices for transboundary 
21 See 961 UNTS, 187. 
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pollution injuries and this also would be a threat to development of public 
internationallaw.22 
In addition those multilateral treaties which channel liability to the operator 
or owner of nuclear power facilities, (nuclear vessels,) oil tankers, and off-shore oil 
and gas rigs do not constitute sufficient evidence that the principle that the state is 
ultimately accountable for private activities of subjects under its control has been 
rejected. Therefore, the issue of the potential liability of the controlling state is left 
untouched.23 
Furthermore, the national economy of the State on whose territory the 
activity takes place benefits from that activity generally, and in particular 
government through revenues. It is, therefore, equitable, to prevent unjust 
enrichment, that the benefited state compensates damage in another state 
caused by an activity, under its control, in another state. A state's international 
accountability also makes sense in view of the possibility that the private persons' 
assets or other potential financial resources might not be sufficient to cover the full 
costs of the transnational pollution damage. This argument suggests that those 
private persons who are economically the primary beneficiaries of the activity 
should carry the primary burden of eventual liability in form of civil liability and state 
liability should be subsidiary. 
States' accountability for damage caused by private persons may be 
criticised on the grounds that in certain circumstances the element of control or 
22 It is a well established principle of intemationallaw that the liability a state may incur for the acts of 
private person is a function of that state's control over the activities concerned. See. Goother HamIl, State 
Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private persons, 1980, The American 
Journal of International Law, 525, at p. 527 
23 Certain treaties have both weakened and strengthened the state control position over the private activities 
subjects. e.g. Article ill of the 1962 Draft Convention on the Liability for Operator of Nuclear Ships, 
reprinted in 57 AJlL 268-270, 1962. Article VII of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage, reprinted in 21 I.L.M., 727,737, 1963 
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authorisation may be so attenuated as to no longer provide a reasonable basis for 
holding the state liable. This would be the case, where owing to circumstances 
beyond its control, the State exercises merely nominal, rather than effective control 
over the activity, e.g., state control over a ship which is flying a flag of convenience 
or where the ship is sailing far from a state's territorial sea or in a war zone. 
Similarly, holding the state accountable would be without merit where initial state 
authorisation of the activity be deemed unrelated to the eventual risk created by a 
private person and the state could not have reasonably expected to extend its 
control to the place of subsequent risk creation. 
3.2.1. The impacts of "Trail Smelter Arbitration" on states environmental 
obligations. 
Owing to the need for effectiveness, intemational practice including that of 
states, shifted the legal level at which the problems of compensation for 
environmental damage was to be solved. Since the traditional rules goveming 
inter-state responsibility were not really helpful (as a matter of fact there was no 
serious attempt to apply them in this field,) the Trail Smelter Arbitration in 1914,24 
provided a practical solution to help the victim to obtain compensation for damage 
resulting from activities taking place in foreign country. 
In the Trail Smelter Arbitration the United States sought damages caused to 
the State of Washington by fumes originating from a privately owned Smelter 
located in British Colombia. This Arbitration formulated a rule that under the 
principles of Intemational Law, as well as the law of the United States: 
"No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another 
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
24 [1941] ill U.N.R.I.AA atp. 1938. 
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consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence".25 
There is a similarity between the principle laid down in the Tail Smelter 
Arbitration and the Scots law principle of aemulatio vicini, i.e. malevolence towards 
one's neighbour, whereby a landowner is in principle entitled to use his land for his 
own purposes and to serve his own interests but he must not use it for a malicious 
or unsocial purpose. Malice or spite is always required.26 This is based on the view 
that although there is individual freedom in a society, law should impose some 
reasonable restraint on selfishness. 
The implication of the Trail Smelter rule is that if such a right does not exist, 
the conduct is unlawful and causes state responsibility for the results. The tribunal 
also declared that "a state owes at all times a duty to protect other states against 
injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction". This rule does not explicitly 
state that there is a duty on the state to compensate environmental damage.v 
However, the facts of the case suggest that once a transnational environmental 
injury has occurred, there is also a duty on the part of the polluting state to pay 
compensation for pollution damage.28 The tribunal held that Canada was 
responsible under international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter: 
"it is therefore the duty of the Government of the Dominion of 
Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the 
obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein 
determ ined."29 
25 Id. at p. 1965. 
26 See in deatils, William M. Gordon, Scottish Land Law, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd., 1989. 
27 The issue of state responsibility, in Trail Smelter, stemmed from that the subject matter of dispute 
ostensibly involving claims by individuals in the United States against a private Canadian Corporation. 
28 William Hancok & Robert N Stone, Liability for Transnational Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig 
Blowouts, 1982, Hastings International and Comparative Law, 377 at p. 378. 
29 The Trail Smelter, at pp. 1965-66. 
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The effectiveness of Trail Smelter concept, as a principle whereby sea 
polluters should be obliged to pay compensation to their victims, is in some doubt. 
JP. Grant and OJ. Cusine said: 30 
"It is open to doubt how wide the ratio of the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
can be extended. On a narrow construction, it might be applicable to 
nothing more than damage caused in one state by activities carried 
out in another State. On a broad construction, it might be applicable 
to any damage caused to State or its nationals by a vessel subject to 
the jurisdiction of another State. It is, of course, only on this latter 
construction that the case is relevant to the question of pollution of 
the sea by oil. '131 
It is argued that a broad construction of the ratio in the case is more in 
accordance with the nature of international customary law which is thought to 
establish broad principles of general application, rather than detailed rules to be 
followed in every particular case. The broad construction of the case was 
supported by the decision of the International Court of Justice, LC.J., in the Corfu 
Channel Case in which the court recognised, "every State's obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States". 32 It 
can be concluded that the territory, in this definition, can be extended to the ships 
, 
which carry the particular State s flag. 
The ratio of the Trail Smelter does not give a clear direction to ensure 
reparation of damage actually suffered. The Tribunal only asserted a general duty 
on the part of a state to protect other states from injurious acts by individuals, 
whether natural or legal within its jurisdiction. Difficulty may arise when it comes to 
determining what constitutes an injurious act. It seems, with regard to the polluter 
pays principle, that the polluter should be made liable for compensation to the 
30 For the legal framework, see The Impact of Marine Pol/ution, eels. DJ. Cosine and JP. Grant, 1980, p. 31. 
31 See also, Brownlie, I., Principle of Public International Law, 3rd ed., 1979, p. 285, in which he did not 
extend the value of case to oil pollution from ships. 
32 The Corfu Channel Case, supra. No. 18, p. 22. 
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victims for all damage sustained as a result of an operation. Thus, the costs to be 
borne by the polluter should include all expenditure necessary to achieve an 
environmental quality objective, including the administration costs directly linked to 
the implementation of anti-pollution measures, i.e. the cost of preventing and 
elim inating of pollution. 
There is also no rule in the case to ensure that the polluter must pay the 
cost of prevention, control and compensation for damage. To achieve this 
objective, it may be of interest to determine how the legal rules on insurance 
guarantee that the polluter must pay all the cost of prevention, control and 
compensation for damage. This approach may be criticised in that it would be 
unrealistic to expect the insurance industry to adopt a regulatory role by inserting 
and enforcing additional conditions to reduce pollution through the application of 
the polluter pays principle. If such a principle is thought to be desirable, it must be 
primarily designed by and be the responsibility of the Government. 
Chapter 3. Owner pays principle 
The usual rule in transport cases puts liability on the carrier. 33 Imposing 
liability on the operator other than the carrier is an exception to this general rule. 34 
In most conventions, transfer of the loss resulting from oil pollution has been 
based on the particular social and economic condition of the person or persons at 
the time of incident. In this case, it may be questioned why the carrier should 
bear the liability of loss. This question may be justified when it is realised that 
33 Carrier is defined "any person by whom or in his name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been 
concluded with a shipper". See the Hamburg Rules, United Nation Convention on the carriage of Goods by 
sea, 1971 Art. 1; carrier includes "the owner or the charterer who enter into a contract of carriage with 
shipper". Art. 1 (a), The Hague Rule as amended by the Brussels protocol 1969. 
34 e.g. Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operator of Nuclear Installation 1962, channelled liability to 
operator of nuclear installation, see text of the Convention in 57 A.J.I.L., [1963] p. 268. 
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channelling liability to the carrier may offer a limited but direct incentive for the 
carrier to adopt the most efficient scheme for preventing and cleaning up the oil 
spills, because of his ability to pass liability to the insurers and consumers.35 
The assignment of liability for a major oil spill to the ship owner could be 
done in such a way as to leave open the option of how this liability should be borne 
to the shipowner. He will then have a direct incentive to choose the most cost 
effective method of pollution control in the case of an oil spill. In a broad sense, 
this method could range from spending resources to building safer vessels and 
ultimately to payment of damages once spills have occurred. 36 
3.3.1. Common law and owner pays principle 
In Anglo-American Common Law, those who have committed negligence 
are responsible of payment for damage which has been caused by their wrongful 
conduct. Thus, under the Common Law, the pollution victims who suffer damage, 
cannot establish a valid claim merely by showing that the defendant owned the 
ship which caused the damage. In River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson,37 
the court expressly said that an owner incurs no liability simply because of that 
ownership. However, it was accepted that the fact of ownership of property is 
prima facie evidence that at the time of the damage it was the negligent owner or 
his servant or agent who caused the damage and therefore there is liability for 
compensation. 38 The owner can only escape the liability if able to show that the 
damage was caused by the negligence of a person for whom he is not vicariously 
35 Philip A, Cummins, Denies E. Logue, Robert D. Tollisin, and Thomas D. Willett, Oil Tanker Pollution 
Control, DeSign Criteria. v. Effective Liability Assessment, 1975, lMar.Law & Comm. 169, at p. 175. 
36 Id. 
37 (1877) 1 App. Cas. 743. 
38 Barnard v. Sully (1931) 47 T.L.R 557. 
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liable. This view is supported by the decision of Samson v. Aitchison,39 in which 
Lord Aitkinson said,4O "I think that where the owner of an equipage whether a 
carriage and horses or a motor, is riding in it while it is being driven, and has thus 
not only the right to possession, but the actual possession of it, he necessarily 
retain the power and the right of controlling the manner in which it is to be driven, 
unless he has in some way contracted himself out of his right or is shown by 
conclusive evidence to have in some way abandoned his right." Therefore, the 
party who exercises complete control over the operation, maintenance, repair, and 
training of the crew has a duty to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy. If he 
performs his duty negligently or has knowledge that the vessel is unseaworthy he 
may be liable for any pollution which results from such a negligent act,41 even if he 
is not the true author of the accident which caused the pollution. 
In the case of multiple causes of damage, a" who are involved are 
accountable. 42 The lesser responsibility of one wrongdoer may not reduce the 
amount of his liability to the victims, as against his fellow wrongdoers, unless his 
conduct was not a substantial enough factor to be causative. This is why, where 
an injury was caused by conduct of two or more people acting in breach of their 
duty of care, and where there is no way of ascertaining the tortfeasor, the court 
held that a" were jointly and severally liable.43 
39 [1912] AC. 844. 
40 Id. at p. 849. 
41 The Amoco Cadiz, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304 at p. 337. 
42 Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd. v. British Celanese Ltd. and Others, [1952] 1 
All E.R. 1326. 
43 Summers. v. Tico, 33 cal2d, 80, 199 p, 2 d1, 1948. 
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3.3.2. The CLC and owner pays principle 
The main aim of the Convention was to safeguard the interest of the victims 
of pollution and to reduce oil pollution. To achieve this, it would be in the interests 
of the victims that the party liable is someone most easily identifiable by the victims 
and most likely to be able to provide adequate financial guarantees.44 It should 
also recognise who would be more able to take effective measures to prevent or 
minimise pollution.45 
Under CLC, liability for pollution damage is assigned, in order to obtain 
foregoing aims, exclusively to the ship owne~ because it is to identify and locate 
him.47 The other rationale for such strict Channelling of liability could be that it 
would eliminate completely the need for a person other than the ship owner to be 
insured against claims for pollution damage. 
Channelling liability for compensation exclusively to the owner may cause 
problems if a change of ownership takes place during the currency of an insurance 
policy. If the pollution damage is to be continuously covered by the insurer, the 
new owner would have to take insurance cover immediately he came into 
ownership of the vessel. This might create administrative difficulties, in particular 
when the change of ownership takes place while the vessel is at sea. Taking new 
insurance cover could take considerable time. If any accident happens during this 
44 Mr. Mennies, Australia delegation, LEG/ConflC. 2/SR.31 13 Nov. 1969. 
45 Mr. Newman, U.S.A delegation, Id. 
46 Art. 1(3), 1969 CLC, defined owner as "the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in 
the absence of registration, the person or persons owing the ship. However in the case of a ship owned by a 
state and operated by a company which in that state is registered as the ship's operator, owner shall mean 
such a company". 
47 Spanish delegation view regarding Draft Article of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, see in 
Official Records of the International Legal Conference on marine pollution damage, 1969, published by 
IMO 1973, at p. 462 
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period, the victim of pollution is left without any insurance to cover the loss. This 
problem may be solved if the insurer is forced to continue cover until, within a 
specified time, a new owner takes insurance cover. 
The freight may substantially increase when the cost of pollution damage is 
only channelled to owners. The owner may complain that in a difficult freight 
market, extra costs of this sort are hard to pass on. He may also say that it is not 
fair to take liability on his shoulders where a time charterer is himself liable for 
incident. This can be clearly shown where the time charterer sends a vessel to an 
unsafe port and damage is caused as a result, for which the charterer must 
indemnify the shipowner.48 
Under the CLC, claims against the owner are limited to pollution damage in 
accordance with the Convention.49 Therefore, if the damage which is suffered is 
pollution damage but does not attract the rule of liability because one of the 
specific exemptions in the Convention, there is no remedy against the owner under 
the general principles of law, such as common law or civil code. As a result it can 
be said that the owner pays prinCiple is not absolute, and the owner only pays 
compensation to those who have suffered pollution damage under the Convention. 
No claim for pollution damage would be made against the servants or 
agents of the owner.50 Of course this does not mean that the ship's agent could 
not be required to give a contractual indemnity in respect of any pollution damage, 
nor does it mean that the registered owner cannot take an indemnity from servants 
48 Grace (GW) & Co Ltd. v. General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1950] 2 K.B. 383; Kodross Shipping 
COIpn, v. Empresa Cubana de' Flets, The Evia (No.2); See also The Po1yglory [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 353, 
where one of the vessel's anchors dragged and fouled the under water pipeline. The charterers were held in 
breach on the ground that something more than ordinary prudence and skill was required by master and 
crews in order to avoid the danger. 
49 Art. lli(4). 
50 Id. The 1984, as adopted by 1992, Protocol to the CLC more clarified the servant and agents and 
extended protection to other people such as pilot any member other than the crew, charterer, salvors ... , see 
Art. lli(4). 
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or agents if the damage results from their personal intentional act or omission. The 
question of exactly who is a servant or agent is not defined in the Convention and 
is, therefore left to national law. 
In order to identify a servant, for whose wrong the owner is vicariously 
liable, a distinction should be made between the contract of a service and the 
contract for services. An employee is part of the team formed by the business 
work-force and the job he does is an integral part of the business operation. 
Under a contract for services the person supplying them is merely an accessory. 
Mackenna J. examined the question in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) 
Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions & National Insurance,sl and said "A contract of 
service exists if the following three conditions are fulfilled: (I) The servant agrees 
that in consideration of a wage or other remuneration he will provide his own work 
and skill in performance of some service for his master, (ii) He agrees, expressly 
or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the 
other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master, (iii) The other 
provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service." Thus 
if a contract of service does not have such characters- existence of consideration, 
sufficient degree of control , consistency in the provisions of contract, it is not a 
contract of service and the person doing the work will not be a servant. 
Many shipping firms may not need an expensive item of equipment or 
certain services in their day to day operation to justify the permanent purchase, 
so they tend to hire from a specialist concern that lends equipment or services. 
Invariably such transactions are on the basis that the borrower not only takes 
temporary loan of the equipment or services, but also with it, the employee who 
operates that particular equipment or services. So such an operator, whilst 
51 [1968] I All E.R 433. at pp. 439-40. 
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remaining in the general employment of the firm which hired the equipment or 
services spends a lot of time away from his employer, working temporarily under 
the direction of the shipping firm which becomes for a few days or weeks 
something like a temporary employer. Suppose a situation arises where an 
operator who causes damage through his own fault, who is responsible 
vicariously for the consequences? Is it the general employer who probably pays 
the man's wage and retains the right to dismiss and control him; or the employer 
shipowner, who had been directing his activities whilst the hired equipment or 
services was being used for his work? The answer to this question depends on 
the terms of contract which regulate liability between the general and temporary 
employer. In the absence of such specific terms, Lord Porter in the House of 
Lords52 said "Many factors have a bearing on the result. Who is paymaster, who 
can dismiss, how long the alternative service lasts, what machinery is employed -
all these questions have to be kept in mind ... Among the many tests suggested I 
think that the most satisfactory by which to ascertain who is the employer at any 
particular time is to ask who is entitled to tell the employee the way in which he is 
to do the work upon which he is engaged". 53 
The above situation may be applied, by analogy, to the agents and owner, 
as a principal relationship. Thus an owner is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts 
or omissions of his agents, provided of course that they arise in the commission of 
the duties being undertaken for the owner, under the special contract. Mere 
permission from the owner for a friend or relative to use a ship for his own purpose 
does not create a principal agent situation. The point was considered by the House 
52 Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (LiveIpool) Ltd and McFarlane. [1946] 2 All E.R 
345. atp.351. 
S3 See also Denning L.J. in Penham v. Midland Employers Mutual Association Ltd. [1955] 2 All E.R. 561 
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of Lords in the Morgan v. Launchbury,54 in which Lord Wilberforce pointed out 
that on an established common law rule, the owner need not pay if he has no 
control over the actor, has not authorised or requested the act, or if the actor is 
acting wholly for his own purpose. 
Interpreting the CLC in the light of legislative history, the court55 found in the 
Amoco Cadiz case,56 that the term mandataries and preposes ("agents and 
servants") were intended by drafters "to refer to and immunise the master and 
crew of a vessel, individuals who would be unable to bear the financial expenses 
of liability and whom it would therefore be futile and unfair to sue." That is, the 
terms were not intended to immunise the master and crew of major shipping 
companies, who are able to afford the financial expenses, from suit. The court also 
found that the consulting agreement between parent company and registered 
owner does not purport to create the relation of principal-agent, but that of owner-
independent contractor. Furthermore, the registered owner is not a parent 
company agent where it does not and cannot exercise any direction or control over 
the operation of parent company.57 
The owners pays principle does not, under the CLC, extend to a state-
owned ship, "warship or other ships owned or operated by a state and used, for 
the time being, only on Governmental non-commercial service."58 This exclusion is 
consistent with the general public international doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
54 [ 1972] 2 All E.R 606. 
55 United States District Court fro the Northern District of illinois. 
56 [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 304 atp. 337. 
57 Since the United States had not signed the CLC, therefor its court's interpretation cannot have too much 
legal effects where the CLC is applied, but it still can be regarded as a good guide in the interpretation of 
"servant or agent" under the CLC. 
58 Art. XJ(l). 
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with the role which states have seen for themselves in the regulation of oil 
pollution. The exemption may also be justified with the view that lack of such an 
exemption may drag the state into court against its will, so that in practice a 
limitation fund would have to be established. If the right to limit was denied claims 
would be paid in full. However, in the case of commercial activity there is no 
immunity for a state-owner's claim in connection with a ship if, when a cause of 
action arises, the ship is used for a commercial purpose. Such exemption may 
also be well justified when it is realised that the insurer is usually reluctant to 
compensate governments for the use of ships and men ordinarily engaged in a 
state service. The Marine Insurance Act 190659 provides that a policy "on goods", 
means only such goods as are merchantable. It can be construed that as property, 
ships must be merchantable, i.e. a ship is put to sea for the purpose of 
commerce. 60 Hence, if the ship is used for state service, not commercial service, it 
is not covered by a general policy on the ship. 
Article IV of 1969 CLC provides "when oil has escaped or has been 
discharged from two or more ships, and pollution damage results, therefore, the 
owner of all ships concerned, unless exonerated under the Article III, shall be 
jointly and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable." 
The situation clearly envisaged by the Article is where two or more tankers collide 
and their cargoes spill into one slick, which causes pollution damage which is not 
separable. This is identical to the common law and Admiralty rule in collision cases 
where vessel C is damaged by a collision between vessel A and B for which they 
are both to blame. Therefore, pollution victims can recover damage in full from 
either of the tanker owners who are to blame, on the basis of single liability for 
59 Sched. I. r. 17. 
60 So stated by underwriters in Ross v. Thulaites, before Lord Mansfield [1776] 1 Park. 23, 24; so defined 
by Best c.J. in Brown v. Stapyleton [1827] 4 Bing. 119 at 12l. 
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single injury. This rule will not be applied where pollution damage caused by 
several owners is reasonably separable. In such a case each owner is held 
separately liable. 61 
Joint and several liability is applied where oil has escaped or has been 
discharged from two or more "ships". Ship is defined as a vessel carrying oil in 
bulk as cargo. Thus, the Article does not apply where a laden tanker and dry cargo 
vessel collide and oil spills from both of them, since oil has not escaped from "two 
or more ships", as defined in the convention. It is also noted that the Article does 
not apply where oil is discharged from one vessel which is owned by different 
persons, because the Article only applies where "two or more" ships are involved. 
Similarly, the Article does not apply where charterers or salvors are jointly or 
severally to blame for pollution damage because it applies only to "the owners of 
all ships concerned" and they are not regarded as "owners" liable under the 
Convention. 
It may be argued that, since tanker industries are mostly an offshoot of the 
oil industry and will pass any increases in insurance costs to that industry, it would 
also be more logical to channel liability to the oil companies as owners, whether or 
not they actually control the tanker operation. It would also be in the interests of 
the victims of oil pollution to recover damage by taking action against one of the 
major oil companies rather than against a tanker owner who is likely to use every 
device of company law and shipping registration to escape liability.62 
It may also be said that it would be reasonable to make the operator of a 
tanker liable rather than the ship owner because firstly, the burden of liability 
61 See Perfonnance Cars Ltd v. Abraham [1962] 1 Q.B. 33; Bakerv. Willoughly [1970] AC. 467. 
62 As it was viewed by, G.W. Ketoon, The Lesson of the Torrey Canyon, English Law Aspects, Current 
Legal Problems,( 1968) vol. 21, pp. 109-110 
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should induce a person to take all measures to prevent oil pollution and to 
minimise a loss when that has occurred. Such measures can only be taken by an 
operator, as the person exercising control of the operation and management of the 
ship. Thus where a ship is under a demise charter, the charterer (as owner of pro 
hac vice)63 is in actual control of the ship on a particular voyage or at specified 
time, and the owner has no control over the operation and management of the 
ship. This difference may raise the question of which of the ship owners, 
charterers or their agents, would be liable to persons who are strangers to the 
contract as for instance in the case of damage which may be caused by improper 
navigation of the ship.M Secondly, a condition for providing insurance liability for 
pollution damage will depend on circumstances arising during the operation of the 
ship. In consequence, the owner who does not operate the ship will not be in a 
position to provide proper insurance of liability.6S 
Imposing liability on the operator may be criticised, because it may not safeguard 
the interest of the victims in certain cases, for instance, in the case of a time 
charterer who controls the commercial function of the vessel and would normally 
be responsible for the resultant expenses of such activities to the ship owner. 66 ln 
addition, since the operational contract is one between the operator and owner, 
the former may not be identifiable by third parties. 
63 An owner pro hac vice is not true owner of the vessel, but rather than one who has entered a demise 
charter under which owner surrenders all control of ship. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, ss. 
4-23. 
M Colinvaux. R.(editors), Carvers's Carriage by Sea, 13 ed, v. 1, London, Stevenson & Sons, 1982. pp. 
582-588. it was also viewed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic delegation, LEG/Conf!4/Add. 1, 7 
Oct. 1969 
6S See the view of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic delegation, Id. 
66 Swedish Delegation views in, LEG/Conf. 4/Add-2, 31 Oct. 1969. 
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3.3.3. TOVALOP and the owner pays principle 
Under TOVALOP, liability is assigned to the participating Tanker Owners 
which includes Bareboat Charterers, as a pro hac owner. 07 The owner has been 
defined as the person or persons registered as the owner, or in the absence of 
registration, the person or persons owning the tanker, except that in the case of 
state-owned ships operated by a company registered as the operator. In this case 
the operator is deemed the owner for the purposes of the Agreement. 68 It seems 
that the phrase "registered as the owner of the ship", is of no value since the 
ownership is usually established by its "registry". However, it is necessary to make 
a distinction between the "operator" and the owner which might not always be the 
same person. The concept of "operator" basically covers the bareboat charterer, 
the case where the management of the ship at sea has been assigned to 
charterer. Thus time or voyage charterers should be excluded because in both 
these instances, the shipowner ensures the management of the ship at sea with 
his crew, and therefore the registered owner remains responsible. 
The extension of TOVALOP cover to bareboat charterers does not mean 
that there is two voluntary payment where tanker is subject to a charter, because 
there cannot be two claims in respect of one loss. Thus, unless otherwise agreed 
in writing, "any payment made by the owner to a person constitutes full settlement 
of all that person's claim against the owner, the tanker involved, its charterer, their 
officers, agents, employees and underwriters. "69 However, it is not clear that if a 
claimant accept a TOVALOP offer from the bareboat charterer can sue the 
registered owner under national legislation. 
07 Clause I(c) and Clause VIll(e). 
68 Clause 1 (c). 
69 Clause VIll(e) and (k). 
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3.3.4. HNS Draft and the owner pays principle 
It was strongly believed that, under HNS, only ship owners should be liable 
either because this solution was the most easily justifiable in terms of other liability 
instruments, or because of practical considerations. 70 In addition, shippers' 
interests argued that the majority of incidents which would give rise to liability 
under the Convention arise not from the inherent characteristics of the cargo, but 
from some action or omission on the part of the ship and, therefore, in most cases 
the ship owner was to blame and should carry the liability.71 
It may be argued that the ship owner does not bear the substantive risk of 
civil liability since he, even when his liability is strict, may exclude his liability if he 
proves that the damage resulted from an act of war, natural phenomena of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or the negligence or other 
wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance 
of lights or other navigation aids in the exercise of that function.n 
Chapter 4. The shipper pays principle 
There is an opinion that the financial protection against pollution would be 
most suitably established by imposing the financial obligation not only on the 
shipowner but also on the cargo interest, the shipper, itself. This idea is supported 
by the view that maritime transport is not dangerous in itself. It becomes 
dangerous when the ship carries dangerous goods.73 Therefore, it would be logical 
70 British Maritime Law Association view in, Conference of the committee' Maritime International, 
Montreal May 1981, HNS, atp. 6. 
71 Id. at p. 7. 
n See Tiberg, H., Oil Pollution of the Sea and the Swedish Tsesis Decision, 1984, L.M.C.L.Q, 212. 
73 Two alternative approaches to the concept of dangerous goods are possible: a traditional view might 
regard dangerous goods as a category the extent of which is to be developed by precedent or statutory 
regulation, see Regulation 1 (2) of the Merchant Shipping Dangerous Goods, Regulation 1981; The court has 
viewed in wider terms to embrace cases in which the danger is to be found in the surrounding circumstances 
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for the party with the cargo interest to accept the risk, or at least part of it. 74 It may 
also be justifiable that the party with the cargo interest takes on his shoulders 
pollution damage because he is better able to establish funds and provide more 
protection for victims of pollution damage.7s 
It may be argued that it would be difficult to identify cargo interests since 
they include a variety of people, such as shipper, a receiver, and owner for the 
duration the cargo. The liability cannot be placed on the owner because 
ownership could change during the voyage and therefore there would be no 
degree of certainty regarding the owner. The same reason could be applied to the 
receiver. 76 It would also be optimistic to assume that cargo owners would agree to 
set up a joint fund for payment of damage, since their interests are different. 
The proposal to impose liability for payment on the cargo interest may give 
rise to a further objection. Although a shipper may not change during the voyage 
and be a factor known to owner and even to the victims, nevertheless a shipper 
can not exercise any control over the ship while it is on the high seas. On the other 
hand, if the shipper, as a cargo interest, accepts liability the ship owner would 
have no incentive to take the necessary safety measures.77 
The view that liability should be passed to the person named in the bill of 
lading may also provide some problems because the shipper with whom the main 
rather than in inherent damage of goods itself. It was said that, while it may be thought inaccurate to 
categorise some liquid, which is carried in bulk, as inherently dangerous, it may be nevertheless create 
problems if permitted to leak from their containers and create pollution damage, see Sellers in MinistIy of 
Food. v. Lamport & Holt [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 371 at p. 382. 
74 Mr, Philip, Denmarlc Delegation, LEG/ConflC.2/SR. 3 Nov. 1969. 
75 Irish Delegation, IMCO, LEG/Confl4/Add. 4,12 Nov. 1969. 
76 As it was said by, Mr. Mc Govern, Irish delegation, LEG/Conf., C.21WP.l.Rev, LEG/Confl4/Add. 4, 
1969. 
77 Mr. Norden, Swedish delegation, LEG/Confl C.2/SR.7, 13 Nov. 1969. 
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responsibility rests might belong to a country which did not subscribe to the 
convention and therefore, it would be difficult to obtain desired compensation. 
3.4.1. Under CRISTAL 
CRISTAL is the oil cargo interest's voluntary response to the recognition 
that in some cases persons sustaining pollution damage would not be able to 
recover adequate compensation under existing legal and other regimes, including 
CLC and TOVALOP.78 Under CRISTAL, in the first instance the claimant must 
seek recovery from the owner of the tanker involved in the incident up to the limit 
stated in the supplement to TOVALOP. If the recovery from the tanker owner and, 
where applicable, the fund is insufficient, further recovery must first be sought by 
the claimant from any other source.79 Compensation is provided within defined 
limits by a fund administered by an instituteroset up under the CRISTAL 
agreement, and contributed to by the oil companies party to it, through raising a 
levy based on the receipts from the crude and fuel oil. 81 
3.4.2. Under lope Fund 
The Fund Convention seeks to find a solution to distribute the cost of oil 
pollution damage by involving the industries which bring petroleum products to the 
market. The main function of the IOPC Fund is to provide supplementary 
compensation to those who cannot get full compensation for oil pollution damage 
78 Preamble to Contract Regarding A Supplement to Liability for Oil Pollution, see in Memorandum of 
Explanation of the Contract Regarding to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, revised February 20 1989 
79 Id. 
ro The Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution Compensation Limited, a company incorporated in 
Bermuda 
81 Clause VIII(2). 
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under CLC, and to indemnify the ship owner for the portion of his liability under 
CLC.~ 
To provide a more equitable distribution of cost, the IOPC Fund is financed 
by a contribution paid by any person who receives more than 150,000 tonnes of 
crude oil or heavy fuel oil, in a contracting state after carriage by sea in the 
relevant calendar yearn. In fact the burden of payment falls disproportionately on 
the oil industry and consumer in those states. 
3.4.3. Under HNS Draft Convention 
There is a general feeling that risks inherent in the HNS do not arise only 
from carriage but are also inherent in the substances themselves and substandard 
shipping, as distinct from transportation, such as unsafe packing standards, 
inadequate or inexact dangerous goods declarations. As a general principle of law, 
in the common law and certain statute law,84 the shipper of goods impliedly 
undertakes, an absolute warranty, to ship no goods of such a dangerous character 
or so dangerously packed85 that the ship owner or his agent could not by 
reasonable knowledge and diligence be aware of their dangerous character;86 and 
he is therefore liable to any other person who is injured by the shipment of such 
~ 1971 Fund Convention, Art. 2.l. 
83 Id. Art. 1O.l. 
84 See Merchant Shipping Act 1894 ss. 446-450; The Nuclear Installations Act 1965 imposes strict 
liabilities in relation to accidents occurring during the carriage of nuclear or radioactive matter in certain 
specified circumstances; Rule 6 of Art. IV in Scheduke to the Caniage of Goods by Sea Act, as adopted by 
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 also deals with dangerous goods. See Art iv Rule 6. 
85 See Sir Alan Abraham Mocatta. Michael 1. Mstill. Stewart C. Boyd, Scrutton on Charter parties and Bills 
of Lading, 18 ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, at pp. IlO-I02, Chandris v. Isbrandtsen- Moller [1951] 
1 K.B. 240. 
86 See Atkin 1. in Mitchel, Cotts v. Steel [1916] 2 K.B. 610 at p. 614. 
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dangerous goods without notice87 • Therefore, there was considerable support for 
shippers only liability as is provided for maritime carriage of nuclear substances. 88 
Ship owning interests believe that the demand for higher compensation in 
respect of HNS does not derive from any view that the ship owners concerned are 
negligent, but from the potential of those substances to cause catastrophic 
damage substantially higher than limits available in the 1976 Limitation 
Convention. They concluded, therefore, that shippers should bear part of the 
liability involved in the carriage of dangerous cargoes. 89 Goods may be dangerous 
within this principle if owing to legal obstacles as to their carriage or discharge they 
may involve detention of the ship.90 Thus a shipment of goods which renders the 
voyage illegal, or which might involve the ship in danger or forfeiture or delay is 
precisely analogous to the shipment of a dangerous cargo which might cause the 
destruction of the ship. 
A significant majority of states in the IMO Legal Conference voted for a two-
tier system of compensation whereby the primary compensation would be 
channelled to the ship owner, and the excess compensation placed on the cargo in 
order to provide sufficient compensation for victims of any incident91 . 
87 The liability of the shipper and ship owner, where dangerous goods are shipped, were much elaborated in 
Brass v. Maitland [1856] 26 L.J.Q.B. 49. 
88 The 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. 1971 Brussels Convention Relating 
to Chi! Liability in the fuel or Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material which extended the liability of 
operator of nuclear installation to damage caused by nuclear incident during the transportation of nuclear 
substances by sea. 
89 British Maritime Law Association, supra. No. 67, atp. 6-7. 
90 Mitchell v. Steel [1916] 2 KB. 610. 
91 LEG XXXIV, para. 22/49 and 61. 
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3.5. Concluding remarks 
There are, as was explained, several ways to assign and apportion 
responsibility for harm to the marine environment because of pollution incidents at 
sea. It is generally believed that all businesses, governments, insurance industries 
and the public must join together to fight pollution and to pay related costs. 
The "polluter pays principle" was introduced in order to ensure more 
effective protection of the marine environment and to encourage a higher standard 
of care. It also served to provide sufficient insurance to cover the potential costs of 
any spill. There is some anxiety in the application of the principle to the damage 
caused by pollution, in particular damage done to the marine environment and its 
natural resources which do not have a ready market value. It is also fair to say that 
the merits of the principle are in serious doubt when it comes to enforcement. 
Equal access principle is too uncertain in its operation to guarantee full 
compensation and to ensure the implementation of the pollution pays principle 
unless such a principle is adopted by the relevant national legislation. Although the 
principle reflects a laudable aim, there are doubts about its application in practice. 
Even where the polluter is successfully identified and required to pay, he is often 
merely the initial, rather than the ultimate payer. For example, where the polluter is 
a government body, payment by it usually results in additional charge on the 
general taxpayer; and where the polluter is a commercial entity, it can often pass 
on a remedial cost to its customers in the form of increased prices. 
The question of state responsibility for harm to the marine environment 
takes two forms: (I) responsibility for ensuring that activities which are about to 
take place do not cause harm to the marine environment, i.e. preventive role, (2) 
responsibility after the pollution accident has happened. To implement its first duty, 
states must attempt, through international, regional, and universal co-operation, to 
avoid damage to the marine environment while enhancing the quality of the marine 
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environment. The question of state responsibility as to payment of compensation 
to the victims, after a pollution incident has happened, is a difficult one which 
needs further consideration. Generally speaking, international law and practice has 
not received any general principle capable of clearly defining an obligation which 
rests upon states to compensate any other state in respect of oil pollution. 
Consequently, it is only in the rare case that a state finds itself liable in 
international law. Thus, the risk of accidental pollution at sea is usually carried by 
private parties whose liabilities are regulated through specific private law 
conventions. Nevertheless, states can playa crucial role regarding compensation 
within the framework of international conventions. 
Most conventions, agreements and regulations regarding pollution liability 
have assigned liability to the owner, because that is the most expeditious way for a 
victim to obtain compensation. However, liability does not attach to the owner in a 
number of specified instances. Therefore, in some cases the victims bear the cost 
of pollution damage. The complications surrounding ownership and operation of 
tankers have demonstrated the difficulty confronting claimants in pressing their 
claims against charterers, and operators of ships. This inadequacy can be 
remedied by placing liability, by convention or agreement, upon the parties, who 
are in the position to take significant precautions to prevent or reduce the pollution 
damage, other than the shipowner. Although assigning liability and payment of 
pollution damage to the shipper, as cargo interest, may make identifying the 
responsible party easy where one party owns the cargo, it may not provide 
sufficient compensation for victims, in particular in catastrophic cases. The 
establishment of a fund which is financed by the cargo interest would be the most 
appropriate solution for providing sufficient financial support for victims of pollution. 
It is also pointed out that the owner or shipper pays principle, in spite of 
success in many cases, does not offer a complete solution which covers all 
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aspects of pollution damage, due to exceptions and financial limits. Thus, attention 
should be devoted to establishing a state-funded compensation regime in order to 
cover pollution damage at a level above the Conventions, the CLC and FC. The 
impact of this scheme would be to spread the cost of serious accidents equitably 
across the community as a whole and provide sufficient means to compensate all 
pollution victims. 
PART IV. THE EXTENT AND QUANTUM OF LIABILITY 
Chapter 1. Extent of limit 
4.1.1. Introduction: The importance of limitation for marine pollution 
Limitation of the liability of shipowners for losses or damages in connection 
with the operation of ships has long been a tradition in international maritime 
law. I The limitation of shipowners' liability, as an exception to the principle of full 
liability, e.g. in common law, has been justified as a commercially practical device 
by which the effects of maritime disaster can be reasonably apportioned and as a 
means to encourage the investment of risk capital in maritime adventure. 
Availability of the right to limit is more important for a shipowner as the impact and 
range of their potential liability expands, as in the case of oil pollution in which the 
strict liability is involved and shipowner may have to pay for incidents over which 
he has no control and could not have prevented. The range of a shipowner's 
liability may also expand with regard to the consequential claims which are 
involved in oil pollution cases. 
It may be said that, in modern times, the need to encourage shipowners to 
invest is no longer a valid reason for limitation, since insurance is available and 
that this has removed the danger of disaster. There is, however, no doubt that 
one of the main reasons for continuing the system of the right to limit, in recent 
times, is to enable the shipowner to obtain adequate insurance cover for third 
party claims and to encourage the insurers to provide insurance by allowing a 
reasonable calculation of their maximum exposure with certainty, in particular in 
oil pollution cases which can involve the huge potential financial liability. In other 
words, a limit may make the shipowner's liabilities insurable by removing the 
uncertainty which surrounds unlimited liability insurance. In effect, underwriters 
1 See more comments in, Dohoran, Jeans. J., The Origins and Development of Limitation of Ship owners 
Liability, 53 Tulane Law Review, 1979, atpp. 999-1045. 
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accept, as does the shipowner, a calculable risk which puts the underwriter in a 
position to charge a lower premium and the shipowner a lower freight. That would 
not be possible if the assured's liability was unlimited. In addition, the existence of 
the right to limit make it possible for a shipowner to obtain cover for his total 
exposure and not just some portion. 
The existence of a right to limit may be criticised, in particular when taken 
along with insurance cover, on the ground that it encourages shipowners not to 
maintain their ships properly on the basis that they will not be paying in full for the 
resultant claims. Consequently, they may send a ship out which is not in a proper 
condition and is potentially apt to create major risks of pollution. It seems that this 
theory has no logical reason since, in fact, lack of proper maintenance may well 
cause the limitation clause to be broken in the insurance policy, thus defeating the 
supposed object. In a Standard Ships General Policy one of the main conditions 
for cover is that the ship which is sent to sea should be in a seaworthy condition, 
i.e. in proper state of maintenance for the particular voyage, Thus, if a vessel puts 
to the sea in an unseaworthy condition with the full knowledge and consent of the 
assured, the underwriter is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness.2 
As a result, if there is any lack of maintenance, the shipowner will lose his right to 
limit and this is not in his favour, in particular where highly potential pollution risks 
are involved. 
At Common Law, in which there is a tendency to fuller indemnity as 
adequate protection for those who have suffered damage, the limitation of ship 
owners may be accepted on two grounds which are based on economic reasons 
not on justice and equity, "(I) the need which the insurer of civil liability of ships has 
to determine the scope and consequence of the accident which can affect the 
insured in order to evaluate the risk and determine the premium, (II) the accident 
2 S. 39 f\.1IA 1906. 
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of a catastrophic nature which can lead to bankruptcy of not only ship owners but 
also insurers. "3 
International conventions have also developed the concept of limitation. 
The first was adopted in Brussels in 1924 and reflected the fact that a ship owner 
may limit his liability to the value of the ship and freight or the amount of £ 8 per 
ton. 4 The second was established in 1957 again in Brussels. 5 The last one was 
adopted in London in 1976.6 The other conventions, which deal with the lim itation 
of the liability of shipowners, result from an integral part of the international 
arrangement providing liability for oil pollution, of which the 1969 CLC and 1971 
FC are the core. There are many reasons for providing such special limitations. 
The most justifiable reason is that the amount of limitation provided in other 
international conventions was too low to provide sufficient compensation for oil 
pollution victims. 
4.1.2. Legal authorities for supporting right to limit in the case of liability for 
pollution damage 
The 1924 and 1957 Limitation Conventions clearly granted the right to limit 
in respect of claims for oil pollution damage. The 1976 London Convention 
3 Lopezsaavedra, D. M., The London Convention of 1976 on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: 
Disadvantages of its Possible Ratification, [1978-1982] IV yeatbook Maritime Law., 138, at p. 140. 
4 It was named The International Convention for Unification of Certain Ru1es relating to the Limitation of 
the Liability Owners of Seagoing Vessels. See text of Convention in Bendict on Admiralty, 7th ed., by 
Michael F. Stilley, vol. 6, Document No.5-I, 1993. 
5 Under the name of International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability Owners of Sea-
going Ships. See teAi in Bendiet, Id, Document No. 5.2. In UK law, the Merchant Shipping (Liability of 
Shipowners and Others) Act 1958 amended the 1894 Act in order to give effect 1957 Limitation 
Convention. 
6 The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, so called 1976 London Convention. See 
text id, Document No. 5-4. It has been incorporated into English law by the Merchant Shipping Act 1979. 
The Merchant Shipping Act 1979, sch, 4, contains the relevant provision of the 1976 Limitation 
Convention. 
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provided that the convention does not apply to "claims for oil pollution damage 
within the meaning of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage dated 29 November 1969 or of any amendment or proposal thereto which 
is in force ... "7 The wording of the article clearly shows that there is no condition 
that a claim is actually governed by provisions of the 1969 Convention. It has 
excluded from limitation under the Convention all claims for oil pollution damage 
"as defined" in the 1969 Convention. The consequence of this is that where oil 
pollution damage as defined in the 1969 ConventionS results in liability based not 
on the 1969 Convention, but on national law, such liability will not be subject to 
limitation neither under the 1976 Limitation Convention nor under the 1969 
Convention. 
The effect of this exclusion would be that, in an incident involving claims for 
both oil pollution damage and other claims, the shipowner would have to establish 
two distinct limitation funds, one under the CLC for pollution damage, and one 
under the 1976 Convention for all others claims. In this way, it is felt that the 
respective rights of pollution victims and other claimants would best be protected. 
This exclusion also removes the jurisdiction conflict where two limitation funds are 
to be established. Thus it is possible for a CLC limitation fund to be established in 
one country and a 1976 Lim itation Convention fund to be established in another, 
both against the shipowner in respect of matters arising out of the same incident. 
The wording of the 1976 oil pollution exclusion provision is far from clear; it 
does not show exactly what claims should be excluded. Unclear provision may 
give rise to difficulties in countries which have ratified both the 1976 London 
Convention and the 1969 CLC or the protocol to it. Does it refer to all claims for 
pollution damage? Does it apply only to claims against the registered ship owner 
7 Art. 3(b) 1976 London Convention. 
8 Art. 1(6). 
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for "oil pollution damage"9 for which liability under the CLC may arise? Another 
difficulty would be where pollution damage is caused by a laden tanker but 
suffered in a state which is only party to the 1976 Convention. Since damage of 
this type caused by a laden tanker is pollution damage within the meaning of 1969 
CLC, the question may arise as to which of these conventions must be applied. It 
has been observed that, had the state also been a party to the 1969 Convention 
then this claim would be limited under CLC, otherwise it would noPO 
The CLC contains its own limitation provisions in favour of the tanker owner. 
It is to the effect that pollution damage be put to the person other than the owner 
to whom the CLC limitation provision is applied. For example, a cargo ship may 
collide with a laden tanker causing a massive oil spillage and pollution damage. 
The claim for pollution damage against the cargo ship would not fall within CLC, 
but the cargo shipowner would liable for pollution damage. In such a case the 
cargo shipowner would have to rely upon the 1976 Limitation Convention, in order 
to be able to limit for pollution claims. Such a division of right to limit may create 
certain anomalies where both tanker and cargo ship are to blame for the collision 
which caused the pollution damage. A plaintiff, for example, a government, who 
has incurred heavy clean-up costs may sue both the tanker owner and cargo ship 
owner. The tanker owner will be able to limit his liability to the plaintiff under the 
CLC, and the cargo owner mayor may not be able to limit his liability under 
9 Oil pollution damage is not in fact defined in the 1969 CLC but oil and pollution damage are. 
10 Abecassis, D. W., Oil Pollution from ships, 1985 atp. 188. 
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another convention or provision. In this way, the plaintiff will make fuller recovery 
of his costs than if the same discharge had been made without the involvement of 
cargo owner. 
Article IX of the CLC 1969 provides that the action for compensation for 
pollution damage may only be brought in the Courts of any contracting state or 
states in whose territory pollution damage has happened. Article V(3) of the 
Convention provides that the action for establishing of limitation fund shall be 
brought within "the court or other competent authority of anyone of Contracting 
States in which the action is brought under the Article IX. From these two Articles it 
can be construed that firstly the right of limitation of liability must be invoked in the 
same contracting state in which the action for pollution damage is brought, and 
secondly, a limitation fund action must be established independently of any claim 
for the pollution damage. Thus, it is not in practice possible to commence a 
limitation action in a jurisdiction in which no proceeding has been brought against 
the limiting party. In theory, it should be possible to do so, since the act of invoking 
the limitation of liability is separate from the claim for pollution damage and 
therefore, constitution of right to limit does not necessarily mean the admission of 
pollution liability. 
The result of such a conclusion would be to prevent pre-emptive action by a 
shipowner. It may be said that the restriction in priority of taking the limitation 
action is only imposed on the shipowner and, therefore, the other people who have 
the right to limit can take such action before starting legal proceedings on pollution 
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liability. Such a view may have an application under the 1976 Limitation 
Convention in which people other than the shipowner, (e.g. charterer, manager 
and operator), are entitled to the right to limit, but has no application in the 1969 
CLC where the right to limit is only exclusively provided for the owner of ship as 
defined in the Convention. 
Under the 1984 Protocol, as adopted by 1992 Protocol, to CLC, in contrast 
with the 1969 CLC, the right to limit may be established before proceedings are 
instituted in any court or other competent authority in anyone of the contracting 
states. 11 This gives the owner an initiative which may be valuable in a case where 
he wishes to consider currency movement. The possibility of establishing a 
limitation fund before action is brought has an added advantage, in particular in 
cases in which the IOPC Fund12 is also involved, that claims may be settled 
without action actually being brought in court. In addition, having authority to 
establish right to limit, indicates that the court in which the limitation action is taken 
may be different from the court in which the legal action on merit is taken. 
4.1.3. Who may limit liability ? 
If one considers the original purpose of limitation, namely to encourage ship 
owners to carry on their business and put their vessel to sea, the conclusion may 
be reached that the right to limit should be restricted to the ship owner only. This 
was criticised by Lord Denning M.R. in the Bramley Moor,13 in which he said: 
11 Art. 6(3). 1984 protocol to the 1969 CLC. 
12 See descritption ofIOPC Fund in supra. chapter. 4. pp. 148-151. 
13 [1964] P. 200 at p. 220. 
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"Limitation of liability is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of public policy which has 
its origins in history and its justification in convenience." Therefore, in so far as the 
intention over the years has been to extend the concept of lim itation so that it 
applies to the incident itself rather than to the separate individuals then the 
wording of the Convention must be construed so far as possible as to give 
protection to all those involved in the maritime adventure. 
However, sufficient encouragement to the shipping industry as a whole may 
not be provided if only the shipowner has the right to limit. Other entities such as 
charterers are engaged in types of business that are vitally important to the 
generation of shipment by sea, and they may be exposed to the same risks as are 
ship owners. 
The 1924 Convention by Article 1 restricted the right to lim it liability to the 
"owner of a sea going vessel" but Article 10 provided that ''where the person who 
operates the vessel without owning it or the principal charterer is liable, ... , the 
provisions of this Convention are applicable to him". The 1957 Convention has 
provided, in addition to ship owners and bareboat charterers, a right of limitation to 
"the charterer, manager and operator of the ship."14 It also applies to the master, 
members of crew and other servants, whether the ship owner or other prinCipal 
parties limit liability or noP5 It should be noted that" other servants" is broad 
enough to include the shore side personnel of owners, charterers, managers and 
operators. 
The umbrella of protection was expanded in the 1976 London Convention to 
include additional parties seeking lim itation. All of the entities, the owner, charterer, 
manager and operator of a sea-going ship, who may limit under the 1957 
14 Art. 6.2. 
15 This is perfectly consistent with the philosophy of encouraging investment in shipping. 
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Convention are listed. 16 The term charterer is not defined in the 1976 London 
Convention but, theoretically, it could include bareboat charterer, time charterer, or 
voyage charterer. To dispel any doubt, it is suggested that the phrase of "any 
charterer" should be added to the article. Under the 1976 London Convention two 
new faces also appear in the line of parties expressly entitled to limit: salvors17 and 
insurers. I8 They are to be encouraged because their services not only help the 
owners, but also protect the environment. Moreover, the provisions of the 
convention allow limitation to any person for whose" act, neglect or default" a 
principal party entitled to limit would be responsible.I9 Those for whom the 
principle party is responsible might include, in some circumstances, independent 
contractors, e.g. stevedores or repairmen.2o 
The owner of a ship shall only be entitled to lim it his liability under the 1969 
CLC.21 Therefore, servants or agents of the owner are not entitled to the right to 
limit under the CLC. The expression "owner" includes any owner whether legal 
registered owner, or in the absence of registration, the person owning the ship. 
This does not include a parent corporation of the registered owner, as was held in 
the Amoco Cadiz case,22 in which the district court23 found that only Amoco 
Transport Company (not its parent corporations, Standard Oil Company and 
16 Art. 1.2. 1976 London Convention. 
17 Art. 1.1. Id. 
18 Art. 1.6. Id. 
19 Art. 1.4. 1976 London Convention. It reads" If any claim set out in this article is made against any 
person for whose act, neglect or default the shlp owner or salvor is responsible, such a person shall be 
entitled to avail himself of the limitation of liability provided by this Convention." 
20 The Muncaster Castle, [1961] A.C. 807. 
21 Art. V(I) 
22 [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304. 
23 The Untied States District Court for the Northern District of lllinois. 
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Amoco International Oil Company) was the registered owner of the Amoco Cadiz. 
It was also held that the Standard and AIOC were not Transport Agents, and 
therefore, they could be sued and held liable without limitation under the CLC. 
The definition of shipowner is, as mentioned above, recognised as being 
tied to the meaning of the ship. Article 1 (1) of 1969 CLC has defined ship as "any 
sea-going vessel and any sea-born craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo". Thus, the owner of a ship which is sailing in internal water has 
no right to limit liability under the Convention. Furthermore, the definition of the 
ship does not extend the right to limit to the owner of such vessels as a hovercraft 
or drilling unit, assuming that they could be regarded as a sea-going vessels or 
sea-borne crafts, because they are not capable of carrying oil in bulk as cargo. 
It is construed, from channelling liability exclusively to the owner, that the 
servants or agents of the owner, salvors, bareboat charterers have no right to lim it 
their liability under the 1969 CLC. Therefore, if, for example a charterer is liable for 
the same spill as the owner itself and both are able to limit their liability, the owner 
should do it under the CLC and the Charterer under the 1976 Limitation 
Convention, as enacted in the U.K. The criticism of the charterers' exemption is 
removed by the 1984 Protocol, as adopted by 1992 Protocol, to 1969 CLC which 
extended its application to the charterers. 
A difficult situation, as to who may seek the right to limit, may arise when oil 
has escaped or has been discharged from two or more ships owned by the same 
owner in a situation where one ship out of a group is owned by a different owner. 
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As to a situation where different ships are involved, the owner of all ships "shall be 
jointly and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable." 
Article V(1) of 1969 CLC provides, the owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his 
liability under this Convention. Thus all owners are entitled to seek right to limit, 
because all independently caused the pollution damage which allow the victims to 
sue all or any of them for the full amount of his loss. 
The CLC is silent as to who can seek the right to limit, when one vessel is 
owned by a different owner who joins in the causing of oil pollution, thereof leaving 
the solution to the national law. At common law, the part-owners are joint 
tortfeasors where "their respective share in the commission of the tort are done in 
furtherance of a common design."24 The pollution victim, therefore, does not have 
several causes of action against each of them, but one action against them all. A 
judgement against one of the part-owners may bar any subsequent, or even the 
continuance of the same action, against others. The question of whether there is 
one injury can be difficult one. The simplest case is that of two virtually 
simultaneous acts of negligence, as where two shipowners behave negligently and 
cause the same pollution damage, but there is no requirement that acts be 
simultaneous. Thus the acts of the two defendants may be separated by a 
substantial period of time and yet contribute to one, indivisible in injury for this 
purpose. However, where the pollution victim's damage results progressively, the 
24 It was quoted by Per Bankes L.J, in The Koursk [1924] P. 140 at p. 159., from eerk and Lindsed on 
Torts, 7th ed., P. 59. 
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individual stages of which are brought about by the separate acts of different 
defendants, each defendant is liable for the extent to which he contribute to the 
final result. 25 If the pollution victim shows that the defendant made a material 
contribution to his loss, it is likely that he will recover in full, unless the defendant is 
able to show that his action was insufficient to cause the whole loss.26 
So far as English national law is concerned, one defendant may recover a 
contribution or indemnity from any other defendant liable in respect of the same 
damages, but that is a matter between defendants and does not affect the plaintiff, 
who remains entitled to recover his whole loss from whichever he chooses. Under 
the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 197827 whereby a defendant may seek 
contribution not withstanding that he has ceased to be liable to the plaintiff since 
the damage has occurred. Thus, under the Act part-owner is entitled right to limit, 
since deprivation of one of them of the right to limit, because of actual fault or 
privity, does not deprive the others from their entitlement to limitation. 
4.1.4. The standard of conduct barring the right to limit. 
For as long as a global limitation of liability has been permitted to the 
shipowner, it has been subject to the qualification where the loss was in some 
direct way the fault of a defendant shipowner or other entitled to limit. The 
limitation of liability laid down in the 1924 Convention does not apply to the 
obligation arising out of acts or faults of the owner of the vessel.28 The 1957 
25 Thompson v. Smith's Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd. [1984] Q.B. 405. 
26 Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw [1956] AC. 613. 
27 S. 3. replacing sect. 6(1)(a) of the Law reform (Married Women and Tortfessors) Act 1935. 
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Limitation Convention allowed limitation for general categories of claims unless 
"the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privy of the 
owner.''29 This phrase is identical to that contained in the 1969 CLC.30 Contrary to 
general practice, the 1957 convention provided the right to limit for masters or 
members of the crew "even if the occurrence ... resulted from the actual fault or 
privity of one or more of such persons.'IJI The question of fault and privity, as a 
condition for barring the right to limit was also considered at common law. In the 
Lady Gwendo/en,32 it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to limit their 
liability since their "actual fault or privity" had contributed to the accident. 
The phrases such as "fault" or "actual fault" or "privity", are poor guides to 
the ship owner concerning what he must do or avoid in order to obtain limitation. 
These words also seem like empty containers into which the courts are free to 
pour whatever content they will. It may be thought that they are equivalent of wilful 
misconduct. The word "fault" does not necessarily imply bad or malicious 
behaviour: that is to say, in legal terms the purposive breach of some general 
obligation. It can encompass carelessness and lapses of attention. Although 
"privity" may in many cases be satisfied by proof of the knowledge of the 
shipowner as the fault of others, it does not seem that the knowledge of 
consequences of the fault is a necessary part of the privity. Uncertainty 
28 Art. 2.1. 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of 
the Liability of Owners of Seagoing vessels. 
29 Art. 1(1). 
30 Art. V (2), Under TOV ALOP limitation is unbreakable and actual fault and privity is irrelevant. 
31 Art. 6 (3). In Colwell- horsefalL v. West Country Yacht Charterers Ltd, The Annie Hay, [1968] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 141, Brandon J held that when the owner of a motor launch made it available as a patrol boat for the 
use of officials during a power boat race off Falmouth and while navigating it for that purpose negligently 
struck and sank a larger motor- cruiser, he could limit liability, since navigational fault arose in his capacity 
as master, not owner, or his vesseL See also The Alaster [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 581. 
32 Arthurv. Guniness Son and Co. Ltd., The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 2 AIlE. R. 283 
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surrounding the phrase "fault or privity" has caused the right to limit to be easily 
lost in many cases. 
The decision of the House of Lords in the Marion,33 indicates how easy it 
is to break this test in practice. The master anchored and damaged a submarine 
pipe line because he was not using up to date charts. The House of Lords decided 
that "It was the duty of the managing director to ensure that an adequate degree of 
supervision of the master of the Marion, so far as the obtaining and keeping of up-
to-date charts were concerned, was exercised either by himself or by his 
subordinate managerial staff each of whom was fully qualified to exercise such 
supervision, in so far as the managing director failed to perform his duty in this 
respect, such failure constitutes in law actual fault of the plaintiffs", the vessel 
Marion which was managed by a company. In this case, the managing director 
was also at actual fault by not giving his subordinate managerial staff clear, 
precise and comprehensive instructions regarding the matters of which they 
required to be kept informed. 
The vagueness of the 1924 and 1957 Conventions was, to some extent, 
diminished by the 1976 London Convention which provided, 
"A person shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is provided that 
the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with 
the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that 
such loss would probably result. "34 
This provision is similar to that one in Art. 6(2) of the 1984 protocol to 1969 CLC. 
The wording seems to give good guidance as to what conduct will defeat the right 
33 [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 at p. 2. 
34 Art. 4. 1976 London Convention. This wording is very close in intent and effect, but not identical, to the 
English law concept of "wilful misconduct" which governs the question of when the conduct of the assured 
invalidates insurance cover. See S.55(2)(a). See also The Salem, [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 342, in which the 
charterer and crew conspired to scuttle the ship, clearly wilful misconduct, and some oil escaped. It is 
debatable whether it could be shown that there was either intent to cause pollution damage or both 
recklessness and knowledge that such would probably result. 
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to limit. The phrase "if it is provided", indicates that under this test the burden of 
proof is on the "claimant". This means that, unlike the test of fault or privity, if there 
is doubt about the personal misconduct of the owner, he will be entitled to limit. 
The words of the "personal act or omission ... " in the 1976 London 
Convention differ from previous conventions regarding the limitation of liability 
which only speaks of actual fault or privy. Therefore, it can be construed that the 
words "personal act or omission" were introduced with the intention of effecting a 
result not dissimilar to that achieved by the use of the words "actual fauIL.". This 
provision clearly shows that the actual fault or privity of owners should be 
distinguished from the act or omission of those who run the company. The use of 
the word "personal" strongly reinforces this concept. The question was raised by 
Viscount Haldane in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum. Co. 
Ltd,35 in which he said that the words "personal act or omission" imported 
"something personal to the owner, something blameworthy in him, as distinguished 
from constructive faulL.such as the fault... of his servant or agents." Therefore, it 
would be necessary to determine the identity of persons whose personal acts or 
omissions are treated as being of the company. 
Generally speaking, a company is a separate legal entity with rights and 
obligations separate from and not dependent on the members.36 If things go 
wrong, it is company which is ulitimately responsible. A company, in fact, must 
operate through a person where knowledge and a state of mind, in certain 
circumstances, can be imputed to the company- the alter ego theory.37 It is 
important to recognise that the relevant person must have sufficient responsibility 
35 [1915] AC. 705. 
36 Saloman v. Saloman & CO. Ltd. [1897] AC. 22; Tustall v. Steigman [1962] 2 All E. R. 417 
37 Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] AC. 705. 
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and authority to be regarded as the "alter ego" of the company.38 It may be 
acceptable to say that the act or omission of the director of the company, as the 
mind of the company or alter ego must be regarded as an action of company itself; 
the company 
"Has not a mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its 
active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person 
of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but 
who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation. "39 
This concept is subject to criticism. The phrase "alter ego" is misleading. 
The person who speaks and acts as the company is not an alter. He is identified 
with the company itself40 and it would be more correct to use the term "ego" rather 
than "alter ego" which is sanctified by inveterate usage. The question was raised in 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattras,41 in which it was decided that the manager 
was "another person" apart from the company. If this is true, it may be asked who 
represents and acts as the company in fault, criminal or privity cases. 
It was formerly thought that a corporation, being a fictitious person, could 
not be liable where liability involved some specific state of mind. 42 It is now well 
settled that it can and accordingly a company may be sued for wrongs involving 
fraud or malice as well as for wrongs in which intention is immaterial. This was 
clearly considered in D.P.P. V. Kent and Sussex Contractors. Limited,43 in 
38 Arthur. v. Guinness Son and Co. (Dublin), The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 2 All E. R, 283. In which it was 
viewed that the marine superintendent was at fault since he was the most senior man in company with any 
knowledge of shipping, despite of the fact that he exercised an executive function. 
39 VIscount Haldane, L.C., in Lennard's Carrying Company Limited. v. Asiatic Petroleum Company 
Limited, [1915] A.C. 705 at p. 713. 
40 See Lord Reid, in Tesco Supermarket. v. Nattras, [1972] AC. 153 at pp. 174-5. 
41 Id. at p. 154. 
42 e.g. see Stevens v. Midland Counties Rly [1854] 10 Ex. 352; Per Lord Bramwell in Abrath v. North 
Eastern Rly. [1886] 11 App. Cas. 247 at p. 250. 
43 [1944] 3 K.B. 146 
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which it was held that a company could be convicted of the offence of making a 
false statement, which was committed by their servants. It was argued by 
Macnaghten J.44 that "it is true that a corporation can only have knowledge and 
form an intention through its human agents, but circumstances may be such that 
the knowledge and intention of the agent must be imputed to body corporate."45 
It may be argued that if the formal legal management of a ship or control of 
a vessel is delegated to an identifiable person, his behaviour would constitute the 
act or omission of the owners' company.46 The House of Lords in the "Marion" 
, 
said47 that the Managing Director of the vessel s management company had a 
duty to ensure that an adequate degree of supervision of the master in keeping the 
chart up to date was exercised, either by himself or by subordinate management 
staff. It concluded that because the Managing Director had failed in his duty, his 
failure had constituted the actual fault of the ship owner. If the delegation of 
authority to another was improper, the act of delegation itself may accounted to be 
the actual fault of the owners.48 However, it would remain necessary to show that 
the directing mind and will of "alter ego" corporation is guilty of the relevant breach 
of duty. 
It may be contended that some duties are not capable of delegation and 
therefore any breach of the duty is the breach of the shipowner himself. This was 
44 Id. at p. 156. 
45 See also Rex v. LC.R. Haulage, Limited and Others [1944] 1 KB. 551 in which it was held that 
company can be indicted for the criminal act of its agents, and its liability depending upon the nature of the 
charge, the relative position of agent and other relative facts; In the Moor v. Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All E. R. 
515 was held that the officers were acting within the scope of their employment in making the sales and 
return, and the fact that these made with intent to defraud the company did not render the officers only less 
than the agents not to affect the guilty of company. 
46 The Marion [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1. 
47 Id. 
48 See The Garden City [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 382. 
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argued in the Truculent,49 in which one of HM submarines was lost as result of a 
collision which was in part caused by the fact that the submarine was carrying 
misleading navigation lights. Mr Justice Willmer held that the duty to put lights in 
the right place on a submarine was indeed a non-delegatable duty and the 
conclusion that the ship owner, here the Admiralty, was personally or actually at 
fault did not follow from the premise that the duty was laid down on them directly. 
He held that for the Admiralty to be denied the right to limit its liability, it was 
necessary that the breach should not only be a breach by the Admiralty, but it 
should be committed by the directing mind and will of the Admiralty. He held that 
where a duty was laid on the Adm iralty itself, it was enough to find liability if any 
one for whom the Admiralty was responsible had breached it; but the right to 
limitation was not lost unless the person who was guilty of the relevant breach was 
himself the personal embodiment of the Admiralty. Exactly the same principle can 
be applied to a corporation, so that the mere fact that a corporation is in breach of 
its own duty, which is not the sort of duty which requires to be performed by their 
board of directors or their managing director, does not mean that it thereby 
necessarily involves the loss of the provision which enables ship owners to limit 
their liability. 
In recent times, hiding behind the veil of incorporation has been seen as an 
evasion of responsibility. The development of this concept has led to change in 
legal emphasis such that the individuals behind the company are now prosecuted 
or sued rather than the company itself. The separate entity principle has been 
disregarded both by parliament (e.g. the Companies Act 1985, Ss. 24 and 733) 
and by courts. Significantly, the ability to take action against directors has been 
included in the most recent statutes regulating the environment. The Water Act 
49 [1952] P. 1. 
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1989 and the Environmental Protection Act 1990, which creates specific statutory 
criminal offence in relation to pollution, both contain provisions permitting 
prosecutor to take action against Directors. The provision states that where a 
company is guilty of an offe!lce under the Act and that offence is proved to have 
been committed with consent of, or because of, the neglect of a Director or the 
senior officer then he, as well as the company is liable to be punished. 
When the common law comes into operation it is much more difficult to say 
with certainty that directors become personally liable to legal consequence of 
company. In Re a CompanY,50 the plaintiff companies sued the defendant in deceit 
and! or for compensation for breach of constructive trust and! or fiduciary trust. It 
was held that the defendant should not be permitted to hid behind the company. 
The courts should and would use its power to pierce the corporate veil (i.e. to 
disregard the separate entity principle) where it was necessary to achieve justice 
irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate structures under consideration. 
As a result, it is difficult to state that where the court will necessarily or invariably 
hold the Directors personally liable. Each application is treated on its merits. 
However, what is clear from this decision is that Directors will begin to find 
themselves personally responsible for acts of pollution carried out by the company. 
After solving the problems of the corporate owner, it may be asked, what 
happens to the right to limit if the owner is also the master of the ship, and his 
negligence causes pollution damage? Can such a person limit his liability or will he 
be disqualified on the ground of his "actual fault or privity"? The question was 
raised in Coldwell- Horsetail v. West Country Yacht Charterer Ltd, The 
AnneittY,51 in which a collision was due to the negligent navigation of the master, 
who also owned the offending vessel. The court held he was entitled to limit 
50 [1985] 1 B.C.C. 99,421. 
51 [1968] 1 All E.R 657. 
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liability and argued that the owner would lose the limitation privilege if his fault had 
been in his capacity as owner, as opposed to master, for instance, failure to pass 
on or observe Admiralty or to install proper navigational equipment. 
The word "personal" in the Convention may also raise the question: is 
limitation of liability actually a defence which is "personal" to the owner, and 
therefore beyond the insurer's reach? An assured, under insurance law, may avail 
himself of special defences which are denied to his insurer where it is sued 
directly, such as the assured's personal immunity from suit, e.g. a wife's suit 
against her husband's insurance were denied because insurance cover was given 
personally to the insured.52 Thus it may be argued that the insured may be denied 
the right to limit because the conventional right to limit is a right "in personam" and 
intended to reduce liabilities peculiar to shipowners, not insurers.53 The argument 
loses its effectiveness when it is realised that the CLC provides the insurers their 
own right to limit and the same defences, other than bankruptcy or winding up, 
which the owner himself would have been entitled to invoke.54 
The word "privity" of the shipowner as an alternative ground for breaking the 
lim itation has been dropped in 1976 Lim itation Convention and substituted by the 
phrase "knowledge that such loss would probably result". To be privy to another's 
action means to have some private knowledge of it, to be in on the secret. Thus in 
this sense, "privity" in the phrase "actual fault or privity" has the same meaning as 
the word "knowledge ..... " in the 1976 Limitation Convention. However there is a 
difference between these two phrases in practice. In the 1976 Limitation 
52 Morgans v. Launchberry [1973] AC. 127. 
53 Limitation by contract, as distinguished from statutory limitation, is not a personal defence granted by 
the law to all members of particular class as a matter of public policy, but rather is a limitation agreed upon 
by parties to the contract 
54 Art. Vll(8). 
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Convention the phrase "personal act or omission" restricted the application of 
knowledge to the owner himself, whereas in the phrase "fault or privity", an owner 
who knows of or who wilfully shut his eyes to a fault, must run the risk of being 
held actually at fault himself as well as privity to the fault of others. What is 
important in both phrases is to what extent having such a knowledge is needed to 
break the right to limit. As an answer to this question, Lord Denning in the 
Eurysthenes,55 took an objective view of such knowledge and said, "When I 
speak of knowledge, I mean not only positive knowledge, but also the sort of 
knowledge expressed in the phrase "turning a blind eye". If a man, suspicious of 
the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and refrains from enquiry- so that he should not 
know of it for certain- then he is to be regarded as knowing the truth. This "turning 
a blind eye" is far more blameworthy than mere negligence. Negligence in not 
knowing the truth is not equivalent to knowledge of it." 
The right to limit is lost only if the loss resulted from the act of the owner: 
"committed to limit with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss would probably result". It seems in practice it is very 
difficult to imagine a plaintiff being able to prove that the conduct of the person 
liable was sufficiently serious to deny the right of limitation under the 1976 London 
Convention, likewise the 1984 protocol to CLC. For practical reasons, the right to 
lim it is usually unbreakable because of the difficulty of proving intention or 
recklessness. The breaking of the right to limit becomes much more difficult, and in 
some cases impossible, when it is realised under the test that the claimant must 
show not only recklessness, but also knowledge that such loss would probably 
result. 
55 [1976] 3 All E. R. 243 at p. 251. 
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The words of intention have received more attention in the criminal law 
than in private law. A proposal suggested that a test of intention should contain 
one of two alternative elements: 
"Did the person whose conduct is in issue either intend to produce 
the result or have no substantial doubt that his conduct would 
produce it?"56 
Recklessness has, at common law, been defined as the act and 
unreasonable decision that causes a risk of damage. 57 Lord Diplock has included 
within the designation of "reckless" those who fail to give thought to the possible 
consequences of their acts. Recklessness, in the 1976 London Convention, also 
requires that the actor should have "knowledge that such loss would probably 
result". It means that even a person who acted in unreasonable ignorance of the 
risk of loss would not be deprived of the right to limit if he had no knowledge of the 
probable loss. 58 It is worth pointing out that the test is more stringent than the test 
for recklessness in criminal proceedings in which the defendant does not have to 
have any knowledge of the loss at all. 
It is supposed that the concept of conduct barring the right to limit, in the 
1976 London Convention and 1984 protocol to CLC is close, but not identical, to 
the English law concept ''wilful misconduct" of the assured which invalidates the 
insurance contract. 59 It may be concluded that the owner may lose the right to 
limit, in pollution cases, if there is wilful misconduct. However, the facts of the 
Salem case60 illustrate the opposite of this conclusion. There, the owner and crew 
56 Draft Criminal Liability (Mental Element) Bill, d. 2; See also The Law Commission. No. 89, Reports on 
Mental Element in Crime (1987), paras. 40-68. 
57 R V. Stephenson [1979] Q.B. 695. 
58 Goldman. v. Tai Airlines [1983] 3 All E. R 693. 
59 S. 55(2)(a), MIA 1906; P. Samuel & Co. Ltd. v. Dumas [1924] All E. R 66. 
60 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 342. 
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conspired to scuttle the ship, which was clearly wilful misconduct, and some oil 
escaped in the process. Despite the wilful misconduct, the owner retained the right 
to limit, because it was difficult to show that there was either intent to cause 
pollution damage or recklessness, and knowledge that such damage would 
probably result. 
The assured owner may lose the right to limit if he has expressly or 
impliedly granted a warrantY,61 as a term of the insurance contract. Warranties 
must be strictly complied with. It is quite irrelevant that the breach is connected 
with a loss that subsequently occurs.62 The right to lim it is lost from the date of the 
breach of the warranty. Therefore, it will remain intact until the date of the breach. 
However, losing the right to limit his liability to a third party does not allow the 
shipowner's liability insurer to restrict his cover. In other words, if the shipowner 
loses his right to limit to the third party, he will not lose his insurance cover; 
insurance cover is quite separate and different from issue of the shipowner's 
limitation and the only link is that the insurer only covers a shipowner's legal 
liabilities. 
On a breach of warranty, the insurer's only option is to repudiate the 
contract. This option is lost if the insurer waives a breach of warranty. In West. v. 
National Motor and Accident Insurance Union,63 the insured was alleged to be 
guilty of a breach of warranty by mis-stating the value of property insured. When 
he subsequently suffered loss, the insurer purported to reject the claim but also to 
rely on a term in the policy to refer the dispute to arbitration. It was held that with 
regard to relying on the policy in this respect, the insurer had waived any right to 
61 See defmition of warranty in S. 33(1) of:MIA 1906. 
62 S. 33(3). :MIA 1906; De Hahn. v. Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343; 99 E.R. 1130. 
63 [1955] 1 All E. R. 800. 
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avoid the policy for breach of warranty. Thus, the insured would not lose the right 
to limit liability, in the case of a breach of warranty, if the warranty was waived by 
the insurer. 
It must also be realised that there is a close connection between the loss of 
the right to limit and the operation of the "warranty of seaworthiness" in policies of 
marine insurance. It was provided64 that if ''with the privity of the assured, a ship is 
sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss 
attributable to unseaworthiness". Therefore, if limitation is broken by the "actual 
fault or privity" of the shipowner as to the seaworthiness of the vessel, it may be 
possible for the underwriter to repudiate liability. 
In the insurance law it was recognised that liability insurance is primarily for 
the benefit of the injured party rather than for the protection of the assured. This 
may conflict with the philosophy which is behind the right to limit, as a device to 
protect the shipowner, in particular where it is compared with the direct action right 
, 
against insurers. An insured s rights against an insurer are, under the Third Parties 
(Rights against Insurer) Act 1930, transferred to a third party. The question which 
this posed is, whether the assured's right to limit liability is transferable to a third 
party or not. In_Murray. v. Legal & General Assurance SocietY,65 it was held 
that the rights and liabilities of the insured which are transferred to third parties are 
only those rights and liabilities in respect of the liability incurred by the insured to 
third parties. It can be concluded that since the right to limit is a general right under 
the general law, and not dependent on any term of policy, therefore the right to 
limit liability is not transferable to a third party. In consequence, an insurer cannot 
claim that he has limited liability against a third party, when the insurer having the 
64 S. 39(5) :MIA 1906. 
65 [1969] 3 All E. R. 794. 
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right to limit, becomes insolvent. Thus, the direct action right does allow full 
recovery by a third party from the insurer even when the shipowner assured is 
able to limit his liability. This conclusion does not seem to be logical when it is 
realised that the Third Parties Rights Against Insurer Act 1930, subjects the insurer 
to no greater liability than the assured would have. It means that if the shipowner 
limited his liability, the insurer does also, to the effect that the direct action would 
not be allowed until completion of the limitation proceeding, otherwise the direct 
action would deny the shipowner the benefit of its insurance. Thus, in order to 
impose liability beyond that of the assured and ignore the right to limit on liability 
under the maritime principle, the prinCiple of limitation would have to be rewritten 
as would the 1930 Act and the contract of insurance. 
Pollution victims may be discouraged from attempting to challenge the 
owner's right to limit in court because the insurance cover, which is mostly 
provided by P & I, is limited in the case of oil pollution. Therefore, in most cases 
the insurance cover will be intact, even if the right to limit is broken. For example, 
the CLC permits a direct suit against the insurer to those who provide financial 
responsibility and they are entitled to the CLC limits event the owner is not.66 VVhat 
is the impact of the Convention's holding that insurers are entitled to limitation? 
The insurer is not involved in the litigation as well as the assured. Thus, giving 
such a right to the insurer also avoids the threat of defeating the right to limit, 
because of the knowledge of insurance coverage. In addition, having access to the 
right to limit, gives the insurer an opportunity to make a proper decision over the 
amount of premium, which usually becomes less than where there is no such right. 
66 Art. Vll(8). 
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However, if there was no such right, it would be possible that the right to limit be 
easily broken and consequently prejudice the insurer, without being involved in the 
litigation. 
4.1.5. Establishment of the limitation fund as a condition of availability of 
right to limit. 
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation, under CLC 
and the limitation conventions, the owner is required to constitute a fund for the 
total sum representing the limit of his liability with the court or competent authority 
of the contracting state, in whose territory or territorial sea, damage has occurred 
and in which an action has been brought. 67 The main goal of the establishment of 
the fund is to ensure that the pollution victims have security for their claims up to 
the ships limit under CLC, even, in the event that the ship owner himself is not 
able, by reason of bankruptcy or otherwise, to satisfy the claims. 
The establishment of the fund, under the Convention, seems somewhat 
illogical because a direct right of action is available against the shipowner's liability 
insurer. 68 A claimant, therefore, under the CLC has not only the benefit of direct 
action against the insurer but also the fund. Thus, the defendant in an action under 
CLC is treated more harshly than the defendant in any other action, e.g. under 
1976 London Convention. It might be argued, in favour of constitution of a 
limitation fund, that the ship owners insurance might fail to satisfy the victims claim 
in full, particularly in cases where an incident involved a large number of claims. 
67 Art. V(3). 1969 CLC and Art. II. 1976 London Convention. 
68 This criticism is not applicable to the 1976 London Convention fund, since there is no general right of 
direct action against an insurer for liabilities in this Convention. 
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The fund is constituted either by consignment of the sum or by producing 
other guarantees, such as bank or P & I Club guarantees, acceptable under the 
legislation of the contracting state where the fund is constituted and considered to 
be adequate by the court or competent authority. 69 The acceptance of bank 
guarantees for the constitution of a limitation fund may be opposedJo The reason 
for opposition is that no interest accrues on a bank guarantee, whereas if the 
limitation amount is paid in cash, it can be invested by the court, in which the fund 
is established and will earn interest for the benefit of the third party claimants. This 
opposition may be rejected on the ground that the bank guarantee should also 
cover interest on the limitation amounPl This argument may have no effect where 
the limit of liability cannot be exceeded by the addition of interest. For example, the 
aggregate amount of the ship owners liability, under the CLC, shall in no event 
exceed 14 million SDR. 
The amount of the limitation fund is distributed on the basis of anyone 
incident in the territory of one contracting state.72 Therefore, where a ship collides 
with two vessels, one rapidly after the other, and as the result of one act of 
improper navigation the owner is entitled to limit his liability to one payment for the 
whole damage since both collisions are the result of the same act. Thus, if they 
are not the result of the same act the owner of the offending vessel must establish 
two limitation funds. Similarly, if an incident pollutes the shore of one contracting 
state and one non-contracting state, the owner does not have the privilege of 
establishing only one fund for a claim arising from both contracting states. 
69 Id. 
70 It was opposed by the IOPC Flllld in the case of The Haven. See details in the IOPC Flllld Annual Report 
1992, at p. 63. 
71 So held by an Italian judge in the case of the Haven, in the Court of first instance in Genoa, Id. 
72 Art. V(1) 1969 CLC. 
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The term "incident" has been defined, under the 1969 CLC, as "any 
occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, which causes 
pollution damage."73 In contrast to this provision, and in contrast to the other 
Limitation Convention, the CLC has accepted the voluntary costs of preventing or 
minimising the pollution damage (in order to provide an incentive to act), and this 
can be claimed against the limitation fund, along with other claims. However, such 
a right can exist only where the preventive costs are incurred by the ship owner 
after the oil has escaped.74 Thus, there is no right to claim against the limitation 
fund for costs which are incurred to remove a pure threat before the incident. 
The acceptance of a salvage award as a cost of preventive measures 
against the limitation fund is in doubt. It may be argued that there is no right of 
recourse to the limitation fund for such an award, since salvage is undertaken for 
the saving of ship or cargo, not for the preventing or minimising of pollution 
damage. The effect of this argument may become less when it is realised that 
under the Lloyd's Open Form, the owner is entitled the enhanced award for the 
prevention of pollution damage. Thus, it seems that the amount of enhancement is 
qualified as a preventive measure for which the owner has a right of claim against 
the limitation fund. 
The established fund is distributed among the claimants in proportion to the 
amounts of their established claims.75 Thus, no lien or privilege, to which a 
claimant may be entitled, enables the claimant to have priority over the other claim 
against the fund. It is possible in many cases that the amount of established claims 
exceed the amount of the limitation fund. If this is so, the amount of each claim 
must be ascertained, and until this happens the distribution of the fund must be 
73 Art. 1(8). 
74 Art. 1(7). 
75 Art. V(4). 
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delayed. In this case there is a question as to who shall get the benefit of any 
interest occurring on the limitation fund between the date of its establishment and 
its distribution. Since the Convention is silent on these questions, they are left to 
national law. However, some of these problems might be solved by inserting a 
clause in the Convention which enables a provisional distribution of the lim itation 
fund to such claimants whose claims have been properly established, while 
reserving part of the fund to cover other claims which are anticipated during the 
limitation action period. 
It is not clear in the CLC, under what national law the fund is distributed, 
the national law of where the fund is constituted or the national law where the fund 
is distributed or the national law where the claimant has already instituted legal 
proceedings against the limiting shipowner. Since the fund is usually constituted by 
depositing sums or by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee acceptable 
under the legislation of Contracting States where the fund is constituted,76 it can 
be construed that it would be easier and more practical that the fund distribution 
be governed by the law of the Contracting State in which the fund is constituted. 
The statute limiting the liability of owners applies only to the original claim 
for damage and does not extend to costs or interesP7 This may raise the question 
of what constitutes an adequate consignment in court when establishing a 
limitation fund. Brandon J. defined an adequate payment as "payment of an 
amount not less than the limit as ascertained in accordance with the order in force 
at the date which payment was made.''78 It can be concluded that the costs and 
76 See Art. 14 of the 1976 London Convention. 
77 Lord Stowell, in the Dundee, (1827) E.R. 166. at pp. 194, 196. 
78 The Mecca [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 17. 
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interest may be included, with regard to the order in force, in the amount of the 
limitation fund. 
An owner of a limitation fund, as well as his servants or agents or any 
person providing him with insurance or other financial security, will obtain by 
subrogation, the rights which the person so compensated would have enjoyedJ9 
This right of an owner cannot be properly be described as a legal right to claim 
against his own lim itation fund, since it is not possible for anyone to bring a claim 
against himself. It is rather an equitable right to be given credit in the distribution of 
a fund, for payment made by him in respect of a claim that could have been 
brought against the fund but has not been so brought and cannot be so brought, 
because he has been satisfied by the payment concerned. 8o For this reason, if no 
payment has in fact been made, the owner cannot put forward in his own right a 
contingent claim in respect of claims which might in future be proved against him 
under a judgement. 
The amount of the claim put against the fund in respect of payment made 
elsewhere cannot be more than the amount of the actual claim that the claimant 
concerned would have been entitled to bring against the fund if he had not 
enforced or accepted such payment. 81 This means, the owner is only entitled to 
credit for the amount of the dividend that would have been receivable from the 
fund by the claimant concerned. If the amount of payment was less than the 
amount of such dividend, the owner can only obtain credit for the lesser amount so 
paid and the balance distributed rateably between all the claimants on the fund. 
79 The Coaster [1922] 38 T.L.R. 511 at p. 512. See also Art. V(5). 1969 CLC. 
80 The Kropreinz Olar [1921] P. 52 at p. 57. 
81 The Giancite Motta [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 221 
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Under the Article V(5) of the CLC, the shipowner or his insured stands in 
the shoes of the claimant for rights which the claimant would have enjoyed under 
the Convention, i.e. the right of subrogation. Article VI provides that where the 
owner has constituted a fund and is entitled to limit his liability, "no person having a 
claim for pollution damage arising out of that incident shall be entitled to exercise 
any right against any other assets of the owner in respect of such a claim." From a 
comparison of these two Articles it can be construed that the owner's right of 
subrogation can only be settled against the fund. Thus, the right of subrogation will 
be lost where the limiting shipowner has settled a claim in a jurisdiction in which 
the 1969 CLC does not apply. 
The other problem of establishing a limitation fund is when the ship owner 
settles his claim out of court in one currency, e.g. deutschmarks, and establishes 
the fund in another currency, e.g. sterling. Since the ship owner has to expend his 
own currency to purchase that of the claimant whose claim has been settled, it 
would be closer to justice if the amount of the fund be calculated by converting it 
into sterling, the amount of shipowner's currency which he had to expend. 82 
The date on which conversion takes place probably should be one of three 
possible dates: either that of the decree of lim itation, that of the constitution of the 
limitation fund, or that of the proof of the claim against the fund. 83 It may be 
suggested that since limitation is a form of statutory insolvency, the date ought to 
be the same as it is in a bankruptcy or company liquidation. It is usually the date 
when proof of the claim is admitted by the liquidator.84 It may also be the date of 
winding Up.85 However, since the lim itation fund is mostly calculated at the date on 
82 The Despina R. [1977]2 Lloyd's Rep. 319. (C.A) 
83 The Despina R. [1977]1 Lloyd's Rep. 618 at p. 629. (1st instance) 
84 Lords Wilberforce and Cross in Miliangos v. George Frank (TexliIes) Ltd. [1976] AC. 443. 
85 Re Dynamic COIp of America [1976]1 W.L.R. 757. at p. 774. 
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which the fund is constituted or at the date of the limitation decree, whichever is 
earlier,86 it is submitted that the conversion of the settlement figures should be 
made at the earlier of these two dates. 
Difficulty may arise in connection with tonnage by reference to which the 
limitation fund is calculated, in particular where both tug and tow are liable for loss 
or damage suffered by a third party. Where the tug and tow are in different 
ownership, each owner is entitled to limit with reference to the tonnage of his 
vessel. 87 But where the tug and tow are in the same ownership the position may 
be more complex. It has been held that where the collision with some other vessel 
was caused by the negligent navigation of those on board the tug and tow, the 
owner may limit with reference to the combined tonnage of the tug and tow in 
contact with the other vessel. 88 
Chapter 2. Extent of cover 
4.2.1. The basis of limit 
The basis of the amount of limitation has been justified by various methods. 
It was provided that ''the liability of the owner of any vesseL.shall not exceed the 
amount of value of the interest of such owner in such a vessel and her freight then 
pending. "89 The question which arises here is when the vessel's value is 
determined. It was held that a vessel's value would be measured after the accident 
86 The Mecca [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 17. 
87 The English Maid (1894) P. 239 at pp. 244-5. 
88 The Harlow [1922] P. 175 at pp. 183- 87. This 'Was also applied in situation where not only was the tug 
herself not in collision, but also where there was no negligence on board the tow. See The Freden (1950) 83 
Ll.L. Rep. 424. 
89 The US. Limitation of Liability Act, S. 183(a), 46 U.S. 1976. 
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occurred. 9o Moreover the shipowner's insurance proceeds do not constitute part of 
the owners interest91 because this would increase the ship owner's limit of 
liability. 92 
. , 
The ship s value method, which favoured the owners of old, poorly 
maintained ships, does not provide sufficient compensation for victims of pollution 
damage, which in most cases is huge. If the aggregate amount of limitation 
exceeds the value of the vessel, many claimants may go without sufficient 
compensation for their damage. Meanwhile, if a ship in the process of discharging 
a pollutant is lost or becomes a constructive total loss, the claimants of pollution 
damage may be left without hope of compensation altogether. 
In England, between 1850-60, legislation was passed which fixed the limit of 
liability on the ship's tonnage base. 93 Before this legislation, in particular in 18th 
and 19th centuries, English law recognised the value of the ship as the limit of 
liability, but contrary to this system U.S.A. law measured the value of the ship 
before the accident. 94 The modern structure of the limitation amount is based on 
the traditional view which referred to the limitation tonnage of the ship95 and a new 
one which introduces a maximum level amount of liability for ships in different 
tonnage's.96 
90 The City of Norwich 118 U.S. 468. (1886). 
91 Id. at pp. 193-5. 
92 MW Hangen Incheah, 1988 AM.C. at p. 1230, in which it was held a ship owner is not required to 
increase its security deposit for a limitation fund by an amount to equal to its insurance coverage. 
93 This system was, without great change, incOIporated into the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
94 Professor Erling Selving, An Introduction to the 1976 Convention, see article in The Limitation of Ship 
owners, Liability: The New Law, Published by Institute of Maritime Law, The University of Southampton, 
1986, p. 4. 
95 Art. 3(7) 1957 Limitation Convention. 
96 Art. 6. 1976 London Convention. 
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The generally accepted point is that the limit should be the maximum that 
was insurable at a reasonable cost,97 i.e., the limit should be as much as that 
figure which enables the ship owner to free himself from liabilities which exceed 
the amount recoverable by insurance costing a reasonable amount. 
4.2.2. The quantum of cover 
4.2.2.1. 1957 Limitation Convention. 
The 1957 Limitation Convention gives extra protection to a personal 
claimant98 by treating his claims differently in two respects from property claims: 99 
(1) personal claims were given a limit over three times that of a property claim, i.e. 
3100 Francs for each ton of the ships tonnage to personal claims and 1000 Francs 
for each ton of the ship's tonnage to a property claim;lOo (ii) Where there were 
both property and personal claims then the latter were treated more favourably in 
that the claims were not aggregated. In effect, the top two thirds of the fund was 
reserved solely for personal claimants and the remaining one-third of the fund for 
property c1aims. 101 
The Convention has provided a uniform limit for all vessels regardless of 
their size. For example, a ship of 500 tons has the same limit as a vessel with 
5000 tons. 102 It is difficult to say that a vessel with 500 tons would cause one tenth 
97 Further details see, Professor Erling Selving .... supra. No.8 at p. 11. 
98 Personal claims was simple way of descnoing death or personal injury. See Art. 1(2). 
99 The Convention referred to property claims which is somewhat inaccurate as there may be economic 
loss. See Art. 1(1) and (2). 
100 Art. 3 (a)(b). 
101 Art. 3 (c). 
102 The Convention has reserved to national law the right to regulate specific provisions for limitation of 
liability of ships less than 300 tons. See Art. 16(2)(b). 
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of damage to a vessel of 5000 tons. Small ships may cause great loss, e.g. in 
pollution cases, yet some sophisticated and expensive ships may have very low 
limits of liability under the Convention. 103 
Fixing limitation on a tonnage base, without regard to a vessel's age and 
value can reasonably be criticised. First, "such a system would wholly ignore the 
wide disparity in vessels; second, any system that is not tied to the value of the 
vessel in some way is destined for early obsolescence due to changes that 
inevitably take place in the value of currency throughout the world ... "104 Therefore, 
such a measure not only does violence to the traditional concept of limiting the 
ship owner to his investment in the maritime venture, but also fails to take 
account of practical considerations that justify the protection of ship owners. 
It was felt, with regard to casualties involving super tankers, that the 
provisions of the 1957 Limitation Convention did not provide an adequate level of 
compensation if claims for oil pollution damage were pooled with that of the 
Convention limitation fund. This is why, it is necessary for countries which, through 
municipal law, apply the Convention and separate oil pollution claims from all 
others to ensure that, where there is an incident involving claims for both oil 
pollution damage and other claims, the ship owner will have two distinct limitation 
funds: one for oil pollution damage and one for all other claims. 
4.2.2.2. 1976 London Convention. 
103 See e.g. Mc Dennind v Nash Dredging Reclamation Co. Ltd., The Times, July. 31. 1988. 
104 Clarence Morse, the head of American delegation at the Tenth Diplomatic Conference on Maritime 
Law 1957 Brussels, see more details of his remarks in Arthur M. Boeal, Efforts to Achieve in Uniformity of 
Law Relating to Limitation of Ship owners Liability, 1979, Tulane Law Review, vol. 53, 1277 at p. 1290. 
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Under the 1976 Convention there is a sliding scale with various layers of 
limits depending on the vessel tonnage. It provides five "slices" for personal claims 
and four for property claims. 105 For example, for a ship of 70000 limitation tons 
and above, there are always five calculations for personal injury claims and four for 
other claims. 
The Convention provides a significant increase in the lim its over those 
agreed in 1957. It has properly taken into account inflation during the 1957-1976 
period. There is a substantial increase in the minimum limit for small shipsl06 and 
a modest and gradual falling of limits for the ships in the range of 30000-70000 
tons. For ships above 701000 tons, the additional amount per ton for tonnage in 
excess of 701000 tons is so low that the effect of inflation is not fully reflected.107 In 
general, although the fixing of a sufficient limitation amount is a difficult job in 
pollution cases, it would be logical to say that those injured in a disaster should get 
reasonable compensation for their damage and loss and should be insured 
against those losses by the ship owner. 
It should be added that there is a special limit for a salvor who is not 
operating from a ship or who is operating solely on the ship to, or in respect of 
which, the salvage service was rendered and for any person for whose act, neglect 
or default he or they are responsible. "108 It would be arguable whether the limit 
should be calculated according the tonnage of the vessel or not when damage is 
caused by the negligence of the salvage crew. 
105 Art. 6. 
106 Small ships have received special treatment lUlder the Convention which provided a minimum limit of 
500 tons which is applicable to ships whose actual tonnage is less than 500 tons 
107 See the limit ofliability in Art. 6. of 1976 London Convention. 
108 Art. 9(b). It was fixed in an amolUlt equivalent to the limit for ship of 1500 tons. See Art. 6(4) 
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4.2.2.3. The 1969 CLC and 1984 protocol, as adopted by 1992 Protocols 
When the CLC was adopted, it was recognised that higher limits would be 
necessary for oil pollution damage, in order to provide adequate compensation for 
those who have suffered damage. 109 The maximum amount of financial liability 
based on the views that the capacity of the insurance market should be taken into 
account in the fixing of limit. However, any limitation of liability is by its very nature 
a compromise between the interest of full or maximum compensation to the victim 
and the interest of the party who will have to pay, e.g. the shipping industry or oil 
companies. 
The shipowner, under the 1969 CLC, is entitled to limit his liability in respect 
of anyone incident to an aggregate amount of 2000 gold francs per ton of ship's 
tonnage, subject to ceiling of 210 million francs. l1O Upon entry into force of a 
protocol to CLC, dated 19 November 1976, the unit of account changed from the 
Poincare gold Franc to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International 
Monetary Fund. According to SDR system, the amount of gold Franc in 1969 
changed to 133 SDR, equivalent to about US. $.182.21 as at 22nd of February 
1993, per unit or a maximum of 14 million, about $19,180,000 as 22nd February 
1993. SDR whichever is the lesser. For this purpose, the ships tonnage is its net 
plus engine room space. 
The liability ceiling under both the CLC and Fund Conventions were too low, 
in particular in catastrophic cases, e.g. the Exxon Valdez, Victims of oil pollution 
are, therefore, not assured full compensation. Efforts were made to increase these 
ceilings considerably through protocols to the Conventions. The 1984 Protocol, as 
109 Preamble to the 1969 CLC. 
110 Art. V. 
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adopted by the 1992 protocoP 11 with a little modification as to tonnage, amended 
lim its of liability in the 1969 CLC. Article (6) provided: 112 
''The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this 
Convention in respect of anyone incident to an aggregate amount 
calculated as follows: 
(a) 3 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 5000 units of 
tonnage; 
(8) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional 
unit of tonnage,113 420 units of account in addition to the amount 
mentioned in subparagraph (a); 
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event 
exceed 59.7 units of account". 
When the 1992 Protocol comes into force,114 after ratification by ten states 
including four states with no less than one million units of gross tanker tonnage 
(instead of the six states required by the 1984 CLC Protocol), this limit will rise to 3 
million SDR for ships not exceeding 5,000 gross tons and 420 gross tons for every 
ton excess thereof up to a maximum of 59.7 million, approximately $.81,789,000 
as at 22nd February 1993. Furthermore limitation tonnage under the 1992 Protocol 
will be its gross tonnage calculated in accordance with the International 
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships. The combination of the use of 
gross rather than net plus the engine room space and new Tonnage Convention 
will, generally speaking, result in larger limitation tonnage and consequently larger 
limitation funds when the 1992 Protocol comes into force. However, if the total of 
all claims exceeds these figures, then in theory each compensation payment must 
be reduced in proportion. In practice however this limit is usually of little 
IlIOn 27 November 1992 a conference of fifty-five maritime nations adopted a new Protocol of 1992 to 
amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, IMO Doc. 
LEG/Conf. 9/15. 
1I2 It replaced Article V(I) of the 1969 CLC. 
113 The unit of tonnage is, in line with the 1976 London Convention, the gross tonnage calculated in 
accordance with the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ship. See Art. 4(5) of the 1984 
protocol. 
114 It is very likely to become operational in the near future becuase of the increasing the amount of limits 
of liabilility by a " tacit acceptance" procedure and of reducing the procedures of entry into force. 
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significance to claimants, since normally additional compensation is available from 
one source or other. 
This limit will increase when the amount of the limit in the 1971 FUND 
Convention is included. The aggregated amount of compensation payable by the 
Fund, under 1984 protocol to CLC as adopted in 1992 protocol, in respect of any 
one incident was originally limited so that the total sum of that amount of 
compensation actually paid under the CLC would not exceed 450 million gold 
Francs. 115 The assembly of the Fund was empowered to raise this amount to some 
not exceeding 900 million Francs. 116 This limit has been increased many times, so 
far, by IOPC Funds Assembly. 
Oil pollution victims can recover more than the limitation amount under the 
Convention where persons other than the owner, e.g. the manager, builder and 
classification society of the ship, are involved in liability, under general principles of 
law.117 The CLC provides that "no claim for compensation for pollution damage 
shall be made against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this 
convention, no claim for pollution damage under this convention or otherwise may 
be made against the servant or agents of the owner. "118 It omits, therefore, to 
exclude a claim against a charterer who may be liable for pollution damage in 
negligence. In these circumstances the charterer would be entitled to the benefit of 
115 Art. 4(4). 1984 International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ship, 
116 Art. 4(6) Id. Amendment procedure was replaced by Art. 15 of 1984 Protocol to the Fwd Convention 
wder which the limit can be revised by a simple procedure where the amendment adopted by the legal 
committee of IMO is deemed to be accepted eighteen month after being notified to all parties to the 1984 
protocollDlless a quarter of them object. 
117 There have been two notable cases where such others have been sued. In the Amoco Cadiz, the 
manager and builder were sued in the United States court in respect of oil spill in France in 1979; and in the 
Tanio where large number of defendant's including managers and ship repairer were sued in France in 
respect of spill off France in 1980. 
118 Art. 3(4). 
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the limitation convention. But, since both he and ship owner have separate 
limitation funds, i.e. the owner under CLC and charterer under the limitation 
convention, the effect would be that the greater compensation would be available 
from them, than it was thought under CLC in which both the owner and bareboat 
charterer are insured together under one policy. 
4.2.3. The limitation unit 
It is important that the financial unit by which limitation of liability is to be 
calculated should be uniform. The limits in 1957 Convention1l9 and the 1969 
CLC120 were expressed in gold francs(poincare francs)121 which should be 
converted into the national currency of the state in which the ship owners limitation 
fund is constituted on the basis of the official value of that currency by reference 
to the franc on the date of the establishment of the limitation fund. The gold value 
system, which appears to be stable and uniform, has not proved to be stable and 
uniform where gold value was translated into national currencies at official rates 
and at other market rates. 122 
To avoid the problem with the gold units, a new unit of account was 
adopted, in the 1976 protocol to the CLC, which was based on the Special 
Drawing Right, SDR, as defined by the International Monetary Fund, IMF.123 The 
SDR has been defined as a basket of currencies whose value is determined daily 
119 Art. 3(1). 
120 Art. V(l). 
121 Franc was defined in Art. 3(6) 1957 Convention as being units consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold, 
see Art. V(9) of the1969 CLC. 
122 Tibolouyski. A. The Special Drawing Rights in liability convention: an acceptable solution? (1979)2 
L.M.C.L.Q. 169. See also Franklin Mint v T.W.A [1984]1 Lloyd's Rep, 220. 
123 Art. 8. 1976 London Convention. and Art. 2. 1976 Protocol to 1969 CLC which entered into force in 
1981, and 1976 protocol to the Fund Convention which has not come into force until end of 1992. 
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by IMF.124 The whole idea of using such a unit of account depends on the 
currency of the state and may vary from time to time with the international strength 
and weakness of the currency. 
The SDR is converted into the national currency of the states in which the 
shipowners limitation fund is constituted, at the date of constitution of such a 
fund. 125 The protocol to the Civil Liability Convention came into force in 1981, 
whereas the 1976 protocol to the Fund Convention did not come into force until 
1992. The difference in entering into force of these two Protocols raised an 
important legal question, regarding the method of conversion, when the Haven 
case was being considered by Italian court in 1992. The IOPC Fund claimed that 
the conversion should be made on the basis of the SDR. The IOPC Fund's main 
argument in support of its position was that "the inclusion of the word "official" in 
the definition of the unit of account laid down in the original text of the 1969 Civil 
Liability Convention was made deliberately in order to ensure stability in the 
system and it was clearly meant to rule out the application of the free market price 
of gold; this definition was by reference included in the Fund Convention. "126 The 
IOPC Fund has also stressed that the application of a different unit of account in 
the CLC and FC would lead to unacceptable results, in particular as regards the 
relationship between the portion of liability to be born by the ship owner and IOPC 
Fund. This argument was rejected by the judge, in charge of the limitation 
proceedings, who based his decision on the application of the free market value of 
gold since the 1976 protocol to the FC which replaced (gold) franc with the SDR 
124 See more technical details in L. Bristow, Gold Francs Replacement Unit of Account, 1976, L.M.C.L.Q., 
P.31 
125 Art. II of the 1976 Protocol to the 1969 CLC. 
126 The Haven (Italy II April 1991), IOPC Annual Report 1992 at p. 70. 
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was not in force. 127 It is submitted that the judge has made a wrong decision 
because, although there is a difference between the date of entry into force of the 
two Conventions and their Protocols, it must be realised that the Fund Convention 
was originally established as supplementary, not separate to the Civil Liability 
Convention. 
4.3. Concluding remarks 
Limitation of liability is a privilege which was granted by statute to a defined 
person in shipping activities, to limit liability to pay damage to a certain sum that 
would otherwise be payable in full provided liability has arisen in certain defined 
circumstances. The idea of limiting liability for pollution damage considerably 
preceded the idea of creating a special regime for liability for oil pollution damage, 
although this was really a by-product of the idea of generally limiting liability of the 
those involved in shipping. A major factor, in specifying the proper limit of liability, 
is the need to recognise and be sensitive to the nature and extent of the risk 
involved in pollution cases. In this way, it is felt that the respective rights of victims 
of pollution and other claimants can be protected while permitting the ship owner 
to limit his liability at an acceptable level with regard to the capacity of insurance 
market. 
The existence of a secured right to limit removes an important element of 
uncertainty from the ship owners liability insurance, as an equitable means of 
distribution of risks, and causes premiums to be both lower and more certain. It 
seems that limitation of liability is, from the insurance point of view, in a majority of 
pollution liability cases is no longer necessary because of the purchase of 
substantial reinsurance cover by P & I clubs. The real point is that the existence of 
a right to limit makes the extent of insurance cover possible. 
127Id. at p. 71. 
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As long as global limitation of liability is permitted to ship owners, it will be 
subject to the qualification that it will not be available if the loss is in some direct 
way, the result of the fault or privity of the shipowner or other people entitled to 
limit. This causes difficulties in practice, not only because the burden of proof 
varies from state to state, but also because of the interpretation of what facts 
constitute actual fault or privity. As a result, the shipowner, his insurers and all 
potential claimants have no certainty of expectation as to how they will be treated 
by the courts if a great disasters occurs. 
To reduce these difficulties, the 1976 Limitation Convention, as it was 
adopted by the 1984 or 1992 Protocol to CLC, provides that the right to limit 
should only be denied if it is proved that the loss results from the personal act or 
omission, committed with intent to cause such loss, or recklessly, with knowledge 
that such loss would probably result, on the part of a person seeking to limit 
liability. The question which needs more consideration here is, whose and what act 
or omission is accounted for by the actual fault of the ship owner, and how far 
those conclusions would be altered when the formulation "personal act or 
omission" is applied. 
In principle, the maximum costs of accidental pollution cannot be 
determined, since it is always possible to imagine some accident more costly than 
any given accident. The devastating experience of Amoco Cadiz and the Exxon 
Valdez litigation disaster sharply emphasise the need to increase the level of 
compensation available for innocent victims and to cover clean up costs. The 
raising of the limit of liability of ship owners has always been worrying for the 
shipping sector, in particular their liability insurers. In order to maintain a kind of 
balance in the distribution of the pollution risks, the increased limit, however, 
should be such as to permit their insurance in the P & I markets. However, it 
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seems that the limit of related conventions to civil liability for oil pollution are too 
low to be consistent with the present capacity of the insurance market. 
In any case, the only system which guarantees full compensation to the 
victims is unlimited liability. It seems there is a general reluctance among the 
related industries, to accept the application of unlimited liability, because of a fear 
that a too severe burden of liability for oil pollution damage may have an adverse 
effect on the shipping and oil industry. However, a conventional system of limited 
liability may be acceptable, provided that the limit is set at a level sufficiently high 
to secure adequate compensation to victims. In fixing the correct amount of limit, it 
must be realised that it should be higher than the limit of compulsory insurance, 
because the shipowner always in practice has some fund available in addition to 
what is covered by insurance. Furthermore, fixing the limit of liability with regard to 
the amount of insurance market does not seem to be acceptable because it 
implies a greater risk of pollution damage, since the shipower is not himself 
financially interested in avoiding damage to the same extent if all such damage is 
in fact covered by an insurance company and not by the shipowner. However, in 
fixing the higher limit, consistency with the insurance capacity seems to be to 
some extent, necessary in order to secure some level of compensation for 
pollution victims. By using the SDR, as a measure of converting the limit of liability, 
the limitation of liability to some extent escapes the possibility of being reduced 
because of fluctuations in one single currency. This does not, however, take care 
of detrimental effects which may result from the general inflation which hits all 
currencies and, in consequence, may in time make an agreed amount inadequate. 
To avoid this problem, it might be a good idea to establish special committee 
under the related conventions to recommend immediate amendment, with regard 
to the increase or decrease in currencies at international level of the amounts 
specified. 
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PART V. EFFECTIVENESS OF INSURANCE 
Chapter 1. Protection of the Polluter 
5.1.1. Philosophy behind liability insurance. 
The basic philosophy of liability insurance is that it indemnifies the insured 
from the legal consequences of liability. In practical terms one might say that it 
subjects the burden of liability to the insurer. If the objective of such insurance is 
merely shifting liability from one party to another, society will get no benefit from 
such a transference, in that only a few people can gain from a particular insurance. 
To achieve overall justice in the abstract sense, it is desirable to discourage 
dangerous conduct through insurance contracts. 1 It is obvious that any regulation 
which effectively tries to impose strict liability on the polluter results in some 
benefits to society.2 This approach can be justified when it is accepted that the 
purpose of insurance, as a means of compensation, should not only be the taking 
of money from the insurer and the giving of money to the injured party nor should it 
be a method of covering the insured's liability. It should be structured so as to still 
allow an element of deterrence against unlawful results of negligent acts which in 
the context of pollution can have catastrophic results. 
The kind of risk which may be transferred to the insurer, depends on the 
terms of each particular insurance contract. An insurance policy may contain terms 
which show that the policy covers all risks with certain exceptions.3 In spite of the 
pervasive regulation of insurance transactions, the coverage offered by an 
insurance policy is in most respects, and in particular in the case of pollution 
1 Fleming, Jam. 1. R., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, vol. 57, The Yale 
Law Journal, 1984, p. 549. 
2 Id. p. 551. 
3 A policy signed in this fonn is called an all risk policy. See Keeton, K., Basic Text of Insurance Law, 
1971, at p. 270. 
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liability insurance cases, is subject to many restrictions in terms of the contract. 
Some restrictions concern the person and the interest to be protected, others 
concern the nature of the risk covered by the contract.4 Thus, insurers, as risk 
managers, should not only look at the insurance as a means of sharing or 
distributing risks, but also devote some time to notions of prevention and safety to 
better manage the risks involved in pollution. 
If the insurance industry tends to minimise the risk of injury or damage, 
insurers themselves will benefit. Insurance should sensibly contribute to loss and 
accident prevention. This is usually done in two distinct ways; ''first, insurers may 
themselves attempt to take direct steps to minimise the losses of accidents against 
which they insure.5 Secondly, the premium rating system adopted by insurers may 
encourage other parties to take steps to minimise loss and accident.'16 
Economic efficiency? is one of the most important factors which usually 
affects different insurance arrangements, as a method of managing risk by 
distributing it among large number of individuals or groups. Insurance law 
promotes economic efficiency whenever it is structured to help to reduce the sum 
of the overall cost through loss prevention.8 This idea is supported by the concept 
which states that, "resources are allocated efficiently whenever more could be 
saved through loss prevention than can be protected by insurance. '19 In other 
4 Keeton, K, Id. p. 273. 
5 In order to do this, for example, insurers usually maintain inspectors to survey shlps, equjpment, and 
advice to the insured as to how to minimise and avoid accident. To prevent further loss, the fire brigade in 
England were originally established and maintained by insurers. See, Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law, 3d ed., 1980, p. 569. 
6 Id. p. 568. 
? As a measure of the degree to which particular allocation use of resources maximise their value .. 
8 Erich and Becker, Market insurance, Se/finsurance, and Se/fprotection, 80 J.Pol. Eco, 1972, p. 623. 
9 Abraham, KS., Distributing Risk, Insurance, Legal theory, and public policy, 1986, p. 11. 
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words, money should be spent on loss prevention, safety precautions, and the 
reduction of activity levels, rather than treating as an economic equation so long as 
it saves more than the same expenditure on insurance would protect. In this way 
the sum of two costs, economic costs and accidental avoidance will be reduced, 
and in consequence insurance can enhance overall economic efficiency. 
It must be said that the effects of direct loss prevention by an insurer are 
limited by a numbers of factors. Firstly, such activities have to be paid for out of 
premium income, and the return on them is not always immediately apparent. This 
means that an insurer who chooses to cut down or even eliminate expenditure on 
such activities can probably under cut other insurers in a competitive market, 
unless insurers can undertake this kind of activity in a joint operation.1O Secondly, 
the incentive for the insurer to minimise loss is small because, a new accident 
precaution device may in theory lead industry to cut the cost of accidents and be a 
substantial amount. The result of this would be that insurers would immediately 
come under pressure to reduce their premium rates. Conversely, if the accident 
rate goes up because of insufficient attention to accident prevention, insurers can, 
and do, increase their premium rates. 11 Therefore, although insurers are, in 
practice, well placed to pay a large role in accident and loss prevention, there is 
little incentive for them to do so. 
5.1.2. Protection of the polluter as an insured 
In the context of property and casualty insurance the term "insured" 
ordinarily signifies a person whose risk of a loss of a designated type is part of the 
10 Id. p. 570. 
11 Id. p. 571. 
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subject matter of the contract, i.e. a person whose loss is an occasion for liability. 
Ordinarily the benefits are payable to the insured who has suffered the loss, 
unless the insured has assigned the benefits to someone else. However, under the 
liability insurance, the right of a third person under the cover have been linked to 
the rights of a third party beneficiary to the contract, so as to entitle the third party 
to receive benefits even where the insurer has a good defence, e.g. insolvency of 
the insured polluter. 
It is obvious that the victims of pollution damage have to overcome many 
hurdles in order to obtain compensation on the basis of general principle of the law 
of tort. In order to protect victims easily and effectively, several alternatives to 
individual liability have been developed. For example, first party insurance, which 
spreads the loss among pollution victims, taken out by the victim or by the polluter 
for the benefit of the victim, or specific funds which compensate victims of pollution 
damage without the need to first establish liability. If the victim of pollution could 
insure against such a risk, he would be able to recover pollution damages from 
the insurer. There are of course policies under which damages caused by 
pollution may also be covered. 12 However, there is no insurance policy under 
which the victim of pollution can directly insure against such losses. The technical 
difficulties involved in this type of insurance are substantial: first, the size of the 
potential damage deters insurers from bringing it under the cover; second, any 
insurance cover is only possible if there is an insurable interest. 
12 A number of reports confinn that pollution damages are incidentally compensated under fire insurance, 
all risk car insurance, life and sickness insurance and other first party policy. See, e.g. Keeton, E., Supra. 
No.3, at pp. 12-3, 270. 
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Even if such cover were available it would entail the disadvantage of the 
victims themselves financing the compensation by payment of the premiums. 13 
This is against the "polluter pays" principle which internalises the cost of pollution 
damage to the polluter. 14 This also deters insurers from achieving their 
"prevention" goal through insurance, unless they are able to exercise a right of 
recourse against the polluter. 15 Moreover, first party insurance is not, in contrary to 
the some liability insurance, compulsory. 
It might be suggested that a mechanism, under which the polluter takes 
pollution insurance on his account for the benefit of those who suffer from 
pollution, would put the financial burden of insurance on the polluter rather than 
the victim. 16 Although, this solves the problem of cost internalisation, by allowing 
recourse against the polluter in favour of the liability insurer, the difficulty 
nevertheless seems too large to overcome if pollution insurance for the benefit of 
victims is intended to have generalised application. In addition, this mechanism 
would not be able to attract sufficient support on the part of the polluters unless it 
were made compulsory. It also has to be said that such a move would in a sense 
reverse the roles of insurer and insured. 
As pollution damage became more recognisable, society began to impose 
liability on the polluter. In response, polluters turned to liability insurance coverage 
13 Bocken, H., Alternative to Liability and Liability Insurance for Compensation of Pollution Damage, 3 
Insurance Law Journal, 1990, 141 at p. 142. 
14 This defect, of course, would be minor when the pollution victims are themselves responsible for their 
own injuries, but the defect is a major concern where the sources of the pollution are other than victims 
15 The concept of subrogation, which would provide insurers an avenue for recovery of losses from 
responsible polluters, is not always available under prevailing legal doctrine where personal injuries are 
concerned. See, Jerry E. Cardwell, Insurance and Its Role in the Struggle between Protecting Pollution 
Victims and the Producer of Pollution. 31 Drak. Law. Review, 1981-1982, 913 at p. 919 
16 See Bocken, H., supra. No. 13. p.142 
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in order to better protect themselves. 17 This was accomplished by a contractual 
relationship in which insurance companies or insurers undertook to do something 
that is of value to the insured. 
In legal theory marine insurance is essentially a contract of IndemnitY,18 i.e., 
the amount recoverable is measured by the value of the assured's loss.19 
However, the consequences of any loss do not always accord with this cardinal 
principle. 2O Therefore, in marine insurance, a polluter may not be indemnified 
perfectly. This results from the distinctive characteristics of indemnity insurance, 
e.g. insurable interest, double insurance, new for old deduction, right of 
subrogation, and limitation in the policy of the insurers liability. 
The essence of insurance is also to protect the assured against the risks of 
uncertain events. Therefore, as a general rule the insurance does not cover losses 
caused deliberately, because it would be contrary to public policy to assist 
someone who has committed a wrong.21 Thus, liability insurance coverage for 
intentional pollution is the subject of much uncertainty. The problem can be traced 
to the fact that some incidents of pollution are caused by negligence while others 
are a regular and expected consequence of the operation of ships. 
In principle insurance protects the insured against the loss which he might 
suffer after an accident has happened.22 The question may arise as to whether the 
17 Cardwell, Jerry. F., Insurance and Its Role the Struggle Between Protecting Pollution Victims and the 
Procedures of Pollution, Drake Law Review, [1981-1982], p. 913, at p. 916 
18 S. 1 of the MIA 1906. 
19 Lister. v. Romford Ice Ltd. [1957] A.C. 55. 
20 Kent. v. Bird (1777) 2 Cowp. 58. 
21 This principle governs all forms of insurance e.g .. see. Beresford. v. Royal Ins. Co., [1938] A.C. 586. 
See also Gray. v. Barr, Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (Third Party) [1971] 2 Q.B. 554. 
22 S. 1. MIA 1906. 
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preventive costs incurred by the insured are recoverable or not. There is clear 
authority, under the sue and labour clause, for the view that if the peril insured has 
occurred and caused partial loss to the insured property, the costs of the 
measures necessarily taken to prevent further loss are covered.23 It may be 
questioned whether the situation would be different if the damage had not actually 
happened at all. Sue and labour clauses can perm it recovery of certain prevention 
costs in case it was stated that "sums paid to avert a peril may be recovered as 
upon a loss by that peril.' 124 This does not clearly show whether pure prevention 
costs, without any elements of loss are recoverable or not. It would be logical to 
apply the same principle to pollution liability insurance and protect the polluter who 
has prevented further pollution damage. 
Chapter 2. The role of insurance in protection of environment 
5.2.1. The Insurance industry and its deterrent effects 
Economic efficiency is by no means the only goal of insurance. It does not 
carry all the aims with which society expects insurance to protect society as a 
whole. It also ignores the question of appropriate and fair distribution of risk which 
is usually intended by optimal risk management. To achieve this, risk control as a 
method of risk management, has been suggested in order to minimise or prevent 
the risk.25 Therefore, it is logical to argue that the one of insurance purposes 
should be the reduction of the overall risk in other ways, besides indemnification of 
the assured. 
23 Symington. v. Union Insurance of Canton, [1928] 97 L.J.K.B. 646. 
24 Pyman Steamship Co. v. Admiralty Commissioners [1919] 1 K.B. 49. atp. 53. 
25 Keeton, E., Supra. No.3, pp. 5-6. 
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The deterrent effect of tort liability, as a means of compensation, seems to be 
straightforward and much more effective than the insurance and fund 
compensation, because under such a system those who cause the accident have 
to pay their victims out of their own pockets. This leads to the cost internalisation 
which encourages the tortfeasors to choose between loss prevention cost or future 
liability cost. Under this system, therefore, a potential tortfeasor should calculate 
the cost of liability and thereby determine to reduce it, in order to obtain more 
benefits. Alternatively the potential tortfeasor must accept the risk.26 In 
consequence, the tort law could realistically strive to promote an optimum level of 
safety and risk. 
Insurers have traditionally played the major role in the minimisation of risk 
by maintaining equipment and using the advice of experts. Insurers may attempt to 
take direct steps to minimise the risks which they insure against.27 For example, 
insurers usually maintain inspectors to survey ships' equipment and to advise the 
insurer how to minimise the risk and avoid the loss. Direct loss prevention activity 
may be limited because, firstly, such activity has to be paid for out of premium 
income and the return is not always immediately apparent. Secondly, the incentive 
to insurers to minimise losses is small since accident prevention device may lead 
to a large cut in the cost of accidents, and therefore pressure to reduce premiums. 
This is why preventive measures are usually taken by insurers indirectly through 
premium rating systems which encourage the insured to take steps to prevent or 
minimise the risk of pollution or through exceptions to coverage for intentionally 
caused harm. Co-insurance and deductible provisions give the insured a stake in 
self-protection. 
26 This is usually done by improvement of the safety system. For further details see in, Calabresi, G. and 
Hirschoff, John T., Towards Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale Law Journal., 1972, pp. 1055,1057. 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, J. Legal. Stud, [1972] p. 29. 
27 For example, fire brigades in England were originally established and maintained by insurers. 
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Liability insurance may have either efficient or inefficient deterrent effects. 
Accurate insurance pricing and risk classification encourage the insured to invest 
more in deterrence and cost internalisation. On the other hand, inaccurate pricing 
or classification allows the insured to externalise the risk of liability and ignore the 
benefit of possible prevention efforts. Thus, the more accurate and detailed the 
risks classification and pricing, the greater the insurer's influence on achieving the 
balance between loss prevention and insurance. As a result it can be said that the 
deterrent effect of liability insurance depends much more on the way premiums 
are set or risks are classified. 
A potential insurance therefore, in order to achieve its deterrent purpose, 
should be able to predict accurately the prevention, minimisation, or liability costs 
that it will eventually have to pay. If these costs are precisely predictable, the 
insurer will make a more accurate decision with regard to a particular assured. On 
the other hand, if these costs are speculative, the insurer may inaccurately 
calculate the costs and benefits of investment in loss prevention and the risk of 
liability. 
Predictability of amount of liability varies a great deal from activity to 
activity. Costs of liability for injuries caused by polluting substances is considerably 
more difficult to predict than other liabilities. New toxic substances are 
continuously being introduced and, therefore, the severity of damage that may be 
associated with them cannot be predicted accurately until experience 
accumulates. Furthermore, pollution damage does not usually occur immediately 
after discharge and damage caused by some pollutants may not be discovered 
until years after discharge. In addition, the ways in which hazardous substances 
may migrate contiguous property after a discharge are not completely predictable. 
Legal and economic changes must also be added to these difficulties, because of 
the very long period between exposure to pollution and manifestation of damage. 
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Thus may have an effect on the claims experience that render previous predictions 
inaccurate.28 
There are two suggestions, with regard to the above mentioned difficulties, 
under which insurers may be able to obtain their goals: to indemnify the insured 
and improve environmental conditions through minimisation and prevention of 
pollution risk. One way is to limit or deduct the amount of liability insurance and 
thereby encourage the insured to internalise part of the risk. This is usually done 
by clubs under deductible or excess clauses, whereby the initial amount of money 
which is to be borne by the member on his own account in respect of anyone 
claim settlement is increased.29 This threat may induce more cautious behaviour 
on the part of the insured or encourage him to increase safety measures, in order 
to reduce final pollution damage. Although this method may, to some extent, 
improve the environment, the result of its application may be catastrophic for small 
business30 which is not able to handle liability where the deductible amount is 
usually high in pollution cases. 
Another way is to provide accurate insuring pricing systems with regard to 
the high risk involved in the discharge of polluting substances. If the pricing is 
inaccurate, the allocation of resources between insurer and insured cannot be 
optimum. If the expected loss is under priced the industries, oil or shipping or 
insurance, may under-allocate for prevention and over-allocate to insurance. On 
the other hand, if the insurance is overpriced, the industries may over-allocate 
28 See Abraham. K.., supra. NO.9. at p. 47. 
29 DeductIole clause is not, of course, peculiar to P & I insurance, they can also be found in wider marine 
insurance - hull and cargo. 
30 The result may be also disastrous for a big enterprise which is not operating profitably. 
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resources to prevention. 3! The choice between these methods depend on the 
philosophy which is behind the particular industry in financing the expected loss. If 
risk prevention is their priority, they will over allocate their resources to prevention 
rather than insurance, and in consequence insurance is under-priced. This may 
encourage industry to purchase more insurance. In contrast, if industry under-
allocates its resources for prevention and over-allocates to the insurance, the 
insurance would be over-priced and industry would not be able to buy more 
insurance. In practice, people do not buy insurance and invest in loss prevention in 
sequence. They invest simultaneously in both. 
The absence of detailed reliable data, make it difficult to evaluate risk and 
accordingly to price premiums against liability in the distant future. One solution to 
these difficulties is to provide a form of insurance that does not rely heavily on long 
term prediction. To do this the logical way is to replace the conventional form of 
pollution liability insurance, occurrence coverage,32 with "claims made" coverage. 33 
The former attempts to charge in the present for all the eventual results of 
personal activities. Consequently, under this kind of policy it is very difficult to price 
with confidence, especially when the frequency and severity of risk is likely to 
increase in the future at an unpredictable rate. Whereas, under the latter, claims 
made coverage, an insurer only needs to predict the extent of insured exposure 
31 The premium nay be based on combination of factors including potential hazards of substance, 
characteristic of the people and area may be affected by risk, vessel specification, insured risk management 
policies and safety record. See more details in, Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims; 
Reinsurance Regulation and not so Superfund Act, 11 Environmental Law., 1981, p. 869. 
32 It covers liability for activities that take place during the policy period, regardless of when, during the 
policy or years after it, a suit seek to impose liability is field. How long coverage extend after expire of 
policies depend on whether the policy cover manifestation of damage during the policy period, exposure 
during the period regardless of when injury from exposure is manifested, or wrongful act during the policy 
regardless of exposure or manifestation. See more details, Keeton, E. supra, No.3 at pp. 300,301,335. 
33 It insures against liability for claims filed during the policy year regardless when pollution activity take 
place. See, Keeton, E. supra. No.3. at pp.445-452. 
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which is claimed during the forthcoming policy period. Therefore a claims made 
policy can be priced with more confidence than an occurrence policy. 
Although the shift from an occurrence to a claims made coverage policy 
solves the prediction problems of insurance industries, it does not provide too 
much encouragement for the assured to care for the environment through cost 
internalisation, because it is not mainly based on the future costs of today's 
activities, but it is based on the cost of activities incurred this year as a result of 
activities that took place in the past. Therefore, a claims made pricing system may 
induce an enterprise to under-estimate the cost of prospective liability, and 
consequently it would not pay attention to loss prevention measures. However, this 
weakness does not necessarily mean that the move towards claims-made 
coverage has been inappropriate. Since, the insured, under the claims-made 
policy, is always at risk that his coverage will not be renewed because of unsafe 
operations, this threat may create an incentive for safe operations. 
The claims record of the insured has been recognised as one of the bases 
for determining of the size of the future premium. It means that future insurance 
premiums vary with regard to the previous record of the insured, and therefore 
encourage good behaviour in running the business and indirectly affect loss 
prevention. To the extent that insurance companies charge different rates for 
different claims records, the assured may be encouraged to take safety 
precautions. However, it must be realised that the great majority of shipowners' 
premium rates are determined by the average experience of shipowners in that 
class of business, and not by reference to their own experience. The effectiveness 
of an average experience rating system in loss prevention may be reduced 
because, first it is not simple to define who is meant by the "experience" of the 
shipping company. Does this mean that the number or the cost of the accident and 
damages which have occurred? Should the "experience" take account of costs 
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which are not paid by the ship owner's insurer? What is done with one very large 
claim could distort the shipowner's claim experience for years. Secondly, there is 
the time-lag problem. Experience rating is always based on out-of-date 
experience. For example, a pollution liability insurance premium in 1993 must be 
fixed in 1992, and must therefore be based on the experience of 1991 and earlier 
years. As a result, it seems that it is unlikely that the experience rating system for 
fixing a ship owners' pollution liability insurance premium has a very significant 
effect in reducing or minimising the risk of pollution accidents. 
5.2.2. Control of assured activity through the Special Rules. 
Some rules of clubs are worded in such a way as to entitle the club to avoid 
or reduce claims which are made against it. This can be done to the extent that 
such claims have arisen or have been exacerbated by the members failure to 
abide by the rules. For example, pollution liability is not covered if liability results 
from non- performance of the Special Rule. However, there should be a causal 
connection between failure of a rule as a warranty and a claim. The question 
whether any particular rule amounts to a warranty, implied or express, is a matter 
of the individual construction of the particular rule. 34 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that a warranti5 is a condition 
which must be complied with exactly according to its terms whether it be material 
to risk or not.36 Thus an insurer may avoid liability in cases of non-compliance with 
warranties regardless of whether the assured's failure has had any bearing on his 
loss, i.e. an absolute warranty. Therefore, it is important to distinguish whether a 
34 See Amould on Marine Insurance, at para. 698. 
35 See defInition of warranty in S. 33(1) of the MIA 1906. 
36 S.33(3). 
359 
particular proviSion of insurance is or is not a "warranty" where the insurer is 
unable to prove that non-compliance of provision has had any cause or connection 
with the loss or has in any way prejudiced its position, and also in those cases 
where a member has failed to comply with the requirement of insurance provision 
in circumstances where compliance was impossible. 
5.2.2.1. The requirement of classification. 
The Rule, which is identical in most clubs, requires that an entered vessel 
must be, and remain throughout the period of entry, classified according to the 
regulation of the special classification society which was introduced by the 
manager of club. The objective of the classification is to provide an assurance that 
a particular vessel meets the recognised structure or mechanical standards for the 
purpose of enhancing the safety of life, property and the environment. Failure to 
observe the classification requirements may lead to an accident which causes loss 
of life, cargo, and damage to the environment. As a warranty, the requirement also 
provides a condition precedent for attaching the insurance cover and failure to 
meet the requirements gives the insurer the right to refuse cover. 
The rule of classification, as a measure of loss prevention, may lose its 
effectiveness when it is realised that the classification societies are primarily 
interested in ensuring that the vessel is seaworthy in the sense that she will not 
sink on the voyage or during the time in which a normal policy of marine insurance 
is in effect. The insurers, on the other hand, are more concerned with the 
condition of the vessel as a potential source of liability, e.g. its ability to carry cargo 
carefully. For this reason, in addition to classification, it may be more effective to 
conduct a special survey in order to provide a more effective means for prevention 
or reduction of pollution liability. 
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The condition of classification as an "exception" to liability must be 
distinguished from the rule of classification as a "warranty", the breach of which 
would terminate all insurance cover. The effect of an "exception" does not 
discharge the insurer from liability but merely ensure that the insurer is not at risk 
while the exception is operating. For example, if an insurer on receipt of survey 
report disclosing a breach of classification, lifts insurance cover in so far as it 
relates to a claim for part of sustained damage, this can be construed more as an 
exception to cover rather than as being a breach of "warranty". The loss of part of 
the cover could also have severe effects where the insured's vessel is chartered 
on the condition that the owner should maintain "full insurance cover" for the 
benefit of himself and the charterer. If the vessel falls out of the class during the 
charterparty period, such as to deprive the owner of part of his insurance cover 
this fact alone would put him in prima facie breach of his charterparty obligations. 
5.2.2.2. Control of the safety condition of vessels by regular surveys. 
The unacceptable level of operations and low maintenance standards in the 
shipping industry is said to be one of the main causes of accidents at sea. In order 
to keep proper standards throughout the operation, the club rules provide that a 
ship inspection is to be carried out at specified times with a sanction in the case of 
a member failing to repair, as necessary, for loss of insurance. 37 The ship 
inspection may include crew experience and training, management policies, safety 
practice and pollution control facilities38 • 
37 In Arrison v. Douglas (1835) 3 A & E. 396, the court decided a condition to keep the vessel in good 
repair was a warranty. 
38 TIris inspection system will be nothing more specific than a general inspection but it will allow that the 
Club to make its own independent assessment outside of the assessment made by the flag states and 
Classification Societies, for the particular vessel in their routine visit. 
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It may be argued that the effect of the special rule may be reduced if 
disobeying orders of managers only prevents the renewal of insurance as opposed 
to rendering the existing policy void. This argument may be rejected if the rule is 
regarded as a condition precedent, or warranty, for the continuance of the 
insurance. Thus, the precise language used by a particular club's rule requires 
close examination in order to judge whether such a rule amounts to warranty. In 
Harrison v. Douglas,39 it was held that a rule merely directing the committee of 
the club to exam ine a vessel was not an express warranty relating to the survey, in 
consequence the failure to implement did not lead to the loss of insurance cover. 
Lord Abbinger C.B. in Stewart v. Wilson,40 held that the effect of survey rule was 
that the insurance effected on the vessel was void unless the direction was 
complied with, because the language of rule was so regulated that it amounted to 
a condition precedent for cover. 
5.2.2.3. Seaworthiness of vessel as a condition precedent to cover. 
Club rules generally provide that the club may avoid liability in respect of 
claims which have arisen by virtue of "unseaworthiness." This requirement does 
not originally come from the express rule of club, but rather is rooted in an implied 
warranty which has generally been accepted in marine insurance law.41 Thus, 
mere acceptance of a marine insurance policy is deemed to be an admission of 
seaworthiness, unless the policy expressly otherwise provides in clear language.42 
There is, in a voyage charterparty, an implied undertaking, which embraces an 
obligation in respect of every part of the hull, machinery, stores, equipment and 
39 (1835) 3 A. & E. 396. 
40 (1843) 12 M & W. 11. 
41 S. 39 of the MIA 1906. 
42 See MIA 1906 Ss. 34(3), 35(3). 
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the crew, that the ship shall, when the voyage begins, be seaworthy for that 
particular voyage and for the cargo carried.43 Thus, the standard of seaworthiness 
varies with every adventure. The shipowner's duty, as to the seaworthiness of a 
vessel in the case of ordinary perils likely to be encountered, is an absolute one, 
i.e. there is no defence that he did not know that the ship is seaworthy, except in 
some ordinary circumstances which is beyond the shipowner's control. 44 
Although there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness in a time policY,45 an 
assured is not covered for loss where it is shown that there has been a default in 
keeping the vessel seaworthy and this has resulted in the loss.46 It may be argued 
whether club cover constitutes a time policy. The question was raised in the case 
of the rrEurysthenes",47 where it was decided that in spite of the vagaries of club 
cover, entry in a P & I club was a time policy. 
The effectiveness of the implied seaworthy warranty, as a loss prevention 
means, may become less when it is accepted that it is enough to satisfy this 
warranty that the ship be originally seaworthy for the voyage insured when she 
sets sail. The rule, therefore makes no warranty that the ship shall continue to be 
seaworthy in the course of the voyage. 48 This establishes the condition that the 
assured gives no warranty for continuing good conduct of the master an crew and 
this therefore, reduces the amount of the effectiveness of loss prevention. Such a 
reduction should not be over-emphasised, because if the crew and equipment are 
43 Stanton. v. Richardson (1874) 9 L. R C.P. 390. 
44 See more details in ER, Hardy Ivamy, Payne and Ivamy's Carriage of Goods by Sea, 13 ed., 1989, at pp. 
45 S. 39(5). MIA 1906. 
46 Thomas. v. Tyne Wear SS. Freight Insurance Association [1917] 1 KB. 938. 
47 Compania Maritime San Basilio S.A v. The Oceanus Mutual Undenvriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
[1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171. 
48 See Lord Mansfield in Bermon v. Woodbridge, (1781) 2 Dougl. 781 at p. 788. 
363 
originally sufficient, and master and crew are persons of competent skill, all will 
have been done what is necessary to comply with the insured's warranty as to 
seaworthiness. 
5.2.2. 4. The limits of navigation 
Any restriction imposed on the type of trade or an geographical limits, either 
entirely or for certain period, is generally regarded as a warranty, breach of which 
will relieve the insurer from all liability. In Col/edge v. Harry,49 a rule providing that 
the vessel should not sail on a specified voyage at specified times was held to be 
warranty which was broken when the vessel sailed towards the prohibited 
destination and suffered damage. It may be argued that such a restriction is not 
warranty but a mere exception to cover. It has been argued50 that although a 
provision of this kind has generally, previously been construed as a warranty in the 
strict sense, rather than an exception to cover granted by the policy, recent marine 
insurance cases do not really support this proposition. The answer to the question, 
of course, depends on the construction of the particular policY,51 having regard to 
the manner in which the particular restriction is phrased. 
5.2.2.5. The obligation as to sue and labour 
Club Rules generally contain, as a condition precedent to the cover, 
detailed provisions as to a member's obligations to take all such steps, as if he is 
an uninsured ship owner or as if he were not entered in the club, as may be 
reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising any expenses or liability52 in 
49 (1851) 6 Exch. 205. 
50 See Raoul Colinvaux, editor, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, vol. II. 1981, atp. 692. 
51 Provincial Insurance Co. of Canada v. Leduce. (1874) 6 L.R. P.C. 224.; Morgan v Provincial Insurance 
Co. Ltd. [1932] 2 K.B. 70. 
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respect of which he may be insured by the club upon the occurrence of any event 
liable to give rise to a claim.53 If a member fails in his duty the club committee may 
at its discretion reject any claim by him against the club arising out of the casualty 
or reduce the sum otherwise payable by the club in respect thereof by such 
amount as it may determine.54 On the other hand, if the members do their duty, as 
to minimising or averting further liability, as provided by the club, they would be 
reimbursed, for the extraordinary costs and expenses reasonably incurred by 
them,55 in order to encourage them to take more precautionary measures, 
However, in the absence of an express clause, it is not clear whether sue and 
labour costs are recoverable in marine insurance.56 
5.2.3. Special Compensation Fund and its deterrent effects 
One of the important mechanisms for the protection of victims is the 
creation of a specialised pollution compensation fund which compensates victims 
52 Restricting the duty of minimising and averting the expenses and liability does not mean that the member 
is, prior the accident, at liberty to act in careless manner, because the Club Ru1es and the provision of the 
Marine Insurance Act outlaws conduct by an assured which amounts to wilful misconduct. The fact that the 
duty is said to arise on the occurrence of any casualty is a feature necessitated by the peculiar nature of the 
P & I insurance coverage. Since an essential feature of indemnity insurance as provided by the chili is that 
no loss within club cover is deemed to have occurred until a member has been both adjudicated liable and 
has discharged such liability, i.e. pay to be paid. 
53 The provisions is consistent with general principle of marine insurance as expressed in the MIA 1906, in 
Section 78(4), provided: " .... .it is the duty of the assured and his agent, in all cases to take such measures as 
may be reasonable for the pmpose of averting or minimising a loss". 
54 It seems that the clubs rarely exercise their power under this rule. See Brandon J , in the Remak [1978] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 545 at p. 554. 
55 The phrase "extraordinary" is neither defined by Club Ru1es nor by the sue and labour provision of the 
MIA 1906. However, it is compatIble 'with the word used in the definition of general average in Section 66 
of the MIA 1906 which says that the extraordinary expenditure is something more than those ordinary 
disbursement which are necessary for keeping the ship in proper condition to carry out its trade. For a 
resume of what expenses are covered, see Hazelwood ,S. J, P & I Clubs Law and Practice, 1989 at PP. 271-
274. 
56 See the knight of St. Michael [1898] P. 30. In the U.S.A. there is clear authority that prevention costs can 
be recovered under a non-marine policy in the absence of ex-press coverage. See, Leebov v. United States 
Fidelity & Guarding Co. [401] Pa. 477 (1960). 
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of certain types of environmental damage without obliging them to establish 
individual liability.57 The major characteristic of such a fund is that it is financed, 
through contributions from a group of potential polluters. A fund spreading risks 
among of all the members operates in the same way as a private liability 
insurance. But there are important differences between the way insurance 
premiums and fund surcharges are calculated. Unlike most private liability 
insurance schemes, compensation funds usually set their premiums in the form of 
a surcharge that bear no close relation to the amount of risk borne by the 
members. 
Nevertheless, private and public compensation funds have tried to control 
the behaviour of their members through direct regulation. 58 The funds are not only 
designed to compensate those who have been injured by exposure to a pollutant, 
but also to promote the appropriate level of care and safety by handlers of 
substances. The fund mainly achieves its deterrent goal, through regulation and 
provision of a right of subrogation. 59 Such a system encourages cost internalisation 
through making the polluting industry liable to the fund even after pollution victims 
have received compensation from the fund. 
To achieve its goals of compensation and prevention, it is desirable for the 
fund firstly to promote regulation that prevents misbehaviour and encourages good 
conduct by giving some concessions to those who observe safety regulations 
properly, and secondly, to limit its capacity insurance cover in order to promote the 
57 e.g. see, 1971 FC 
58 Curie, State Pollution Statute, 48 Chi.L.Q., 1981, p. 27. 
59 It transfer to the funds victims, rights against polluting enteIprise in exchange of payment of damage by 
the funds. e.g., see, Article. 9, International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971. See also details about right of subrogation, 
E.R.Hardy.Ivamy, The General Principle of Insurance Law, Ch. 46, 1980, 5th ed., pp. 465-480. 
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optimal level of deterrence. Despite these regulations, the ability of the 
compensation fund to perform its public and private duty still much depends on 
whether the fund is granted a right of subrogation or not. 
Non-subrogated funds, which are mostly financed by surcharges and where 
there is no right of subrogation as to what has been paid, have a less deterrent 
effect than the liability insurance, since the amount of the surcharge, in contrast 
with private liability insurance under which premiums are calculated with regard to 
the amount of risk, does not depend on individual fund members' risks. The 
surcharge, e.g. extra tax, may have some effects on the level of activities of 
members of the funds, by raising the cost of products, but its impact on the safety 
level seems to be minimal because, such funds do not apply the risk classification 
method in their system. It may be said60 that the surcharge is based on the amount 
of substances which may have some deterrent effect. In response it should be said 
that, although such practices have some deterrent effect they do not provide a 
great effect because it does not incorporate actual loss experience into the 
surcharge rate. 
Although subrogated funds have much potential capability to produce much 
greater deterrent effect than the non subrogated fund, in practice, it might not be 
as ideal as we think. Subrogation rights of funds increase deterrence if the fund's 
liability obliges ship owners to compare the ultimate pollution liability with the cost 
of loss prevention, since only under this condition will the shipowning industry have 
to compare the actual cost of insurance against the cost of liability, whether to 
ordinary plaintiffs or the funds, and costs of precaution which would help to reduce 
liability. In addition, the subrogated fund would have a deterrent effect if the 
objective of the fund, in applying the right of subrogation, is to finance the fund. 
60 See Abraham, K., Supra No.9, at p. 54 
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Otherwise it would be much easier to achieve the financial objectives through 
surcharges rather than subrogation under which funds would double the charge to 
legally responsible members without obtaining much additional deterrence for their 
effort61. 
The maximum success of the subrogated fund, as mentioned above, 
depends on a more refined structure for the pricing of liability insurance which is 
usually difficult to get in pollution cases, due to the various types of damage 
involved. This raises the question whether, without having this refined price 
structure, the approach of cost internalisation through subrogation has any value 
with regard to the high administration costs which are required to obtain the 
refund. In addition, a subrogated fund would have little deterrent effect, or the 
same effect which can be achieved by a non-subrogated fund through surcharges 
in accordance with risk estimates, if there is no refined classification of insurance 
coverage. As a result, it would not be rational to pay more and get less. 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
It is highly desirable that insurance not only protects the insured, but also 
provides incentives to avoid polluting incidents and minimise damage after such 
incidents. In order to protect the insured, the insurer should provide high level 
cover so that adequate compensation can be available to victims and clean up 
operations. To further strengthen the preventive measures, some steps might be 
taken. Firstly, the insurer may be only grant cover to owners provided with 
adequate pollution prevention equipment. Secondly, such devices should be 
strictly inspected and supervised by the insurer at the time when insurance is 
61 Due to difficulties in estimating of total cost of future liability, neither the risky shipping entetprise nor 
the fund insuring them against liability could have justifiable confidence in the accuracy of their estimates 
of the relevant costs. 
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written and through the terms of the policy. Thirdly, the insurer should have the 
right to terminate the insurance contract if the insured fails to comply with the 
insurer's instruction to adopt prevention measures which are objectively 
necessary. Fourthly, the policy should provide for a substantial excess in the event 
of an incident. There is a different question of balance here. The excess should 
not be so large as to be against the interests of victims of pollution damage. 
Excessive deduction may leave victims with inadequate compensation, in 
particular where a small shipping company is involved. Fiftly, a system of 
encouragement and penalties related to premiums should be set up to reward ship 
management who have used due diligence to avoid incidents or minimised 
damage after an incident and penalise those who have been negligent, on the 
basis of the number of incidents recorded during the insurance year. 
The general assumption is that if compensation and insurance law is 
couched in penal and reward terms, this will put pressure on the industry to 
maintain higher standards, and thereby reduce the risk of environmental damage. 
The role of marine insurance and compensation funds in relation to pollution will 
always be a complicated one. On the one hand no-one wants pollution to occur. 
The result of pollution can be catastrophic for the environment and economy alike. 
On this basis the argument favours internationally agreed measures of a 
preventative rather than insurance nature. To this end, insurance may make 
shipowners and masters, feel they do not need to take as many precautions to 
minimise the risk of pollution. Alternatively, there is a clear need to provide an 
equitable and workable system of insurance and compensation for the victims of 
pollution damage. It is clear that the law of individual states are not enough in this 
area with all the complications that there are, as to causation and liability and of 
course difficulty if the party who causes the pollution simply cannot pay. The role 
of marine insurance and compensation funds in pollution cases will always be a 
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balancing role. On the one hand, the insurance or compensation cover must be 
adequate enough and accessible enough to compensate the victims of pollution 
properly and quickly. On the other hand the insurance and compensation scheme 
must not be so liberal and generous that they remove any deterrent effect and fail 
to encourage shipowners and masters to take adequate precautions to avoid 
pollution. Furthermore, insurance and compensation schemes must always 
encourage measures which minimise the actual pollution damage once an 
accident has occurred. The role of marine insurance and compensation is to 
provide an adequate system of checks and balances to achieve all these aims. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law liability system has been found significantly lacking in the 
case of compensation for pollution damage and losses in the past. This failure 
primarily stems from the fact that the law of torts or delicts was developed to 
deal with a single individual tortfeasor or wrongdoer. It therefore seems ill-
suited for pollution problems in which pollutants usually affect major portions of 
the population in large regions and make the task of proving any claim infinitely 
more difficult. It would usually be difficult for a shore-bound or remote claimant 
to prove negligent seamanship. If a negligence claim fails, no greater success 
can be expected from trespass or nuisance. 
There are also problems relating to the ambit of the duty of care in every 
case and similar problems relate to the causation factor and the difficult 
question of remoteness of injury and remoteness of damage. The development 
of liability insurance, in which the method of compensation normally depends 
on what has been lost and not fault or contributory negligence, has altered the 
administration and financing of the tort-based system, in which there is little 
interest in considering the question of finance. The move away from a purely 
fault-based system to a compensation system has helped to end a system 
where same parties might be over compensated at the expense of the other 
claimants. Nevertheless, the current system is not perfect . The inevitable 
conclusion is that there requires to be some form of compensation system 
based on strict liability and compulsory insurance from which a claim can be 
met without having to satisfy the rigorous criteria laid down in the common law 
of negligence or some other tort giving rise to liability. 
In theory, the strict liability system performs the compensation function 
better that tort liability, simply because more people will recover compensation 
if fault does not need to be proved. Furthermore, strict liability has the 
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advantage over negligence in respect of accident prevention because by 
imposing liability for damages which are unavoidable at the time of accident, 
should force shipowners to spend more on safety systems in an attempt to 
prevent accidents. However, even a strict liability system has drawbacks and 
could be just as regressive in its effect as a negligence liability. A strict liability 
scheme does nothing about the two major drawbacks of the tort system, firstly 
the need to prove a casual link between accident and damages (a difficult job in 
case pollution damage at sea which may result from different causes) and 
secondly the need to find the responsible defendant. If it is proposed to adopt 
an absolute liability, with no need to prove causation, this would provide a full 
and adequate compensation scheme which is available under the tort system, 
only if the related economic environment, including the insurance industry has 
enough potential economic capacity to cover such a system. 
The voluntary strict liability system under which the tort action remains 
intact have now largely been overtaken by conventional obligations. However, 
this system cannot be ignored for several reasons. Firstly, by no means all 
countries have, or perhaps intend, to become signatories to the existing 
conventions. Secondly, although the voluntary and convention devices are 
broadly similar in context, there are still some significant differences of detail 
over the scope of claims which necessitates the continuation and development 
of voluntary arrangements even in countries which are now signatories to the 
obligatory convention in respect of compensation for pollution damage. Thirdly, 
despite improvement in the limit of compensation in the conventional schemes, 
there are still claims which are outside the scope of the limitation of these 
schemes. Fourtly, there is no provision in existing voluntary agreements, in 
contrast to obligatory convention, requiring no-fault benefit set off against tort 
benefit to prevent double recovery. 
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However, the voluntary scheme, TOVALOP, suffers a major disadvantage 
by requiring retention of third party liability insurance. The voluntary nature of 
the agreement may cause an insurer to take a cautious attitude in providing 
insurance cover for gratuitous payment. The assumed legal liability under the 
voluntary agreement is far removed from the general principle of liability 
insurance under which no liability must be admitted without prior insurer's 
consent in writing. Disputes may also arise when the insurer is dealing with 
TOVALOP liability in a possible, general average situation where a mixture of 
motives are involved. Every claim must be notified by the insured within two 
years of the incident. This time limit illustrates a difference between an 
insurance company and TOVALOP where each company has its own time limit 
for notices of claim. The other problem which may come into existence in 
relation to insurance is when the insurer is obliged to provide insurance against 
salvor liability for pollution damage which may be caused in the process of the 
salvage effort, as a preventive measure which is payable under TOVALOP and 
is not covered by the tanker owners' liability insurance, unless it expressly so 
provides. The waiver of the subrogation right, under TOVALOP, is a diversion 
from the general principle of insurance law under which the insurer is 
subrogated to the rights of those whom he has indemnified. All these 
differences indicate that tanker owners, in the performance of their liability 
under the agreement, need a very special insurance contract. To achieve this, 
it is suggested that the terms on TOVALOP liability are automatically 
incorporated into the insurance policy, in order to satisfy the financial guarantee 
under the agreement. 
Restricting of the scope of compensation to damages for loss which can be 
proved to have a relationship and the problems of remoteness of damage and 
quantification of damage has put many claims for pollution damage or loss out 
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of the scope of existing compensation regimes and their compulsory insurance, 
in particular, where economic loss or environmental damage are involved. Pure 
economic loss is generally described as indirect loss, from the standpoint of the 
sequence of events, and hence not subject to compensation even if connected 
by causal link to the event which give rise to it. There are also problems of 
nature in relation to damage to the environment, except as regards cost of 
restoration. Even where the environmental damage is recoverable, it is not 
clear which type of claimant is qualified for compensation and there is difficulty 
and evaluation of those marine sources which have no directly quantifiable 
economic value. The language is also ambiguous on the question of whether 
the cost of anticipatory measures taken by contracting states prior to actual 
discharge is recoverable. The compensation schemes have not provided any 
answer to the question of how much preventive measure costs, such as clean 
up costs, fixed costs or additional costs, all should be taken into account as 
recoverable damages. These ambiguities give considerable freedom of 
interpretation to the courts in the contracting states to define, according to their 
law, the scope of recoverable damages. This can lead to different 
interpretations which reduce the better functioning of the compensation 
regimes. It is submitted that it is necessary to revise existing regimes so as to 
extend their scope to embrace all of these deficiencies. 
A mark of the present compensation system, for pollution damages, is that 
the compensation for environmental damage, i.e. damage to sea fauna and 
flora, is not covered, due to the fact that the schemes have been specifically 
devised to compensate victims of pollution damage, as opposed to 
compensating generally for environmental damage which is difficult to calculate 
in monetary terms. To amend existing legal schemes is not a perfect solution. 
Instead, a specific body of law, in the national and international level which 
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specifically deals with the compensation for environmental damage, would 
provide a better system. Establishment of a system of mutual cover making use 
of insurance techniques would help in providing sufficient guarantees for 
compensation for environmental damage. Such a form of redress could be 
costly to the shipping industry and this could give way to a more deterrent role 
for insurance and compensation schemes. 
The existing compensation regime does not address pollution damage 
occurring on the high sea. There is no doubt that the general recognition of an 
exclusive economic zone, with 200 miles off each adjacent state, will reduce 
the lack of compensation regime dealing with damage on the high seas. 
However, there is still an area of the high seas which is not covered. Although 
limited contribution by the industry's voluntary schemes does provide 
compensation for pollution damage in this area, there is still a gap in the 
providing sufficient compensation, which needs to be filled by the extension of 
the application of existing civil liability schemes to the uncovered area at sea. 
Even if in those cases where no-fault liability of the shipowner polluter is an 
established fact, the position of victims, in relation to recovery of compensation, 
is still dependant on two factors: any amount of limitation of liability which can 
be claimed by the party liable, and any condition allowing the party for 
exoneration of right to limit the amount. A major factor, in specifying the proper 
limit of liability is the need to recognise and be sensitive to the nature and the 
extent of risk involved in pollution cases. It is recognised that the capacity of the 
existing compensation system is far from compensating real damages and 
losses and neither can the capacity of the insurance market bear the real loss. 
The existing schemes and insurance markets do not come close to being able 
to cope with serious disasters involving the enormous scale of losses or 
damages, such as Exxon Valdez. The cover available for a small tanker is not 
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comparable with the seriousness of substances involved in pollution incidents. 
It is submitted that it is necessary to bring compensation levels into line with the 
reality of the damage caused by a large spill even where there is a small ship. It 
is the capacity of the insurance market to cope with the reality of such a 
proposal that must be called in question. 
There is a difficulty in practice not only because of the burden of proof 
which may vary in the different contracting states but also because of the 
interpretation of what facts constitute actual fact or privity. As a result the 
shipowner, his insurer and all potential claimants have no certainty of 
expectation as to how they will be treated by the limit of the compensation. 
There is therefore the possibility that some victims may be over compensated 
and some under compensated under the same convention for the same case. 
The non-existence of a secured right to limit may also increase uncertainty and 
cause the insurer to increase premiums substantially. This can mean that the 
shipowner takes less cover and in consequence there is less secured payment 
for pollution victims. 
Insurers have shown themselves very cautious in dealing with the risks 
that pollution represents. They are concerned because of the way in which the 
civil liability in the field of pollution damage is developing, and in particular the 
tendency towards strict liability, and the variety and extent of damage which is 
involved in pollution incidents. A liability insurance policy does not directly cover 
damage caused by pollution, it only covers damage attributable to an insured 
party whose liability is established. A claim remains unsettled as long as the 
assured's liability has not been established. This may create a climate of 
contention between the responsible polluter and his victims, both with regard to 
establishing the responsibility of a third party and the recognition and 
assessment of damages or losses. Insurers are reluctant to cover liability as to 
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pure economic loss. Most policies do not cover salvage expenses incurred to 
prevent the pollution damage from spreading, unless property is saved. 
Insurers do not regard environmental damage as an insurable interest, since 
nobody's possessions are damaged. Insurance cover of potential pollution 
damage is high but is subject to a ceiling. This means that for an amount falling 
outside the available limit the polluter remains his own insurer. If the amount of 
damage is substantially beyond the insurance cover, a responsible polluter may 
experience difficulty in meeting the cost of damage. Consequently the persons 
who have suffered the pollution damage may find themselves without any 
compensation. To remove all these deficiencies, it is submitted that it is 
necessary to replace the third party liability policy by an insurance policy 
directly covering pollution liability at sea so as to ease the difficulty of proof and 
extend cover to the risks which are outside the normal third party policy. It is 
submitted that to increase the amount of limit the existing pooling agreement 
should be strengthened by insurers from the contracting states of the 
conventions dealing with compensation for pollution liability at sea. However, it 
must be accepted that all these solutions depend on the interaction of a 
multitude of factors including the economic condition of the insurance industry 
as a whole, the ability of the industry to develop related data which would 
enable them to assess the risk and operate profitably in the pollution insurance 
liability market and close co-operation between insurer and insured. 
The deterrent effect of compensation is a question of great significance in 
the construction of a compensation system. It has been realised that the 
insurance system of pollution damage is not just to indemnify victims, but also 
to provide a mechanism which has a deterrent and which prevents or reduce 
the damage. There are a number of possible techniques whereby an element 
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of deterrence can be retained in schemes involving the use of compulsory 
insurance and compensation funds. 
Insurance operates as a method of distribution of loss and varying 
premium rates operate as a form of general deterrence. The combination of 
these two seems to produce a perfect blend. There is no doubt that to the 
extent that pollution damages are eventually paid through the insurance 
premiums of those who take part in polluting activities, the insurance system 
does reflect the purpose of general deterrence. It would be highly desirable that 
prevention measures designed to avoid incidents are strengthened by a system 
of encouragement and punishment based on the premium rate. A high 
premium could encourage less careless actions, provided of course, the 
premium is not transferred to the consumers of shipping services. The threat of 
withdrawal of insurance cover, if adequate prevention facilities are not provided, 
could represent an even more significant deterrent effect, especially where 
cover is made compulsory and payment of a policy might probably put a 
company out of business. The existence of a deductible insurance system, 
provided it is substantial, could also encourage companies to maintain 
adequate standards and preventive measures. The right of subrogation can 
also be regarded as an effective measure to encourage more careful actions in 
order to avoid payment. Comparable deterrent technique could be used in the 
case of a compensation fund system. However, no matter which of these terms 
is applied, the balance to be struck between environmental considerations on 
the one hand and a viable system which can provide sizeable insurance on the 
other is not easy to strike. 
It is clear that the laws of individual states, with all the complications as to 
causation and liability and of course the ultimate difficulty if the party who 
causes the pollution simply cannot pay, are not enough to provide an equitable 
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and workable system of insurance and compensation for the victims of pollution 
damage, and at the same time encourage precaution measures to minimise the 
risk of pollution. The role of marine insurance and compensation funds in 
pollution cases will always be a balancing role. On the one hand the insurance 
or compensation cover must be adequate and accessible enough to 
compensate the victims of pollution properly and quickly. On the other hand, 
the insurance and compensation schemes must not be so liberal and generous 
that they remove any adequate precautions to avoid pollution. 
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